


Cryptographic Applications of One-Way Functions

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
Three Pillars of Data Security

- Confidentiality
 - Deniability
- Integrity
 - Authentication
 - Non-repudiation
- Availability


Symmetric Encryption



Asymmetric Encryption




Digital Signatures



Some Ancient History

- Galileo Galilei 1610
- Haec immatura a me iam frustra leguntur o.y.
- These are at present too young to be read by me
- Cynthiae figuras aemulatur mater amorum
- The mother of love imitates the shapes of Cynthia
- Venus has the same phases as the Moon


Hash Functions



Properties of Hash Functions

- Efficiently computable
 - Given x , easy to compute $y = f(x)$
- Pre-image resistant
 - Given y , infeasible to find x such that $f(x) = y$
- Second pre-image resistant
 - Given x , infeasible to find $x' \neq x$ such that $f(x') = f(x)$
- Collision resistant
 - Infeasible to find $x_1 \neq x_2$ such that $f(x_1) = f(x_2)$

Digital Signatures in Practice




A Bit of Theory


- Do one-way functions exist?
- In theory, nobody knows
 - Does $P = NP$?
- In practice, several families
 - SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, RIPEMD, ...

Applications



- Integrity
 - Time-stamping
- Authentication
 - Message authentication
- Non-repudiation
 - MAC + time-stamping



Time-Stamping with Hash-Chain




Merkle Trees




L	N1
R	N00
L	L011


Time-Stamping with Block-Chain



Time-Stamping with Hash Calendar



Message Authentication




Digital Signatures

- Message authentication
 - Receiver can verify that the message came from sender
 - But can't prove this to anyone else
- Digital signature
 - Receiver could not have created the message/signature pair by themselves
 - Can prove this to anyone, thus achieving non-repudiation

BLT – Key Generation

- To sign messages at times $1..T$
 - Generate T keys $z_1..z_T$
 - Bind each key to a time slot $x_t = \text{hash}(t, z_t)$
 - Aggregate the bindings into a Merkle tree
 - Publish the root of the tree



BLT – Signing & Verification

- To sign message m at time t
 - Authenticate message with correct key: $y = \text{hash}(m, z_t)$
 - Time-stamp the authenticator to prove time of use: $a_t = \text{stamp}(y)$
 - Send $m, (t, z_t, c_t, a_t)$
- To verify signature $s = (t, z, c, a)$ on message m with public key p
 - Check that z is indeed correct key for time t : $\text{hash}(t, z)$ must link to p via the hash chain c
 - Check that z was used at correct time: $\text{hash}(m, z)$ must link to hash calendar via the hash chain a

Questions?

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