

Analysis of Equilibria in Iterative Voting Schemes

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What's Iterative Voting?

Luke



Leia



Han



R2D2



C3PO



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What We Know About It

(Meir et al., AAAI 2010)

Using plurality voting and linear tie-breaking, when players are myopic and using a best response strategy, they will always converge to a stable state, i.e., a Nash equilibrium.

What are these
equilibria?

Theorem I

Given two profiles a and b , it is NP-complete to decide if b is reachable from a using an iterative best-response strategy.

But is our model
realistic enough?

Option 1: Truth Bias

When a voter doesn't have a way to influence the outcome, it returns to its truthful vote.

Convergence is not guaranteed.
Even the existence of a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed.

(Laslier & Weibull; Thompson et al.)

Truth Bias

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Truth Bias: Non-convergence

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Theorem II

Truth-bias equilibria have a single non-truthful voter.



We have an algorithm which finds all truth-bias Nash equilibria with complexity $O(mn)$.

Option 2: Lazy Bias

When a voter doesn't have a way to influence the outcome, it can abstain. However, this is a one-time event, as a voter cannot "un-abstain".

Convergence is guaranteed, but the existence of a Nash equilibrium is not.

(Desmedt & Elkind, EC 2010)

Lazy Bias

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Lazy Bias

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This is NOT a Nash equilibrium

Theorem III


Lazy bias equilibria have a single non-abstaining voter.




We have a polynomial algorithm which finds all lazy-bias Nash equilibria reachable from starting truthful position.

Empirical Results: Truth bias winner quality

■ Uniform ■ Single peaked ■ Single crossing



So what have we showed?



Where to go on from here?

More voting rules

(truth bias for veto/k-approval submitted)

More complex iteration model
(see previous presentation)

Empirical analysis using
various distributions on these
scenarios

Thanks for
listening!



(turned out they were all extremely lazy biased)