

Process Programming to Support Medical Safety: A Case Study on Blood Transfusion

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Introduction

● Medical errors

- Result in approximately 98,000 deaths per year in the United States
- Caused by faulty processes and conditions, (Institute of Medicine)

● IOM advocates using more information technology to help improve medical care.

Medical Safety Project

- **Medical Safety Project at UMASS-Amherst**
 - **Researchers in Dept. of Computer Science have been working with researchers and medical practitioners from UMASS School of Nursing & from Baystate Medical Center**
- **Investigating applying software engineering technologies and evaluating effectiveness**

Our Approach

- **Process programming to model medical processes**
 - Little-JIL process programming language
- **Requirements engineering to capture medical safety properties as formal statements**
 - Propel property elucidation system
- **Finite-state verification to detect errors**
 - LTSA (Labelled Transition System Analyser)
 - SPIN (Simple PROMELA Interpreter)
 - FLAVERS (Flow Analysis for Verification Systems)
- **Case Study – In-Patient Blood Transfusion Process**

Outline

- **Defining Processes**
- **Representing Properties**
- **Analyzing Processes**
- **Observations**
- **Conclusions and Future Work**

Defining Processes

- **Medical processes**


- **Complex, concurrent, and exception-rich**

- **Process language requirement**

- **Capture complexity in medical processes**
- **Precise enough to support static analysis and to eventually drive simulations and executions**
- **Understandable to a medical professional**

Little-JIL Overview

- Visual language for coordinating tasks
- Uses hierarchically decomposed steps
- Step icon




In-Patient Blood Transfusion Process Example

- **Consists of 23 Little-JIL Diagrams**


- Decompose in-patient blood transfusion process into conceptually meaningful subprocesses

- **Present a few of the Little-JIL in-patient blood transfusion process diagrams to give an indication of what the model looks like**

In-Patient Blood Transfusion



Single-Unit Transfusion Process



In-Patient Blood Transfusion properties

- **Policies often exist that are a starting point for these properties, e.g.,**
 - **The patient's informed consent must be confirmed prior to carrying out a physician's order for a blood transfusion.**
 - **The patient's identification must be verified immediately before obtaining each blood specimen.**
 - **The patient's identification must be verified prior to administering each unit of blood product.**
 - **.....**

Representing Properties


● Propel System

- Aims to make the job of writing and understanding properties easier
- Provides three alternative formats
 - Interactive question tree
 - Disciplined natural language
 - Graphical finite-state automata
- e.g., Patient informed consent must be confirmed prior to each blood transfusion process being initiated.

Propel Question Tree

- How many events of primary interest are there?
 - One: event A
 - Two: events **Confirm_Patient_Consent** and **Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion**
- How do **Confirm_Patient_Consent** and **Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion** interact?
 - **Confirm_Patient_Consent** causes **Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion** to occur
 - **Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion** cannot occur until after **Confirm_Patient_Consent** has occurred
- Is **Confirm_Patient_Consent** required to occur at least once?
 - Yes, **Confirm_Patient_Consent** is required to occur at least once
 - No, **Confirm_Patient_Consent** is not required to occur at least once
- After **Confirm_Patient_Consent** occurs, can?
 -

Finite-state Automaton



Disciplined Natural Language


- *Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion cannot occur unless Confirm_Patient_Consent has already occurred.*
- *Confirm_Patient_Consent is not required to occur, however, and if it does not occur, Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion can never occur. Even if Confirm_Patient_Consent does occur, Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion is not required to occur.*
- *Before the first Confirm_Patient_Consent occurs (or the scope interval ends), the events in the alphabet of this property, other than Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion, can occur any number of times.*
- *After Confirm_Patient_Consent occurs and before the first subsequent Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion occurs (or the scope interval ends), the events in the alphabet of this property, including Confirm_Patient_Consent but not Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion, can occur any number of times.*
- *After the first subsequent Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion occurs:*
 - *the events in the alphabet of this property, other than Confirm_Patient_Consent or Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion, could occur any number of times;*
 - *Carry_Out_Physician_Order_for_Transfusion cannot occur again until after another Confirm_Patient_Consent occurs;*
 - *Confirm_Patient_Consent can occur and if it does, then the situation should be regarded as exactly the same as when the first Confirm_Patient_Consent occurred, meaning that all restrictions described on the events would again apply.*

Analyzing Processes

- **Apply finite-state verification techniques to determine if the process definition is consistent with each property**
 - Considers every trace through the process
- **If a property does not hold, the verification tool will provide a counterexample trace**
- **Process improvement: change process, property, or both**
 - Reverify until satisfied

Process Verification

- Little-JIL process translated to intermediate representation
- Intermediate representation translated to the expected input for the selected Finite-State Verification (FSV) tool



Observations

- **Took several iterations to represent the in-patient blood transfusion process**
 - Difficult to find right level of granularity
 - Formulating properties helped improve the process definition
- **There is a tension between expressiveness and analyzability**
 - Some of the more expressive constructs in Little-JIL are difficult to model. e.g., choice step
- **Medical professionals could understand the process definition**

Observations(Cont'd)

- **The verifiers revealed errors in the process**
 - All verifiers used found the same errors in the process
- **All verifiers have some limitations**
 - Need optimization and abstraction to reduce the size of the model generated
 - FLAVERS is currently best able to handle the larger problems, but requires more insight to tune the model

Conclusions and Future Work

- **Appears to be a promising approach but more work is needed**

- **Support for timing in the process language, property specifications, and analysis tools**
- **Support for simulation and simulation-based analysis**
 - **Reduce patient waiting time**
 - **Optimize use of resources, e.g., number of beds**
- **Support for execution in the clinical setting**
 - **Process-guided automation**
 - **“Hands free” interface**
- **More evaluation**

Thanks