

Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Management under Fluctuating Procurement Costs

Philip (Renyu) Zhang


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
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Goal of our paper: To study the optimal joint pricing and inventory policy of a firm under fluctuating procurement costs.



Introduction

Under procurement cost fluctuation:



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Introduction

Under procurement cost fluctuation:

▶ Inventory Management:

1. Uncertainty from both supply and demand sides
2. Inventory becomes a risky asset to invest on.



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2. Control demand to consume its inventory in a most profitable way.

▶ Supply Diversification

1. Procure inventory from a portfolio of complementary sources.
2. Enjoy both the responsiveness and risk reduction.



Research Questions

In our study, we strive to answer the following questions:



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In our study, we strive to answer the following questions:

1. What is the **structure** of the optimal pricing and inventory policy under cost fluctuation?



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In our study, we strive to answer the following questions:

1. What is the **structure** of the optimal pricing and inventory policy under cost fluctuation?
2. How do the fluctuating costs **impact** the firm's pricing and inventory decisions? Or how does the firm **optimally respond** to the cost fluctuation?



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3. How does the **dual-sourcing** policy affect the pricing and inventory decisions?
4. How **significant** is the value of dynamic pricing and dual-sourcing? Are they **strategic complements or substitutes**?

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3. How does the **dual-sourcing** policy affect the pricing and inventory decisions?
4. How **significant** is the value of dynamic pricing and dual-sourcing? Are they **strategic complements** or **substitutes**?
5. What is the **risk attitude** of a firm towards the procurement cost fluctuation?



Outline

- ▶ Contributions and Related Literature
- ▶ Model formulation
- ▶ Analytical and Numerical results
- ▶ Conclusion: Managerial Insights



Contributions



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Contributions

1. We are **the first** to study joint pricing and inventory management under fluctuating procurement costs. We characterize the **optimal inventory replenishment and pricing policy structure** in the **sole- and dual- sourcing models with and without inventory re-selling**.



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3. We show that the value of dynamic pricing and dual-sourcing under cost volatility is **significant** and that they are **strategic complements**.
4. We find the **risk-seeking** attitude of a **risk-neutral** firm under procurement cost fluctuation.



Literature Review

We are at the cross roads of two streams of literature:



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- ▶ Joint price&inventory control:
 - ▶ Whitin (1955)
 - ▶ Federgruen and Heching (1999, 2002).



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
- ▶ **Our paper:** Joint pricing&inventory management under demand uncertainty and cost fluctuation.



Model Formulation: Basics

- ▶ A **risk-neutral** firm procures raw material inventory from a spot market, produces an end-product in an MTO fashion, and prices the product in a final market.
- ▶ T periods in total, labeled backwards, full backorder.

- ▶ Sequence of events in period t :



Model Formulation: Demand

$$D_t = d(p_t) + \epsilon_t.$$

- ▶ ϵ_t : *i.i.d.* continuous random variables, with $\mathbb{E}\{\epsilon_t\} = 0$.
- ▶ $d(\cdot)$: **strictly decreasing** function of p_t , the sales price of the product, with strictly decreasing **inverse** $p(\cdot)$ in the expected demand, d_t .



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Assumption 1

$R(d_t) := p(d_t)d_t$ is continuously differentiable and strictly concave.

Remark: The concavity of $R(\cdot)$ implies the decreasing marginal revenue with respect to demand.



Model Formulation: Cost Process

$$c_{t-1} = s_t(c_t, \xi_t).$$

- ▶ $s_t(\cdot, \cdot) > 0$ a.s., increasing in c_t for any given ξ_t .
- ▶ ξ_t : The random perturbation in the cost dynamics.

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- ▶ $\mu_t(c_t) := \mathbb{E}\{s_t(c_t, \xi_t)\} < +\infty$ is increasing in c_t .

States, Decisions and Primitives



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States, Decisions and Primitives

- ▶ **State variable** (I_t, c_t) :
 - ▶ I_t = net inventory **before replenishment** at the beginning of period t .
 - ▶ c_t = realized procurement cost in period t .



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- ▶ **Model Primitives**
 - ▶ $\alpha = \frac{1}{1+r_f}$ = **discount factor**, where r_f is the risk-free interest rate.
 - ▶ b = **backlogging cost** per unit backlogged at the end of a period.
 - ▶ h = **holding cost** per unit stocked at the end of a period.



Sole-sourcing Model

- ▶ The firm procures from a **spot market only** and **cannot resell** the excess inventory to the spot market.

$V_t(I_t|c_t)$ = the maximal expected discounted profits in periods $t, t - 1, \dots, 1$ with starting inventory I_t and cost c_t in period t .



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- ▶ Terminal condition: $V_0(I_0|c_0) = 0$, with $c_0 = s_1(c_1, \xi_1)$. i.e., excess inventory is discarded without any salvage value in the last period.



Bellman Equation

$V_t(l_t|c_t)$ satisfies the following Bellman equation:

$$V_t(l_t|c_t) = c_t l_t + \max_{x_t \geq l_t, d_t \in [d, \bar{d}]} J_t(x_t, d_t|c_t), \text{ where}$$

$$\begin{aligned} J_t(x_t, d_t|c_t) &= -c_t l_t + \mathbb{E}\{p(d_t)D_t - c_t(x_t - l_t) - h(x_t - D_t)^+ - b(x_t - D_t)^- \\ &\quad + \alpha V_{t-1}(x_t - D_t|s_t(c_t, \xi_t))\} \\ &= R(d_t|c_t) + (b - c_t + \alpha \mu_t(c_t))x_t + G_t(x_t - d_t|c_t), \end{aligned}$$

with $R(d_t|c_t) := (p(d_t) - b - \alpha \mu_t(c_t))d_t$ and

$$G_t(y|c_t) := \mathbb{E}\{-(h+b)(y-\epsilon_t)^+ + \alpha[V_{t-1}(y-\epsilon_t|s_t(c_t, \xi_t)) - s_t(c_t, \xi_t)(y-\epsilon_t)]\}.$$



Dual-sourcing Model

- ▶ The firm procures from the **spot market** or **signs a forward-buying contract**, **without** inventory reselling. The expiration time of the forward-buying contract is 1 period. i.e., the inventory ordered in period t is received at the beginning of period $t - 1$.

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- ▶ Forward-buying contract: (f_t, q_t) , where $f_t = \gamma c_t / \alpha$, with $0 < \gamma \leq 1$ as the pre-order discount and/or convenience yield. In period $t - 1$, the firm receives q_t unit of inventory and pays $f_t q_t$.



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$V_t^d(I_t | c_t)$ = the maximal expected discounted profit in periods $t, t - 1, \dots, 1$
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- ▶ I_t = the sum of the on-hand and pipeline inventories.



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with $L(y) := \mathbb{E}[-(b + h)(y - \epsilon_t)^+]$ and

$$H_t^d(y|c_t) := \alpha \mathbb{E}[V_{t-1}^d(y - \epsilon_t|s_t(c_t, \xi_t)) - s_t(c_t, \xi_t)(y - \epsilon_t)].$$



Optimal Policy Structure


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
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
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We have characterized the **structure of the optimal policy** in all models:

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2. Cost-dependent order-up-to/pre-order-up-to list-price policy. (Dual-sourcing, without inventory reselling)



Optimal Policy Structure with Inventory Reselling

With inventory reselling:

1. Starting inventory does not influence the optimal policy.
2. Dual-sourcing model is reduced to the sole-sourcing model for a risk-neutral firm.



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Impact of Procurement Cost Fluctuation



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Impact of Procurement Cost Fluctuation

1. The optimal sales price is **increasing** in the current procurement cost, i.e., the firm would like to pass its cost risk to customers.



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Impact of Procurement Cost Fluctuation

1. The optimal sales price is **increasing** in the current procurement cost, i.e., the firm would like to pass its cost risk to customers.

2. The firm may respond to a higher spot market price by **increasing or decreasing** its safety-stock, order-up-to level and pre-order quantity (it's a tradeoff between **current cost saving** and **future speculation opportunity**).



Impact of Procurement Cost Trend



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1. The optimal sales price is **increasing** in the potential procurement cost trend, i.e., the firm should control its demand so as to **consume its inventory in a most profitable fashion**.



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2. The firm should **increase** its safety-stock, order-up-to level and pre-order quantity with a higher future cost trend, i.e., the firm **bets more on potentially higher future costs**.



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Value of Dynamic Pricing and Dual-sourcing



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1. Very significant value of dynamic pricing and dual-sourcing, **at least 20%** for the former and **on average 7 – 9%** for the latter.



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2. Dual-sourcing motivates the firm to **decrease** its order-up-to level and sales price.



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2. Dual-sourcing motivates the firm to **decrease** its order-up-to level and sales price.
3. Dynamic pricing and dual-sourcing are **strategic complements**, i.e., the application of one strategy increases the value of the other.



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Risk-seeking Attitude of the Risk-neutral Firm



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Risk-seeking Attitude of the Risk-neutral Firm

- ▶ If the future procurement cost is **concavely increasing** in the current cost (e.g., Geometric Brownian Motion and mean-reverting process), the firm will earn **more profit** under a **more volatile** procurement cost process, i.e., the **risk-neutral** firm will exhibit a **risk-seeking** attitude towards the cost fluctuation risk.



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 - ▶ Carefully **forecast** future cost trends.



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4. Procurement cost fluctuation creates **more opportunities than risks** for a **risk-neutral profit-maximizing** firm.
5. The **feedback mechanism** partially contributes to the **wild fluctuation** of commodity prices in recent years.



Q&A

Thank you!

Questions?

