



# Pandemic Influenza

October 27, 2008

# Death rates from major infectious diseases in the United States: 1900-1965




# Death rates from ALL CAUSES in the United States: 1900-1994



Armstrong et al., 1999, *JAMA* **281**: 61

# 1918 influenza epidemic: realization of a worst-case scenario



First case: Albert Mitchell, Camp Funston, KS, March 11, 1918

Up to 20% of all humans infected

20-50 million deaths worldwide, 650,000 in the US

2.5% average case mortality rate; up to 16% in some cities

# Influenza A

Pleiomorphic enveloped virus,  
80-120 nm

Orthomyxoviridae family,  
isolated from ferrets in 1933


Endemic in water birds (ducks,  
gulls, shorebirds)

Invasion mediated by HA  
protein (hemagglutinin)  
binding to sialic acid

Birds mostly  $\alpha$ 2,3 linkage to  
galactose, humans mostly  $\alpha$ 2,6  
linkage

Neuraminidase cleaves sialic  
acid links; required for viral  
shedding (target of Tamiflu)


Virus also encodes an RNA-  
dependent RNA polymerase




**Influenza A Virus Replication**

# Genome has 8 RNA segments


Influenza A virus gene segments and encoded proteins				
RNA segment	Nucleotides	Protein	Amino acids	Molecules per virion
1	2341	polymerase PB2	759	30-60
2	2341	polymerase PB1	757	30-60
3	2233	polymerase PA	716	30-60
4	1778	haemagglutinin HA	566	500
5	1565	nucleoprotein NP	498	1000
6	1413	neuraminidase NA	454	100
7	1027	matrix protein M1	252	3000
		matrix protein M2	97	20-60
8	890	non structural protein NS1	230	-
		non structural protein NS2	121	130-200



Each viral RNA segment is packaged by the nucleoprotein NP with a polymerase heterotrimer (PA, PB1, PB2) ready to go



# Segments reassort when distinct viruses infect the same cell



Major antigenic determinants are HA (hemagglutinin) and NA (neuraminidase)

16 HA types and 9 NA types found in waterfowl


Antigenic SHIFT is due to a new HA or NA type

Antigenic DRIFT is due to point mutations in HA and NA


PANDEMICS arise when human populations are immunologically naïve for a new type

# Currently H3N2 and H1N1 cause most of the yearly infectious cycle

U.S. WHO/NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories  
National Summary, 2004-05 through 2007-08



Pneumonia and Influenza Mortality  
for 122 U.S. Cities  
Week Ending 05/17/2008



Note that influenza and pneumonia USUALLY cause ~8% of all reported deaths during the winter months

# Influenza vaccine production

Currently grown in embryonated chicken eggs

Live virus inactivated by formaldehyde treatment

~ 3 eggs per dose; availability would be severely compromised with avian influenza epidemic

Lag time from seed strain choice to large-scale availability is 28 weeks

Cell-based vaccine culture methods are under development

Public confidence in vaccines is generally low

Swine flu - 1976

Compare public response to MMR vaccine

# Drug treatments for influenza

## Amantidine and Rimantidine

Approved by FDA in 1976

Active only against influenza A

Inhibitors of M2; virus cannot escape envelope

Widespread resistance; no longer recommended

## Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and Zanamivir (Relenza)


Approved by FDA in 1999

Active against both influenza A and influenza B

Inhibitors of neuraminidase; prevent viral shedding from cell surface

Oseltamivir delivered orally as an ethyl ester pro-drug

Found by screening sialic acid derivatives



# Can we predict which strains will emerge? Positive selection?

Predictive Isolate: Codon set  
 A/Shangdong/5/94: Positively selected codons  
 A/Harbin/3/94: Codons associated with receptor binding  
 A/Santiago/7198/94: Fastest evolving codons  
 A/NewYork/15/94: Codons in or near antibody combining sites A and B




Table 1. The 18 positively selected codons in the HA1 hemagglutinin gene and their membership in alternative codon sets. R, codons associated with the sialic acid receptor binding site; A or B, codons in or near antibody combining site A or B, respectively; F, codons with rapid rates of amino acid replacement.

Codon	Codon set		
121	—	—	F
124	—	A	—
133	—	A	F
135	R	A	F
138	R	A	F
142	—	A	—
145	—	A	F
156	—	B	F
158	—	B	—
186	—	B	F
190	R	B	F
193	—	B	F
194	R	B	F
197	—	B	—
201	—	—	—
226	R	—	F
262	—	—	—
275	—	—	F

Bush et al., 1999, *Science* **286**: 1921

# The next pandemic...


When, not if. How bad will it be?

Why was 1918 so bad?

Can we predict the next source of major antigenic shift or species crossing?

# 1918 death rate unusually high in males and people ages 20-40


FIGURE 1 Age-specific death rates for influenza and pneumonia combined, males (solid) and females (dotted), 1917 and 1918



SOURCE: US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1956.

Noymer and Garenne, 2000,  
Pop. Dev. Rev. 26: 565



# 1918 flu recovered from US Army pathology samples and one person buried in the Alaska permafrost



# Properties of the reconstructed 1918 virus in mouse infections

a: regular influenza  
b-f: recombinant 1918

Microarray analysis for inflammation-associated gene expression



Kash et al., 2006, *Nature* **443**: 578

# Only 10 aa changes in polymerase subunits consistently distinguish human from avian

**Table 1 | Amino acid residues distinguishing human and avian influenza polymerases**

Gene	Residue no.	Avian	1918	Human H1N1	Human H2N2	Human H3N2	Classical swine	Equine
PB2	199	A	S	S	S	S	S	A
PB2	475	L	M	M	M	M	M	L
PB2	567	D	N	N	N	N	D	D
PB2	627	E	K	K	K	K	K	E
PB2	702	K	R	R*	R	R	R	K
PB1	375	N/S/T†	S	S	S	S	S	S
PA	55	D	N	N	N	N	N	N
PA	100	V	A	A	A	A	V	A
PA	382	E	D	D	D	D	D	E
PA	552	T	S	S	S	S	S	T

\* All human H1N1 PB2 sequences have an Arg residue at position 702, except that two out of three A/PR/8/34 sequences have a Lys residue.

† The majority of avian sequences have an Asn residue at position 375 of PB1, 18% have a Ser residue, 13% a Thr residue.

PB2: 5 changes, found rarely in avian lineages but occasionally in high pathogenicity avian strains (HPAI) H5N1, H7N7, or H9N2 that infected humans

PB2: Lys627 crucial for high pathogenicity

PB1: replaced by reassortment in both 1957 and 1968; replicative advantage?

PB1: Asn375 to Ser found in swine and equine as well as human isolates

Tradeoffs between function and antigenicity?

# Questions

Can this work help us to predict the next pandemic?

What else do we need to know?

Pandemics require virulence plus transmissibility;  
how can we study transmissibility?

What are the dangers of this project?

Should this project have been approved by the  
NSABB? Should the sequences have been  
published?

How should we be preparing for the next influenza  
pandemic?

# H5N1: The next big thing?

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI):  
communicated directly from birds to humans but  
not (so far) communicated among humans  
(except maybe sometimes)

H5N1 - 1997      H9N2 - 1999      H7N2 - 2002


H7N7 - 2003      H7N3 - 2004      H10N7 - 2005

H5N1 returns most years

Cumulative laboratory-confirmed cases through  
September 2008: 387


Cumulative deaths: 245

# H5N1 spread - October 2008



# 22-40 weeks to an H5N1 vaccine

## Process of influenza vaccine virus selection and development



# How is H5N1 (or HPAI) different from normal human influenza?

Human, normally SA- $\alpha$ -2,6-Gal


Avian, normally SA- $\alpha$ -2,3-Gal

Fixed H5N1 binds to alveolar macrophags  
and type II pneumocytes; consistent with  
severe alveolar damage in human  
patients

Note ferrets and cats are better models for  
human infection than mice

van Riel et al., 2006, *Science* **312**: 399

Shinya et al., 2006, *Nature* **440**: 435



# Wednesday papers:

**Paper 1:** Stevens J, Blixt O, Chen LM, Donis RO, Paulson JC, Wilson IA. “Recent avian H5N1 viruses exhibit increased propensity for acquiring human receptor specificity.” *J Mol Biol.* 2008 Sep 19;381(5):1382-94

**Paper 2:** Morens DM, Taubenberger JK, Fauci AS. “Predominant role of bacterial pneumonia as a cause of death in pandemic influenza: implications for pandemic influenza preparedness.” *J Infect Dis.* 2008 Oct 1;198(7):962-70.