

A Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty

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Outline

- Problem Definition
- Decision under Uncertainty (classical Theory)
- Two-Stage Model
- Probability Judgment and Support Theory
- The Case Studies and Discussion

Decision under Uncertainty

- Judgment of probability
- Decision under Risk

Two studies

- 1995 professional basketball playoffs
- Movement of economic indicators in a simulated economy
- Results
 - Consistent with the belief-based account
 - Violated the partition inequality (implied by classical theory of decision under uncertainty)

Decision Making

- Decision: Depends on the strength of people's belief an event happens.
- Question: How to measure these beliefs ?!

Decision under Uncertainty (classical Theory)


- “... derives beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events from people’s choices between prospects whose consequences are contingent on these events.”
- Simultaneous measurement of utility and subjective probability

Challenges

- From psychological perspective:
 - 1) Belief precedes preference
 - 2) Probability Judgment
 - 3) The assumption of the derivation of belief from preference
- Belief based approach uses probability judgment to predict decisions under uncertainty

Background

- Risky prospects – known probabilities
 - Decision under risk
 - Non-linear weighting function



Background

- Real world decisions – uncertain prospects
- Extension to the domain of uncertainty

Cumulative Prospect Theory

- Assumes that an event has more impact on choice when:
 - Possibility Effect: It turns an impossibility into a possibility
 - Certainty Effect: It turns a possibility into a certainty than when it merely makes a possibility more or less likely.

Bounded Subadditivity

Bounded Subadditivity

- Tested on both risky and uncertain prospects.
- Data satisfied bounded subadditivity for both risk and uncertainty.
- Departure from expected utility theory

Two-Stage Model

- Decision makers:
 - 1) Assess the probability (P) of an uncertain event (A)
 - 2) Then, transform this value using the risky weighting function (w)

Two-Stage Model Terminology

- Simple prospect:
 - (x, A) : Pay $\$x$, if the target event (A) obtains and nothing otherwise.
- Overall value of a prospect (V) :
 - $V(x, A) = v(x)W(A) = v(x)w[P(A)]$
 - $P(A)$: judged probability of A
 - v : value function for monetary gains
 - w : risky weighting function

Probability Judgment

- People's intuitive probability judgments are often inconsistent with the laws of chance.
- Support Theory: Probabilities are attached to *description of events* (called hypothesis) rather than the *events*.

Support Theory

- Hypothesis, A, has a nonnegative support value, $s(A)$.
- Judged probability $P(A, B)$:
 - Hypothesis A rather than B holds.
 - Interpreted as the support of the focal hypothesis, A, relative to the alternative hypothesis, B.

$$P(A, B) = \frac{s(A)}{s(A) + s(B)}$$

Support Theory

- The judged probability of the union of disjoint events is generally smaller than the sum of judged probabilities of these events.

$$s(A) \leq s(A_1 \vee A_2) \leq s(A_1) + s(A_2)$$

Unpacking principle

Support Theory

- Binary Complementarity:
 - $P(A, B) + P(B, A) = 1$
- Subadditivity:
 - For finer partitioning (i.e., more than 2 events), the judged probability is less than or equal to the sum of judged probabilities of its disjoint components.

$$s(A) \leq s(A_1) + s(A_2)$$

Implications

- Contrast between two-stage modern and expected utility theory with risk aversion:
 - The effect of partitioning

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- Contrast between two-stage modern and expected utility theory with risk aversion:
 - The effect of partitioning
 - The classical model follows partition inequality:
- $C(x, A) \geq C(x, A_1) + \dots + C(x, A_n)$, pays \$x if A occurs, and nothing otherwise.
- Doesn't necessary hold considering the two-stage model.

Two-Stage Model


- Predict the certainty equivalent of an uncertain prospect, $C(x, A)$ from two independent responses:
 - The judged probability of the target even, $P(A)$
 - The certainty equivalent of the risky prospect, $C(x, P(A))$

Study 1

- Four tasks:
 - 1) Estimating subjects' certainty equivalents (C) for risky prospects.
Random draw of a single poker chip from an urn
 - 2) Estimating subjects' certainty equivalents (C) for uncertain prospect.
offering reward if a particular team, division, or conference would win the 1995 NBA.
 - 3) An independent test of risk aversion
 - 4) Estimate the probability of target events.

Result of Study 1

Figure 2 Median Judged Probabilities for All Target Events in Study 1



Result of Study 1

- Fit of the models to the data
- Unpacking principle VS. monotonicity

Study 2

- More simulated environment :
 - Subjects have identical information
 - Compare the judged probabilities vs. actual probabilities

Result of Study 2

- Binary partitioning:
 - Judged probabilities (nearly) satisfy binary complementarity
 - Certainty equivalents satisfy the partition inequality
- Finer partitioning:
 - Subadditivity of judged probabilities
 - Reversal of the partition inequality for certainty equivalents

Discussion

- The event spaces under study has some structure (hierarchical, product, ...)
- Subadditivity of judged probability is a major cause of violations of the partition inequality
- Generalization of the two-stage model for source preference.
- Particular description of events on which outcomes depends may affect a person's willingness to act (unpacking principle)