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Philo of Alexandria's Exposition of the Tenth Commandment

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA'S EXPOSITION OF THE TENTH COMMANDMENT

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN THEOLOGY

BY

HANS RICHARD SVEBAKKEN

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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This has been a long journey, and I consider its completion a great blessing. Unsure of how to express my deepest sense of gratitude, I'll let Philo have the last word, in honor of our many hours together: "It is for God to give benefits and for mortals to give thanks, since they have nothing else to give in return" (*Plant.* 130).

Behold me daring, not only to read the sacred messages of Moses, but also in my love of knowledge to peer into each of them and unfold and reveal what is not known to the multitude.

Philo of Alexandria, *De specialibus legibus* 3.6

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of primary sources are those of *The SBL Handbook of Style* (ed. Patrick H. Alexander et al.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999), with the following exceptions:

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Colson English trans. of *Spec. 4* by F. H. Colson in vol. 8 of *Philo*. Translated by F. H. Colson et al. 12 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929-1962.
- Didask.* *Didaskalikos* by Alcinous. English trans. cited by ch. and sec. in *The Handbook of Platonism*. Translated with intro. and comm. by John Dillon. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993. Gk. text cited in brackets by p. [ed. Hermann, 1853] and line in *Enseignement des doctrines de Platon*. Edited with intro. and comm. by John Whittaker. Translated by Pierre Louis. 2d ed. Paris: Belles Lettres, 2002 (e.g., *Didask.* 32.4 [186.14-18]).
- DL Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Translated by R. D. Hicks. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- Eclog.* *Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae* by Ioannes Stobaeus. Cited by p. and line in vol. 2 of Ioannes Stobaeus. *Anthologii libri duo priores*. 2 vols. Edited by Curt Wachsmuth. Berlin: Weidmann, 1884.
- ESE* *Epitome of Stoic Ethics* by Arius Didymus. Cited by sec. in *Epitome of Stoic Ethics*. Edited by Arthur J. Pomeroy. Texts and Translations 44. Greco-Roman Series 14. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999.
- Heinemann German trans. of *Spec. 4* by Isaak Heinemann in vol. 2 of *Die Werke Philos von Alexandria in Deutscher Übersetzung*. Edited by L. Cohn, I. Heinemann, et al. 7 vols. Breslau, Berlin 1909-1964.

- LS A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley. *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Texts cited by section number and text letter (e.g., 25B).
- Mazz. Claudio Mazzarelli, "Raccolta e interpretazione delle testimonianze e dei frammenti del medioplatonico Eudoro di Alessandria: Parte prima: Testo e traduzione delle testimonianze e dei frammenti sicuri," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 77 (1985): 197-209.
- Mosès French trans. of *Spec.* 4 by André Mosès in vol. 25 of *Les œuvres de Philon D'Alexandrie*. Edited by R. Arnaldez, J. Pouilloux, C. Mondésert. Paris, 1961-92.
- PAPM *Les œuvres de Philon D'Alexandrie*. Edited by R. Arnaldez, J. Pouilloux, C. Mondésert. Paris, 1961-92.
- PCH *Die Werke Philos von Alexandria in Deutscher Übersetzung*. Edited by L. Cohn, I. Heinemann, et al. 7 vols. Breslau, Berlin 1909-1964.
- PCW *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt*. Edited by L. Cohn, P. Wendland, S. Reiter. 6 vols. Berlin, 1896-1915.
- Petit *Philon D'Alexandrie: Quæstiones: Fragmenta Græca*. Edited and translated by Françoise Petit. *Les œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie* 33. Paris: Cerf, 1978.
- PHP *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* by Galen. Cited by bk., ch., and sec. in *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*. Edited and trans. with comm. by Phillip De Lacy. 3 vols. 2d ed. *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* 5.4.1.2. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1980-84.
- PLCL *Philo in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes)*. Translated by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker (and R. Marcus). 12 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929-1962.
- Ps.-Andr. Pseudo-Andronicus, Περὶ παθῶν. Cited by p. and line in A. Gilbert-Thirry. *Pseudo-Andronicus de Rhodes «ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΘΩΝ»: Edition critique du texte grec et de la traduction latine médiévale*. *Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum*. Supp. 2. Leiden: Brill, 1977.

- Ps.-Arch. Pseudo-Archytas, *On Moral Education*. Cited by p. [ed. Thesleff, 1965] and line in *Pseudopythagorica Ethica: I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo*. Edited and translated by Bruno Centrone. Elenchos 17. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990.
- Ps.-Metop. Pseudo-Metopos, *On Virtue*. Cited by p. [ed. Thesleff, 1965] and line in *Pseudopythagorica Ethica: I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo*. Edited and translated by Bruno Centrone. Elenchos 17. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990.
- Ps.-Theag. Pseudo-Theages, *On Virtue*. Cited by p. [ed. Thesleff, 1965] and line in *Pseudopythagorica Ethica: I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo*. Edited and translated by Bruno Centrone. Elenchos 17. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990.
- SVF *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*. H. von Arnim. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1903-1924. Cited by vol., p., and line (e.g., III 113, 15).
- TL Timaeus of Locri, *On the Nature of the World and the Soul*. Cited by paragraph in *Timaio di Locri, On the Nature of the World and the Soul*. Edited and trans. with notes by Thomas H. Tobin. Texts and Translations 26. Greco-Roman Religion Series 8. Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985.
- Troph.^B Περὶ τροφῆς^B by Musonius Rufus. Cited by p. and line in Cora E. Lutz. *Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates*. Yale Classical Studies 10. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- AB Anchor Bible
 ABD *Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Edited by D. N. Freedman. 6 vols. New York, 1992.
- ACPQ *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*
 AJP *American Journal of Philology*
- ALGHJ *Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums*
- AMMTC *Ancient Mediterranean and Medieval Texts and Contexts*
 AMP *Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*
 ANRW *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung*. Edited by H. Temporini and W. Haase. Berlin, 1972—
- AP *Ancient Philosophy*
 ARGU *Arbeiten zur Religion und Geschichte des Urchristentums*
 ASE *Annali di storia dell'esegesi*

ASR	<i>Annali di scienze religiose</i>
BBB	Bonner biblische Beiträge
BEATAJ	Beiträge zur Erforschung des Alten Testaments und des antiken Judentum
BJS	Brown Judaic Studies
BThSt	Biblisch-Theologische Studien
BU	Biblische Untersuchungen
BZAW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
CBQMS	Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series
CCWJCW	Cambridge Commentaries on Writings of the Jewish and Christian World 200 BC to AD 200
CEC	Critical Essays on the Classics
CJA	Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CR	<i>Classical Review</i>
CRINT	Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum
CSCP	Cornell Studies in Classical Philology
CSP	Cornell Studies in Philosophy
CUAPS	Catholic University of America Patristic Studies
CWS	Classics of Western Spirituality. New York, 1978—
ELA	Études de littérature ancienne
EPM	Études de philosophie médiévale
ETL	<i>Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses</i>
ETR	<i>Études théologiques et religieuses</i>
EUSLR	Emory University Studies in Law and Religion
FJCD	Forschungen zum jüdisch-christlichen Dialog
GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
GRRS	Greco-Roman Religion Series
HBS	Herders Biblische Studien
HCS	Hellenistic Culture and Society. Anthony W. Bulloch, Erich S. Gruen, A. A. Long, and Andrew F. Stewart, general editors.
HPhQ	<i>History of Philosophy Quarterly</i>
HSCP	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
HTR	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
JACE	Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JJML	<i>Journal of Jewish Music and Liturgy</i>
JJS	<i>Journal of Jewish Studies</i>
JLAS	<i>Jewish Law Association Studies</i>
JSH	<i>Journal of Sport History</i>
JSHRZ	<i>Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit</i>
JSNT	<i>Journal for the Study of the New Testament</i>
JSPSup	Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha: Supplement Series
JTS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>

LTE	Library of Theological Ethics
MCL	Martin Classical Lectures
MScRel	<i>Mélanges de science religieuse</i>
MdB	<i>Le Monde de la Bible</i>
MP	<i>Museum Patavinum</i>
NAWG	<i>Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen</i>
NovT	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
NovTSup	Supplements to Novum Testamentum
NTOA	Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus
OBO	Orbis biblicus et orientalis
OPM	Oxford Philosophical Monographs
OTM	Oxford Theological Monographs
PA	Philosophia Antiqua
PASSV	<i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume</i>
PBACAP	<i>Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy</i>
Ph&PhenR	<i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i>
PhilSup	<i>Philologus: Supplementband</i>
PHR	<i>Problèmes d'histoire des religions</i>
REG	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
REL	<i>Revue des études latines</i>
RKAM	Religion und Kultur der alten Mittelmeerwelt in Parallelforschungen
RM	<i>Review of Metaphysics</i>
RSR	<i>Recherches de science religieuse</i>
RTL	<i>Revue théologique de Louvain</i>
SA	Studia Anselmiana
SAP	Studien zur antiken Philosophie
SBLTT	Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations
SBS	Stuttgarter Biblestudien
ScEs	<i>Science et esprit</i>
SCHNT	Studia ad corpus hellenicum Novi Testamenti
ScrTh	<i>Scripta Theologica</i>
SF	<i>Studi filosofici</i>
SJPh	<i>Southern Journal of Philosophy</i>
SNTSMS	Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SO	<i>Symbolae Osloenses</i>
SPh	<i>Studia Philonica</i>
SPhA	<i>Studia Philonica Annual</i>
SPhA	Studies in Philo of Alexandria
SPhAMA	Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity
SSEJC	Studies in Scripture in Early Judaism and Christianity
STA	Studia et Testimonia Antiqua
SUNT	Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments
TDNT	<i>Theological Dictionary of the New Testament</i> . Edited by G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. Translated by G. W. Bromily. 10 vols. Grand Rapids, 1964-1976.

TSAJ	Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum
TSHP	New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy
TSP	Trivium: Special Publications
TUGAL	Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
VC	<i>Vigiliae Christianae</i>
VCSup	Supplements to <i>Vigiliae Christianae</i>
VTSup	Supplements to <i>Vetus Testamentum</i>
WMANT	Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
WS	<i>Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie und Patristik</i>
WTS	Wijzgerige Teksten en Studies
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZNW	<i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche</i>

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Septuagint version of Exodus 20:17, translated literally, reads as follows:

You shall not desire your neighbor's wife. You shall not desire your neighbor's house, nor his field, nor his male servant, nor his female servant, nor his ox, nor his beast of burden, nor any of his flock, nor anything that is your neighbor's.¹

This is the last of the Ten Commandments,² and although Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 B.C. – A.D. 50) must have known the full biblical version,³ he cites the Tenth Commandment simply as "You shall not desire" (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις),

¹ My translation of LXX Exod 20:17 [=LXX Deut 5:21 verbatim]: οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ πλησίον σου. οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ πλησίον σου οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν αὐτοῦ οὔτε τὸν παῖδα αὐτοῦ οὔτε τὴν παιδίσκην αὐτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ βοῦς αὐτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ ὑποζυγίου αὐτοῦ οὔτε παντὸς κτήνους αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅσα τῷ πλησίον σου ἐστίν. For details on the text of Exod 20:17, including ancient versions, see Innocent Himbaza, *Le Décalogue et l'histoire du texte: Etudes des formes textuelles du Décalogue et leurs implications dans l'histoire du texte de l'Ancien Testament* (OBO 207; Fribourg: Academic Press, 2004), 155-65 (cf. 68-72).

² Within the biblical canon, the Ten Commandments appear first in Exod 20:1-17 (cf. Deut 5:1-21) spoken by God and so become known as the "ten words," or in modern usage the "Decalogue" (NB LXX Deut 10:4: τοὺς δέκα λόγους). Philo often refers to them as οἱ δέκα λόγοι (e.g., *Spec.* 1.1, *Decal.* 154) or δέκα λόγια (e.g., *Decal.* 36, *Spec.* 3.7).

³ Philo used the LXX, not the Hebrew Bible (see Valentin Nikiprowetzky, *Le commentaire de l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie* [ALGHJ 11; Leiden: Brill, 1977], 50-96, esp. 51-52). No evidence for an abbreviated version of the Tenth Commandment exists in the MS tradition of the LXX. On the LXX Pentateuch, see the introductory essays in *Le Pentateuque d'Alexandrie: text grec et traduction* (ed. Cécile Dogniez and Marguerite Harl; Bible d'Alexandrie; Paris: Cerf, 2001), 31-130, including David Runia, "Philon d'Alexandrie devant le Pentateuque," 99-105.

indicating that in his view the principle concern of this Commandment is desire itself (ἐπιθυμία), not desire's object.⁴

This dissertation explains in detail Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment. As an introduction, this chapter (1) situates Philo's exposition within his larger corpus of works, (2) sketches in summary form the nature and content of the exposition, (3) explains the value of the exposition, (4) reviews prior research, and (5) outlines the plan of the dissertation.

PHILO'S COMMENTARY ON MOSAIC LEGISLATION

Philo describes the contents of the Pentateuch as a sequence of three topics: creation, history, and legislation.⁵ In a series of works known collectively

⁴ In *Spec.* 4.78, Philo cites the Tenth Commandment as an abbreviated, two-word prohibition: "Let us turn now to the last of the Ten Words (δέκα λογίων) . . . 'You shall not desire' (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις)" (my translation). (Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Philo's writings are from PLCL.) In *Decal.* 142, he clearly has this abbreviated version in mind: "Finally, he places a prohibition on desiring (τελευταῖον δ' ἐπιθυμῆσαι ἀπαγορεύει), knowing that desire (τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν) is crafty and treacherous (νεωτεροποιὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον)" (my translation). (Cf. *Decal.* 173: πέμπτον [of the second tablet] δὲ τὸ ἀνεῖργον τὴν τῶν ἀδικημάτων πηγὴν, ἐπιθυμίαν; *Her.* 173: ἡ δ' ἑτέρα πεντάς ἐστιν ἀπαγορεύσεις μοιχείας, ἀνδροφονίας, κλοπῆς, ψευδομαρτυρίας, ἐπιθυμίας.) In his discussion of the Tenth Commandment (*Decal.* 142-153, 173-174; *Spec.* 4.78b-131), Philo mentions none of the prohibited objects of desire listed in the LXX version (οἰκία, ἀγρός, παῖς, παιδίσκη, βούς, ὑποζύγιον, κτήνος), with the exception of γυνή, which appears once in a list that includes also "reputation" (δόξα) and summarily "anything else that produces pleasure" (τινος ἄλλου τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀπεργαζομένων) (*Decal.* 151). Similarly, πλησίος, an essential element of the LXX version (τοῦ πλησίον σου; τῷ πλησίον σου), appears only once (*Spec.* 4.93), and there it involves Platonic psychology: the θυμός, or spirited part of the soul, is a "neighbor" to the λόγος, or rational part.

⁵ "The oracles delivered through the prophet Moses are of three kinds (τρεις ιδέας). The first deals with the creation of the world (τὴν μὲν περὶ κοσμοποιίας), the second with history (τὴν δὲ ἱστορικὴν) and the third with legislation (τὴν δὲ τρίτην νομοθετικὴν)" (*Praem.* 1). The same classification appears in *Mos.* 2.46-47, although Philo initially identifies only two parts: (1) the historical part (ἱστορικὸν μέρος), which he subdivides into two sections dealing respectively with the creation of the world (κόσμου γενέσεως) and genealogy (γενεαλογικῶν), and (2) the part dealing with commands and prohibitions (περὶ προστάξεως καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεως). The part dealing with commands and prohibitions is equivalent to the third topic in *Praem.* 1, while the subdivisions of the first part are equivalent to the first two topics in *Praem.* 1. (On the equivalence of γενεαλογικός and ἱστορικός, see F. H. Colson's note on *Mos.* 2.47 in PLCL 6, 606; also PLCL 8, 313, n. a.) This correlation of *Praem.* 1 and *Mos.* 2.46-47 is standard—see, for example, Peder

as the Exposition of the Law, he offers an exegesis of the Pentateuch using these topics as his basic outline.⁶ The Exposition begins with a treatise on the creation of the world (*De opificio mundi*), continues with a set of treatises on the patriarchs (*De Abrahamo* and *De Iosepho*),⁷ and ends with a set of treatises on Mosaic legislation (*De decalogo*, *De specialibus legibus* 1-4, and *De virtutibus*).⁸ This last set dealing with legislation consists thematically of only two parts, despite its formal division into six treatises: the first comprises *De decalogo* and practically all of *De specialibus legibus* (1.1 – 4.132), the second comprises the

Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria," in *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period* (ed. M. E. Stone; vol. 2 of *The Literature of the Jewish People in the Period of the Second Temple and the Talmud*; CRINT 2; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1984), 233-82, 234, n. 5; Richard Hecht, "Preliminary Issues in the Analysis of Philo's *De Specialibus Legibus*," *SPh* 5 (1978): 1-56, 3; Leopold Cohn, "Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos," *PhilSup* 7 (1899): 387-436, 405-06.

⁶ On the Exposition of the Law see esp. Peder Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria—A Systematic Philosopher or an Eclectic Editor? An Examination of his *Exposition of the Laws of Moses*," *SO* 71 (1996): 115-34; also Jenny Morris, "The Jewish Philosopher Philo," in Emil Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.—A.D. 135): A New English Version Revised and Edited by Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, and Martin Goodman* (vol. 3, part 2; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987), 809-89, 840-54.

⁷ Originally, the set included treatises also on Isaac and Jacob (see *Ios.* 1), which are now lost. Most assign these treatises to the "history" portion of the creation-history-legislation triad of *Praem.* 1 (e.g., Peder Borgen, "Philo," 237). Some, however, assign them to the legislative portion, based on Philo's claim that the patriarchs themselves represent unwritten counterparts to the written laws he begins to consider in *De decalogo* (see *Abr.* 3). The historical portion, in this configuration, consists of Philo's Allegorical Commentary, a separate series of treatises covering most of Genesis (on which see Borgen, "Philo," 243-44; Morris, "Philo," 830-40). Valentin Nikiprowetzky, for one, holds this view: see PAPM 23, 13, and *Commentaire*, 234-35, n. 17. But if the correlation of *Praem.* 1 and *Mos.* 2.46-47 is correct, the legislative portion mentioned in *Praem.* 1 corresponds explicitly to "commands and prohibitions" in *Mos.* 2.46 and cannot reasonably include the lives of the patriarchs. For other problems with this view, see Cohn, "Einteilung und Chronologie," 406, n. 23; cf. Morris, "Philo," 845-46, n. 134.

⁸ Another treatise, *De praemiis et poenis*, immediately follows *Virt.* and concludes the Exposition. In *Praem.* 2-3, Philo states that he has fully discussed (i.e., finished) the legislative section in the preceding treatises and is moving on to a new topic: "the rewards and punishments which the good and the bad have respectively to expect." *De praemiis et poenis* thus forms a fitting conclusion to the Exposition, insofar as the stipulated rewards and punishments are contingent on observance of the laws. But it does not form part of the legislative section proper, because it does not deal with the laws themselves. Philo's treatise on Moses, *De vita Mosis* 1-2, is closely connected with, but not part of, the Exposition (see Erwin R. Goodenough, "Philo's Exposition of the Law and His *De Vita Mosis*," *HTR* 26 [1933]: 109-25).

remainder of *De specialibus legibus* (4.133-238) and *De virtutibus*.⁹ In both parts, Philo cites laws then analyzes them, noting mostly their literal bearing on practical and ethical matters.¹⁰ But the real commentary on Mosaic legislation in Philo's Exposition is the first part (*Decal.* 1.1 – *Spec.* 4.132), which he frames as a unified, systematic, and comprehensive exposition of Mosaic commands and prohibitions, using an organizational scheme based entirely on the Ten Commandments.¹¹

For Philo, the Ten Commandments are absolutely preeminent, and *their* arrangement and content determine the overall arrangement and content of his legal commentary in *Decal.* 1.1 – *Spec.* 4.132.¹² To establish their importance,

⁹ Philo makes an obvious, explicit transition from one major topic to another in *Spec.* 4.132-34. For division of the same material into the same two parts, see points B and C on Peder Borgen's outline of the Exposition ("Philosopher or Editor?," 118).

¹⁰ In *Decal.* 1.1 Philo announces that his investigation of the written laws will not neglect allegorical interpretations, when they are warranted, and indeed it does not (e.g., *Spec.* 2.29-32). Nevertheless, Philo's legal commentary tends to avoid allegory, in some instances offering only a literal treatment of laws read allegorically in the Allegorical Commentary (see Colson, PLCL 7, xiii, n. c, and Isaak Heinemann, PCH 2, 4, n. 1, for examples, such as *Ebr.* 14-95 vs. *Spec.* 2.232 on Deut 21:18-21). Samuel Sandmel ("Philo Judaeus: An Introduction to the Man, his Writings, and his Significance," *ANRW* 21.1:3-46, 10) thus goes too far in saying: "The treatises in [the 'Exposition of the Law'] are no less allegorical than those in the 'Allegory of the Law.'"

¹¹ *Praem.* 2 suggests that part one (*Decal.* 1.1. – *Spec.* 4.132) represents, from Philo's perspective, the Pentateuch's "legislative part" proper (thus Borgen, "Philosopher or Editor?," 132-33; cf. Borgen, "Philo," 239-40). Part two (*Spec.* 4.133-238 and *Virt.*) has a different organizational scheme (categorization by *virtues*, not *Commandments* [see *Spec.* 4.133-35]) and is secondary to part one in terms of both length and design. Part one is roughly three times as large (ca. 277 vs. ca. 95 pages in PCW); but, more importantly, part one represents Philo's principal effort to organize all Mosaic precepts into a single logical system (on which see esp. Yehoshua Amir, "The Decalogue According to Philo," in *The Ten Commandments in History and Tradition* [ed. B.-Z. Segal and G. Levi; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990], 121-60, 128-30; idem, "Philon und die jüdische Wirklichkeit seiner Zeit," in *Die hellenistische Gestalt des Judentums bei Philon von Alexandrien* [FJCD 5; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1983], 3-51, esp. 42-44 [= "Das System der Gebote"]). In this respect, part two serves as a catchall, accommodating laws that do not fit neatly into Philo's primary scheme (see Amir, "Decalogue," 127; Morris, "Philo," 851).

¹² On the Decalogue in Philo, see esp. Amir, "Decalogue"; also Ulrich Kellermann, "Der Dekalog in den Schriften des Frühjudentums," in *Weisheit, Ethos, und Gebot* (ed. H.G. Reventlow; BThSt 43; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2001), 147-226, esp. 161-70; Paul Kuntz,

Philo begins his systematic study of Mosaic legislation with a distinction between two categories of law:

I will proceed to describe the laws (τοὺς νόμους) themselves in order, with this necessary statement by way of introduction, that some of them (οὓς μὲν) God judged fit to deliver in His own person alone without employing any other, and some (οὓς δέ) through His prophet Moses whom He chose as of all men the best suited to be the revealer of verities. Now we find that those which He gave in His own person and by His own mouth alone are¹³ both laws and heads summarizing the particular laws (συμβέβηκε καὶ νόμους . . . καὶ νόμων τῶν ἐν μέρει κεφάλαια), but those in which He spoke through the prophet all belong to the former class. (*Decal.* 18-19)

Two key traits set the Ten Commandments apart. First, God delivered them personally to the Israelites without a human mediator.¹⁴ Second, each of the Ten Commandments has a unique dual significance: like any law, it stands on its own

"Philo Judaeus: A Decalogue in the Balance," in *The Ten Commandments in History: Mosaic Paradigms for a Well-Ordered Society* (ed. Thomas d'Evelyn; EUSLR; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 11-26; Miguel Lluch Baixauli, "El tratado de Filón sobre el Decálogo," *ScrTh* 29 (1997): 415-41; André Myre, "La loi et le Pentateuque selon Philon d'Alexandrie," *ScEs* 25 (1973): 209-25, 222-24; Samuel Sandmel, "Confrontation of Greek and Jewish ethics: Philo: *De Decalogo*," in *Judaism and Ethics* (ed. Daniel J. Silver; New York: Ktav, 1970), 163-76. On the Decalogue as an organizational scheme, see in general Hecht, "Preliminary Issues," 3-17; for the scheme's presence in *Decal.* and *Spec.* see Borgen, "Philosopher or Editor?," 123-28; for details of the scheme see Daniel Jastram, *Philo's Concept of Generic Virtue* (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1989), 30-35, and Cristina Termini, "Taxonomy of Biblical Laws and ΦΙΛΟΤΕΧΝΙΑ in Philo," *SPhA* 16 (2004): 1-29, esp. 1-10.

¹³ Substituting "are" (συμβέβηκε) for Colson's "include," which does not properly emphasize the dual nature of each Commandment. Cf. Nikiprowetzky, PAM 23 ("sont non seulement des lois, mais aussi les principes qui commandent le détail des lois particulières"); Treitel, PCH 1 ("sind zugleich Gesetze und Grundprinzipien"); Francesca Calabi, *Filone di Alessandria, De Decalogo* (Philosophica 24; Pisa: ETS, 2005) ("sono leggi e principi delle leggi particolari").

¹⁴ Cf. *Spec.* 2.189. Philo rejects an anthropomorphic concept of God speaking to the Israelites, developing instead the notion of a miraculous "divine voice" created especially for the occasion (*Decal.* 32-35; for analysis see Amir, "Decalogue," 135-48; also Reinhard Weber, *Das "Gesetz" bei Philon von Alexandrien und Flavius Josephus: Studien zum Verständnis und zur Funktion der Thora bei den beiden Hauptzeugen des hellenistischen Judentums* (ARGU 11; Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001), 68-77.

as a distinct ethical imperative; but it also functions as the "head" (κεφάλαιον) or "summary" of an entire category of particular laws (νόμων τῶν ἐν μέρει).¹⁵

In Philo's view, God delivered each of the Ten Commandments "in the form of a summary,"¹⁶ stating succinctly what Moses spells out at length by means of additional laws found elsewhere in the Pentateuch.¹⁷ These other laws form a distinct set of subsidiary precepts, which—despite their individual variety—all express in some way the moral essence of their respective summary Commandment. To characterize this unique relationship of particular law(s) to summary Commandment, Philo uses a variety of terms and expressions. In terms of status, the particular laws are all subordinate to their respective "heads," as Philo's use of ὑπό ("under") and related compounds clearly indicates.¹⁸ In terms of function, they all "refer to" (ἀναφέρεσθαι; ἀναφορὰν λαμβάνειν) a

¹⁵ Cf. *Decal.* 154: "[W]e must not forget that the Ten Words (οἱ δέκα λόγοι) are summaries of the special laws (κεφάλαια νόμων εἰσὶ τῶν ἐν εἴδει) which are recorded in the Sacred Books and run through the whole of the legislation" (substituting "Words" [λόγοι] for Colson's "Covenants"). Thus the title of *De decalogo* in Greek MSS (G, F, H): περὶ τῶν δέκα λογίων, οἱ κεφάλαια νόμων εἰσὶν (MSS: λογίων, PCW: λόγων; PCW & G: οἱ, F & H: ἄ). On κεφάλαιον, see Termini, "Taxonomy," 5-6.

¹⁶ κεφαλαιώδει τύπῳ (*Spec.* 4.78; also *Decal.* 168). Cf. *Gaius* 178-79: "We determined to give Gaius a document, presenting in a summarized form (κεφαλαιώδη τύπον) the story of our sufferings and our claims. This document was practically an epitome (ἐπιτομή) of a longer supplication which we had sent to him a short time before through the hands of King Agrippa."

¹⁷ *Decal.* 175: "For it was in accordance with His nature that the pronouncements in which the special laws were summed up (κεφάλαια μὲν τῶν ἐν εἴδει νόμων) should be given by Him in His own person, but the particular laws (νόμους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῷ μέρει) by the mouth of the most perfect of the prophets whom He selected for his merits and having filled him with the divine spirit, chose him to be the interpreter of His sacred utterances." Cf. *Cong.* 120, where these ten are "general heads (γενικὰ κεφάλαια), embracing the vast multitude of particular laws (τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀπείρων νόμων), the roots (ρίζαι), the sources (ἀρχαί), the perennial fountains of ordinances (πηγαὶ ἀέναοι διαταγμάτων) containing commandments positive and prohibitive (προστάξεις καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεις περιεχόντων) for the profit of those who follow them."

¹⁸ For the particular laws as simply "under" (ὑπό) their respective heads, see *Decal.* 170; as "arranged under" (ὑποτάσσεσθαι), see *Decal.* 168, 171; as "falling under" (ὑποπίπτειν), see *Decal.* 174 (ὑποστέλλειν essentially = ὑποπίπτειν in *Decal.* 157, *Spec.* 4.1, and *Spec.* 4.132).

single summary command, serving or promoting its moral purpose in some way.¹⁹ But in abstract terms, Philo envisions the relationship between summary Commandment and particular law(s) as that of genus to species.²⁰

The treatises *De decalogo* and *De specialibus legibus* represent, at least in part, Philo's painstaking and systematic attempt to illustrate this genus-species relationship. His treatise on the Ten Commandments deals with the ten genera, expounding each of the Commandments in sequence (*Decal.* 50-153) and introducing the idea of their summary function (*Decal.* 154-75).²¹ His treatise on the particular laws (*Spec.*) again expounds the ten genera, in even greater depth, but goes on to identify and comment on their respective species. The Pentateuch itself never uses a genus-species taxonomy to organize precepts into a coherent system, so Philo must construct the system himself. In other words, *Philo* must match species with genera, indicating which laws belong with which of the Ten

¹⁹ E.g., *Spec.* 2.223: "I have now completed the discussion of the number seven [i.e., the fourth "head" (cf. *Spec.* 2.39)] and of matters connected with days and months and years that have reference to that number (τῶν εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναφερομένων)." *Spec.* 2.242: "I have gone through the five heads of laws (κεφάλαια νόμων) that belong to the first table, along with whatever particular laws have reference to each of them (ὅσα τῶν κατὰ μέρος εἰς ἕκαστον ἐλάμβανε τὴν ἀναφορὰν)" (my translation). Cf. *Leg.* 2.102: "This is practically the summation (τὸ κεφάλαιον) of the whole Song [of Moses], to which every other part refers (ἐφ' ὃ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀναφέρεται)" (my translation). In *Hist. eccl.* 2.18.5, Eusebius refers to *De specialibus legibus* as Περὶ τῶν ἀναφερομένων ἐν εἴδει νόμων εἰς τὰ συντείνοντα κεφάλαια τῶν δέκα λόγων α β γ δ.

²⁰ The δέκα λόγοι are τὰ . . . γένη τῶν ἐν εἴδει νόμων (*Spec.* 1.1; *Spec.* 3.125: τὰ γένη τῶν ἐν εἴδει νόμων) and thus "generic" (*Cong.* 120: γενικὰ κεφάλαια; *Her.* 167: τῶν γενικῶν δέκα νόμων; *Her.* 173: γενικοὶ . . . κανόνες). On this as a *legal* taxonomy in Philo, see esp. Jastram, *Generic Virtue*, 30-35. Jastram's remarks situate the legal taxonomy in the context of Philo's broader application(s) of the genus-species concept (see his chapter one, "Theory of Genus, Species, and Particular," 10-72). See also Termini, "Taxonomy." Termini argues that Philo's application of a genus-species taxonomy to Mosaic legislation is radically innovative, although his interest in the systematic organization of legal materials reflects contemporary trends in Roman jurisprudence.

²¹ Philo first treats introductory questions such as why God delivered the Ten Commandments in the desert (§§2-17), why there were ten (§§20-31), what voice announced the Commandments (§§32-35), and why the form of address was second-person singular (§§36-43).

Commandments.²² When his work is finished, he leaves no doubt as to his purpose:

For if we are right in describing the main heads delivered by the voice of God as generic laws (κεφάλαια γένη νόμων), and all particular laws of which Moses was the spokesman as dependent species (εἶδη), for accurate apprehension free from confusion scientific study was needed, with the aid of which I have assigned and attached to each of the genera what was appropriate to them throughout the whole legislation (ἐκάστῳ τῶν γενῶν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς νομοθεσίας τὰ οἰκεία προσένειμα καὶ προσέφυσσα). (*Spec.* 4.132)²³

The scope of Philo's project is immense: considering each of the generic summaries in turn, he has scoured the Pentateuch in search of the corresponding specific precepts. In this respect, *De specialibus legibus*

²² Despite disagreement over the originality of Philo's use of the Decalogue as a comprehensive taxonomic framework, consensus suggests that Philo at least did the work of matching species with genera. This consensus justifies the study of *Philo's* view of the Tenth Commandment, insofar as it allows for *him* to decide which laws logically pertain to the Tenth Commandment, based on *his* understanding of that Commandment. For a minimalist position, which concedes the originality of Philo's genus-species matching but otherwise attributes his basic taxonomy to traditional (rabbinic) Judaism, see Naomi Cohen, *Philo Judaeus: His Universe of Discourse* (BEATAJ 24; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995), 72-85, esp. 84-85. (On Philo's understanding of the Decalogue in relation to rabbinic tradition, see esp. Hecht, "Preliminary Issues," 3-17.) For a more generous position, which sees Philo as an innovator not only in his assignment of species to genus but also in his granting of a special inclusive status to the Decalogue, see Termini, "Taxonomy." Borgen, "Philosopher or Editor?," 126, has an intermediate position, which nevertheless approximates Cohen's: "Philo seems to develop in a more systematic fashion a notion also found in Palestinian tradition, that the Decalogue contained *in nuce* all the commandments of the Mosaic laws. Thus, Philo has a Jewish concept as organizing principle, but he has developed it into a broader systematic rewriting than found elsewhere in the contemporary Jewish sources."

²³ Substituting "genera" (γενῶν) for Colson's "heads." On this passage, see also Termini, "Taxonomy," 8. Cf. *Spec.* 3.7: "Since out of the ten oracles which God gave forth Himself without a spokesman or interpreter, we have spoken of five, namely those graven on the first table, and also of all the particular laws which had reference to these (ὅσα τῶν κατὰ μέρος συνέτεινεν εἰς ταῦτα), and our present duty is to couple them with those of the second table as well as we can, I will again endeavour to fit the special laws into each of the genera (πειράσομαι πάλιν καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν γενῶν ἐφαρμόζειν τοὺς ἐν εἴδει νόμους)" (substituting "genera" [γενῶν] for Colson's "heads").

complements *De decalogo* by presenting for each Commandment subsidiary laws that reflect its moral essence.²⁴

Although the scope of Philo's project involves all of the Ten Commandments, his procedure makes it simple to extract the remarks devoted to any one of them. For the most part, he follows a rigid ten-point outline in both *Decal.* and *Spec.*, introducing each Commandment, saying what he wants to say, then moving on to the next.²⁵ As a result, both treatises have an embedded series of self-contained units, each with its own topic and structure, each dealing essentially with *one* of the Ten Commandments. Correlating the text unit devoted to a particular Commandment in *Decal.* with the text unit devoted to the same Commandment in *Spec.* provides material for a more or less self-contained exposition of that Commandment.²⁶ Each exposition includes Philo's analysis of the Commandment itself (the genus), plus his treatment of the subordinate laws (the species).

PHILO'S EXPOSITION OF THE TENTH COMMANDMENT

Naturally, the last exposition embedded in *Decal.* and *Spec.* deals with the Tenth Commandment, which in Philo's Decalogue is the two-word prohibition οὐκ

²⁴ Cf. Morris on *Spec.* ("Philo," 847-48): "In this work Philo makes an extremely interesting attempt to bring the Mosaic special laws into a systematic arrangement according to the ten rubrics of the Decalogue."

²⁵ Structural outlines of the treatises reveal Philo's straightforward sequential movement through the list of Ten Commandments. For an outline of *Decal.*, see Borgen, "Philosopher or Editor?," 124-25. For an outline of the four books of *Spec.*, see Heinemann, PCH 2, 8-13 (although, as Heinemann's outline indicates, Philo in effect treats the First and Second Commandments as a single unit).

²⁶ For a schematic correlation of material from *Decal.* and *Spec.*, see the outline of the Sixth through Tenth Commandments in André Mosès, PAPM 25, 15-16.

ἐπιθυμήσεις.²⁷ Philo abbreviates the Septuagint version, which lists various aims of desire: a neighbor's wife, house, field, etc.²⁸ Although he never explains or justifies this abbreviation, it makes good sense in light of his overall treatment of the Ten Commandments, especially the last five, which he views as a pentad containing basic prohibitions governing human affairs.²⁹ Superficially, the abbreviation accomplishes a stylistic leveling, bringing the Tenth Commandment into line with the four other basic prohibitions: οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ κλέψεις, οὐ φονεύσεις, and οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις—the last of which is itself an abbreviation of the Ninth Commandment.³⁰ More importantly, however, a *specific* formulation of the Tenth Commandment would contradict Philo's claim that the Commandments are comprehensive, generic summaries—or, as with οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, generic *prohibitions*. In his system of thought, limiting the scope of the Tenth Commandment to specific objects would blur the distinction between genus and species. Rather than a summary, the Commandment would read more like a short list of "particular laws."³¹ Philo does consider various objects of

²⁷ See above, n. 4.

²⁸ Cf. LXX Exod 20:17 [=LXX Deut 5:21]. See above, n. 1.

²⁹ *Decal.* 121: ἀπαγορεύσεις τῶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. In Philo's view, these five prohibitions are comprehensive: "These are general rules forbidding practically all sins (οὗτοι γενικοὶ σχεδὸν πάντων ἀμαρτημάτων εἰσὶ κανόνες), and to them the specific sins may in each case be referred (ἐφ' οὓς ἕκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι τῶν ἐν εἴδει συμβέβηκεν)" (*Her* 173). For the division of the Ten Commandments into pentads, see esp. *Decal.* 50-51 (also *Her.* 168).

³⁰ NB Philo's citation οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις (*Spec.* 4.41; cf. *Decal* 172: τέταρτον δὲ [κεφάλαιον] τὸ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ψευδομαρτυρεῖν) compared with Lev 20:16 [=Deut 5:20]: οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις κατὰ τοῦ πλησίον σου μαρτυρίαν ψευδῆ. For the other prohibitions, whose simple two-word expressions Philo adopts verbatim, see Lev 20:13-15 [=Deut 5:17-19]. Cf. Rom 13:9 (Codex Sinaiticus): οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ φονεύσεις, οὐ κλέψεις, οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις.

³¹ Although the LXX version does include a general prohibition of ὅσα τῷ πλησίον σου ἐστίν, it never loses the fundamental specification τοῦ πλησίον σου. In its full LXX formulation,

desire in his exposition, but only as concrete illustrations of the nature and function of desire *itself*, not restrictions on the Commandment's proscriptive *range* of objects.³²

In its entirety, Philo's commentary on the Tenth Commandment consists of three text units: *Decal.* 142-53, *Decal.* 173-74, and *Spec.* 4.78b-131. The first of these units, *Decal.* 142-53, is the last installment in Philo's initial survey of the Ten Commandments (*Decal.* 50-153). Focusing on what the prohibition entails, this unit contains a sketch of the nature, mechanics, and potentially disastrous effects of desire, framed initially (§§142-46) as a review of the four cardinal πάθη: pleasure (ἡδονή), grief (λύπη), fear (φόβος), and desire (ἐπιθυμία).³³ The

the Commandment does not proscribe, for example, the desire for a house per se, only the desire for a specific type of house—viz., the house of a neighbor.

³² For example, in *Spec.* 4.86-91 Philo wants to illustrate how desire "produces a change for the worse in all which it attacks" (§86) by listing various aims of desire and the respective vices associated with those aims. The aims are all quite general: "money" (χρήματα), "reputation" (δόξα), "power" (ἀρχή), "physical beauty" (σώματος κάλλος), "the tongue" (γλῶττα) (i.e., desire to speak or keep silent), "the belly" (γαστήρ) (i.e., desire for food and drink).

³³ On πάθος as a philosophical term, see in general F.E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 152-55. πάθος refers essentially to something that happens *to* someone (i.e., an experience one undergoes), so "passion" bears literally the sense of its cognate "passive" despite its often active sense. (For an ancient [Platonic] discussion of active and passive connotations of πάθος, see Galen, *PHP* 6.1.5-23; cf. Martin Elsky [trans.], "Erich Auerbach, 'Passio as Passion' ['Passio als Leidenschaft']" *Criticism* 43 [2001]: 288-308). As a psychological term, πάθος refers to an experience undergone in one's soul; for example, the experience ("passion," "feeling," "emotion") of fear. Ancient moral philosophers proposed various definitions for both πάθος per se and the individual πάθη, along with various strategies for how best to manage passion(s). On the four cardinal πάθη see Simo Knuuttila and Juha Sihvola, "How the Philosophical Analysis of the Emotions was Introduced," in *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (ed. J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen; TSHP 46; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), 1-19, esp. 14-16. For an explanation of the Stoic view of πάθος over against the Platonic-Aristotelian view, see Michael Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul," in *The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics* (ed. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 93-110. On passion(s) in Philo see esp. Helmut Schmidt, *Die Anthropologie Philons von Alexandria* (Würzburg: Konrad Tritsch, 1933), 86-101; also David Charles Aune, "Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and Earliest Christianity," in *Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World* (ed. Wendy E. Helleman; Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 125-58, esp. 125-34; John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (rev. ed.; Ithaca, N.Y.:

second unit, *Decal.* 173-74, briefly restates the pervasive ill effects of desire, then previews *De specialibus legibus* by noting the existence of "many ordinances which come under this head," without identifying any of those ordinances. The third unit, *Spec.* 4.78b-131 contains Philo's most comprehensive and sustained treatment of the Tenth Commandment and represents the exposition proper.³⁴ Again he covers the nature, mechanics, and effects of desire, as in the first unit, but in much greater depth (*Spec.* 4.78b-94). Then, in fulfillment of his overarching program for *Decal.* and *Spec.*, Philo cites and expounds the Mosaic dietary laws, which in his view are the "particular laws" that belong under the heading οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (*Spec.* 4.95-131). Together these three units amount to 374 lines of Greek text in PCW, and the exposition proper amounts to 301 lines, all devoted to Philo's understanding of the Tenth Commandment. In sheer quantity, Philo's

Cornell University Press, 1996), 151-52; Petra von Gemünden, "La culture des passions à l'époque du Nouveau Testament: une contribution théologique et psychologique," *ETR* 70 (1995): 335-48, esp. 339-42; Margaret Graver, "Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic ΠΡΟΠΑΘΕΙΑΙ," in *Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy* (ed. Francesca Alesse; SPhA 5; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 197-221; repr. from *Phronesis* 44 (1999): 300-25; Carlos Lévy, "Philon d'Alexandrie et les passions," in *Réceptions antiques: lecture, transmission, appropriation intellectuelle* (ed. Lætitia Ciccolini et al.; ELA 16; Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm, 2006), 27-41; idem, "Philo's Ethics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 146-71, esp. 154-64 [= "The Passions"]; Salvatore Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (OTM; London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84-92, esp. 92; Max Pohlenz, *Philon von Alexandria* (NAWG 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1942), 457-61; David Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (PA 44; Leiden: Brill, 1986), 299-301; Michel Spanneut, "Apatheia ancienne, apatheia chrétienne. I^{ère} partie: L'apatheia ancienne," *ANRW* 36.7: 4641-4717, 4701-04; Walther Völker, *Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandria: Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit* (TUGAL 49.1; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich, 1938), 80-95; David Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," *ANRW* 21.1:372-416, 400-05; idem, "Philo of Alexandria on the Rational and Irrational Emotions," in *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; New York: Routledge, 2008), 201-20.

³⁴ Because it amounts to a self-contained treatise, the unit *Spec.* 4.79-135 receives the title "*De concupiscentia*" in some MSS (see PCW 5, xiv, xxvi), and—as Colson notes (PLCL 8, 56, n. 1)—Cohn "here begins a fresh numeration of chapters." Older studies sometimes refer to *Spec.* 4.79-135 using the Latin title and Cohn's fresh numeration (e.g., Emile Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie* [EPM 8; 3d ed.; Paris: J. Vrin, 1950], 253).

exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις stands on a par with some of his independent treatises—for example, *De gigantibus* (320 lines in PCW) and *De sobrietate* (353 lines in PCW). The importance of this exposition, however, lies in the material itself, first in its own right but also in its relation to other first-century treatments of the Tenth Commandment and key topics in Philo's ethical theory.

THE VALUE OF PHILO'S EXPOSITION

As a substantive, detailed analysis of the Tenth Commandment from arguably the best representative of Hellenistic Judaism in antiquity, Philo's exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις deserves a full and independent analysis. In his exposition, he considers in depth both the Commandment itself and the dietary laws that in his mind reflect its moral essence, so a careful reading should answer two fundamental questions:

1. In Philo's view, *what* does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? (All desire? A certain type? What type?)
2. In Philo's view, *how* is the Tenth Commandment observed? (What are the mechanics of its observance? What role do the dietary laws play in its observance?)

Answering these two questions also illuminates broader questions regarding Philo's unique fusion of Judaism and Hellenism. For example, how does a first-century Jew, who is fully committed to the literal observance of the Law of Moses,³⁵ who is *also* an accomplished student of Greek philosophy, interpret the

³⁵ See *Migr.* 89-93, esp. 93: "Nay, we should look on all these outward observances as resembling the body (σώματι), and their inner meanings as resembling the soul (ψυχῆ). It follows that, exactly as we have to take thought for the body, because it is the abode of the soul, so we must pay heed to the letter of the laws (τῶν ῥητῶν νόμων ἐπιμελητέον). If we keep and observe these, we shall gain a clearer conception of those things of which these are the symbols; and

significance of the Decalogue's prohibition of desire (ἐπιθυμία), a function of the soul that Greek philosophers studied at length? How does an obscure set of dietary regulations, which placed observant Jews at odds with the broader culture, become the centerpiece of Moses' philosophical training program for the management of desire?³⁶ Philo's exposition speaks to these and other issues.

But Philo's work is important also for the comparative assessment of a broader first-century interest in the Tenth Commandment, attested by two of Philo's contemporaries, Paul and the author of 4 Maccabees.³⁷ Both authors, like Philo, cite Greek versions of the Tenth Commandment and contemplate its moral significance.³⁸ A full appreciation of the similarities and differences among these three treatments of the Tenth Commandment, as well as their relation to broader

besides that we shall not incur the censure of the many and the charges they are sure to bring against us."

³⁶ On the Jewish dietary laws in Philo's day, see John M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE)* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 434-37; Katell Berthelot, "L'interprétation symbolique des lois alimentaires dans la Lettre d'Aristée: une influence pythagoricienne," *JJS* 52 (2001): 253-68; Christoph Heil, *Die Ablehnung der Speisegebote durch Paulus: Zur Frage nach der Stellung des Apostels zum Gesetz* (BBB 96; Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 1994), 23-123; Hermut Löhr, "Speisenfrage und Tora im Judentum des Zweiten Tempels und im entstehenden Christentum," *ZNW* 94 (2003): 17-37; James N. Rhodes, "Diet as Morality: Tracing an Exegetical Tradition" (M.A. thesis; Catholic University of America, 2000), esp. chs. three (Aristeas) and four (Philo); E.P. Sanders, "Purity, Food and Offerings in the Greek-Speaking Diaspora," in *Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah: Five Studies* (London: SCM Press, 1990), 255-308, 272-83; Abraham Terian, "Some Stock Arguments for the Magnanimity of the Law in Hellenistic Jewish Apologetics," *JLAS* 1 (1985): 141-49.

³⁷ See Romans 7:7-25 and 4 Maccabees 2:4-6. The exact dates of the relevant texts cannot be determined, but their relative chronology *can*. The absolute terminus ad quem for Philo's exposition is his death, which by general consensus is hardly later than A.D. 50 (Peder Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria," *ABD* 5:333-42, 333). Paul's letter to the Romans probably was written between A.D. 55 and 60 (Joseph Fitzmyer, *Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* [AB 33; New York: Doubleday, 1993], 85-88). 4 Maccabees probably was written near the end of the first century A.D. (Hans-Josef Klauck, *4. Makkabäerbuch* [JSHRZ 3.1; Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1989], 668-69).

³⁸ Paul's version, like Philo's, is οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (Rom 7:7; cf. Rom 13:9). 4 Macc has an expanded, more specific version, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ πλησίον σου οὔτε ὅσα τῷ πλησίον σου ἐστὶν (2:5), but the context suggests that a comprehensive scope is understood (NB πάσης ἐπιθυμίας in 2:4; and esp. μὴ ἐπιθυμῆιν εἶρηκεν ἡμᾶς ὁ νόμος in 2:6).

trends in biblical exegesis and ethical reflection, is impossible without a proper understanding of Philo's work—which is by far the most elaborate of the three.³⁹

Finally, a comprehensive investigation of Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment promises a better understanding of key topics in Philo's ethical theory, which can in turn illuminate broader trends in Middle-Platonic ethical theory.⁴⁰ For example, Philo grounds his exposition in theoretical overviews of the *πάθη*, using a variety of technical terms and concepts.⁴¹ Clearly, he intends to establish at first a working model of *ἐπιθυμία* as *πάθος* and then apply it to his discussion of the prohibition *οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις*. Because Philo is a Middle-Platonist, his exposition offers valuable insight into the elements of a Middle-Platonic theory of the "passions," insofar as it deals with passionate desire.⁴² The

³⁹ For an overview of these three treatments, see Thomas Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric in Its Contexts: The Argument of Romans* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2004), 229-32. Tobin concludes that the three reflect "broader discussions within Hellenistic Judaism about the function of the law in relation to theories about the nature of the passions, particularly desire, in Greco-Roman philosophy" (232). See also Petra von Gemünden, "Der Affekt der *ἐπιθυμία* und der νόμος," in *Das Gesetz im frühen Judentum und im Neuen Testament* (ed. Dieter Sänger and Matthias Konrad; NTOA / SUNT 57; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Fribourg: Academic Press, 2006), 55-74; Stanley Stowers, "Paul and Self Mastery," in *Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook* (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2003), 524-50, 531-34 (cf. Stanley Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994], 58-65).

⁴⁰ On the fundamentally Platonic orientation of Philo's thought, see esp. Thomas H. Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919; repr., New York: Garland, 1979), made more useful by A.C. Geljon and D.T. Runia, "An Index Locorum to Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus," *SPhA* 7 (1995): 169-85. On Philo as a *Middle* Platonist, see esp. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 139-83; also "Special Section: Philo and Middle Platonism," *SPhA* 5 (1993): 95-155. In light of contemporary Middle-Platonic moral psychology, Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment looks like the work of a "*de facto* Middle Platonist," one of the six positions outlined in David Runia's typological spectrum (see "Was Philo a Middle Platonist? A Difficult Question Revisited," *SPhA* [1993]: 112-140, 125): "he does not belong to the school, but has a philosophical stance which is fundamentally Platonist and might well make him welcome in such circles."

⁴¹ See esp. *Decal.* 142-46, *Spec.* 4.79.

⁴² Simply put, Philo's exposition reflects a Middle-Platonic theory of the passions, insofar as it combines a fundamentally Platonic psychology (esp. *Spec.* 4.92-94) with Stoic technical

concept of self-control (ἐγκράτεια) also bears directly on Philo's understanding of the Tenth Commandment.⁴³ When he begins his survey of the "particular laws," *species* of the genus οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, Philo cites the law of first fruits (Exod 23:19; Deut 18:4), which in his view exists "for the practice of self-control" (πρὸς ἄσκησιν . . . ἐγκρατείας).⁴⁴ This phrase suggests not only the importance of ἐγκράτεια, but also the relevance of another ethical concept, ἄσκησις—specifically, how Mosaic laws regarding food and drink function as *practice* in the cultivation of self-control.⁴⁵ Understanding Philo's exposition involves the clarification of these and other topics.

definitions of passion(s) (esp. *Spec.* 4.79; cf. *Decal.* 142)—a combination evident in other Middle-Platonic texts (e.g., *Didask.* 32.1 [185.26]). Middle Platonists rework these Stoic definitions, enabling them to describe psychological phenomena whose existence "orthodox" (i.e., Chrysippean) Stoicism would deny (e.g., non-rational parts of the soul in conflict with a rational part). Evidence in Philo's exposition for this sort of reinvention exists but has not been properly assessed. For example, Philo in *Spec.* 4.79 adds to the Stoic definition of passion as "excessive impulse" (πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή; see DL 7.110 [=SVF I 50, 21], *ESE* 10 [=SVF III 92, 11], *PHP* IV 2.8 [=SVF III 113, 15]) the qualifier "unmeasured" (ἄμετρος), which is unattested in the Stoic sources and indicates a failure to limit the *quantitative* force of a non-rational impulse—a notion incompatible with the Stoic understanding of impulse as a form of rational assent (on which see Brad Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1985], esp. chs. 3 and 5, NB 167-68 on "excessive impulse": "no aspect of the theory [Stoic psychology] . . . admits of the sort of variation of degree which would be needed for a more familiar quantitative sense of 'excessive'").

⁴³ *Spec.* 4.97, 99, 101, 112 [x2], 124. For the explicit connection of ἐγκράτεια with the Tenth Commandment, see, for example, vol. 2 of Harry Austryn Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (2 vols; 2d rev. print.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), 235-36; also Stowers, "Paul and Self Mastery," 532. For general considerations of ἐγκράτεια in Philo, see esp. Maren Niehoff, *Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture* (TSAJ 86; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 94-110; also Stowers, "Paul and Self Mastery," 531-34 (cf. Stowers, *Romans*, 58-65).

⁴⁴ *Spec.* 4.99. Philo twice lists ἐγκράτεια as one of many different kinds of ἄσκησις (*Her.* 253, *Leg.* 3.18). Pierre Hadot uses Philo's two lists as a basis for his discussion of different "spiritual" exercises in antiquity, by which he means exercises of Greco-Roman philosophers pertaining to the soul, not exercises practiced in a religious setting (Pierre Hadot, "Spiritual Exercises," in *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault* [ed. w/intro. Arnold Davidson; trans. Michael Case; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995], 81-125, 84).

⁴⁵ In regard to Philo's usage, the term ἄσκησις has little to do with modern terms such as "ascetic" or "asceticism," whose connotations derive mostly from Christian monasticism. The Greek term has no intrinsic association with religious practice (see Hermigild Dressler, *The Use*

Even an introductory survey of the nature and content of Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment commends it to further study. Moreover, Philo facilitates such study by neatly packaging his material: the structural layout of his broader Exposition of the Law makes his exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις a complete text in and of itself. Earlier studies of Philo have touched on this text in a variety of ways, from a variety of perspectives, with a variety of results.

HISTORY OF RESEARCH

Had Philo chosen to publish his exposition of the Tenth commandment as an independent work, it surely by now would have received more attention. But to date there is no comprehensive study of this important treatise, one that deals exclusively with Philo's view of the Tenth Commandment in light of *his* interests, *his* agenda, *his* organization of the material, and *his* understanding of the relevant topics—one that clearly and adequately answers the two basic questions of *what* the Commandment prohibits and *how* someone observes the Commandment. Translators of the units *Decal.* 142-53, 173-74 and *Spec.* 4.78b-131 offer general remarks on Philo's interpretation of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, along with commentary on specific passages, but the scope of their work is too broad and too sketchy to treat those units—especially the exposition proper—in sufficient depth.⁴⁶ Similarly, a number of works whose aims lie elsewhere offer

of Ἄσκέω and Its Cognates in Greek Documents to 100 AD [CUAPS 78; Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1947]). For Philo, ἄσκησις pertains mainly to ethical philosophy, as one of three ways to acquire virtue: nature, instruction, and *practice* (e.g., *Abr.* 52).

⁴⁶ Translations for the *Decal.* units (§§142-53, §§173-74) are in chronological order: Leopold Treitel, PCH 1 (1909); F. H. Colson, PLCL 7 (1937); Valentin Nikiprowetzky, PAPM 23 (1965); Francesca Calabi, *Filone*, Decalogo (2005); cf. Ronald Williamson, *Jews in the Hellenistic*

incidental, often helpful, remarks on Philo's Tenth Commandment, but never in an effort to explain his view in full.⁴⁷ In fact, only two works offer sustained treatments of the Tenth Commandment in Philo, and neither satisfies the need for a comprehensive study.

Harry A. Wolfson

In an extensive work on Philo, Harry Wolfson devotes part of a chapter on ethics to a study of the Tenth Commandment.⁴⁸ The title of his brief analysis, "The Virtue of the Control of Desire," reflects a broader aim on Wolfson's part to explore the relationship between law and virtue, in particular *where* and *how* Philo's understanding of Mosaic law incorporates terms and concepts derived from Greek ethical theory (and/or Jewish tradition).⁴⁹ He does not intend to

World: Philo (CCWJWCW 1.2; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 255-78. For the *Spec. 4* unit (§§78b-131): Isaak Heinemann, PCH 2 (1910); F. H. Colson, PLCL 8 (1939); and André Mosès, PAMP 25 (1970).

⁴⁷ For example, Amir, "Decalogue," 158-59; Klaus Berger, *Die Gesetzesauslegung Jesu* (WMANT 40.1; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1972), 346-48; Erwin Goodenough, *The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), 207-08; Walther Houston, "Towards an Integrated Reading of the Dietary Laws of Leviticus," in *The Book of Leviticus: Composition and Reception* (ed. R. Rendtorff and R. Kugler; VTSup 93; FIOTL 3; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 142-61, 144-47; Kellermann, "Dekalog," 168; Lluch Baixauli, "Decálogo," 436-38; William Loader, "The Decalogue" in *The Septuagint, Sexuality, and the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004), 5-25, 12-14; Anita Méasson, *Du char ailé de Zeus à l'Arche d'Alliance: Images et mythes platoniciens chez Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987), 154; Thomas E. Phillips, "Revisiting Philo: Discussions of Wealth and Poverty in Philo's Ethical Discourse," *JSNT* 83 (2001): 111-21, 114-15; Alexander Rofé, "The Tenth Commandment in the Light of Four Deuteronomic Laws," in *The Ten Commandments in History and Tradition* (ed. B.-Z. Segal and G. Levi; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990), 45-65, 48-49; Torrey Seland, "The Moderate Life of the Christian *paroikoi*: A Philonic Reading of 1 Pet 2:11," in *Philo und das Neue Testament* (WUNT 172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 241-64, 259-63; Stowers, "Paul and Self-Mastery," 531-34 (cf. Stowers, *Romans*, 58-65); Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 231-32.

⁴⁸ Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:225-37.

⁴⁹ Before his discussion of the Tenth Commandment, Wolfson deals with the topics "'Under the Law' and 'In Accordance with Nature'" (165-200) and "Commandments and Virtues" (200-225). Topics in "The Virtue of the Control of Desire," listed in the table of contents as subheadings, are: "Control of actions and control of emotions, 225.—The treatment of the tenth commandment as dealing with the control of the pure emotion of desire in native Jewish tradition

provide a comprehensive analysis of the contents of Philo's exposition. Instead, as part of a sweeping effort to reconstruct Philo's system of thought, he considers the significance within that system of a moral imperative aimed not at action(s) but at "pure emotion."⁵⁰ Although limited, Wolfson's treatment nevertheless includes substantive claims about Philo's interpretation of οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆσεις.

Wolfson's most valuable contribution comes at the end of his analysis, where he recognizes the central importance of ἐγκράτεια in Philo's overall understanding of the Tenth Commandment.⁵¹ In particular, he recognizes that "[t]he negative tenth commandment is . . . a command to control one's desire."⁵² In other words, the negative prohibition implies a positive command to cultivate the virtue of ἐγκράτεια, which—as Wolfson notes—is "the positive term . . . by which the control of excessive desire is to be described."⁵³ But because his interests lie elsewhere, he only considers *that* this is true, not *how* this is true. He never answers the basic question of how someone observes the Tenth Commandment or how it in fact promotes ἐγκράτεια. Wolfson also realizes that, for Philo, *other* Mosaic laws work along with the Tenth Commandment to

and in Philo, 226.—Philo's diatribe against the emotions and the rabbis' diatribes against the evil *yetzer*, 229.—Similarity and difference between Philo on the one hand and Aristotle and the Stoics on the other in their treatment of the emotion of desire, 231.—'Continence' as the virtue opposed to the vice of 'desire,' 235."

⁵⁰ Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:225.

⁵¹ Stanley Stowers (e.g., "Paul and Self Mastery," 532) similarly notes the importance of ἐγκράτεια for Philo's understanding of the Tenth Commandment.

⁵² Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:235.

⁵³ Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:235.

promote ἐγκράτεια.⁵⁴ But he never mentions the dietary laws, let alone explain how—in Philo's view—they pertain to οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆσεις. In this respect Wolfson's treatment, even where it does correctly characterize Philo's view of the Tenth Commandment, remains sketchy.

Although valuable for its emphasis on ἐγκράτεια, Wolfson's study misconstrues Philo's view of what the Commandment prohibits. He makes the unfounded assumption that Philo, with the Septuagint version in mind, understands the Tenth Commandment to be a prohibition *only* of desire for what belongs to another person.⁵⁵ Wolfson does not acknowledge the generalizing effect of Philo's abbreviated οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆσεις, choosing instead to retain the Septuagint version's specification "of your neighbor" (τοῦ πλησίον σου).⁵⁶ He admits that this specification does not appear in Philo's commentary but assumes it nevertheless:

Though Philo speaks of desire in general, that is, of a desire for what we have not, and not of a desire for that which belongs to somebody else, still his discussion, in so far as it is a commentary upon the commandment, implies that the desire of which he speaks is that desire which the commandment explicitly describes as a desire for that which belongs to another person. (Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:228)⁵⁷

⁵⁴ "It is the virtue of 'contenance' . . . that is taught by the tenth commandment as well as by all those special laws of which the purpose, as seen by [Philo], is to teach the control of desire" (Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:236).

⁵⁵ Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:228-29.

⁵⁶ Wolfson takes this in its most general sense of ὅσα τῷ πλησίον σου ἐστίν, as the LXX version stipulates. He cites and disagrees with Colson, whose assessment is correct: "The words 'thy neighbour's,' which are repeated so emphatically in the tenth commandment, as we have it and Philo also had it in the LXX, receive little attention from him" (PLCL 8, x).

⁵⁷ Also 2:229: "It is exactly the latter kind of desire, the desire for that which belongs to somebody else, that the tenth commandment as a law, and not a mere moral maxim, legally prohibits, according to Philo . . ." Ibid.: "In his discussion of the legal prohibition not to desire that which belongs to one's neighbor, a prohibition, as we have said, of a mere desire for that which belongs to one's neighbor."

The only evidence Wolfson offers in support of this view involves Philo's first example of an object of desire, namely money (χρήματα).⁵⁸ He argues that, although Philo does not specify the money's source:

the subsequent statement that a desire for money leads to robbery and purse-cutting and house-breaking makes it quite evident that the desire for money spoken of was not a desire for money in general but rather for the money in the pocket or the purse or the house of one particular person. (Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:228)

But Wolfson fails to cite the entire passage, which goes on to associate the desire for money also with, for example, receiving bribes (δωροδοκία), which clearly involves greed per se and not desire for the money "of one particular person." Moreover, the other examples of desiderata on Philo's list, none of which Wolfson mentions, hardly make sense when construed strictly as belonging to another person. This is especially true in the case of desires for food and drink, which are, for Philo, governed by the Tenth Commandment's particular laws.⁵⁹

Wolfson's study suffers also from an outdated conception of Philo's relationship to Greek philosophy. As he investigates select details of Philo's "homily on the evils of desire," Wolfson considers Philo an eclectic who adopts any number of different philosophical positions ad hoc. Wolfson suggests that in most of his analysis of ἐπιθυμία Philo chooses a Stoic position, but "[w]henver

⁵⁸ *Spec* 4.87: "If the desire is directed to money it makes men thieves and cut-purses, footpads, burglars, guilty of defaulting to their creditors, repudiating deposits, receiving bribes, robbing temples and of all similar actions."

⁵⁹ On Philo's association of the Tenth Commandment with dietary laws, Amir notes: "This association of ideas is possible only if the Commandment is shorn of its concluding words, 'anything that is your neighbor's'. For after all, kashrut has nothing to do with issues of ownership, of 'mine and thine'. An animal is not forbidden as food because it is stolen goods" ("Decalogue," 159).

forced by certain native Jewish presuppositions, he departs from the Stoics and follows some other philosopher or presents a new view of his own."⁶⁰ Wolfson is correct, generally speaking, when he matches various terms and concepts in Philo's commentary with the same terms and concepts in sources known to be, for example, Stoic.⁶¹ But he gives the misleading impression that Philo freely vacillates from one philosophical *opinion* to another, with no underlying commitment to one philosophical *orientation* over another. Philo's "eclectic" philosophical mix is instead best understood as a reflection of his Middle Platonism; but without this insight Wolfson's study cannot provide an adequate understanding of Philo's philosophical perspective.⁶²

In sum, Wolfson offers a substantial discussion of the Tenth Commandment in Philo, but one whose breadth and depth are severely limited due to the relatively minor role it plays within a much larger and more broadly oriented work. His answer to the question of *what*, in Philo's view, the Tenth Commandment prohibits is incorrect, since he limits the scope of ἐπιθυμία to

⁶⁰ Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:231. Wolfson initially emphasizes Stoic provenance: e.g., 2:230: "It is the Stoics . . . whom Philo follows here in the external formulation of his views." . . . "He similarly follows the Stoics . . ."

⁶¹ E.g., Wolfson cites *SVF* for definitions of emotion comparable to *Spec.* 4.79, but he fails to note the significance of the non-Stoic ἄμετρος in Philo's definition (see above, n. 42).

⁶² Cf. Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 182: "My chief thesis (as against such an authority as H.A. Wolfson, for example) is that Philo was not so much constructing for himself an eclectic synthesis of all Greek philosophy, from the Presocratics to Posidonius, as essentially adapting contemporary Alexandrian Platonism, which was itself heavily influenced by Stoicism and Pythagoreanism, to his own exegetical purposes." For a fuller, yet still concise, statement of this position, in which Dillon rejects the misconceptions of (1) Philo as an "eclectic" who (2) merely uses philosophical *language* to serve exegetical aims, see his preface to *Philo of Alexandria: The Contemplative Life, The Giants, and Selections* (trans. and intro. David Winston; CWS; Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1981), xii-xiii. See also David Winston's introduction (*idem*, 1-37), in which he accepts Philo's views as "Middle Platonist, that is, a highly Stoicized form of Platonism, streaked with Neopythagorean concerns" (3).

only desire for what belongs to another person. Nor does he answer the question of how someone observes the Tenth Commandment, although he provides the proper context for an answer—namely, the acquisition, development, and exercise of ἐγκράτεια. Finally, his comments on the nature and function of ἐπιθυμία, although helpful at times, fail to represent Philo's relationship with Greek philosophy properly.

Kathy L. Gaca

In her book *The Making of Fornication*, Kathy Gaca includes a chapter on Philo that deals in part with his understanding of the abbreviated Tenth Commandment.⁶³ While the broad scope of her work precludes an exhaustive treatment of Philo's exposition, Gaca nevertheless presents a sustained and virtually self-contained study of Philo's interpretation of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, offering summary conclusions and a bold thesis about Philo's notion of forbidden desire.⁶⁴ Taking all three of the relevant text units into account (*Decal.* 142-53, 173-74; *Spec.* 4.78b-131), she addresses not only the question of *what*, in Philo's view, the Commandment prohibits, but also but also *how* someone observes the Commandment, including an explanation of how the dietary laws promote its

⁶³ Chapter seven ["Philo's Reproductive City of God"] in *The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity* (HCS 40; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 190-217. Pages 193-99 deal directly with the Tenth Commandment.

⁶⁴ See esp. her section titled "Philo's Revolutionary Conception of Forbidden Desire" (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 194-204). The aim of her book is "to resolve an important philosophical and historical problem about the making of sexual morality in Western culture: Do the patristic sexual rules of second-century Christianity differ notably from the Greek philosophical sexual principles that the patristic writers used to help formulate their own? Alternatively, are these Christian rules in unison with the Greek philosophical basis that they claim to have" (1). Her interest in Philo lies mainly in his contribution to the sexual ethics of "Christian Platonism" (see 193-94, along with her study of Clement of Alexandria in 247-72).

observance.⁶⁵ In one important general respect Gaca's work breaks new ground and sets a worthy standard: in her consideration of Philo's view of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, she takes seriously the idea that he is a Middle Platonist, consistently bearing in mind his debt to Plato and his acceptance of Platonic doctrines pertinent to an analysis of ἐπιθυμία.⁶⁶ But in her analysis of Philo's view, Gaca misconstrues the textual data, misreading a number of passages and failing to mention others that would readily disprove her claims.⁶⁷ For this reason, and because her study proposes a definitive—but incorrect—account of how Philo understands the Tenth Commandment, it deserves a detailed review.

Stated in its broadest terms, Gaca's thesis is that Philo's explanation of the abbreviated Tenth Commandment combines two elements into one innovative "Jewish Middle Platonist notion of forbidden desire"—namely, (1) "the Hellenistic Jewish concern about the desire (ἐπιθυμία) to disobey God's laws" and (2) "the Middle Platonist problem of excessive physical appetites (ἐπιθυμῖαι)

⁶⁵ Gaca does not quote Philo at length, but she does refer to passages from all three units of his exposition, indicating her awareness of the extent of his treatment. Her references take into account esp. *Decal.* 142, 173-174 and *Spec.* 4.78, 85, 87-96, 100-118.

⁶⁶ On Gaca's concept of Philo as a "Jewish Middle Platonist," see *Making of Fornication*, 191, n. 2. Although her conclusions are problematic, Gaca's *approach* is commendable in several respects. For example, she brings a Platonic psychological model to bear on the textual data of Philo's exposition, relating his discussion of ἐπιθυμία to Plato's theory that there is in the soul a distinct, non-rational source of ἐπιθυμία—i.e., [τὸ] ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν [εἶδος] (*Resp.* 439 D; NB *Spec.* 4.92-94 [cf. *Tim.* 70 D-E]). Moreover, she notes key implications of Plato's theory, such as one's inability to remove appetitive ἐπιθυμία entirely and the consequent importance of its *moderation* (e.g., *Making of Fornication*, 197). Gaca also understands that Philo's Middle Platonism involves the reinvention of Stoic terms and definitions: "The Stoic definitions of the passions that Philo uses are thus like a label that at first glance looks Stoic, but the contents have changed" (201). Gaca's understanding of exactly *how* Philo changes the contents is problematic, but this statement as such is correct.

⁶⁷ Cf. David Runia's review of *The Making of Fornication* in *SPhA* 17 (2005): 237-43, esp. 241-43. Runia's summary assessment of Gaca's study includes a caveat: "[B]ecause its method of analyzing and interpreting texts is flawed, it is to be used with caution" (243).

for the pleasures of food, drink, and especially sexual activity, contrary to reason's judicious sense of moderation."⁶⁸ What this means is that Philo follows a broader exegetical trend within Hellenistic Judaism to treat the Tenth Commandment as an abbreviated, two-word prohibition (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις), but he does *not* follow the standard line of interpretation, which takes the prohibition to mean "that it is wrong or sinful even to desire to act contrary to God's will."⁶⁹ Instead, Philo follows Plato's conviction that uncontrolled appetitive desire, especially sexual desire, corrupts individuals and societies, and for this reason

⁶⁸ See Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 194-95. Stated differently: "He reinterprets Platonic appetite—and sexual desire foremost—in light of the Hellenistic Jewish prohibition against the desire (ἐπιθυμία) to disobey God's will" (197). Gaca frames her thesis as a matter of sexual ethics: "Philo's sexual principles are part of an innovative agenda for social order that borrows from Plato and the Pentateuch, makes sense only in relation to both, and yet represents neither without noteworthy transformation. This is especially true for Philo's reinterpretation of the problems Plato sees with sexual desire, which Philo presents in his take on the aphoristic version of the Tenth Commandment: 'You will not desire' (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις). In Philo's synthesis, forbidden desire (ἐπιθυμία) in the Hellenistic Jewish sense, which signifies any inclination to defy God's will, becomes primarily sexual in light of Plato's conviction that uncontrolled desire (ἐπιθυμία) for sexual pleasure is the single biggest source of individual and social corruption" (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 193).

⁶⁹ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 153. See 153-54 for Gaca's idea of a "Hellenistic Jewish variant on the Septuagint Tenth Commandment." In her discussion of Philo, Gaca speaks of "the Hellenistic Jewish Tenth Commandment in its two more traditional forms," by which she means (a) the LXX version itself (Exod 20:17 [=Deut 5:21]) and (b) the abbreviated version οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, which omits the list of direct objects (198). She believes that Paul and Philo's citations of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις serve as evidence for a hypothetical *tertium quid*—namely, an exegetical tradition that *influenced* these two authors. Her supposition involves first the claim that prior to Philo, who in fact offers the earliest extant citation of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (see above, n. 37), one or more unidentified Hellenistic Jewish exegetes chose to make an abbreviated Tenth Commandment their object of inquiry. This is of course plausible, but the alternate supposition that Philo himself was the first to cite and interpret οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις is equally plausible and less speculative. After all, his is the most extensive extant commentary on the abbreviated version and—contingent on unknown facts regarding the publication of his Exposition of the Law—is as likely as any to have been the seminal work. Be that as it may, Gaca goes on to attribute a standard line of interpretation to this already hypothetical exegetical tradition. Οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, the "newer prohibition" offered by the tradition, means "that it is wrong or sinful even to desire to act contrary to God's will" (153). Gaca's view problematically requires Philo to creatively modify a tradition for which no evidence exists, at least in terms of an extant text that cites οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, then explicitly offers the interpretive conclusion "that it is wrong or sinful even to desire to act contrary to God's will." (On 152 Gaca cites "a broader Hellenistic Jewish and early Christian trend that stresses the danger of rebellious impulses very stringently"; but this broader trend—even if it did exist—does not constitute evidence for the exegetical trend that Gaca posits.)

he interprets οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις as a divine injunction to control appetitive, especially sexual, desire.

This last idea, that Philo's Tenth Commandment deals especially with sexual desire, deserves careful attention, since it in effect answers the question of *what* the Commandment prohibits. Ultimately, this idea derives from a reasonable but false assumption on Gaca's part that Philo imports without modification a certain concept of desire found in Plato's writings—a concept she outlines in an earlier chapter of her study.⁷⁰ Taken for granted, this assumption drives an almost syllogistic logic that informs much of what Gaca has to say about Philo's view of the Tenth Commandment: (a) when Plato thinks of ἐπιθυμία and its dangerous propensity for excess, he has in mind physical appetites, *especially* the sexual appetite; (b) when Philo thinks of the Commandment οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, he has in mind Plato's concept of ἐπιθυμία and its dangerous propensity for excess, therefore (c) Philo has in mind physical appetites, *especially* the sexual appetite. A number of sweeping claims ensue:

Philo reinterprets this commandment in a Platonic spirit that is very much in keeping with "nothing in excess," as though οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις meant "you will restrain your physical appetites from becoming excessive," the sexual appetite especially. By οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις in this sense, God too teaches the Platonic doctrine that depravity is grounded primarily in the

⁷⁰ See Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 26-41, esp. 32-33. The accuracy of Gaca's reading of Plato on this point bears only secondary importance, since the question is what *Philo* has to say about desire in his exposition of the Tenth Commandment. Even if she has correctly understood Plato's concept of appetitive desire, this concept must not serve *automatically* as the interpretive lens for Philo's understanding of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις without proof that Philo too is employing the same concept. This is especially true if Philo, as Gaca admits, is a Middle Platonist, which implies that he would have employed "Platonic" concepts that had been modified in significant respects in light of philosophical developments postdating Plato.

unrestrained sexual appetite and its progeny of vices. (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 196)

Or similarly:

In God's social order these iniquities would become a thing of the past, so long as the people heed the commandment οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις by getting their appetitive urges under control, especially sexual desire. (Idem)⁷¹

Gaca frames these statements carefully, avoiding the claim that οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις deals *exclusively* with sexual desire. She does, after all, understand that the basic operation of Plato's ἐπιθυμητικόν involves desires also for food and drink.⁷² But in some instances there is no clear acknowledgement of the relevance of non-sexual desire(s) within the Commandment's purview: "Philo's Tenth Commandment is innovative as a Decalogue rule because it valorizes sexual desire as the main source of all wickedness."⁷³ In other instances, particularly in concluding summaries of her argument, there is no indication that anything *but* sexual desire lies within the proscriptive range of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις:

Though Philo supports Plato's argument that uncontrolled sexual desire is the primary and most incorrigible source of all vices, he identifies the

⁷¹ The "iniquities" Gaca has in mind appear in *Republic* 575 B. In her view, Philo cites this passage in *Spec.* 4.87 (certainly an allusion, but Philo's χρεωκοπίας τε καὶ παρακαταθηκῶν ἀρνήσεσι has no parallel in the *Republic* passage) to illustrate "proliferating vices that he attributes to breaking his version of the Tenth Commandment" (196). But in *Spec.* 4.87, Philo explicitly considers desire directed at "money" (χρήματα), not sexual or even appetitive desire per se. Plato *does* consider χρήματα an object of appetitive desire (see *Resp.* 580 E), but Philo's inclusion of other objects of ἐπιθυμία, like "reputation" (δόξα), which Plato does *not* associate with appetitive desire, proves that ἐπιθυμία in his exposition must be conceived more broadly.

⁷² E.g., Plato cites thirst to illustrate the distinction between rational and appetitive elements within the soul (see *Resp.* 439 A-E; cf. 437 D: "[S]hall we say that the desires (ἐπιθυμιῶν) constitute a class and that the most conspicuous members of that class are what we call thirst and hunger?' 'We shall,' said he" [trans. Paul Shorey] [unless otherwise noted, all translations of Plato's writings are from the Loeb Classical Library]).

⁷³ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 198. Also: "Philo's version of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, however, prohibits unrestrained sexual desire as the primary religious defiance and corruption in the city of God" (198).

Hellenistic Jewish notion of desiring to disobey God (ἐπιθυμία) *with the Platonic sexual appetite* (ἐπιθυμία). (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 297; emphasis added)⁷⁴

Gaca clearly has an answer to the question of what Philo's Tenth Commandment prohibits. Although she ostensibly points to "excessive appetitive desire," she in fact has appetitive *sexual* desire in mind.⁷⁵

But the idea that Philo's concept of desire in his exposition is exclusively—or even primarily—sexual is incorrect, since Philo associates οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις with a generic desire involving any number of different objects, none of which looms any larger than another in the Commandment's theoretically limitless proscriptive range.⁷⁶ In fact, the idea that οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις deals with a *specific* desire of any type is inherently implausible, because Philo believes that the Ten

⁷⁴ Cf. 216, where Philo is said to identify "the Platonic notion of sexual desire (ἐπιθυμία) with the Hellenistic Jewish concern about the inherently wrongful impulse (ἐπιθυμία) to transgress God's laws. He makes this identification most notably through his Jewish Middle Platonist explanation of the commandment against forbidden desire (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις)" (emphasis added). Also 23: "[Plato] would have needed an interpreter to understand how the problems that he associates with uncontrolled sexual desire were written into the Tenth Commandment that Philo and Clement produced."

⁷⁵ This exclusive focus is confirmed by Gaca's construal of the Mosaic dietary laws, which in her view do not ultimately regulate appetitive desires for food and drink, but instead target the Tenth Commandment's real concern—*sexual* desire: "Philo regards Moses' dietary laws as the one sure regimen that reduces sexual desire and thereby subdues its offspring of vices" (*Making of Fornication*, 196).

⁷⁶ On this point there seems to be virtually unanimous agreement among commentators, with the exception of Gaca. For example, Colson (PLCL 7, 76, n. c): "Philo extends the meaning of the word from covetousness of what is another's to desire in general"; Mosès (PAPM 25, 17, n.1): Philo's version of the Tenth Commandment "n'admet pas de contenu véritable, puisque le désir est lui-même coupe de tout objet précis"; Williamson (*Philo*, 267): "Philo . . . extends the meaning of a desire to include its most general sense." Even Wolfson (2:228), who needlessly specifies "desire for that which belongs to another person," nevertheless acknowledges that "Philo speaks of desire in general, that is, of a desire for what we have not." On the concept of generic desire, note esp. *Migr.* 155: "It is this mixed multitude which takes delight not in a few species of desire only (μὴ μόνον ὀλίγοις εἶδεσιν ἐπιθυμίας χαίρων), but claims to leave out nothing at all, that it may follow after desire's entire genus (γένος), including all its species (ὧς πᾶν εἶδος ἐμφέρεται)" (substituting "desire" [ἐπιθυμία] and "desire's" [ἐπιθυμίας] for Colson's "lusting" and "lust's," neither of which the context supports).

Commandments are all generic summaries.⁷⁷ Philo's commentary consistently reflects his underlying belief in a prohibition of desire able to subsume any and all specific types. For example, in *Spec.* 4.80 Philo identifies this most troublesome passion simply as "desire for what we do not have" (ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀπόντων).⁷⁸ When Philo goes on to associate this desire with specific aims, he is merely illustrating its troublesome nature, noting that it creates savage hunger and thirst, "but not for something to fill the void in their bellies—they hunger for money, fame, power, voluptuous bodies, or any of the countless other things that seem to them enviable and worthy of struggle" (*Spec.* 4.82; my translation).⁷⁹ As this list indicates, sexual desire is not foremost in Philo's mind, nor even appetitive desire per se.⁸⁰ At most, sexual desire forms a part, but only a small part, of

⁷⁷ NB *Spec.* 4.78b: "[L]et us go on to the last of the Ten Words (δέκα λογίων), which like each of the rest was delivered in the form of a summary (κεφαλαιώδει τύπω καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον): 'Your shall not desire'" (my translation). Note also the following descriptions of the Ten Commandments: *Cong.* 120: γενικὰ κεφάλαια; *Her.* 167: τῶν γενικῶν δέκα νόμων; *Her.* 173: γενικοὶ . . . κανόνες.

⁷⁸ Philo's immediate specification of "things which seem good, though they are not truly good" (ὅσα τῷ δοκεῖν ἀγαθῶν, πρὸς ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ὄντων) mitigates the generic sense of ἐπιθυμία somewhat but still allows for most any particular "good" object (cf. the parallel passage in *Decal.* 146: ἐπειδὴν δὲ λαβῶν τις ἔννοιαν ἀγαθοῦ μὴ παρόντος ὀρέγεται τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ). Of course, when Philo turns to the Tenth Commandment's particular laws (dietary laws) the desire for food and drink are singled out, but in a *paradigmatic*, not absolute, sense (see *Spec.* 4.96).

⁷⁹ Cf. *Spec.* 4.86-91.

⁸⁰ In fact, Gaca's proposal that ἐπιθυμία in Philo's exposition refers specifically to Platonic appetitive desire (a function of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) collapses with the mention in *Spec.* 4.82 of δόξα (cf. §88) and ἡγεμονία (cf. ἀρχή in §89)—which represent, in Plato's own reckoning, ambitions of the spirited part of the soul, τὸ θυμοειδές. E.g., *Resp.* 581 A-B: "[D]o we not say that [τὸ θυμοειδές] is wholly set on predominance (τὸ κρατεῖν) and victory (νικᾶν) and good repute (εὐδοκιμεῖν)?' 'Yes indeed.' 'And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part (φιλόνηκον) and that which is covetous of honour (φιλότιμον)?' 'Most appropriately.'" (On τὸ θυμοειδές see John Cooper, "Plato's Theory of Human Motivation," in *Reason and Emotion* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999], 118-37, esp. 130-36; repr. from *HPhQ* 1 [1984].) Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 92-93, notes: "Als Gegenstand des Begehrens werden fast durchweg die Strebungen, die Platon von dem zweiten und dritten Selltenteil aussagt, zusammengefaßt." This conflation of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν and τὸ θυμοειδές makes sense in light of Middle-Platonic moral psychology, which was influenced by Aristotle's concept of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός as two types of

Philo's overall concept of desire with respect to the Tenth Commandment.⁸¹ Not only do Philo's words fail to support the claim that οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις targets sexual desire—they positively refute it.

Naturally, this raises the question of where and how Gaca finds textual support for her idea that the desire proscribed by Philo's Tenth Commandment is primarily sexual. She asserts that "Philo accepts Plato's theory of the irrational physical appetites *as well as his position that the sexual appetite is the most domineering and recalcitrant of the lot*" (emphasis added), citing *Spec.* 4.92-94 to support her claim:⁸²

Finally, they determined that desire must reside in the area around the navel known as the "diaphragm" (ἐπιθυμία δὲ τὸν περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον διάφραγμα χώρον). Since desire has the least to do with reason (ἤκιστα μετέχουσιν λογισμοῦ), it clearly must reside as far as possible from reason's royal domain—practically at the outskirts. Naturally, the pasture of this most insatiable and licentious of beasts (πάντων

ἔρεξις, which both belonged to a single faculty of the soul, the ὀρεκτικόν (see P. A. Vander Waerdt: "The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato's Tripartite Psychology," *GRBS* 26 [1985]: 283-302 and "Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral Psychology," *GRBS* 26 [1985]: 373-94; cf. Charles Kahn, "Plato's Theory of Desire," *RM* 41 [1987]: 77-103, 78-80).

⁸¹ The passage in Philo's exposition that pertains to sexual desire appears in *Spec.* 4.89: "If the object [of desire] is bodily beauty they are seducers (φθορεῖς), adulterers (μοιχοῦς), pederasts (παιδεραστάς), cultivators of incontinence and lewdness (ἀκολασίας καὶ λαγνείας ζηλωτάς), as though these worst of evils were the best of blessings." In *Decal.* 168-69, Philo has in mind the very same types of immoral sexual behavior, but he is commenting on a different Commandment, the κεφάλαιον τὸ κατὰ μοιχῶν, "under which come many enactments against seducers (φθορέων) and pederasty (παιδεραστῶν), against dissolute living (τῶν λαγνίστερον βιούντων) and indulgence in lawless and licentious forms of intercourse (ὀμιλίαις τε καὶ μίξεσιν ἐκνόμοις καὶ ἀκόλαστοις χρωμένων)." The lack of commentary on sexual matters in Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment is best explained by his having already dealt with such matters in his exposition of the Sixth Commandment, which governs the obviously sexual transgression of adultery. The preeminence of the *Sixth* Commandment, not the Tenth, in Philo's consideration of sexual ethics is correctly noted by Baudouin Decharneux, "Interdits sexuels dans l'œuvre de Philon d'Alexandrie dit 'Le Juif,'" *Religion et Tabou Sexuel* (ed. Jacques Marx; *PHR* 1; Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1990), 17-31, esp. 18-25.

⁸² See Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 195. Presumably, *Spec.* 4.92-94 is the textual evidence Gaca has in mind, since it is the only passage she cites in the paragraph other than *Decal* 173-74, which for her serves only to prove that "appetites are an unavoidable part of our human and animal nature."

ἀπληστότατον καὶ ἀκολαστότατον οὖσαν θρεμμάτων) is the area of the body associated with primal drives for food and sex (ἐμβόσκεσθι τόποις, ἐν οἷς τροφαί τε καὶ ὀχεῖαι). (*Spec* 4.93-94)⁸³

Philo clearly marks in this passage the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν as the seat of primal drives for food and sex, but this is ultimately nothing more than an endorsement of Plato's tripartite psychology.⁸⁴ By itself, this passage does not prove that Philo saw οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις primarily as a restriction of sexual desire. In fact, not one of the passages Gaca cites reflects a special emphasis on sexual appetite in Philo's exposition. She claims that he agrees with Plato that:

[t]he sexual appetite and reproductive urge, when fattened and left to their own devices, are the main root of depraved minds and social mores because they stimulate a proliferation of other passions. (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 195)

To support this claim, she cites *Spec*. 4.85 as follows: "Sexual eros is 'the passion at the origin of wrongdoing' (ἀρχέκακον πάθος) (*Spec* 4.85)."⁸⁵ But a fuller citation shows that Gaca misreads Philo's statement:

For the passion to which the name of originator of evil can truly be given is desire (τό. . . ἀρχέκακον πάθος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία), of which one and that the smallest fruit the passion of love (ἧς ἐν τῷ βραχύτατον ἔγγονον, ἔρωος) has not only once but often in the past filled the whole world with countless calamities (συμφορῶν) . . . (*Spec*. 4.85)

⁸³ My translation. Cf. *Tim*. 70 D – 71 A. On the relation of *Spec*. 4.92-94 to the *Timaeus* account, see Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 304.

⁸⁴ NB λόγος, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία in *Spec*. 4.92. Gaca may be justified in her suggestion that Philo here endorses "Plato's theory of the irrational physical appetites" (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 195), but Philo says nothing about "[Plato's] position that the sexual appetite is the most domineering and recalcitrant of the lot." Gaca assumes that a reference to the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν mentioning its characteristic appetites proves ipso facto that Philo holds a highly sexualized concept of ἐπιθυμία throughout his exposition.

⁸⁵ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 195.

The ἀρχέκακον πάθος in this passage is clearly ἐπιθυμία (desire involving *any* object), not "sexual eros" as Gaca states.⁸⁶ Philo does identify ἔρωσ as an "offspring" (ἔγγονον) of ἐπιθυμία, but nothing in the passage requires even *this* word to have a sexual connotation.⁸⁷ Gaca also misconstrues the phrase ἀπάντων πηγῆ τῶν κακῶν (*Spec.* 4.84), which she cites four times. The "spring of all vices" is indeed ἐπιθυμία, but in light of *Spec.* 4.82 (esp. ἄλλων ἀμυθήτων) it must be understood as desire involving any number of possible objects—not sexual desire, or even appetitive desire per se. Gaca first misunderstands the sense when she states that "physical appetition in general" (ἐπιθυμία) is "the origin of all wrongdoing,"⁸⁸ then she provides in each subsequent reference to *Spec.* 4.84 a different rendering of ἐπιθυμία:

⁸⁶ Thus, for example, Méasson, *Char ailé*, 154: "Philon analyse d'abord le désir en lui-même et, *sans référence à aucun objet*, le définit: ἀρχέκακον πάθος, «la passion qui est le principe du mal» (§ 85)" (emphasis added). Note also "ἄλλων ἀμυθήτων" in *Spec.* 4.82.

⁸⁷ *Spec.* 4.85 in its entirety shows that the "calamities" (συμφορῶν) Philo has in mind primarily involve warfare. A parallel passage in *Decal.* 152-53 also mentions "calamities" (συμφορῶν) involving warfare, and their source in that passage is the desire (ἐπιθυμία) for money (χρημάτων), glory (δόξης), or pleasure (ἡδονῆς). In general, Gaca fails to note that ἔρωσ in Philo's exposition is not inherently sexual, given Philo's association of ἔρωσ with a variety of objects, as in *Decal.* 151: "Consider the passion whether for money or a woman or glory or anything else that produces pleasure (χρημάτων ἔρωσ ἢ γυναικὸς ἢ δόξης ἢ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ἡδονῆν ἀπεργαζομένων): are the evils which it causes small or casual?" Gaca seems to limit the scope of ἔρωσ, by definition, to sexual desire alone: "Uncontrolled sexual desire, or eros, is especially problematic for Philo and his predecessor Plato" (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 195). This is surprising, since Gaca in an earlier chapter on Platonic desire emphatically notes the difference between "sexual appetite" and "Platonic eros" (see *Making of Fornication*, 36-69). On ἔρωσ in Plato, including its orientation in theory toward *any* object, see David M. Halperin, "Platonic *Erôs* and What Men Call Love," *AP* 5 (1985): 161-204. Gaca faults Halperin's study for "diminish[ing] the opposition" between eros and sexual desire (*Making of Fornication*, 38, n. 53), when in fact he clearly and carefully notes the difference (Halperin, "Platonic *Erôs*," 170-76). Her citation of Halperin, intended to prove his conflation of eros and *sexual* appetite for *sexual* pleasure, fails to take into account his explicit distinction between the terms "appetite" and "desire" (see Halperin, "Platonic *Erôs*," 170). For the more general notion of ἔρωσ in Plato, see esp. *Symp.* 205 D, where it is defined as ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

⁸⁸ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 198.

- "sexual and other appetite" is "the origin of all wrongdoing"⁸⁹
- "innate sexual desire" is "the origin of wrongdoing"⁹⁰
- "eros" is "the origin of wrongdoing"⁹¹

The same word, ἐπιθυμία, from the same passage, receives a progressively more sexual connotation in the course of Gaca's study, without justification or explanation. Gaca can produce no clear evidence for an especially sexual connotation of ἐπιθυμία in Philo's exposition because no such evidence exists. Moreover, the principal evidence she cites (three times) from elsewhere in Philo's corpus, *Opif.* 151-52, is inconclusive.⁹² Although this passage deals with sexual attraction, it has little to say about the kind of ἐπιθυμία Philo envisions when commenting on the Tenth Commandment.⁹³ In fact, this passage does not even contain the word ἐπιθυμία, contrary to Gaca's original citation:

"The irrational appetite" (ἐπιθυμία), and the sexual appetite in particular, "is the beginning of wrongs and violations of the Law" (*Opif* 151-2).⁹⁴

The relevant section in full reads:

And this desire begat bodily pleasure (ὁ δὲ πόθος οὗτος καὶ τὴν τῶν σωμαίων ἡδονὴν ἐγέννησεν), that pleasure which is the beginning of

⁸⁹ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 198: "Philo, however, differs dramatically from Plato by insisting that sexual and other appetite is a 'great and excessive wickedness, truly the origin of all wrongdoing' (*Spec* 4.84)."

⁹⁰ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 200: "For Philo, however, the 'origin of wrongdoing' and 'of violation of the Law' (*Spec* 4.84, *Opif* 151-2) is innate sexual desire and its tendency to excessive pleasure . . ."

⁹¹ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 216: "In support of Plato's political theory, Philo formulates a distinctively Jewish Platonist position that sexual desire is the primary root of rebellion against God. As he phrases this idea, eros is the 'origin of wrongdoing' and 'of violation of the Law' (*Spec* 4.84, *Opif* 151-2)."

⁹² See Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 198, 200, and 216.

⁹³ As part of his commentary on Genesis 1-3, Philo considers the nature and consequences of sexual ἔρωσ between Adam and Eve.

⁹⁴ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 198.

wrongs and violation[s] of the law (ἤτις ἐστὶν ἀδικημάτων καὶ παρανομημάτων ἀρχή), the pleasure for the sake of which men bring on themselves the life of mortality and wretchedness in lieu of that of immortality and bliss. (*Opif.* 152)⁹⁵

Clearly, the passage states that "bodily pleasure" (τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἡδονήν), and not "irrational appetite" (ἐπιθυμία), is ἀδικημάτων καὶ παρανομημάτων ἀρχή.⁹⁶ The pleasure (ἡδονή) mentioned here arguably involves sexual ἐπιθυμία, but the word ἐπιθυμία simply does not appear, and applying this passage to Philo's commentary on the Tenth Commandment is unwarranted. Gaca is unable, with this or any other passage, to demonstrate that Philo sees οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις mainly as a proscription of sexual desire, or that he anywhere in his exposition singles out sexual desire as especially problematic over against any other type.

Because her study misidentifies *what* the Commandment prohibits, its explanation of *how* someone observes the Commandment, particularly the role played by the dietary laws, is also incorrect. According to Gaca, and in keeping with her overall emphasis, the dietary laws for Philo ultimately target sexual

⁹⁵ The "desire" mentioned here is πόθος, which—like ἔρωσ, also in *Opif.* 152—need not have a sexual connotation, although it clearly does in this case. Cf. *Opif.* 5: ἔρωτι καὶ πόθῳ σοφίας; *Ebr.* 21: πόθος ἀρετῆς; *Fug.* 164: πόθον ἐπιστήμης; *Decal.* 148: πόθῳ τοῦ τρανωθῆναι ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τὸν ἦχον.

⁹⁶ Philo's comments in this passage reflect a much broader treatment, attested throughout his works, of pleasure (ἡδονή) as a moral danger. On Philo's view of pleasure, see esp. Alain Le Boulluec, "La place des concepts philosophiques dans la réflexion de Philon sur le plaisir," in *Philon d'Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie* (ed. Carlos Lévy; Turnhout: Brepolis, 1998), 129-52; also Peter Booth, "The Voice of the Serpent: Philo's Epicureanism," in *Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World* (ed. Wendy E. Helleman; Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 159-72; Francesca Calabi, "Il serpente e il cavaliere: piacere e 'sophrosyne' in Filone di Alessandria" *ASR* 8 (2003): 199-215; Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 92-93; Graziano Ranocchia, "Moses against the Egyptian: The Anti-Epicurean Polemic in Philo," in *Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy* (ed. Francesca Alesse; SPhA 5; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 75-102, esp. 88-100.

desire.⁹⁷ Since a dangerous causal link exists between unrestrained eating and unrestrained sexual desire (which in turn causes a proliferation of other vices), dietary laws that restrict food intake restrict also sexual desire and thus limit the vicious behavior associated with sexual excess.⁹⁸ But nowhere in Philo's discussion of the dietary laws (*Spec.* 4.96-131) is sexual desire mentioned, much less cited as the ultimate concern. This again calls into question Gaca's treatment of Philo's text—*what* does she claim to find and *where*. She refers to *Spec.* 4.96, where Philo states the rationale of the dietary laws from Moses' perspective, but she misinterprets his statement:

Moses thus "began to train and chastise the appetite centered on the belly" (*Spec.* 4.96), because he knew God's people needed to put their "love-mad" sexual behavior on the right kind of diet (*Spec.* 3.9-10).⁹⁹

According to *Philo*, the reason Moses focused on training the desire "whose field of activity is the belly" (τὴν περὶ γαστέρα πραγματευομένην ἐπιθυμίαν) is so that "the other forms (τὰς ἄλλας) will cease to run riot as before and will be restrained by having learnt that the senior and as it were the leader of their company (τὴν πρεσβυτάτην καὶ ὡς ἡγεμονίδα) is obedient to the laws of temperance" (*Spec.* 4.96). The desire for food and drink is preeminent and

⁹⁷ "Restricting diet is an important part of taming sexual desire for both Philo and Plato. Philo regards Moses' dietary laws as the one sure regimen that reduces sexual desire and thereby subdues its offspring of vices" (Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 196).

⁹⁸ Gaca elsewhere makes the connection between food and sexual desire without explicitly mentioning dietary laws: "Human beings must keep their appetites under rational guard by curbing their wild sexual desire through restricting the intake of food and drink" (*Making of Fornication*, 195). Also: "Sexual eros on Plato's view comes into its own as a raging tyrant once surplus nutriment fuels its voracity. The combined sexual appetite and reproductive urge, when fattened and left to their own devices, are the main root of depraved minds and social mores because they stimulate a proliferation of other passions. Philo fully agrees with Plato on this matter" (idem).

⁹⁹ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 196.

serves as a "paradigmatic instruction" (παραδειγματικῆ διδασκαλίᾳ in 4.96), whose training is applicable to any other form of desire, including—but certainly neither limited nor especially pertinent to—sexual desire. Gaca omits the second half of Philo's sentence in *Spec.* 4.96, which contains *his* understanding of the rationale for training dietary desires, and substitutes a different rationale based on a passage from a different treatise, which has no direct application to Philo's discussion of the Tenth Commandment.¹⁰⁰ As for prohibited animals, Gaca understands Philo to say that Moses "knew that the prohibited types of animal flesh, such as pork, are particularly laced with an aphrodisiac surplus (*Spec.* 4.100-18)."¹⁰¹ But Philo says nothing of the sort in *Spec.* 4.100-18. He does say that Moses prohibited animals "whose flesh is the finest and fattest, thus titillating and exciting the malignant foe pleasure (τὴν ἐπίβουλον ἡδονήν) . . . knowing that they set a trap for the most slavish of the senses, the taste (γεῦσιν), and produce gluttony, an evil very dangerous both to soul and body" (*Spec.* 4.100).¹⁰² Without exploring here the full import of this statement for Philo's understanding of the dietary laws, it is enough to note that the sensory pleasure involved is gustatory, not sexual.¹⁰³ Gaca notes also Philo's summary statement concerning Moses'

¹⁰⁰ Philo's comments in *Spec.* 3.9-10 pertain, as he explicitly states, to the *Sixth* Commandment, the first in the second table (see *Spec.* 3.1-8).

¹⁰¹ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 196. Gaca essentially considers only Philo's discussion of prohibited animals (*Spec.* 4.100-18), leaving out *Spec.* 4.119-31, a section that also treats particular laws falling under the rubric οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις.

¹⁰² Presumably, this is the passage Gaca has in mind, since Philo immediately gives the example of pork in *Spec.* 4.101 and Gaca mentions pork explicitly when citing this passage.

¹⁰³ In any case, the context suggests that Philo's interest is in Moses' proscriptive cultivation of self-control (NB *Spec.* 4.101: πρὸς . . . ἐγκράτειαν), not the avoidance of "aphrodisiac surplus." Isaak Heinemann, commenting on this passage, correctly notes this interest on Philo's part: "Nach SpL. IV 100 ff. will Moses durch seine Speisegesetze vor allem zur

prohibition of various animals, that "by this as by the withdrawal of fuel from a fire he creates an extinguisher to desire (σβέσιν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας)" (*Spec.* 4.118).¹⁰⁴

But this has no explicit bearing on sexual desire, unless the term ἐπιθυμία is presumed to have an especially sexual connotation in *Spec.* 4.96-131, which it does not. In fact, due to an overemphasis on sexual desire, Gaca overlooks the fundamental role of the dietary laws from Philo's perspective, which is to promote self-control (ἐγκράτεια)—initially with respect to desire(s) for food and drink, but ultimately with respect to desires of any type.¹⁰⁵

Despite their respective contributions, the studies of Wolfson and Gaca, along with other shorter, incidental treatments of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, fail to answer with sufficient depth or accuracy the fundamental interpretive questions surrounding Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment. As a result, this important aspect of Philo's thought remains obscure.

Selbstbeherrschung anregen; daher sind gerade besonders wohlschmeckende Tiere verboten, wie das Schwein" (*Philons Griechische und Jüdische Bildung* [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962], 163).

¹⁰⁴ Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 196.

¹⁰⁵ Other considerations of the dietary laws in Philo, which to various extents emphasize the importance of ἐγκράτεια without finding any special concern with sexual desire on his part, include Norman Bentwich, *Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1910), 123-24; Peder Borgen, *Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time* (NovTSup 86; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 168-69; Mireille Hadas-Lebel, *Philon D'Alexandrie: Un penseur en diaspora* (Paris: Fayard, 2003), 159-62; Richard Hecht, "Patterns of Exegesis in Philo's Interpretation of Leviticus," *SPh* 6 (1979-80): 77-155, esp. 108-15; Heinemann, *Bildung*, 155-66; Houston, "Dietary Laws," 144-47; Alan Mendelson, *Philo's Jewish Identity* (BJS 161; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 67-71; Niehoff, *Philo on Jewish Identity*, 105-06; James Rhodes, "Diet and Desire: The Logic of the Dietary Laws According to Philo," *ETL* 79 (2003): 122-33; Karl Olav Sandnes, *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles* (SNTSMS 120; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 128-29; Cristina Termini, "Philo's Thought within the Context of Middle Judaism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 95-123, esp. 119-21 [= "The Dietary Laws"]; Giovanni Maria Vian, "Purità e culto nell'esegesi giudaico-ellenistica," *ASE* 13 (1996): 67-84, esp. 78-80.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapters two and three of this dissertation do not deal directly with Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment. Instead, they offer an introductory survey of terms and concepts that Philo uses in that exposition, situating his moral psychology within the philosophical context of Middle Platonism.¹⁰⁶ Chapter two treats Philo's concept of desire (ἐπιθυμία), including explanations of its source, nature, function, and problematic *malfunction*. Chapter three treats Philo's concept of self-control (ἐγκράτεια), including explanations of its nature, its acquisition through ἄσκησις, and its role in the proper management of desire. With this conceptual backdrop in place, Philo's exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις emerges more clearly as a thoughtful, coherent statement of his ethical theory.

Chapter four focuses directly on Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment, *Spec.* 4.78b-131, although *Decal.* 142-53 and 173-74 receive consideration in connection with relevant sections of the exposition proper. The goals of this chapter are to provide (1) an outline of the contents of Philo's exposition, (2) a fresh translation of the PCW text, (3) notes on select passages, and (4) commentary on each distinct unit of text.

Chapter five summarizes the results of the dissertation by providing direct and concise answers to the basic questions regarding Philo's exposition:

¹⁰⁶ Without assuming or suggesting that Philo intends to write as a systematic philosopher, chapters two and three nevertheless demonstrate the existence of coherent strands of thought running throughout his exegetical works. Multiple attestation, based on a broad reading of Philo's works, confirms the reliability of these strands as accurate representations of his thought.

1. In Philo's view, *what* does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? (All desire? A certain type? What type?)

2. In Philo's view, *how* is the Tenth Commandment observed? (What are the mechanics of its observance? What role do the dietary laws play in its observance?)

Chapter five also suggests lines of further research based on the results of this investigation.

CHAPTER TWO

PHILO ON DESIRE (ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ)

INTRODUCTION

Understanding Philo's exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις depends on a clear understanding of his concept of ἐπιθυμία, including its source, nature, function, and problematic *malfunction*. Philo's concept of ἐπιθυμία depends in turn on his broader concept of the soul, in particular his *moral psychology*—his understanding of how various elements of the soul's structure and function relate to questions of morality. This chapter begins with a survey of the basic moral psychology of Philo's Middle-Platonic contemporaries, especially their concept of a fundamental bipartition between rational and non-rational components within the soul and their concept of various non-rational capacities whose normal operation includes instances of ἐπιθυμία. Next comes a survey of *Philo's* moral psychology, with a special emphasis on the correspondence between contemporary Middle-Platonic views and his own understanding of both bipartition and the various capacities involved with ἐπιθυμία. The chapter ends with a consideration of how Philo views the *malfunction* of ἐπιθυμία in the soul, identifying two grades of problematic desire—passionate and tyrannical desire—analyzed in light of contemporary Middle Platonism.

PHILO'S MIDDLE-PLATONIC CONTEMPORARIES

As a *de facto* Middle Platonist, Philo reflects the views of his Middle-Platonic contemporaries, in particular Eudorus of Alexandria (fl. ca. 25 B.C.) and his associates.¹ As representatives of a movement known for its renewed interest in the doctrines of Plato, Middle Platonists naturally derived fundamental convictions from the writings of Plato himself, but to rely solely on Plato and project his views onto later Platonists without qualification ignores centuries of philosophical activity postdating Plato.² For this reason, Middle-Platonic evidence

¹ On the notion of a "*de facto* Middle Platonist," see above, page 15, n. 40. In the afterward to his 1996, revised edition of *The Middle Platonists*, John Dillon reviews his position on the relation between Philo and Eudorus: "Despite my cautionary remarks, I have been repeatedly accused (or worse, commended), for presenting Philo as a pupil of Eudorus, and as a Middle Platonist. Let me make it clear once again that I wish to make neither claim. There is no evidence that Philo had ever heard of Eudorus (though I regard it as very probable that he did). All I would claim is that *Philo shows the influence of a brand of Platonism that is in many ways close to that of Eudorus, and the he constitutes good evidence for prevailing trends in contemporary Platonism.*" (*Middle Platonists*, 438-39; emphasis added). On the relation between Philo and the Alexandrian Platonism of Eudorus, see also Mauro Bonazzi, "Towards Transcendence: Philo and the Renewal of Platonism in the Early Imperial Age," in *Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy* (ed. Francesca Alesse; SPhA 5; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 233-51. On Eudorus himself, see John Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 115-35, 436-39; also Heinrich Dörrie, "Der Platoniker Eudorus von Alexandria," in *Platonica Minora* (STA 8; München: W. Fink, 1976), 297-309. For fragments of his work, see esp. Mazz.

² For example, Middle Platonists adapted Stoic technical terms, infusing them with new meaning for use within their fundamentally different system of thought, and a failure to appreciate this leads to a false impression of their incoherent *adoption* of the Stoic principles underlying those terms. When Eudorus expounded a dogmatic Platonism in the first century B.C. (after the Academy's skeptical phase), an elaborate lexicon of Stoic terms and definitions, with an accompanying conceptual vocabulary, had already been systematically formulated. Rather than creating *de novo* an alternative system, with its own terms, definitions, etc., Middle Platonists chose to revise the system at hand, creating distinctively *Platonic* understandings of *Stoic* philosophical language. This was especially true in the field of ethics (e.g., the topic of "passions" [πάθη], including ἐπιθυμία) and moral psychology. On this aspect of Middle-Platonic ethics, note Dörrie, "Eudorus," 301-03 (e.g., 302: "Der Platonismus konnte hier [Ethik] nirgends aus dem Vollen schöpfen wie in der Physik und der Theologie"; 303: "Die bloße Einteilung der Ethik konnte niemanden befriedigen—jetzt galt es, den neuen platonischen Inhalt in diese alte Form zu gießen"); also Giovanni Reale, *The Schools of the Imperial Age* (vol. 4 of *A History of Ancient Philosophy*; ed. and trans. John R. Catan; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 233: "The eclectic character of Middle Platonic ethics has frequently been emphasized, for in addition to Platonic tenets Middle Platonists saw no difficulty in accepting Aristotelian as well as

must act as a guide—confirming, supplementing, and modifying what can be otherwise known from the Platonic dialogues. And enough evidence exists to reconstruct the basic moral psychology and corresponding concept of ἐπιθυμία held by Alexandrian Middle Platonists of Philo's day, based—in addition to the extant fragments from Eudorus himself (Mazz.)—on the following sources:

ARIUS DIDYMUS³ (b. ca. 75 B.C.): Arius was a Stoic philosopher, probably a native of Alexandria and personal acquaintance of Eudorus.⁴ He composed surveys of contemporary philosophical views, including Eudorus and certain "Platonic philosophers" (οἱ κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφοῦντες [*Eclog.* 38.14-15]). Information on this *group* of philosophers (*Eclog.* 37.18 – 38.15) bears special importance, since it most likely depicts contemporary Alexandrian (Middle-)Platonists, and it summarizes principal tenets of their moral psychology, providing crucial evidence for an otherwise unattested aspect of Eudoran Middle Platonism.⁵

Stoic doctrines. A great deal of evidence could be brought forward as proof of this assertion. Nevertheless, *that the Middle Platonists only rarely accepted the results after Plato which are opposed to the Platonic spirit has not been adequately appreciated.* In fact, in the great majority of cases they reinterpret and ground again the new results according to the Platonic spirit" (original emphasis). Cf. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 132: "so many of the innovators who looked back beyond Stoic monism to the psychological observations made by Plato and Aristotle continued to use the terminology of the Stoic theory in setting forth their own doctrines"; John Whittaker, "Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire," *ANRW* 36.1: 81-123, 116: "We may in fact conclude that the Stoic element in Middle Platonism, both in the 'Didaskalikos' and elsewhere, is generally of a superficial nature and indicates rather a generous disposition toward Stoic concepts and terminology than a whole-hearted attempt to accommodate Platonism to a Stoic mould."

³ See David E. Hahm, "The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus," *ANRW* 36.4: 2935-3055, 3234-43 (indices).

⁴ Hahm, "Arius Didymus," 3035-41.

⁵ Arius presents the definitions *currently* held by his contemporaries: οὕτως μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρίζονται (*Eclog.* 38.14-15). His familiarity with one particular Middle-Platonic philosopher from first-century B.C. Alexandria (Eudorus) implies some familiarity with other "Platonic philosophers" from the same milieu (whose views he cites, presumably, in *Eclog.* 37.18 – 38.15). The doxographical nature of Arius' report concerning the moral psychology of these "Platonic philosophers" suggests that the attested views were standard, which in turn suggests that these would have been the views of Eudorus. Without considering the question of Eudorus, P. A. Vander Waerdt nevertheless holds that *Eclog.* 37.18 – 38.15 represents good evidence for Middle Platonism (see "Moral Psychology," 378).

PSEUDO-TIMAEUS,⁶ *ON THE NATURE OF THE WORLD AND THE SOUL* [=TL]: Probably composed in the late first century B.C. or the first century A.D., this treatise arguably represents Eudoran Middle Platonism, based on its distinct profile of agreements with Eudorus on a number of points.⁷ Purportedly written by Timaeus of Locri (of Plato's *Timaeus*), in an affected Doric dialect, the treatise generally reads like an epitome of *Timaeus* 27 C – 92 C, although it offers scholastic Middle-Platonic elaborations on key topics.

PSEUDO-METOPUS,⁸ *ON VIRTUE* [=Ps.-Metop.]: This treatise, probably composed in the first century B.C., in a Doric similar to TL, is one of many Pseudo-Pythagorean ethical writings that arguably reflect Eudoran Middle Platonism.⁹ The clearly didactic aim of *On Virtue* suggests a handbook, which in turn suggests conventional ethical doctrines.¹⁰

PLUTARCH (b. ca. A.D. 45): Plutarch was a Middle Platonist who knew the works of Eudorus.¹¹ Furthermore, Plutarch's teacher Ammonius was both a contemporary of Philo and a native of Alexandria.¹² Assuming Plutarch

⁶ See *Timaios of Locri, On the Nature of the World and the Soul* (text, trans., notes, Thomas H. Tobin; SBLTT 26; GRRS 8; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985); also the commentary of Matthias Baltes, *Timaios Lokros, Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele* (PA 21; Leiden: Brill, 1972).

⁷ On the date of TL, see Tobin, *Timaios of Locri*, 3-7. On the agreements between TL and Eudorus, see Baltes, *Timaios Lokros*, 22-26. Baltes does not believe that Eudorus himself composed TL, but that the work is more likely "ein Produkt aus der Schule des Eudor" (25). Tobin notes some problems with Baltes' position (*Timaios of Locri*, 6) but nevertheless affirms the likelihood of some connection between TL and Eudorus: "One can probably say that the TL came after Eudorus and that the author of the TL was aware of his work" (7).

⁸ See *Pseudopythagorica Ethica: I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo* (text, trans., comm., Bruno Centrone; Elenchos 17; Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990), esp. 87-94 (text), 193-216 (comm.).

⁹ On the date of Ps.-Metopus, see Centrone, *Pseudopythagorica Ethica*, 41-44; on the connection with Eudorus, see *ibid.*, 17, n. 10. Centrone suggests that Philo made use of these Pseudo-Pythagorean ethical writings (*ibid.*, 30-34, 43-44); cf. David Runia, "Why Does Clement Call Philo 'The Pythagorean?,'" in *Philo and the Church Fathers: A Collection of Papers* (VCSup 32; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 54-76; repr. from *VC* 49 (1995): 1-22.

¹⁰ Cf. Centrone, *Pseudopythagorica Ethica*, 193: "Il trattato di Metopo sulla virtù presenta, in forma sintetica e condensate, una serie di loci classici della dossografia etica, amalgamate in maniera più o meno felice."

¹¹ On Plutarch as a Middle Platonist, see Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 184-230. Plutarch cites Eudorus by name in *De animae procreatione in Timaeo* (*An. procr.*) 1013 B, 1019 E, and 1020 C.

¹² On Ammonius see C.P. Jones, "The Teacher of Plutarch," *HSCP* 71 (1967), 205-13; also Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 189-92. Jones suggests approximate dates for Ammonius of A.D. 20 to A.D. 70-80 ("Teacher of Plutarch," 208; cf. Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 191: "Ammonius was probably dead by about A.D. 80"). Dillon calls Ammonius "a product of Alexandrian Platonism" (*Middle Platonists*, 190), although he taught and died in Athens. John Glucker believes, concerning Ammonius' career as a "personal teacher" (καθηγητής) and his arrival in Athens, that

did not radically depart from his teacher on basic ethical theory, his views—especially insofar as they corroborate the testimony of Arius, Ps.-Timaeus, and Ps.-Metopos—reflect standard views among Philo's Middle-Platonic contemporaries.¹³

For the most part, the identification of this material with Eudorus rests on reasonable conjecture, not demonstrable fact. But in any case, this material *does* represent Middle-Platonic thought, as general consensus and corroborating evidence from, for example, Alcinous' doctrinal handbook the *Didaskalikos* attest.¹⁴ Therefore, while the comparison of Philo to Arius Didymus, Ps.-Timaeus, Ps.-Metopos, and Plutarch *probably* illustrates his relation to Eudoran Middle-Platonism, it *certainly* illustrates Philo's relation to general trends in Middle-Platonic thought.

"IRRATIONAL" AND "NON-RATIONAL" IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

The most fundamental question to ask about ἐπιθυμία in Middle-Platonic moral psychology involves the Greek word ἄλογος, which has two radically

"[w]hatever philosophy he knew he had already learnt in Egypt" (*Antiochus and the Late Academy* [Hypomnemata 56; Göttingen: Vandernhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978], 133). Jean Daniélou suggests that Philo and *Plutarch* have a similar "platonisme éclectique" because Philo and *Ammonius* were educated in the same Alexandrian philosophical environment (*Philon D'Alexandrie* [Paris: A. Fayard, 1958], 58-59).

¹³ Among Plutarch's works, *De virtute morali* (*Virt. mor.*) bears special significance, because of its summary representation of a Middle-Platonic (over against Stoic) stance on moral psychology and passion(s). Moreover, the moral psychology of *Virt. mor.* reflects Plutarch's broader commitment to a fundamentally Platonic understanding of the soul, such as he elaborates in *An. procr.* (see Jan Opsomer, "L'âme du monde et l'âme de l'homme chez Plutarque," in *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Ideas religiosas: Actas del III Simposio Internacional sobre Plutarco, Oviedo 30 de abril a 2 de mayo de 1992* [ed. Manuela García Valdés; Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1994], 33-49). Also important are five ethical treatises—*De curiositate* (*Curios.*), *De cohibenda ira* (*Cohib. ira*), *De garrulitate* (*Garr.*), *De vitioso pudore* (*Vit. pud.*), and *De laude ipsius* (*De laude*)—that pertain directly to moral virtue, in particular the role of "practice" (ἄσκησις) in management of the passions (see Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp, *Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele* [Hypomnemata 34; Göttingen: Vandernhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971]).

¹⁴ On which see *Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism* (trans., comm. John Dillon; Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); *Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines de Platon* (ed., comm. John Whittaker; trans. Pierre Louis; 2d ed.; Paris: Belles Lettres, 2002).

different meanings. On the one hand, ἄλογος can mean "non-rational," indicating the absence of reasoning capacity. On the other hand, ἄλογος can mean "irrational," indicating the corruption or malfunction of a reasoning capacity that nevertheless exists. In a treatise that defends a Platonic view of the passions over against the Stoic view of Chrysippus, Galen explains the distinction:

[S]ometimes the α negates the meaning of the word to which it is prefixed, and sometimes it does not. And I find the word ἄλογον used in this way by all the ancients and by men of today. When a person says that a fish or a crab is ἄλογον, he completely negates the meaning of the word logos; but when men criticize a particular statement of a particular person by saying that it is ἄλογον, they do not give it this name because it has no logos, but because it is blameworthy and faulty. (*PHP* IV 4.13-15)¹⁵

Philo understands the same distinction just as clearly:

There are two ways of understanding the absence of reason (τὸ ἄλογον): it means either defying the dictates of logos, as when people call the senseless man "irrational" (ἄλογον), or having no logos at all, as with the non-rational animals (ὡς τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὴ λογικά). (*Sacr.* 46)¹⁶

Do Philo and his Middle-Platonic contemporaries see ἐπιθυμία as an "irrational" (ἄλογος) or a "non-rational" (ἄλογος) function of the soul? Plato himself offers the best place to begin answering this critical question.

PLATONIC FOUNDATIONS

Plato believed that the human soul has three essential components: one rational (τὸ λογιστικόν), one assertive (τὸ θυμοειδές),¹⁷ and one intensely

¹⁵ Trans. De Lacey (slightly modified).

¹⁶ My translation. In *De animalibus*, Philo argues at length that beasts are non-rational (see §§77-100), a position he consistently holds throughout his works: e.g., ζῶα ἄλογα in *Opif.* 73, *Spec.* 2.89, and *Virt.* 160; or simply ἄλογα, as in *Spec.* 1.260.

¹⁷ "Assertive" captures the essence of this component of the soul. Cf. John Cooper, "Human Motivation," 133-34: "the motivations that Plato classifies under the heading of spirit are

desirous (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).¹⁸ Among these three, the most antagonistic relation exists between reason and desire. In fact, Plato establishes the independence of desire from reason by noting its capacity for diametric and simultaneous opposition to reason, granting desire independent agency as a distinct source of motivation in the soul along with reason.¹⁹ If the ἐπιθυμητικόν exists in contradistinction to reason, it must also operate apart from reason, so Platonic

to be understood as having their root in competitiveness and the desire for self-esteem and (as a normal presupposition of this) esteem by others."

¹⁸ *Resp.* 580 D-E: "But the third part, owing to its manifold forms (διὰ πολυειδίαν), we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name, but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element (ὁ μέγιστον καὶ ισχυρότατον . . . ἐν αὐτῷ); for we called it the appetitive part (ἐπιθυμητικόν) because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love (διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδίσια) and their accompaniments (καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοῦτοις ἀκόλουθα), and likewise the money-loving part (φιλοχρήματον), because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires (διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι)." On Platonic tripartition, see Cooper, "Human Motivation." On Plato's general theory of desire, see Charles Kahn, "Plato's Theory of Desire." On appetitive desire, see esp. Hendrik Lorenz, *The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle* (OPM; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). Lorenz's work outlines the basic model of ἐπιθυμία developed by Plato and appropriated in large part by Aristotle. This basic model was formative in Middle-Platonic moral psychology and so helps to explain many aspects of Philo's thought. For a later Platonist's concept of the ἐπιθυμητικόν covering the fundamental data from Plato's writings, see Phillip De Lacy, "The Third Part of the Soul," in *Le Opere Psicologiche di Galeno: Atti del Terzo Colloquio Galenico Internazionale, Pavia, 10-12 Settembre 1986* (ed. Paola Manuli and Mario Vegetti; Elenchos 13; Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988), 43-63.

¹⁹ In the *Republic* (436 B), Plato posits an axiom that shapes his moral psychology, considering it obvious (δῆλον) that "the same thing (ταυτόν) will never do or suffer opposites (τάναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν) in the same respect (κατὰ ταυτόν) in relation to the same thing (πρὸς ταυτόν) and at the same time (ἅμα). So that if ever we find these contradictions in the functions of the [soul] (ἐν αὐτοῖς; cf. ἕκαστα in 436 A) we shall know that it was not the same thing functioning (οὐ ταυτόν) but a plurality (πλείω)" (substituting "soul" for Shorey's "mind" [cf. ψυχῆ earlier in 436 B]). Plato argues that the human soul has a λογιστικόν element ᾧ λογίζεται and a *separate* ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν element ᾧ ἐρά τε καὶ πεινή καὶ διψή etc., since it is otherwise impossible to explain an agent who at the same time desires a drink (via the ἐπιθυμητικόν) but for whatever reason counteracts that desire and abstains from drinking (via the λογιστικόν) (see *Resp.* 439 A-D). (On the argument for tripartition and the axiomatic "Principle of Opposites," see Lorenz, *Brute Within*, 18-34.) Middle Platonists continued to assert the probative force of this axiom as well as the validity of Plato's proof (e.g., Plutarch *Virt. mor.* 442 A, esp. [Πλάτων] ἀποδείκνυσι δὲ τὴν διαφορὰν etc.; also *Didask.* 24 [176.43-177.3]; cf. Galen, *PHP* V 7.1-33).

ἐπιθυμία is plainly "non-rational" (ἄλογος).²⁰ Without rational calculation, without deliberating on the *best* course of action, ἐπιθυμία impulsively pursues pleasure (ἡδονή) as its ultimate aim (most notably via food, drink, and sex) whenever stimulated by the appropriate thought or sensory impression.²¹ Reason's task is to manage desire, as a rational human being would manage a non-rational animal, ensuring that desire's myopic pursuits *serve*, rather than *subvert*, the greater good, which requires the rational pursuit of the best overall course of life.²²

²⁰ *Resp.* 439 D: ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν; *Tim.* 71 D: λόγου καὶ φρονήσεως οὐ μετείχε [τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς]. For a full explanation of ἐπιθυμία as a non-rational phenomenon, see Lorenz, *Brute Within*, e.g. 9: "The notion of a part of the soul that is incapable of reasoning, but capable of giving rise to episodes of behaviour, even to episodes of human behaviour, sets the scene for the book's central theme: the idea, shared by Plato and Aristotle, that while reason can, all by itself, motivate a person to act, parts or aspects of the soul other than reason are equipped with non-rational cognitive resources that are sufficient for the generation of fully formed motivating conditions." For explanations of how desire manages to operate *without* the capacity to reason, see esp. Lorenz, *Brute Within*, 55-95 [= "Belief and Appearance in Plato"] and 113-86 [= "*Phantasia* and Non-Rational Desire in Aristotle"], esp. 119-73; also Cooper, "Reason, Virtue, Value," esp. 255-64 [= "Non-Rational Desires"]; and idem, "Some Remarks on Aristotle's Moral Psychology," in *Reason and Emotion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 237-52, esp. 241-44; repr. from *SJPh* supp. (1988): 25-42; cf. the discussion of "sense-appetite" in N. J. H. Dent, "Varieties of Desire," *PASSV* 50 (1976): 153-75, esp. 154-58.

²¹ On the connection between ἐπιθυμία and ἡδονή, see e.g. *Resp.* 439 D: τὸ . . . ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἐταίρον; *Phaedr.* 238 A: ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἐλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονάς. Cf. Cooper, "Human Motivation," 126-30; idem, "Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value," in *Reason and Emotion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 253-70; repr. from pages 81-114 in *Rationality in Greek Thought* (ed. M. Frede and G. Striker; Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); David Halperin, "Platonic *Erōs*," 172; Lohrenz, *Brute Within*, passim, e.g. 2: "Appetite's stubborn and inflexible attachment to whatever happens to give a person pleasure renders psychological conflict ineliminable. . . . Appetite's attachment to what in fact gives us pleasure is unreformable"). Later philosophers recognized this association in Plato's writings and formulated it with greater precision (e.g., Aristotle, *De an.* 414 b 5-6: ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὐτῆ; Galen, *PHP* V 5.8: τριῶν οὖν τούτων ἡμῖν οἰκειώσεων ὑπαρχουσῶν φύσει, καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος: πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

²² The Platonic view of ἐπιθυμία as a non-rational (ἄλογος) force facilitates its comparison to a non-rational animal, leading to the Platonic imagery of desire as "beast"; see esp. *Tim.* 70 D-E: ἐπιθυμητικόν . . . ὡς θρέμμα ἄγριον; *Resp.* 588 B – 591 A: θηρίον . . . θρέμμα (cf. Urs Dieraur, *Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie*,

BIPARTITION IN MIDDLE PLATONISM

Reason over against 'Επιθυμία / Θυμός

Like other Middle Platonists, Ps.-Timaeus endorses Platonic tripartition, but in a distinctly modified version:

With regard to human souls (ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχᾶς), one part is reasonable and intelligent (τὸ μὲν λογικόν ἐστι καὶ νοερόν),²³ but the other part is without reason and foolish (τὸ δ' ἄλογον καὶ ἄφρον). . . . Of the non-rational part (τῷ δ' ἀλόγῳ μέρει), the irascible element is located around the heart (τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς περὶ τὰν καρδίαν) and the appetitive element around the liver (τὸ δ' ἐπιθυματικὸν περὶ τὸ ἥπαρ). (TL 46)²⁴

Although he clearly identifies each of Plato's three "parts," including its respective location in the body, Ps.-Timaeus frames this tripartition in dualistic terms: the soul, it seems, really has just two parts—the rational and the non-rational (τὸ μὲν λογικόν . . . τὸ δ' ἄλογον).²⁵ This *bipartite* conception of Platonic tripartition subsumes the spirited and desiderative parts under a single "non-rational part" (ἄλογον μέρος), coordinating them as one pair that stands over against reason.

Anthropologie und Ethik [SAP 6; Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977], 66-89 [= "Hinweise auf Tiere in der Anthropologie und Ethik Platons"]. This comparison of the ἐπιθυμητικόν (ἐπιθυμία) to a beast appears also in Middle Platonism, see, e.g., *Didask.* 23 [176.22]: ἄγριον θρέμμα; Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 447 C: ἐπιθυμία as τὸ θηρίον (cf. Julia Annas, "Humans and Beasts: Moral Theory and Moral Psychology," in *Platonic Ethics, Old and New* [CSCP 57; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999], 117-36, esp. 134-36).

²³ On τὸ μὲν λογικόν ἐστι καὶ νοερόν, cf. John Whittaker, "The Terminology of the Rational Soul in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria," *SPhA* (1996): 1-20.

²⁴ Cf. TL 82: "Music and philosophy, its guide, which were established by the gods and the laws for the correction of the soul, accustom, persuade, and sometimes even coerce the non-rational part to obey reason (τὸ μὲν ἄλογον τῷ λογισμῷ πείθεσθαι), the irascible part of the non-rational soul to be tame (τῷ δ' ἀλόγῳ θυμὸν μὲν πρᾶον εἶμεν), and the appetitive part (ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ) to remain quiet when the mind summons it either to action or to enjoyment." (Unless otherwise noted, all translations of TL are from Tobin, *Timaios of Locri*.)

²⁵ Arius Didymus provides evidence for bipartite psychology among "Platonic philosophers" of his day: *Eclog.* 38.3-4: τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς . . . τῷ λόγῳ; *Eclog.* 38.5-6: ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς . . . τῷ λόγῳ; *Eclog.* 38.12-13: ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους . . . τῷ λογικῷ.

Plato did not formulate tripartition in this way.²⁶ Aristotle, to facilitate his discussion of ethics, endorsed a simple dichotomy in the soul between "rational" (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) and "non-rational" (τὸ ἄλογον) (*Eth. nic.* 1102 a 29-30), but he did not use this dichotomy as a frame for Platonic tripartition.²⁷ Instead, this formulation derives from an early and highly influential Peripatetic rendering of Plato's tripartite psychology, first attested in the *Magna Moralia*.²⁸ Peripatetic philosophers superimposed Aristotle's dichotomy onto Platonic tripartition, making his rational part (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) equivalent to Plato's λογιστικόν, while his non-rational part (τὸ ἄλογον) was taken to comprise Plato's θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν (or θυμικόν²⁹/θυμός and ἐπιθυμία). This hybrid version of Platonic tripartition, which pits rational against non-rational, became a standard model for moral psychology among Middle Platonists.³⁰

²⁶ First, Plato never uses the terminology λόγος – ἄλογος in reference to a bipartite division of the soul (see Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," 283-86). Second, Plato's tripartition often views reason and τὸ θυμοειδές as a united pair over against τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν (e.g., *Resp.* 441 A; *Phaedr.* 253 D – 254 E). But the absence of a particular formulation of tripartition as bipartition does not mean that Plato never ascribes bipartition to the soul (see e.g. D. A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," *JHS* 77 [1957]: 112-18).

²⁷ Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," esp. 286-87. Cf. idem, "Aristotle's Criticism of Soul-Division," *AJP* 108 (1987): 627-43.

²⁸ Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation." On the appropriation of this Peripatetic rendering in Middle Platonism, see Vander Waerdt, "Moral Psychology."

²⁹ Plato's term for the assertive part is θυμοειδές (e.g., *Resp.* 441 A: ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον ἐστὶ τὸ θυμοειδές [εἶδος]). Middle Platonists often used the Aristotelian term θυμικός instead of θυμοειδές (cf. *Leg.* 1.70-72, *Leg.* 3.124; also θυμός [e.g., *Conf.* 21; *Spec.* 4.92]). See Whittaker, *Alcinoos*, 87, n. 73 (NB his citation of *Leg.* 3.115); Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," 286, n. 9; also Jean Bouffartigue, "La structure de l'âme chez Philon: terminologie scolastique et metaphors," in *Philon d'Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie* (ed. Carlos Lévy; Turnhout: Brepolis, 1998), 59-75, 60, n. 3 (on *Leg.* 3.115)

³⁰ Vander Waerdt, "Moral Psychology," 378-81, notes six representative examples of Middle-Platonic sources that "harmonize bipartition and tripartition in accordance with Peripatetic doctrine by collapsing the θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν into a single ἄλογον and by opposing this to a reasoning faculty" (377): Arius Didymus' epitome, the *Didaskalikos*, Apuleius, Plutarch, Philo,

Reason over against Appetite (ὄρεξις)

Although Middle-Platonic bipartition appears simply to reconfigure Plato's three soul parts, and thus appears to leave Plato's conception of those parts intact, it actually owes much to *Aristotle's* theory of desire, which differed from Plato's in significant respects.³¹ Unlike Plato, who envisioned three distinct soul parts, each with its own sorts of desires (ἐπιθυμῖαι), Aristotle acknowledged just *one* appetitive faculty of the soul, which generates three different sorts of appetite (ὄρεξις): ἐπιθυμῖα, θυμός, and βούλησις.³² Of these, ἐπιθυμῖα and θυμός are non-rational ὀρέξεις analogous to the motivations generated by Plato's ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές.³³ For example, Aristotle understood θυμός to be the sort of non-rational motivation at work when people get angry, mirroring Plato's concept of the θυμοειδές, which is—among other things—the seat of

and Clement. To this list may be added TL 46, 82, and Ps.-Metop. 118.1-5: τὰς ψυχᾶς δύο μέρεια, τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, . . . τῷ δὲ ἀλόγῳ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τὸ δ' ἐπιθυματικόν.

³¹ On the fundamental revision of Plato's theory of desire resulting from a bipartite conception of tripartition, see Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," esp. 286-87 and 291-301. Ultimately the "attribution of the division ἄλογον/λόγον ἔχον to Plato is based upon an interpretation of tripartition in the terms of Aristotle's doctrine of ὄρεξις" (286).

³² See, for example, *Resp.* 580 D and *De an.* 414 b 2. On Aristotle's theory of desire, see esp. Cooper's essays "Aristotle's Moral Psychology" and "Reason, Virtue, Value." ὄρεξις in Aristotle serves as the generic term for "appetite," of which there are several specific types. Plato, who had no corresponding notion of "generic appetite," never uses the term ὄρεξις. (The term itself derives from ὀρέγω: *reach, stretch* [LSJ, s.v.], which Plato *does* use in the context of moral psychology: e.g., *Resp.* 439 B: ὀρέγεσθαι [*reach after*].) Because ὄρεξις only becomes a term of moral psychology with *Aristotle*, its use among Middle Platonists demonstrates their appropriation of terms and concepts postdating Plato.

³³ On ἐπιθυμῖα and θυμός in Aristotle, see Cooper, "Reason, Virtue, Value," esp. 255-64. NB 257: "Aristotle seems throughout his career to have accepted from Plato's account of the human soul in the *Republic* the division of our non-rational desires into two types, appetitive and spirited (*epithumia* and *thumos*)."

anger in the soul.³⁴ In addition, Aristotle associated ἐπιθυμία with "bodily" desires for food, drink, and sex—the three desires that characterize Plato's ἐπιθυμητικόν.³⁵ But in two key respects, the Aristotelian conception of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία underlying Middle-Platonic bipartition differs from that of Plato. First, what for Plato are acquisitive aims of the θυμοειδές—things like victory, honor, and fame—lose all association with "assertive appetite" (θυμός) and become simply additional objects of "acquisitive appetite" (ἐπιθυμία), along with food, drink, and sex.³⁶ In other words, Aristotle followed Plato in viewing ἐπιθυμία as a non-rational desire for pleasure, but he expanded the scope of ἐπιθυμία to include the intangible—but nevertheless *pleasurable*—objects of

³⁴ Plato, in fact, argues for the distinct function of the θυμοειδές over against the ἐπιθυμητικόν by citing the story of Leontius, whose anger *against* his own repugnant desire to view corpses demonstrates the separation of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία within the soul (see *Resp.* 439 E – 440 A, esp. 440 A: ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὡς ἄλλο ὄν ἄλλω). On the role of the θυμοειδές in Plato, see Cooper, "Human Motivation," esp. 130-36.

³⁵ E.g., *Eth. nic.* 1147 b 25-29. NB ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά (1147 b 25-26) (cf. *Resp.* 558 C-E, 559 A-D). On Plato's ἐπιθυμητικόν, note *Resp.* 437 D, where of all ἐπιθυμῖαι, δίψα (ἐπιθυμία ποτοῦ) and πείνα (ἐπιθυμία ἐδωδῆς) are the "most obvious" (ἐναργεστάτας); also *Tim.* 70 D: τὸ δὲ δὴ σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν ἐπιθυμητικόν. In *Spec.* 4.96-97 Philo acknowledges as chief of all desires τὴν περὶ γαστέρα πραγματευομένην ἐπιθυμίαν, which concerns ἐδωδὴ καὶ πόσις (cf. Plato, *Leg.* 782 E: ἐδωδὴ μὲν καὶ πόσις). In *Leg.* 1.86, ἐπιθυμία (i.e., τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν [see *Leg.* 1.70-71]) compels one toward σιτία καὶ ποτά (cf. *Leg.* 3.147). Cf. δίψα and πείνα as "harsh mistresses" in *Mos.* 1.191, *Spec.* 4.82, *Virt.* 130, *Contemp.* 37. The desire for sexual pleasures (ἀφροδίσια) is another basic function of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν (e.g., *Resp.* 580 E [cf. 436 A-B]). In fact, desires for food, drink, and sex often appear together as the primal triumvirate of appetites (e.g., *Leg.* 782 E; *Phaed.* 81 B). Although closely tied to bodily requirements and conditions, the desires for food, drink, and sex properly belong to the *soul* (viz. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν)—there are, for Plato, no desires *of the body*, only "bodily desires," desires *of the soul* bearing a unique connection to the body (see e.g. R. Hackforth, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945], 61; cf. 79, n. 4; 112, n. 2; 140, n. 2).

³⁶ Cf. Cooper, "Reason, Virtue, Value," 263: "In the *Republic* Plato gives this intermediate kind of desire [sc. θυμός] its own special object of pursuit, victory, and/or esteem or honor (*timē*), corresponding to appetite's [sc. ἐπιθυμία] pursuit of pleasure. As we have already seen, Aristotle rejects this identification: according to him, akratic lovers of honor and victory are incontinently pursuing a pleasure and so are inappropriately subject not to spirited desire but to certain appetites, appetites for victory and honor."

victory, honor, and fame.³⁷ This broader concept of ἐπιθυμία strips θυμός of all acquisitive aims, leaving it almost exclusively associated with *anger* and *aggression* in Middle-Platonic thought.³⁸ In other words, Middle Platonists continued to associate ἐπιθυμία with a particular component of the Platonic soul, but they conceived it more broadly as the *one* source for *all* non-rational appetites, pursuing its aim of pleasure through any number of possible objects. Second, since Aristotle assigned both θυμός and ἐπιθυμία to a single ὀρεκτικόν faculty of the soul, and since θυμός and ἐπιθυμία constitute the soul's ἄλογον μέρος in the bipartite version of Platonic tripartition, ὀρεκτικόν and ἄλογον μέρος become interchangeable in Middle-Platonic moral psychology. Attesting this trend, Arius Didymus lists τὸ ὀρεκτικόν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς (*Eclog.* 38.8) as a variant Middle-Platonic designation for the soul's non-rational part over against its rational part.³⁹ In fact, Middle-Platonic ethical theory in general, which deals

³⁷ *De an.* 414 b 5-6: ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη (cf. *Eth. nic.* 1119 b 6-8).

³⁸ In Plato's *Republic* (548 C - 550 B), the man ruled by τὸ θυμοειδές is not constantly angry: he is rather φίλαρχος and φιλότιμος (549 A)—he *wants* power and honor. The Middle-Platonic conception (following Aristotle) would identify a φίλαρχος or φιλότιμος as one ruled by ἐπιθυμία (sc. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), while someone ruled by θυμός (sc. τὸ θυμοειδές) *would* in fact be irascible. When Ps.-Timaeus considers training of the soul (TL 82), in particular the obedience of the non-rational part to reason (τὸ μὲν ἄλογον τῷ λογισμῷ πείθεσθαι), the ideal for θυμός, which constitutes the non-rational part along with ἐπιθυμία, is that it be "tame" (τῷ δ' ἀλόγῳ θυμὸν μὲν πρᾶον εἶμεν)—in other words, Ps.-Timaeus envisions θυμός *primarily* as an irascible element. Plutarch, however, sometimes *does* maintain the strictly Platonic role for τὸ θυμοειδές as the motivating force for reckless ambition (see Tim Duff, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999], 83-89).

³⁹ Cf. Ps.-Metop. 117.9-10: ἃ μὲν ὦν διάνοια ἀπὸ τῷ λογικῷ μέρεός ἐντι τὰς ψυχᾶς, ἃ δὲ ὄρεξις ἀπὸ τῷ ἀλόγῳ (also Ps.-Theag. 193.13-14: ἃ δὲ ὄρεξις τῷ ἀλόγῳ); *Didask.* 29.2 [182.29-35] (note the association of αἱ ὀρέξεις with non-rational over against rational): σωφροσύνη = δύναμις τίς ἐστι καθ' ἣν τεταγμένως καὶ εὐπειθῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ὀρέξεις πρὸς τὸ φύσει δεσποτικόν, τουτέστι τὸ λογιστικόν; Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 450 E-F: τὸν λογισμὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀλόγου, where τοῦ ἀλόγου includes ὀρέξεις.

with reason's management of non-rational forces in the soul, and which must systematically conceptualize the nature and function of those non-rational forces in need of management, takes full advantage of ἄλογον μέρος as a heuristic device, making it the locus not only of appetite (ὄρεξις) but also of impulse (ὄρμη) and emotion (πάθος).

Reason over against Impulse (ὄρμη)

"Appetite" (ὄρεξις), generally speaking, bears a close relation to "impulse" (ὄρμη), so Middle-Platonic moral psychology, which placed ὄρεξις in the soul's non-rational part, naturally placed ὄρμη there as well.⁴⁰ The term ὄρμη denotes above all directed *movement* within the soul.⁴¹ Thus ὄρεξις, as a type of impulse, denotes directed movement *toward* something, and ἐπιθυμία, more specifically, denotes movement *toward* pleasure, a *pursuit*—other types of impulses denote

⁴⁰ On the topic of impulse (ὄρμη), see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action* (cf. Tad Brennan, "Stoic Moral Psychology," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* [ed. Brad Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 265-69). Inwood considers primarily the Stoic view (esp. 42-101 [= "The Psychology of Action"]), but also the less technical views of Plato and Aristotle (see 242-49 [= "*Hormé* in Plato, Aristotle, and the *Magna Moralia*"]). For Plato, neither ὄρμη nor ὄρεξις are technical terms (the latter does not appear in his writings), so their precise relation cannot be determined. For Aristotle, the terms were more or less interchangeable, which allowed for their conflation among later philosophers, as Inwood notes: "For although one was the central theoretical term for the Stoa [ὄρμη] and the other for Aristotle [ὄρεξις], they could be blended together by those who were not interested in or did not understand the difference between the two psychological theories. This process continued to the point where . . . the desiderative part of the soul could be called *to hormétikon* rather than *to orektikon*" (245). For the Stoics, ὄρεξις was a *type* of impulse: namely, a rational impulse toward the apparent good (see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 235-37; cf. 114-15, 227-28).

⁴¹ According to the generic Stoic definition, an impulse is simply "a motion of the soul toward something," as in *ESE* 9: λέγουσιν . . . ὄρμην εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπί τι κατὰ τὸ γένος (Cf. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 32: "In most of our sources impulse is explicitly defined as a kind of change, movement or activity of the soul"). Stoics considered this definition broad enough to describe impulse in both rational and non-rational animals (τὴν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς . . . καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις), although they believed that human beings, as rational animals, experience *only* rational impulse (λογικὴ ὄρμη).

other types of directed movement.⁴² The issue dividing Stoics and Middle Platonists was not how to describe the phenomenon of impulse, since both could acknowledge the experience of directed movement within the soul. They disagreed over *where* in the soul (in a theoretical sense) impulse occurred and what role reason played in the generation of impulse. Arius Didymus notes that "Platonic philosophers" (οἱ κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφούντες) associated ὄρμη with the non-rational part of the soul (ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς) over against the rational part (τῷ λογικῷ).⁴³ This same association appears in other writings with "Eudoran" affinities (Ps.-Timaeus, Ps.-Metopus, Plutarch) and arguably in the extant fragments of Eudorus himself.⁴⁴ By locating impulse in the non-rational

⁴² Pleasure (ἡδονή), for example, as an impulse denotes directed movement *upward*—an "elevation" (ἔπαρσις) of the soul (ESE 10b; DL 7.114).

⁴³ *Eclog.* 38.10-14 (citing various equivalent definitions of ἠθική): ὄρμη ψυχῆς πρακτική . . . ἢ [=] ποιότης ἀλόγου μορίου ψυχῆς ἢ [=] ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρος ποιότης καθ' ὑποτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένη τῷ λογικῷ ἐπακολουθεῖν. In *Eclog.* 117.11-12, Arius notes the explicit identification of ἄλογον μέρος with ὀρμητικόν by *Peripatetic* philosophers: τῆς γὰρ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν εἶναι λογικόν, τὸ δ' ἄλογον· λογικὸν μὲν τὸ κριτικόν, ἄλογον δὲ τὸ ὀρμητικόν (NB Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Interpretation," 294, n. 29: "Arius' description of the ἄλογον as ὀρμητικόν contravenes Stoic doctrine and appears to represent a Peripatetic adaptation of the Stoic theory of ὀρμητή"). Middle Platonists surely made the same identification, given their readiness to adopt Peripatetic models in moral psychology (e.g., tripartition as bipartition). But even without an explicit *equation* of ἄλογον μέρος with ὀρμητικόν in Middle-Platonic sources, the *association* of ἄλογον μέρος with ὀρμητή unmistakably appears.

⁴⁴ See esp. Mauro Bonazzi, "Eudorus' Psychology and Stoic Ethics," in *Platonic Stoicism – Stoic Platonism: The Dialogue between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity* (ed. Mauro Bonazzi and Christoph Helmig; AMP 39; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007), 109-32. On the basis of a distinction between θεωρία and ὀρμητή in *Eclog.* 42.13-23 [=Mazz. 1.4-10], Bonazzi convincingly argues for Eudorus' acknowledgement of *non-rational impulse* in the context of a Platonic bipartition between rational and non-rational parts of the soul. The association between ὀρμητή and ἄλογον μέρος appears explicitly in Ps.-Metop. 117.12-14: τῶν μερέων τὰς ψυχᾶς δύο τὰ πρᾶτα, τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν τὸ δ' ἄλογον· καὶ λογιστικὸν μὲν, ᾧ κρίνομεν καὶ θεωρούμεν· ἄλογον δέ, ᾧ ὀρμῶμεν καὶ ὀρεγόμεθα (cf. ὀρμητή and ὀρεξίς) (cited also by Bonazzi, "Eudorus' Psychology," 125). Ps.-Timaeus has the association, but not as clearly: e.g., TL 71, where the soul's hormetic faculty (ὀρματικᾶς) is listed *separately* from its rational faculty (λογικᾶς), indicating its non-rational function. See also Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 450 E-F: τὸν λογισμὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν τοῦ

part of the soul, which stands *over against* reason, Middle Platonists affirmed the existence of non-rational impulses in adult human beings. For them, impulses capable of motivating human action could arise, subsist, and desist wholly apart from reason, without reason's assent or authorization.⁴⁵ Such impulses are thus capable of genuinely opposing, or even usurping, reason. In sharp contrast, the Stoics flatly denied the possibility of non-rational impulse in adult human beings.⁴⁶ For them, impulse (ὄρμη) *always* involves rational assent (συγκατάθεσις) and thus *always* denotes an activity of the mind (ἡγεμονικόν).⁴⁷

ἄλόγου, identifying αἱ ὄρμαῖ (πρὸς τὰ σωματικὰ κινούμεναι) with τοῦ ἄλόγου (cf. Bonazzi, "Eudorus' Psychology," 125-26).

⁴⁵ Just as non-rational animals, who have no capacity for reason, nevertheless operate according to impulse. For an explanation of the role of impulse in animal behavior, see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 66-91, esp. 72-82.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 224-42 [=Appendix 2: "The Kinds of Impulse"], esp. 225. Commenting on Arius Didymus' detailed summary of the Stoic classification of impulse (see *Eclog.* 86.17 – 88.7), Inwood notes the Stoic attribution of non-rational impulse to *non-rational animals*, while noting also that for *rational animals* (i.e., human beings) the concept of non-rational impulse simply does not apply (225). Cf. Julia Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (HCS 8. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 106: "Our normal talk of 'irrational' impulses suggests that they are not rational at all; but for the Stoics ordinary language is just wrong here, for there can be no such thing as a totally nonrational impulse, at least not in undefective humans. We grasp the phenomenon, but it is not what we think it is, namely, reason versus something devoid of reason, but rather good reason versus bad, inadequate reason."

⁴⁷ The relation between impulse and assent stands as part of the broader Stoic psychology of action (see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 42-101). Following Inwood (*Ethics and Human Action*, 28), ἡγεμονικόν is translated "mind" (also A. A. Long, "Stoic Psychology," in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Psychology* [ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 560-84, esp. 572-83 [= "Rationality and the faculties of the mind"]). Technically, ἡγεμονικόν refers to the "governing" *part* of the human soul (ψυχή), which commands the operation of strictly instrumental non-rational parts such as the five senses (αἰσθησεις), the faculty of speech, and the faculty of reproduction—thus in Stoic theory, the soul has eight parts (see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 27-41; cf. Long, "Stoic Psychology," esp. 560-72). The mind itself has four powers—"impression" (φαντασία), "impulse" (ὄρμη), "assent" (συγκατάθεσις), and "reason" (λόγος)—of which the first two have non-rational analogues in non-rational animals (on the mind's powers, see esp. Long, "Stoic Psychology," 572-83). The presence of reason in Man, however, influences the operation of the entire mind, making all of its functions distinctly rational: "[O]ur sources are correct, but misleading, when they say that the mind or 'governing part' of the human *psuchē* has the four faculties, impression, assent, impulse, reason. The Stoics' model of the mind would be better rendered by saying that there are three

Stoics, in other words, considered impulse a *rational* function, precluding on theoretical grounds the idea of impulse *opposing*, much less *usurping*, reason.⁴⁸

The Middle-Platonic discussion of impulse certainly owed much to the Stoics, insofar as the Stoics brought the topic into prominence by emphasizing the role of impulse in moral theory, but the difference in their respective understandings of the origin and nature of impulse could not be starker. Simply put, the Stoics conceived impulse as an exclusively rational function, while Middle Platonists conceived impulse as a *non-rational* function, appropriately located in the soul's *non-rational* part.⁴⁹

mental faculties—rational impression, rational impulse, and rational assent. Reason is not something over and above the other three. It is the mind in its entirety. Hence reason (*logos*), mind (*nous*), and thought (*dianoia*) are all terms that refer to the distinctive nature of a human being's *psuchē* (Long, "Stoic Psychology," 575).

⁴⁸ For the Stoics, a moment of rational assent is always the direct cause of human behavior, whether or not the agent is consciously aware of that moment. The idea of an internal, non-rational force *causing* or *determining* behavior clearly and flatly contradicts the Stoic theory of human action. (Cf. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 139: "[A]t no time do we experience impulses or passions which are produced independently of our assenting reason or which conflict with and resist it.") This reflects the Stoic "monistic" psychology, which holds that the human psyche stands united under *one* arbiter—reason. Thus no psychic power other than reason (i.e., no non-rational power) can ultimately determine the course of human action, which *always* proceeds on the basis of an autonomous agent's rational decision. As Inwood explains (idem, 33), Stoic monism did not preclude the existence of soul parts (μέρη), only the possibility of opposition *among* those parts.

⁴⁹ The acknowledgement of non-rational impulses (ἄλογοι ὀρμαί) in adult human beings serves *in itself* as a criterion for distinguishing Middle-Platonic from Stoic moral psychology, *including* the moral psychology of the Stoic Posidonius (ca. 130 – 50 B.C.). While Posidonius *did* acknowledge non-rational forces in the soul analogous to Platonic ἐπιθυμία and θύμος, he did *not* count these non-rational "affective movements" (παθητικὰ κινήσεις [see *PHP* V 5.28]) as impulses (ὀρμαί)—although they could influence the character of (always rational) impulses (see John Cooper, "Posidonius on Emotions," in *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999], 449-84, esp. 467-68, 474-75; repr. from pages 71-111 in *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* [ed. J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen; TSHP 46; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998]). In other words, Posidonius need not muddle the clear and radical difference between Middle Platonists (including Philo) and Stoics on the question of non-rational impulses in adult human beings—or, for that matter, on the question of πάθη, which both groups analyzed ultimately as a type of impulse: for Middle Platonists a type of *non-rational* impulse, for Stoics a type of (*ir*)rational impulse.

Reason over against Emotion (πάθος)

Along with ὄρεξις and ὁρμή, Middle Platonists placed also emotion (πάθος) in the non-rational part of the soul: *feelings* of dejection, fear, elation, desire—can all arise, subsist, and desist *apart from* the rational faculty.⁵⁰ Arius Didymus confirms that "Platonist philosophers" (*Eclog.* 38.14-15) considered the soul's non-rational part to be also its "emotional part" (παθητικὸν μέρος), thus indicating that emotions are essentially non-rational phenomena.⁵¹ Similarly, in TL 71 Ps.-Timaeus lists the soul's "emotional faculty" (παθητικῶς [sc. δυνάμιος]) as something *other than* its rational faculty (λογικῶς [sc. δυνάμιος]), indicating that emotions occur apart from reason. Along with the Stoics, Middle Platonists acknowledged four cardinal πάθη: grief (λύπη), fear (φόβος), pleasure (ἡδονή), and desire (ἐπιθυμία).⁵² But agreement between the two groups virtually ends

⁵⁰ The term πάθος bears various translations, and a comparison of Middle-Platonic over against Stoic ethical theory demands the subtle yet crucial distinction between "emotion" (πάθος) and "passion" (πάθος). *Emotion* (πάθος) is a strictly amoral function of normal human life, while *passion* (πάθος) is an immoral function of abnormal human life. These different connotations led to semantic confusion and charges of equivocation (see Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 449 A-C).

⁵¹ *Eclog.* 38.5-7: "Ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς εἰθισμένον ὑπακούειν τῷ λόγῳ· ἢ πάθος ἢ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς εἰθισμένον ὑπακούειν τῷ λογικῷ. Cf. Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 442 A: [ἢ τ' ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆ] ἕτερον μὲν ἔχει τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, . . . ἕτερον δὲ τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον (*Virt. mor.* represents in large part Plutarch's polemic against the Stoics, who refuse to acknowledge that passions are something *other than* reason, not—as they claim—aberrant manifestations of reason; see 441 C [the Stoic view], 443 B, 446 F – 447 C, 448 D); also *Didask.* 5.2 [156.35-37]: τέμνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τε τὸ λογικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ παθητικόν, καὶ αὖ πάλιν τὸ παθητικόν εἰς τε τὸ θυμικόν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν (cf. 17.4 [173.11-15]). Lilla (*Clement of Alexandria*, 87) suggests that a general tenet of the Middle-Platonic doctrine of πάθος is: "the tendency to consider it as produced by the irrational [i.e., non-rational] parts of the soul."

⁵² On the four cardinal passions, see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 144-45. The four appear also in Middle Platonism, e.g. TL 72: ἀρχαὶ δὲ κακίας ἀδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ φόβοι; Philo, *Her.* 269-70: τὰς τῶν τεττάρων παθῶν δυνάμεις . . . ἡδονῆς . . . ἐπιθυμία . . . λύπης . . . φόβου (cf. Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 88, n. 92). Baltes, *Timaios Lokros*, 199, suggests that the doctrine of four cardinal passions attested in TL 72 formed (for Middle Platonists) part of "ein neues ethisches Lehrgebäude."

with this taxonomy. In the first place, Stoics considered these four passions to be expressions *of the mind*, albeit aberrant expressions (i.e., "irrational" [ἄλογος]).⁵³ This follows from the Stoic conviction that (a) passions are a type of impulse and (b) every impulse derives from reason. By claiming that passions arise *independently from* the rational faculty, Middle Platonists reject Stoic theory unequivocally.⁵⁴ In addition, Stoics considered these four πάθη to be always and inherently bad—thus *passions* and not just *emotions*. Middle Platonists, by contrast, considered the cardinal πάθη an amoral part of normal human existence: their non-rational energy provides essential motivation for human activity, including *virtuous* human activity, and they become problematic only when they overstep the dictates of reason.⁵⁵ So Middle Platonists endorsed as

⁵³ ESE 10: εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς; cf. Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 446 F – 447 A: ἐνιοὶ δὲ φασὶν οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα δόξας εἶναι καὶ κρίσεις πονηράς, οὐ περὶ ἓν τι γινομένης τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλ' ὅλου τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ῥοπᾶς καὶ εἴξεις καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ὀρμᾶς.

⁵⁴ In other words, they side with the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition over against the Stoic. For a discussion of the radical difference between the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of πάθος (as non-rational) and the Stoic concept (as [ir]rational), see Frede, "Stoic Affections," esp. 94-100.

⁵⁵ E.g., Ps.-Metop. 121.10-12: οὐκ ἀφελὲν ὦν δεῖ τὰ πάθηα τὰς ψυχᾶς, οὔτε γὰρ ὠφέλιμον αὐτὰ ἀφελὲν, ἀλλὰ συναρμόσασθαι ποτὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον τῷ δέοντος καὶ τῷ μετρίῳ; Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 443 C: οὐ βουλομένου [τοῦ λόγου] τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτ' ἄμεινον), ἀλλ' ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ; 451 C: μέτεστιν οὖν [ἀνθρώπῳ] καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, καὶ σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ' ἀναγκαίαν οὔσαν, οὐδ' ἀναιρετέαν παντάπασιν ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ παιδαγωγίας δεομένην; *Didask.* 32.4 [186.14-18]: τῶν δὲ παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ ἡμερα· καὶ ἡμερα μὲν ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀναγκαῖά τε καὶ οἰκεία· οὕτως δ' ἔχει ἕως ἄν σύμμετρα ὑπάρχη, προσελθούσης δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀμετρίας ἡμαρτημένα ὑπάρξει. For Middle Platonists, passions are in fact an essential *component* of moral virtue (ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ): TL 73: τὸ πῶς ἔχεν ποτὶ τὰ πάθηα ἀρχά τε καὶ πέρας ἀρετᾶς καὶ κακίας ἐστὶ· τὸ γὰρ πλεονάζειν ἐν ταύταις ἢ κάρρον αὐτῶν εἶμεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς ἀμὲ διατίθητι (on which see Baltes, *Timaios Lokros*, 206: "[W]ie bei Platon . . . sind die Affekte an sich noch nicht schlecht, sie werden es erst durch Übermaß und Unkontrolliertheit"); Arius Didymus (*Ecllog.* 38.6-7): [ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ =] πάθος ἢ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς εἰθισμένον ὑπακούειν τῷ λογικῷ; Ps.-Metop. : 119.8: τὰ δὲ πάθηα τὰς ἀρετᾶς ὕλα; 121.7: γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τῶν παθῶν ἄ ἀρετά; Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440 D: [on ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ] τῷ τὸ μὲν πάθος ὕλην ἔχειν.

an ethical norm the *moderation* of emotion.⁵⁶ This emphasis on moderation stems directly from Middle-Platonic convictions about the soul: a non-rational component, the locus of emotion, simply exists as a matter of fact; and its existence calls for active management *on the part of reason*.⁵⁷

Summary

According to Alexandrian Middle Platonism, the human soul consists of two essentially different parts: a rational part and a non-rational part. Although the non-rational part represents in theory a composite of Platonic θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, this representation involves dramatic modifications of Plato's views. Along with expanding the scope of acquisitive desire (ἐπιθυμία), this representation of tripartition as bipartition facilitates a unitary conception of the soul's non-rational part as the locus of appetite (ὄρεξις), impulse (ὄρμη), and emotion (πάθος)—which all are conceived as non-rational capacities in accordance with their non-rational origin. In sum, Middle Platonists understand "rational" over against "non-rational" to be the *one* overarching paradigm for

⁵⁶ Ps.-Metop. 120.24: μεσότατα τῶν παθῶν (cf. Ps.-Archit. 41.16: ἀσκητέον ὧν ποττὰν μετριοπάθειαν ἴμεν); Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 443 D: παθῶν . . . μεσότητος; 444 C: τοῦτ' οὖν τοῦ πρακτικοῦ λόγου κατὰ φύσιν ἔργον ἐστὶ, τὸ ἐξαιρεῖν τὰς ἀμετρίας τῶν παθῶν καὶ πλημμελείας; 445 A: εἰς τὸ μέτριον . . . καθιστᾶσα τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον; cf. TL 72: ἀδοξαὶ ἄμετροί. Cf. Claudio Moreschini, "Considerazioni sulla dottrina del pathos nel Medioplatonismo," *SF* 8-9 (1985-86), 23-33, 24: "il medioplatonismo . . . sostiene l'eccellenza della dottrina della *metriopatheia*." See also Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 92-103; John Dillon, "*Metriopatheia* and *Apatheia*: Some Reflections on a Controversy in Later Greek Ethics," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy II* (ed. John Anton and Anthony Preus; Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), 508-17; repr. in *The Golden Chain: Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity*; CS 333; Aldershot, Hampshire; Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1990.

⁵⁷ Cf. Dillon, "*Metriopatheia* and *Apatheia*," 515: "the controversy about *metriopatheia* and *apatheia*, which generated such heat in later Greek philosophy, is properly one between the concept of a bipartite or tripartite soul, in which the lower part [or] parts can never be eradicated—at least while the soul is in the body—but must constantly be chastised, and that of a unitary one."

moral psychology, although that paradigm accommodates a number of different conceptual models:

Table One: Variations of Bipartition in Middle Platonism

	TRIPARTITION	APPETITE (ὄρεξις)	IMPULSE (ὄρμηξ)	EMOTION (πάθος)
RATIONAL λογικὸν μέρος	λογικὸν μέρος	λογικὸν μέρος	λογικὸν μέρος	λογικὸν μέρος
NON-RATIONAL ἄλογον μέρος	θύμος / ἐπιθυμία	ὄρεκτικὸν μέρος	ὄρμητικὸν μέρος	παθητικὸν μέρος

This variety naturally allows for variant conceptions of desire (ἐπιθυμία), depending on the model in question. For Middle Platonists, the term ἐπιθυμία can denote either an enduring "part" of the soul or an intermittent *function* of some "part" (ὄρεκτικόν, ὄρμητικόν, παθητικόν). But in any case, ἐπιθυμία represents a non-rational force within the soul in need of reason's management.

BIPARTITION IN PHILO'S WRITINGS

Reason over against 'Ἐπιθυμία / Θυμός

Philo consistently maintains the bipartite psychological model of his Middle-Platonic contemporaries:⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Generally speaking, studies of Philo's work identify the bipartition of rational and non-rational (often "irrational") as the model held most consistently: e.g., Billings, *Platonism of Philo*, 52: "The one distinction which persists throughout is the one . . . between the rational and the irrational parts of the soul"; Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 174-75: "[F]or Philo each of these divisions expresses some aspect of the truth, but the most basic truth remains the division into rational and irrational" (175); Runia, *Philo and The Timaeus*, 468: "Philo regarded the main thrust of Plato's psychology as tending towards a *bipartition* of the soul into a rational and an irrational part" [cf. 304-05]; Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 50: "Trotzdem Philon zwischen den verschiedenen Einteilungen . . . hin- und herschwankt . . ., dominiert doch entsprechend seiner dualistischen Grundhaltung die Zweiteilung der Seele." Cf. Hermann S. Schibli, "Xenocrates' Daemons and the

Since our soul is bipartite (ψυχῆς ἡμῶν διμεροῦς ὑπαρχούσης), having one rational part (τὸ μὲν λογικόν) and one non-rational part (τὸ δὲ ἄλογον), there is a virtue associated with each part . . . (*Congr.* 26)⁵⁹

Furthermore, Philo uses this bipartite model to accommodate Platonic tripartition, again in agreement with contemporary Middle Platonism:

[Esau] was wild and indocile, brimful of fierce temper and desire (θυμοῦ γέμοντα καὶ ἐπιθυμίας⁶⁰), who to sum him up armed the non-rational part

Irrational Soul," *CQ* 43 (1993): 143-67, who on the bipartite schema λογικόν-ἄλογον notes: "This was the working model for Philo of Alexandria in the first century A.D., probably following Eudorus" (161). For a helpful collection of Philonic material on the soul, in outline form and arranged under rubrics relevant to moral psychology, see Gretchen Reydams-Schils, "Philo of Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology: The Socratic Higher Ground," in *Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy* (ed. Francesca Alesse; SPhA 5; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 169-95; repr. from *AP* 22 (2002): 125-47. In addition to assembling and collating data (175-87 ["Philo's Psychology, Nuts and Bolts"]), Reydams-Schils considers "which psychological model Philo prefers in his analysis of rational behavior and the passions" (169-70) and so seeks to *explain* the data (see esp. 169-75, 187-95). She concludes that Philo—despite skepticism regarding the *precise* nature of the soul—consistently maintains an overarching "Socratic" notion of soul-body opposition able to accommodate psychological models of both Platonic *and* Stoic provenance, which Philo can then deploy in various forms according to exegetical need (esp. 190: "A return to the Socratic position of a struggle between soul and body" etc.). Her thesis, however, does not address the question of whether or not Philo holds a consistent view of the *soul itself*, since in the end a "soul-body" dichotomy only affirms the existence of a soul over against the body, which both Platonists and Stoics acknowledged. The bipartition espoused by Middle Platonists (rational over against non-rational) accommodates all of Reydams-Schils' data within one working model of the *soul* and so it provides what the soul-body dichotomy cannot: an overarching paradigm for *moral psychology*. The soul-body dichotomy more likely belongs not to Philo's moral psychology but to his moral *rhetoric*, in which the body (esp. the belly) serves as a foil for loftier pursuits of the soul (see Sandnes, *Belly and Body*, esp. 35-60 ["The belly in ancient moral philosophy"], 97-107 ["The belly-*topos* in Jewish-Hellenistic sources"], and 108-35 ["The belly in Philo's writings"]). On Philo's various formulations of the soul (along with a proposal of νοῦς-αἴσθησις as the one overarching model subsuming the rest), see Bouffartigue, "La structure de l'âme chez Philon," 59-75. See also Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 49-67.

⁵⁹ My translation. Also *Leg.* 2.2: ἐγὼ πολλά εἰμι, ψυχῆ σώμα, καὶ ψυχῆς ἄλογον λογικόν; *Her.* 132: τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον; *Her.* 167: αἱ στήλαι τῶν γενικῶν δέκα νόμων . . . δύο εἰσὶν ἰσάριθμοι τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι, λογικῶ καὶ ἀλόγῳ; *Spec.* 1.66: οὐ κράματα ἐκ λογικῆς καὶ ἀλόγου φύσεως, οἷας τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι συμβέβηκεν; *Spec.* 1.201: δυοῖν δ' ὄντων ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ συνέστη, λογικοῦ τε καὶ ἀλόγου; *Spec.* 1.333: τὴν ὄλην ψυχὴν ἐκ λογικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου μέρους συνεσώσαν; *Conf.* 111: ἐκάστας τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ δυνάμεων προσκληρώσαντες τὰς μὲν λογικῆ, τὰς δὲ ἀλόγῳ μερίδι.

⁶⁰ While Philo does use the term ἐπιθυμητικόν to refer to the desiderative element of the tripartite soul in *Leg.* 1.70-72 and *Leg.* 3.115, he elsewhere uses the term ἐπιθυμία (cf. θυμός for θυμοειδής), as Ioannes Leisegang notes (*Indices ad Philonis Alexandrini Opera* [= vol. 7 of PCW], s.v. at no. 1, "tertia pars animae"): *Conf.* 21; *Spec.* 4.92; *Spec.* 1.146-50, cf. 206 ff.; *Virt.* 13; *Migr.* 67; *Her.* 64; *Spec.* 4.10.

of the soul to war against the rational part (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογον μέρος ἐπιτετεχικότα τῷ λογικῷ). (*Praem.* 59)⁶¹

Reflecting the full range of variant models endorsed by Middle Platonists, Philo also locates appetite (ὄρεξις), impulse (ὄρμη), and emotion (πάθος) within the non-rational part of the soul.

Reason over against Appetite (ὄρεξις)

In agreement with his Middle-Platonic contemporaries, Philo locates ὄρεξις in the non-rational part of the soul:

Our soul is tripartite (τριμερῆ): one part is rational (μέρος μὲν ἐν λογιστικόν), a second is assertive (δεύτερον δὲ θυμικόν), and a third is desiderative (τρίτον δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν). . . . To the desiderative part [philosophers have assigned] the area around the abdomen and belly, since that is the dwelling place of desire (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ κατοικεῖ ἐπιθυμία), non-rational appetite (ὄρεξις ἄλογος). (*Leg.* 3.115)⁶²

Philo indicates in *Leg.* 3.116 that he views this tripartite Platonic model in Middle-Platonic terms, as a *bipartite* dichotomy: ὁ λόγος over against ὁ θυμὸς and ἡ ἐπιθυμία, with the latter pair identified as μέρη τοῦ ἀλόγου. If Philo places ἐπιθυμία in the soul's non-rational part, then his equation of ἐπιθυμία with ὄρεξις ἄλογος clearly places ὄρεξις there as well. So Philo, in good Middle-Platonic fashion, sees ὄρεξις operating *apart* from reason as a *non-rational* force within the soul in a distinct, non-rational part. This flatly contradicts the Stoics,

⁶¹ Substituting "desire" for Colson's "lust"; "non-rational" for "unreasoning." Cf. *Migr.* 66: ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία = τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογον; *Leg.* 3.116: ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία = μέρη τοῦ ἀλόγου; *Her.* 64: τοῦ ἐτέρου ψυχῆς τμήματος, ὅπερ ἄλογον ὑπάρχον αἵματι πέφυρται, θυμὸς ζέοντας καὶ πεπυρωμένας ἐπιθυμίας ἀναφλέγον; cf. *QG* 4.216.

⁶² My translation. Cf. *Post.* 26: ἐπιθυμία δὲ ἀλόγου ἐμποιοῦσα ὄρεξις.

who themselves defined ἐπιθυμία as ὄρεξις ἄλογος but unequivocally meant "irrational appetite," a malfunction of the rational faculty.⁶³

Philo's identification of ἐπιθυμία as ὄρεξις ἄλογος derives ultimately from Aristotle, and Philo's overall use of the term ὄρεξις further reflects the Aristotelian modifications of Platonic theory inherent in Middle-Platonic bipartition. Plato had understood pleasure (ἡδονή) to be the ultimate aim of ἐπιθυμία, and Aristotle added technical precision to this idea by defining ἐπιθυμία as an ὄρεξις τοῦ ἡδέος, or appetite for the pleasant.⁶⁴ Philo likewise associates ἐπιθυμία with ὀρέξεις . . . ἡδονῶν (*Leg.* 3.138).⁶⁵ He can speak of the typical varieties of

⁶³ E.g., DL 7.113: ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶν ἄλογος ὄρεξις [=SVF III 96, 22]. Galen understands both the ambiguity of ἄλογος and the clear intention of Chrysippus to mean "irrational" in his definition of ἐπιθυμία: "[I]n his definition of desire (τὸν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὄρον), which he calls irrational appetite (ὄρεξις ἄλογον), he touches in a way, verbally at least, on the non-rational power in the soul; but here too he departs from it in his explanation, since even the appetite (ἡ ὄρεξις) that he includes in the definition belongs to the rational power (τῆς λογικῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμειος). Thus he defines appetite (αὐτήν) as 'rational impulse' (ὀρμὴν λογικὴν) . . ." (*PHP* IV 4.2-3; trans. De Lacey, slightly modified). Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 89, citing *Leg.* 3.115 (see 162, n. 126), recognizes that the definition of ἐπιθυμία as ὄρεξις ἄλογος is "aus der Stoa wörtlich übernommene," but also that the words by themselves mean very little ("inhaltlich recht leere"). The meaning must be supplied, either through explicit commentary or through clear contextual cues, such as Philo provides via the framework of Platonic tripartition, in which ἐπιθυμία explicitly resides outside of the reasoning faculty and is thus non-rational.

⁶⁴ E.g., *De an.* 414 b 5-6; *Eth. nic.* 1119 b 6-8.

⁶⁵ "We have already mentioned that pleasure goes not only on its breast (ἐπὶ τῷ στήθει) but also on its belly (τῇ κοιλίᾳ), and pointed out that the stomach (γαστέρα) is a place most appropriate to pleasure, for we may almost describe it as a reservoir of all the pleasures (σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀγγεῖον τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀπασῶν αὕτη ἐστὶ). For when the belly has been filled, cravings after the other pleasures also become vehement (ὀρέξεις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν γίνονται σύντονοι), but when it has been emptied, these are quieted and become more still (ἡρεμαῖαι καὶ σταθηρότεραι)" (NB κοιλία in Philo's allegory stands for ἐπιθυμία, i.e., τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). Cf. *Post.* 71, where Philo similarly implies that *desire* (φλεγοῦσης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας) consists of an *appetite* (τοὺς τῶν ὀρέξεων ἐχάλασέ τε καὶ ἔλυσε τόνους) for *pleasure* (ἡδονῶν ἀπεχομένους); also *Abr.* 96: τὰς μὲν ἐφ' ἡδονῆν ἀγοῦσας ὀρέξεις (cf. *Praem.* 71: ἐπιθυμήσει τινὸς ἡδέος).

Platonic ἐπιθυμία (for food, drink, sex) in terms of ὄρεξις, as did Aristotle.⁶⁶ But more importantly, his concept of the non-rational appetite for pleasure expands to include, as it did for Aristotle, objects that Plato had associated with the soul's *assertive* function, not its *appetitive* function—objects like victory, honor, and fame.⁶⁷ So for Philo, as for other Middle Platonists, ἐπιθυμία encompassed the objects of *both* of Plato's inferior soul parts (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές) in its pursuit of pleasure.⁶⁸ This "expansion" of the role of ἐπιθυμία in turn casts θυμός more exclusively as the non-rational agent of anger.⁶⁹ Philo does not often use the term ὄρεξις, but his use does reflect standard trends within Middle-Platonic moral psychology.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ *Det.* 113: ταῖς μετὰ γαστέρα χρώμενος ἡδοναῖς ἐπαλλήλοις καὶ ἔτι ταῖς πρὸς συνουσίαν ὀρέξεσιν ἀκμάζων; *Gig.* 35 μὴ πρὸς πάντα οὖν τὰ τῆ σαρκὶ φίλα αἰ ὀρέξεις ἀνηρεθίσθωσαν; *Ebr.* 214: ἃ τὰς ὀρέξεις ἀναρρηγνύντα [σιτίων, ὄψου, ποτῶν]; *Ebr.* 222: ἡ ἄπληστος ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄρεξις among τοὺς οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ λαιμαργίας καὶ τῶν αἰσχίστων ἡδονῶν ἤττους; *Decal.* 123: τὰς ὀρέξεις (of the adulterer); *Virt.* 136: τῆς ὑπερφυοῦς γαστριμαργίας ὀρέξεις.

⁶⁷ Philo attests this view *explicitly* only in *Post.* 116, but the passage is telling. Philo has in mind people whose appetites are engaged (ταῖς ἀορίστοις αὐτῶν ὀρέξεσιν)—appetites involving not only "bodily pleasures" (σωματικὰς ἡδονάς) but also objects typically associated with Plato's θυμοειδές, such as fame (φιλοδόξους). Cf. *Post.* 117: εὐμορφίας γυνακὸς εἶνεκα, ἡ χρημάτων, ἡ δόξης, ἡ τιμῆς, ἡ ἀρχῆς, ἡ κτήσεως, ἡ συνόλως ὅσα σώματος καὶ τῶν ἐκτός ἐστι πλεονεκτήματα; *Opif.* 79: αἰ δόξης ἡ χρημάτων ἡ ἀρχῆς ἐπιθυμίαι; *Ios.* 70: ἀρχῆς ἐπιθυμία.

⁶⁸ E.g., *Leg.* 2.107: τὰ γοῦν ποιητικὰ [ἡδονῆς] . . . χρυσοῦς, ἄργυρος, δόξα, τιμαὶ, ἀρχαὶ, αἰ ὕλαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, recognized this tendency, without noting the historical developments in moral psychology that account for it: "Als Gegenstand des Begehrens werden fast durchweg die Strebungen, die Platon von dem zweiten und dritten Sellenteil aussagt, zusammengefaßt" (92-93).

⁶⁹ *Leg.* 3.130: τοῦ θυμοῦ . . . τοῦ πολεμικοῦ μέρους; *Leg.* 3.131: ἔρις δὲ μήτηρ ἐστὶ θυμοῦ . . . τῆς οὖν ἐριστικῆς καὶ φιλονείκου ψυχῆς πλημμελὲς γέννημα θυμόν; *Migr.* 67: τὸν πολεμικὸν θυμόν; *Migr.* 210: τὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ὀργῆς πάθος. Cf. Méasson, *Char ailé*, 158-60 [= "Le «thumos» chez Platon et chez Philon"].

⁷⁰ Compare the instances of ὄρεξις (15) and ἐπιθυμία (218) (see *Philo Index*, s.v.). Because the two terms are virtually equivalent (ἐπιθυμία = [ἄλογος] ὄρεξις), Philo's preference for ἐπιθυμία over ὄρεξις may come from a conviction that ὄρεξις in most cases amounts to needless technical jargon.

Reason over against Impulse (ὄρμη)

Siding with his Middle-Platonic contemporaries against the Stoics, Philo believes that the soul's non-rational part can generate non-rational impulses (ὄρμαί), whose independent origin allows them genuinely to oppose, or even usurp, reason.⁷¹ Philo's acceptance of non-rational impulse as a factor in *human* moral psychology derives from broader convictions about the relation between animal and human souls. Following standard formulations of the so-called *scala naturae*, which ranks various forms of existence according to natural endowment, Philo recognizes impulse (ὄρμη) as a capacity possessed by non-rational animals.⁷² Because animals are non-rational (ἄλογος), their impulses are likewise non-rational (ἄλογος), generated by a reflexive mechanism every time an appropriate stimulus appears, *without the authorization or assent of reason*.⁷³ Occupying a higher rank on the scale, human beings have not only the capacity for impulse (ὄρμη), but also the endowment of reason (λόγος), which distinguishes them as a more advanced type of soul. But in Stoic theory, reason is not just one additional endowment among others. In other words, a human soul in no way amounts to simply the capacities of an animal soul, *as they*

⁷¹ Philo acknowledges also *rational* impulses in human beings (e.g., *Praem.* 104: τὰς ὀρμὰς διανοίας). But the issue is not whether mind can generate impulses or not (it can), but whether or not there are *also* non-rational parts of the soul that can generate impulses. On ὄρμη in Philo's writings, including *rational* ὄρμη, see Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 86-87.

⁷² E.g., *Leg.* 2.23: ψυχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ φύσις προσειληφύια φαντασίαν καὶ ὀρμήν· αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν (cf. *Leg.* 1.30; *Deus* 41). On the *scala naturae*, see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 18-27 [= "The Place of Man in Nature"].

⁷³ For a discussion of how impulse works in non-rational animals, see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 66-91 [= "Human and Animal Action"].

function in animals (i.e., non-rationally), with reason added on as a distinct new element.⁷⁴ Reason transforms the very nature of the human soul, making its capacities thoroughly rational. So human beings, for the Stoics, experience only *rational* impulses. In Philo's view, by contrast, the capacities of the animal soul, *as they function in animals* (i.e., non-rationally), remain intact within the human soul, coexisting with reason in what amounts to an animal soul superintended by reason:

Each one of us (ἕκαστον ἡμῶν) . . . is two in number (ἀριθμῶ δύο εἶναι), an animal (ζῷον), and a man (ἄνθρωπον). To each of these has been allotted an inner power akin to the qualities of their respective life-principles (συγγενῆς δύναμις τῶν κατὰ ψυχῆν), to one the power of vitality (ἡ ζωτική), in virtue of which we are alive, to the other the power of reasoning (ἡ λογική), in virtue of which we are reasoning beings. Of the power of vitality the non-rational creatures (τὰ ἄλογα) partake with us . . . (Det. 82)⁷⁵

This Middle-Platonic understanding of the *scala naturae* gives Plato's basic image of the "beast within" a more sophisticated theoretical basis—one that has profound implications for Philo's moral psychology. In particular, Philo considers the same mechanism of non-rational impulse found in animals to operate also in

⁷⁴ See Long, "Stoic Psychology," esp. 574-75.

⁷⁵ Substituting "each" for Colson's "either"; "non-rational" for Colson's "irrational." For Philo, ἡ ζωτική δύναμις (the life power of the ζῷον) includes ὁρμή: e.g., *Leg.* 1.30: τὸ γὰρ ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῷου δυσὶ προὔχει, φαντασίᾳ καὶ ὁρμῇ (cf. *Leg.* 2.23; *Deus* 41). Furthermore, Philo states that ἡ ζωτική δύναμις, including ὁρμή, retains its distinct nature within the human soul, functioning for human beings as it does for non-rational animals (cf. *Spec.* 3.99: τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς φαυλότερον εἶδος . . . ἐν τῷ σώματι, τὸ ἄλογον, οὐ καὶ τὰ θηρία μετέσχηκεν; *Sacr.* 47: τὰς δὲ καθ' ἑτέραν ἐκδοχὴν ἀλόγους [δυνάμεις] . . ., ὅσαι μὴ λογικαί, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ). Cf. Wolfson, *Philo*, 1:385-89 [= "Animals and the Irrational Soul of Man"].

human beings. Just like non-rational animals, human beings experience non-rational impulses (ἄλογοι ὀρμαί).⁷⁶

In his description of Moses, Philo presents an idealized portrait of reason's management of non-rational impulse(s):

He did not . . . allow the lusts of adolescence (τὰς μεριακιώδεις ἐπιθυμίας) to go unbridled, . . . But he kept a tight hold on them with the reins, as it were, of temperance and self-control, and forcibly pulled them back from their forward course (τὴν εἰς τὸ πρόσω φοράν ἀνεχαίτιζε βία). And each of the other emotions (τῶν ἄλλων μέντοι παθῶν ἕκαστον), which rage so furiously if left to themselves, he tamed and assuaged and reduced to mildness; . . . and in general he watched *the first directions and impulses of the soul* (τὰς πρώτας τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιβολάς τε καὶ ὀρμάς) as

⁷⁶ In QG 1.55 (Gk. Petit), Philo acknowledges the reflexive generation of impulse (ὀρμή) at the mere *appearance* of something (ὅταν προσπέσῃ τινὸς φαντασία), i.e., without rational assent. In other words, he describes a mechanism of non-rational impulse *in human beings*. Commenting on the Armenian version of this passage, Margaret Graver correctly notes: "Here the 'impulse . . . of which the appearance is the cause' cannot be the usual Stoic ὀρμή, since in adult humans ὀρμή is always caused by assent, never by the presentation itself" ("Stoic ΠΡΟΠΑΘΕΙΑΙ," 207, n. 19). She then suggests, however, that Philo, "using the term ὀρμή loosely," has in mind the Stoic technical term προπάθεια. But Philo more likely speaks with precision: he refers in this case to a *non-rational* ὀρμή (neither the rational ὀρμή of the Stoics, nor a προπάθεια). The suggestion that προπάθειαι played a meaningful role in Philo's theory of the passions presumes that rational *assent* (συγκατάθεσις) played a meaningful role as well: "Philo . . . assumes that προπάθειαι can be called upon to explain away apparent exceptions to the posited incompatibility of virtue and emotion, taking advantage of a theoretical time-lag between impression and assent" (ibid., 200-01); "Philo employs [the appeal to the προπάθειαι] only where there is some textual warrant for positing a time-lag between impression and assent" (205-06; cf. 208: "the gap between impression and assent"). Philo, however, in keeping with his Middle-Platonic affinities, nowhere brings συγκατάθεσις into his understanding of πάθος (see Pohlenz, *Philon*, 456, n. 1). He would have had precedent for his view of non-rational impulse in the Academic tradition, since Arcesilaus (ca. 316-240 B.C.), in dispute with the Stoics and using Stoic terminology, claimed that *in human beings* impulses reflexively occur in response to the appropriate sensory impression. See e.g. LS 53S [=Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1057 A (=SVF III 42, 22-27)]: οικείας φαντασίας γενομένης εὐθὺς ὀρμῶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκαταθεμένους; cf. LS 69A and commentary: "In effect, Arcesilaus applies to human action the Stoics' account of non-rational animal behaviour" (LS 1:456) (see also Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 86-88). For the term ἄλογοι ὀρμαί, see *Leg.* 3.185: ἄλογος ὀρμή; *Ebr.* 98: ἐν ἡμῖν αἱ ἄλογοι ὀρμαί; *Ebr.* 111: ἀλόγοις ὀρμαίς; cf. *Sacr.* 80: τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου πάθους ὀρμήν. Elsewhere, Philo uses the term ὀρμή when he means ἐπιθυμία (ἄλογος ὄρεξις: non-rational appetite), referring to the basic desires for food, drink, and sex (esp. *Spec.* 1.101: ταῖς πρὸς συνουσίαν ὀρμαίς; *Spec.* 1.193: ἐπιστομίζοντας τὰς ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ὀρμάς [= ἐπιθυμίας]; cf. *Det.* 5: τὰς ψυχῆς ἀλόγουςφοράς; *Agr.* 41: τῆς ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ἀλόγουφοράς; *Spec.* 3.129: ἀλόγῳ φορᾷ). These are clearly non-rational impulses (ἄλογοι ὀρμαί), the kind common to both human beings and animals.

one would a restive horse (ὡς ἀφηνιαστὴν ἵππον), in fear *lest they should run away with the reason which ought to rein them in* (τοῦ ἡνιοχεῖν ὀφείλοντος λογισμοῦ), and thus cause universal chaos. For it is these impulses (αὐταί) which cause both good and bad (εἰσιν αἱ ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαι καὶ κακῶν)—good when they obey the guidance of reason (ὅταν ἡγεμόνι λόγῳ πειθαρχῶσι), bad when they turn from their regular course into anarchy (ἀναρχίαν). (*Mos.* 1.25-26; emphasis added)

The characterization here of reason's *relation* to impulse illustrates the Middle-Platonic perspective evident throughout Philo's writings.⁷⁷ The "primary impulses" (πρῶται ὁρμαί) clearly arise apart from reason, since reason must act *upon* them, actively managing them as a rational human being would manage a non-rational animal (ἀφηνιαστὴν ἵππον).⁷⁸ Although quite dangerous when left to themselves, these impulses are not inherently bad. Their moral import lies entirely in their relation to reason—i.e., whether or not they obey its commanding authority (ἡγεμόνι λόγῳ πειθαρχῶσι).

Philo does not name in this passage the source of the impulses, but clearly desire (ἐπιθυμία) and the "other emotions" (πάθη) derive from the same source. This grouping of ὁρμή, ἐπιθυμία, and πάθος over against reason reflects the Middle-Platonic dichotomy between "rational part" (λογικὸν μέρος) and "non-rational part" (ἄλογον μέρος) evident among Philo's contemporaries. In particular,

⁷⁷ Along with τὰς πρῶτας . . . ὁρμάς, the phrase τὴν εἰς τὸ πρόσω φορᾶν denotes impulse as well (cf. *Deus* 149: τὴν εἰς τὸ πρόσω . . . ὁρμήν). On the synonymy of ὁρμή and φορᾶ, note the generic Stoic definition of impulse: λέγουσιν . . . ὁρμὴν εἶναι φορᾶν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι κατὰ τὸ γένος (*ESE* 9). On "primary impulse," see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 184-94, 218-23.

⁷⁸ Cf. *Spec.* 2.142: ἐὰν λογισμῷ τὰς πρῶτας ἡνιοχῶμεν ὁρμάς μὴ ἐπιτρέποντες αὐταῖς ἀφηνιάζειν καὶ ἀνασκιρτᾶν τρόπον θρεμμάτων ἀγελάρχην οὐκ ἐχόντων; *Spec.* 3.79: οἱ ταῖς πρῶταις εὐθὺς ὁρμαῖς ἐνδιδόντες ὁποιαῖ περ ἂν οὔσαι τυγχάνωσιν ἅς ἡνιοχεῖν δεῖον ἀχαλινώτους ἐῶσιν.

the placement of *emotion* within the soul's non-rational part bears special significance for Philo's moral theory.

Reason over against Emotion (πάθος)

Philo agrees with his Middle-Platonic contemporaries, against the Stoics, when he locates emotion (πάθος) *outside of* the rational faculty *within* the non-rational part of the soul.⁷⁹ Most clearly in *Leg.* 3.114-16, Philo identifies the two non-rational "parts" of the Platonic soul (θυμός and ἐπιθυμία) as the locus of emotion (πάθος):⁸⁰

If, therefore, O mind, thou art ever inquiring what quarter pleasure (ἡδονή) has for her portion, do not consider the place occupied by the head, where the reasoning faculty resides (ὅπου τὸ λογιστικόν), *for thou wilt assuredly not find it there* (οὐ γὰρ μὴ εὐρήσεις), since reason is at war with emotion (μάχεται ὁ λόγος τῷ πάθει), and cannot remain in the same place with it (ἐν ταύτῳ μένειν οὐ δύναται) But look for it in the breast and belly, where high spirit (ὁ θυμός) and desire (ἡ ἐπιθυμία) are, portions of the non-rational (μέρη τοῦ ἀλόγου) (*Leg.* 3.116)⁸¹

Stoics, by contrast, invariably located the πάθη *within* the mind, identifying them as "judgments" (κρίσεις) and thus rational phenomena.⁸² Philo explicitly rejects this view:

⁷⁹ E.g., QG 2.59 (Gk. Petit): περὶ σάρκα δὲ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ πάθος, οὐχ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς (cf. Pohlenz, *Philon*, 458); *Migr.* 25-26, which pits ὁ νοῦς against non-rational emotion (πάθος ἀλόγου). Cf. Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 88: "Er weist . . . die Affekte dem unvernünftigen Seelenteile zu und lehnt ausdrücklich ihren Platz im Kopf, d.h. am Sitz des vernünftigen Seelenteils, ab, während sie nach stoischer Anschauung sich gerade im Hegemonikon vollziehen sollen."

⁸⁰ I.e., παθητικὸν μέρος. Cf. *Agr.* 78: θυμοῦ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ . . . ἀπάντων παθῶν.

⁸¹ Emphasis added; substituting "emotion" for Colson's "passion" and "non-rational" for "irrational." Cf. *Leg.* 3.114: τὰ μέρη τὸ πάθος, τὰ τε στέρνα καὶ τὴν γαστέρα.

⁸² DL 7.111: "They hold the emotions to be judgments (δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι), as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise *On the Passions* (Περὶ παθῶν)" (trans. R. D. Hicks).

The non-rational part of the soul consists of sense-perception and its offspring the emotions, which are also non-rational—*especially* if they are not our "judgments" (κρίσεις). (*Leg.* 2.6)⁸³

As part of the non-rational equipment of the soul, emotions are simply an endowment of human nature.⁸⁴ In this respect, emotions are like a natural faculty (δύναμις), comparable to other faculties like sense-perception.⁸⁵ Philo acknowledges the natural occurrence of non-rational πάθη most clearly in *Congr.*

⁸³ τὸ δὲ ἄλογον αἰσθησίς ἐστι καὶ τὰ ταύτης ἔκγονα πάθη, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ μὴ κρίσεις εἰσὶν ἡμέτεραι. The translation (my own) clearly offers an interpretation of the Greek, but the obscurity of the construction calls for it. Despite Philo's wording, his *meaning* is clear, given the broader context of the passage (*Leg.* 2.1-8). In the course of his allegorical exegesis of Gen 2:8, Philo establishes the following points: the soul is divided into rational (λογικόν) and non-rational (ἄλογον) parts (*Leg.* 2.2); to assist the mind (νοῦς [rational part]), God *separately* fashioned sense-perception (αἰσθησις) and passions (πάθη) as "helpers" (*Leg.* 2.5); the "ruling part" of the soul (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν [νοῦς, rational part]) holds preeminence over the non-rational part (τὸ ἄλογον), which consists of the "helpers" sense-perception and passion, which together represent a distinct, inferior order of creation (*Leg.* 2.6); mind, sense-perception, and the passions are distinct "parts" (μέρη) of one soul (ψυχή) (*Leg.* 2.8). Philo *clearly* affirms Middle-Platonic bipartition in this passage: λογικὸν μέρος over against ἄλογον μέρος. He *clearly* assigns the πάθη to the soul's non-rational part, identifying them as something *other than* reason and therefore not *functions* of reason. There cannot be any real question in Philo's mind as to whether or not the passions are judgments, because he repeatedly and unmistakably claims that they are not, insofar as he identifies them as something distinctly *other than* the rational faculty. By using the term κρίσεις in connection with πάθη, Philo undoubtedly alludes to the Stoic doctrine, which he cites only to reject. Commentators who understand *Leg.* 2.6 in this way include Bréhier, *Idées philosophiques et religieuses*, 263; Le Boulluec, "Philon sur le plaisir," 137; Pohlenz, *Philon*, 458-59; Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 88. Alcinoüs, in his Middle-Platonic treatment of the passions, similarly cites and rejects the Stoic view that passions are judgments (κρίσεις) (*Didask.* 32.1 [185.24-42]). Lilla not only understands Philo to reject the idea of passions as judgments in *Leg.* 2.6 (*Clement of Alexandria*, 92) but also more generally identifies the "refusal to regard [πάθος] as a wrong judgement of reason" as one of three principal tenets in the Middle-Platonic doctrine of πάθος (idem, 87). Cf. Alain Le Boulluec, "La place des concepts philosophiques dans la réflexion de Philon sur le plaisir," in *Pages in Philon d'Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie* (ed. Carlos Lévy; Turnhout: Brepolis, 1998), 129-152, 131: "Une altération sensible consiste à dissocier «passion» . . . et capacité intellectuelle."

⁸⁴ And, for that matter, an endowment of *animal* nature. Just as human beings have within them a mechanism of non-rational impulse analogous to the mechanism within non-rational animals, they also have within them a mechanism of *emotion* (which consists of non-rational impulses) analogous to the emotional mechanism of non-rational animals. For a consideration of the nature of *animal* emotion, see Juha Sihvola, "Emotional Animals: Do Aristotelian Emotions Require Beliefs?," in *Psychology and Ethics* (ed. Lloyd P. Gerson; vol. 3 of *Aristotle: Critical Assessments*; London: Routledge, 1999), 50-82.

⁸⁵ See esp. *Abr.* 236-37: τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν τῶν τεττάρων παθῶν δυνάμεις, ἡδονῆς, ἐπιθυμίας, φόβου, λύπης. Cf. *Leg.* 3.250; *Sobr.* 49.

81, where he notes that before the onset of mature rational calculation (λογισμός) children have only their emotions (πάθη) to guide them.⁸⁶

Because they are not intrinsically immoral, these emotions can provide non-rational motivation for perfectly natural, ethically appropriate behavior.⁸⁷

Philo accordingly asserts that *God created the emotions* as "helpers" (βοηθοί) for the human race:

Moreover, there are, as I have said, helpers of another kind (ἔστι τοίνυν ἕτερον εἶδος βοηθῶν), namely the emotions (τὰ πάθη). For pleasure (ἡδονή) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) contribute to the permanence of our kind: pain (λύπη) and fear (φόβος) are like bites or stings warning the soul to treat nothing carelessly: anger (ὀργή) is a weapon of defense, which has conferred great boons on many: and so with the other emotions (καὶ τὰλλα ταύτη). (*Leg.* 2.8)⁸⁸

The emotion of ἐπιθυμία, for example, can be especially useful, and in fact *necessary*, as a non-rational motivator for the procurement of food and drink,

⁸⁶ See esp. *Congr.* 81-82, on which Le Boulluec ("Philon sur le plaisir," 131) notes: "Prises en elles-mêmes, les quatre «passions» principales, chagrin, peur, désir, plaisir, semblent selon Philon moralement neutres."

⁸⁷ Cf. Williamson, *Philo*, 203-04.

⁸⁸ Substituting "emotion" for Colson's "passion." Philo's allegorical exegesis of Gen 2:19 (see *Leg.* 2.9) equates the πάθη with the "beasts" (τὰ θηρία) God created then presented to Adam as "helpers." Because he considers the emotions morally dangerous, Philo qualifies this identification (see *Leg.* 2.10-11), but he never denies it outright. In *Plant.* 43, he similarly equates θηρία with πάθη, acknowledging their ferocity but nevertheless admitting that they are a necessary component of life in the body (NB ἐξ ἀνάγκης; cf. *Praem.* 88). On Philo's allegorical equation of beasts with emotions, see Carl Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments* (Jena: Hermann Dufft, 1875), 182-84, esp. 182: "Die Thiere, insofern sie vernunftlose Wesen sind, werden Symbole der Leidenschaften, welche ebenfalls das ἄλογον im Menschen darstellen" (emphasis added). A similar Middle-Platonic understanding of the emotions appears in *Didask.* 32.4 [186.14-29], where Alcinous discusses "wild" and "tame" emotions: τῶν δὲ παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ ἡμέρα [186.14-15]. "Tame" emotions are ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀναγκαῖά τε καὶ οἰκεῖα [186.16-17]. These emotions only become problematic when they exhibit a lack of moderation (ἄμετρία) [186.18].

both of which are obviously necessary for survival.⁸⁹ So, for example, in the case of desire for food, virtue requires not the eradication of ἐπιθυμία but its proper management by reason. In general, Philo promotes the value of restraint by endorsing the *moderation* of emotion (μετριοπάθεια) as an ethical norm, although he admits the theoretical possibility of a perfect sage becoming free from the influence of emotion (ἀπάθεια).⁹⁰

Reason over against Sense-Perception (αἴσθησις)

Philo holds yet another conception of the soul's bipartition between rational and non-rational—one closely related to the reason-*emotion* dichotomy—

⁸⁹ Plato, *Resp.* 558 D–E: "[D]esires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary (ἀναγκαῖα), and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us (ὠφελούσιν ἡμᾶς), may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction (τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη)." Cf. Philo, *Leg.* 1.86 (substituting "desire" for Colson's "lust"): "Mark you not that even the most self-controlled of men (οὐχ ὀρᾶς ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἐγκρατέστατοι) under compulsion of the mortal element in them (ἀνάγκη τοῦ θνητοῦ) resort to food and drink (παραγίνονται ἐπὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά), out of which the pleasures of the appetite develop (ἐξ ὧν αἱ γαστρὸς ἡδοναὶ συνεστᾶσιν)? So we must be content to face and fight desire as a principle (ἀγαπητὸν οὖν ἐστὶν ἀντιβῆναι καὶ μαχέσασθαι τῷ γένει τῆς ἐπιθυμίας)" (cf. *Leg.* 3.147, 151, 157; *Gig.* 34; *Ebr.* 131, 214; *Mos.* 1.28; *Contemp.* 37).

⁹⁰ Philo in fact endorses *both* μετριοπάθεια and ἀπάθεια, as the respective goals for intermediate and advanced stages of ethical development (see esp. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 92-106; also Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation: The Gifford Lectures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 385-86; Spanneut, "Apatheia," 4701-04; Williamson, *Philo*, 205-07; Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," 400-05). But since ἀπάθεια presumes a sort of moral perfection, μετριοπάθεια becomes, practically speaking, the ethical ideal (e.g., *Virt.* 195: παρ' ἐμοὶ [εὐγένεια] μὲν γὰρ αἰδῶς καὶ ἀλήθεια μετριοπάθειά τε καὶ ἀτυφία καὶ ἀκακία τίμια; cf. Gemünden, "Culture des passions," 339-42; Williamson, *Philo*, 206). Philo's concept of ἀπάθεια differs from the Stoic concept of ἀπάθεια, in accordance with his rejection of Stoic monistic psychology. Whereas the Stoics envision a mind that avoids false assessments of value and thus avoids passions, Philo envisions a mind so divorced from the sensible world, and so immersed in the intelligible world, that it operates free from the influence of emotions (e.g., *Congr.* 106: τὸ ψυχικὸν Πάσχα = ἡ ἀπόδοσις παντὸς πάθους καὶ παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ διάβασις τοῦ δὲ νοητὸν ἐστὶ καὶ θεῖον; cf. *Fug.* 91; *Leg.* 1.103; *Gig.* 33; *Ebr.* 99-103). Plutarch endorses a similar Middle-Platonic notion of ἀπάθεια, while at the same time endorsing μετριοπάθεια, as Christopher Gill notes in his comment on *Virt. mor.* 444 C-D: "[T]here are two ideals: *apatheia* for the mind as the vehicle of abstract thought and knowledge and *metriopatheia* for the body-based emotions as regulated by practical reason" (*The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 238).

which despite a relative lack of attestation among his contemporaries still bears Middle-Platonic affinities: a bipartition of *mind* (νοῦς) over against *sense-perception* (αἴσθησις).⁹¹ Xenocrates (396 – 314 B.C.), third scholarch of Plato's Academy, used the *Timaeus* to endorse a bipartition of the soul into λογικόν and αἰσθητικόν, indicating a dichotomy between parts of the soul geared respectively to the intelligible (νοητός) and sensible (αἰσθητός) realms.⁹² In this view, sense-perception, a non-rational component of the soul, stems from embodiment and entails the emotions—so αἴσθησις (like πάθος) often *opposes* νοῦς (and intelligible realities) through its attachment to the sensible realm.⁹³ Philo affirms the non-rationality of αἴσθησις,⁹⁴ its close association with the emotions,⁹⁵ its link

⁹¹ On Philo's dichotomy between mind and sense-perception in the context of Middle Platonism, see esp. Bouffartigue, "Structure de l'âme chez Philon," esp. 62-73; also Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 262-66; Thomas H. Tobin, *The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation* (CBQMS 14; Washington: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 148-49; cf. Gérard-Henry Baudry, "Le péché original chez Philon d'Alexandrie," *MScRel* 50 (1993): 99-115; Petra von Gemünden, "La femme passionnelle et l'homme rationnel? Un chapitre de psychologie historique," *Biblica* 78 (1997): 457-80, 468-70.

⁹² See Schibli, "Xenocrates' Daemons," esp. 149-53. For Xenocrates, "τὸ αἰσθητικόν points to that part of the soul which links the psyche to the material, sensate world (the αἰσθητὴ οὐσία); as such it merely serves as the conduit for sensations and operates without reason. The dichotomy of τὸ αἰσθητικόν—τὸ λογικόν not only implies that the sensitive element lacks what its counterpart possesses, but it conceivably also points to the antithetical dimension of the two divisions, in so far as the sensible part may give rise to affections and passions that militate against reason, and that reason in turn must conquer" (153).

⁹³ See esp. *Tim.* 42 A-B (cf. *Didask.* 16.2 [172.2-19]). On αἴσθησις and embodiment, see *Congr.* 21, where Philo calls αἴσθησις "τὸ σωματοειδέστερον ψυχῆς μέρος."

⁹⁴ E.g., *Leg.* 3.50: αἴσθησις . . . ἄλογος οὐσα; *Spec.* 2.89: αἴσθησις . . . ἡ κοινὴ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων (cf. *Leg.* 1.24; *Migr.* 213; *Spec.* 1.33; *Spec.* 4.123).

⁹⁵ E.g., *Leg.* 2.6: τὸ δὲ ἄλογον αἴσθησίς ἐστι καὶ τὰ ταύτης ἔκγονα πάθη; *Leg.* 2 50: τὴν παθῶν αἰτίαν αἴσθησιν; *Abr.* 238: ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ ὀσφρανθῶμεν ἢ γευσώμεθα ἢ ἀψώμεθα, λύπαι καὶ ἡδοναὶ καὶ φόβοι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι συνίστανται, μηδενὸς τῶν παθῶν καθ' αὐτὸ σθένοντος, εἰ μὴ ἐχορηγεῖτο ταῖς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων παρασκευαίς.

to the *sensible* over against *intelligible* realm,⁹⁶ and particularly its capacity to *oppose* νοῦς:

Now the younglings (θρεμμάτων) that are reared among the herd are tame and docile, because they are guided by the care of the herdsman who rules them (ὑπὸ ἐπιστάτου . . . βουκόλου). For those that roam at large and in liberty become wild (ἐξαγριαίνεται) for want of one to tame them, but those who are led by goatherd, neat-herd, shepherd, and the like, the herdsman, that is, who tends whatever kind of animal it may be, must needs be tame and gentle (ἡμεροῦται). So then, the senses also as a kind (τὸ αἰσθήσεων γένος) may be either wild or tame. They are wild (ἀτίθασον) when, throwing off the control of their herdsman the mind (ἀφηνιάσαν ὡσπερ βουκόλου τοῦ νοῦ), they are carried away in their unreason (ἀλόγως) into the outer sphere of things perceptible by them (πρὸς τὰ . . . αἰσθητά). They are tame (ἡμερον) when they respond submissively to reflection (λογισμῶ), the ruling element in our compound nature, and accept its guidance and control. (*Sacr.* 104-06)⁹⁷

Here Philo casts αἴσθησις as a non-rational animal in need of a rational ruler (ἐπιστάτης), the mind (νοῦς). With the mind in charge, αἴσθησις functions like an obedient, tame creature.⁹⁸ But αἴσθησις can become "wild," rejecting the

⁹⁶ For the distinction between realms, note esp. *Her.* 75: δύο γὰρ ἔοικε συστήναι, τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθητόν. αἰσθητῶν μὲν οὖν φύσεων ὁ κόσμος οὗτος, ἀοράτων δ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ νοητός (cf. *Her.* 209: τὰλλα ἐναντία . . . αἰσθητὰ νοητά). For αἴσθησις as link to sensible realm, see e.g. *Migr.* 191: κὰν ἐμποδίζωσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὴν ἀκριβῆ θεάν τοῦ νοητοῦ, μέλει τοῖς φιλοθεάμοσι καθαιρεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπίθεσιν . . . καὶ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ καὶ σκότῳ διατρίβειν ἀξιούσιν, ὡς μὴ πρὸς τινος αἰσθητοῦ τὸ ψυχῆς ὄμμα, ᾧ νοητὰ βλέπειν ἔδωκεν ὁ θεός, ἐπισκιασθῆ; *Her.* 111: νῶ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς καταλαμβάνει τὸν μὲν νοητὸν κόσμον δι' ἑαυτοῦ, τὸν δὲ ὀρατὸν δι' αἰσθήσεως ἐφήκεν; *Somn.* 1.44: ὅστις ἂν σφαλῆ τῶν νοητῶν, αὐτίκα πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητὰ κατασύεται· δεῦτερος γὰρ ἀεὶ πλοῦς ὁ πρὸς αἴσθησιν τοῖς μὴ δυνηθεῖσι πρὸς τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν εὐπλοῆσαι. Cf. David Runia, "A Brief History of the Term *Kosmos Noetos* from Plato to Plotinus," in *Traditions of Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon* (ed. John J. Cleary; Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 151-71.

⁹⁷ Cf. Alcinous' "tame" and "wild" *emotions* (*Didask.* 32.4 [186.14-18]).

⁹⁸ E.g., *Def.* 53: [τιμῆ] τῆς δὲ αἰσθήσεως τὸ μὴ ἀφεθῆναι ρύμη μιᾷ φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς αἰσθητά, ἐγγαλινωθῆναι δὲ ὑπὸ νοῦ κυβερνᾶν καὶ ἠνιοχεῖν τὰς ἀλόγους ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεις ἐπισταμένου.

authority of reason and bringing destructive chaos to the soul.⁹⁹ This sort of relation between νοῦς and αἴσθησις fits Philo's general characterization of Middle-Platonic bipartition: a rational element placed over a non-rational element, one capable of opposing or even *usurping* reason's hegemony. This emphasis on the νοῦς-αἴσθησις dichotomy allows Philo to press another model of the soul, an otherwise *Stoic* model, into Middle-Platonic service.

Reason over against "Stoic" Non-Rational Soul

For Stoics, the soul has eight parts: the rational mind (ἡγεμονικόν), plus the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the faculty of reproduction.¹⁰⁰ On the surface, this Stoic model resembles Philo's Middle-Platonic dichotomy of νοῦς-αἴσθησις: not only does the Stoic soul divide into a rational and a non-rational component (ἡγεμονικόν plus collective seven), but the senses account for five of the seven non-rational parts. So a loose description of *both* models as rational mind over non-rational sense-perception fits the data reasonably well. In terms of moral psychology, however, the two models are fundamentally incompatible. The non-rational parts of the Stoic soul operate *only* by order of the ἡγεμονικόν in a *strictly* instrumental capacity.¹⁰¹ Under no circumstances would—or could—

⁹⁹ E.g., *Agr.* 58: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τροφὰς ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι διὰ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀφθονίας εὐτρεπιζόμενοι, δούλοι γίνονται τῶν τρεφομένων καθάπερ δεσποίνας οἰκέται φόρον τελούντες καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀναγκαῖον, ἄρχοντες δὲ οἱ τούτων ἐπιστατοῦντες καὶ τὰ περιττὰ τῆς εἰς ἀπλησίαν ὀρμῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιστομίζοντες; *Leg.* 2.49: ἔνεκα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν αὐτῇ δουλωθῇ, καταλείπει καὶ τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὄλων θεὸν καὶ τὴν μητέρα τῶν συμπάντων, τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ σοφίαν τοῦ θεοῦ . . . ἵνα γένωνται μία σὰρξ καὶ ἐν πάθος οἱ δύο.

¹⁰⁰ See Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 27-41; Long, *Stoic Psychology*, esp. 560-72.

¹⁰¹ Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 33.

αἴσθησις ever oppose, let alone usurp, the ἡγεμονικόν.¹⁰² But Philo, who clearly knows and *cites* the Stoic eight-part model,¹⁰³ nevertheless characterizes its non-rational component as an antagonist of reason, able not only to oppose but even to supplant and enslave its rightful sovereign:

[S]ix of [the faculties within us] wage ceaseless and continuous war on land and sea, namely the five senses (αἱ τε πέντε αἰσθήσεις) and speech (ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος), the former in their craving for the objects of sense (αἱ μὲν πόθῳ αἰσθητῶν), deprivation of which is painful to them, speech because with unbridled mouth (ἀχαλίνῳ στόματι) it perpetually gives utterance where silence is due. But the seventh faculty is the dominant mind (ἡ περὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν), which, *after triumphing over the six and returning victorious through its superior strength* (δυνατωτέρῳ ῥώμῃ κατακρατήσας), welcomes solitude and rejoices in its own society. (*Abr.* 28-30)¹⁰⁴

Philo's omission here of the faculty of reproduction, making a soul of *seven* parts instead of the canonical *eight*, illustrates his general practice of co-opting the Stoic model and forcing it into a Middle-Platonic mold.¹⁰⁵ He has no real

¹⁰² Because αἴσθησις clearly *does* function in this way for Philo, his understanding of αἴσθησις simply cannot be called Stoic (cf. Pohlenz, *Philon*, 456-57, esp. 456: "[F]ür ihn wächst die Aisthesis weit über die Rolle hinaus, die ihr nach der Stoa zukommen kann. Sie wird zu einem selbständigen seelischen Vermögen, das dem Nus wohl unentbehrlich für die Erkenntnis der Außenwelt ist und ihm damit gute Dienste tut, aber zugleich, da es auch die sinnlichen Triebe umfaßt, sein ständiger Widerpart wird und an die Stelle tritt, die in der griechischen Philosophie das Alogon einnimmt."

¹⁰³ E.g., *Opif.* 117: τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς τὸ δίχα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέρος ἑπταχῆ σχίζεται, εἰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὸ φωνητήριον ὄργανον καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὸ γόνιμον (cf. *Det.* 168; *Mut.* 111; *Her.* 232; *Leg.* 1.11).

¹⁰⁴ Emphasis added. Bouffartigue ("Structure de l'âme chez Philon," 61) also recognizes Philo's reference here to the Stoic model.

¹⁰⁵ Philo *knows* all seven of the Stoic non-rational parts, he simply chooses to omit one (cf. *Det.* 168: τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἑπτὰ διανέμεται μοίρας, ὄρασιν ἀκοῆν ὄσφρησιν γεῦσιν ἀφῆν λόγον γόνιμον; also *Mut.* 111, *Leg.* 1.11; on antagonism between the reproductive faculty and reason, see *Det.* 100-103, esp. 102, 170-74, esp. 174). For another example of Philo's recasting of the Stoic model as Middle-Platonic bipartition, see *Agr.* 30-34. On Philo's use of the Stoic model, see also Carlos Lévy, "Le concept de doxa des Stoïciens à Philon d'Alexandrie: essai d'étude diachronique" in *Passions and Perceptions* (ed. J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum; Cambridge, 1992), 250-84, esp. 275-84.

commitment to the *Stoic* doctrine, but he does insist on the Middle-Platonic bipartition of rational over against non-rational, with the patently non-Stoic assumption of antagonism between the two components. The Stoic formulation simply gives Philo more options when speaking of the soul's non-rational part: reason's non-rational antagonist can be αἴσθησις (as in the Middle-Platonic νοῦς-αἴσθησις dichotomy), or the faculty of reproduction, or the faculty of speech. Philo does *not* endorse a Stoic understanding of the soul—he merely superimposes Middle-Platonic bipartition onto a Stoic formulation, always presuming a moral psychology incompatible with Stoic monism.

Summary

Despite a variety of formulations, Philo ultimately endorses *one* basic model of the soul, setting rational over against non-rational in an often antagonistic bipartition:

Table Two: Variations of Bipartition in Philo's Writings

	"PLATONIC" THREE PARTS	APPETITE	IMPULSE	EMOTION	SENSE- PERCEPTION	"STOIC" EIGHT PARTS
RATIONAL ¹⁰⁶	λόγος	λόγος	λόγος	λόγος	λόγος (νοῦς)	λόγος (ἡγεμονικόν)
NON- RATIONAL	θύμος ἐπιθυμία	ὄρεξις	ὄρμη	πάθος	αἴσθησις	αἴσθησις γόνη φωνή

¹⁰⁶ On Philo's various designations for the soul's rational part, note especially Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 49-50: "Für dieses oberste Vermögen, wodurch sich der Mensch von den Tieren unterscheidet, verwendet Philon nun außer Seele und Nus noch gleichbedeutend διάνοια, λογισμός, λόγος und die formale Bezeichnung ἡγεμονικόν, zwischen denen er . . . nur des Stiles wegen wechselt." Schmidt offers extensive evidence for the interchangeability of various terms on pages 139-42 [=n. 14].

Philo's Middle-Platonic contemporaries offered him various ways of framing his discourse on ἐπιθυμία. Undoubtedly, Plato's conviction that the soul contains an independent, enduring source of non-rational desire exerts a powerful influence: the term ἐπιθυμία stands often as a reference to either the Platonic *faculty* of desire (i.e., τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) or the *operation* of that faculty (i.e., ἐπιθυμίαι)—either, to use Platonic imagery, the beast itself or the beast in action.¹⁰⁷ Philo's Middle-Platonic moral psychology, however, allows for greater technical precision and more sophisticated, variant conceptions of the phenomenon of desire. Philo can, for example, identify ἐπιθυμία as an ἄλογος ὄρεξις. In addition, he understands that ἐπιθυμία bears analysis as an impulse (ὄρμη), which in turn allows him to speak of transient instances of desire in the more abstract technical language of *impulse*. Or Philo can speak of ἐπιθυμία as an *emotion* (πάθος), although he sides with contemporary Middle Platonists by asserting that the emotion of desire, as a function of the non-rational, "emotional" part of the soul, is both natural and amoral. Philo's dichotomy of νοῦς-αἴσθησις offers him not only another model of bipartition, but also another way of envisioning desire: non-rational αἴσθησις yearning for the attractions of the sensible world.¹⁰⁸ Using this

¹⁰⁷ For Philo's Platonic identification of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν (ἐπιθυμία) as a beast, see esp. *Spec.* 1.148: ἀλόγου θρέμματος, ἐπιθυμίας; also *Abr.* 160: τὸ σύμφυτον ἡμῖν θρέμμα . . . τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν; *Leg.* 1.69: τίγριδι δὲ τῷ ἀτιθασωτάτῳ ζῴῳ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν [Μωυσῆς] εἵκασε; *Contempl.* 74: τὸ θρεμμάτων ἀπληστότατον . . . τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν; *QE* 1.19 (Gk. Petit): πολυκεφάλῳ θρέμματι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν.

¹⁰⁸ E.g., *Her.* 109: αἴσθησιν δὲ ἀκόρεστον, ἐμφορουμένην μὲν αἰεὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀκράτορος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας μηδέποτε ἐμπλησθῆναι δυναμένην; *Abr.* 29: αἶ τε πέντε αἰσθήσεις . . . αἶ μὲν πόθῳ αἰσθητῶν; *Agr.* 58: ἄρχοντες δὲ οἱ τούτων [τῶν αἰσθήσεων] ἐπιστατοῦντες καὶ τὰ περιττὰ τῆς εἰς ἀπληστίαν ὀρμῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιστομίζοντες; *Somn.* 2.267: τὸ κτηνώδες θρέμμα,

same notion of non-rational αἴσθησις, but adding the two non-rational faculties of reproduction and speech, Philo used a reworked Stoic model for his Middle-Platonic moral psychology, facilitating, for example, his discussion of the *desire* to speak and the *desire* to keep silent.¹⁰⁹ All of these various conceptions of the soul and its faculties make it possible for Philo to understand and describe any given instance of desire in a variety of equivalent ways. But no instance of ἐπιθυμία, however described, *necessarily* represents for Philo an ethical problem or malfunction of the soul. When Philo wants to speak of desire as an aberration, he turns to other conceptual models.

PROBLEMATIC MALFUNCTIONS OF DESIRE

Passionate Desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία)

In Philo's view, the term ἐπιθυμία can refer also to "passionate desire," meaning non-rational desire that has overstepped the bounds of reason. For Middle Platonists, as for Plato, ἐπιθυμία as such was normal and morally unobjectionable—an inevitable, often *useful*, ingredient of human life. But certainly there were problematic manifestations of ἐπιθυμία, so Plato's heirs needed a precise model for explaining the mechanics of *problematic* desire to match the elaborate moral psychology of the Stoics. For the Stoics, problematic movements of the soul belonged categorically under one rubric, "passion"

τὴν αἴσθησιν (cf. *Spec.* 1.148: ἀλόγου θρέμματος, ἐπιθυμίας; *Abr.* 160: τὸ σύμφυτον ἡμῖν θρέμμα . . . τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν).

¹⁰⁹ E.g., *Spec.* 4.90: ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ γλώτταν φθάσασα μυρία ἐνεωτέρισεν· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἢ τὰ λεκτέα σιωπᾶν ἢ τὰ ἡσυχαστέα λέγειν, καὶ ἀναφθεγγόμενοις ἔπεται τιμωρὸς δίκη καὶ ἐχεμυθοῦσι καὶ τούναντίον (cf. *Fug.* 191; *Det.* 102).

(πάθος): the passions (πάθη), including ἐπιθυμία, were always and inherently bad. But for Middle Platonists, the term πάθος did not bear such an exclusively negative meaning. So despite the appeal—from the standpoint of systematic moral theory—of having *one* designated class of problematic phenomena, the label πάθος by itself simply would not work (as it did for the Stoics) because of its moral ambiguity. The technical Stoic *definition* of πάθος, however, was more promising, especially the designation of πάθος as "excessive impulse" (πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή).¹¹⁰ Stoics and Middle Platonists, despite radically different views of the human soul, could agree that (1) the soul generates impulses (ὁρμαί); (2) some impulses are unobjectionable, some are problematic; and (3) human appetite, generally speaking, bears analysis as either an unobjectionable or a problematic impulse. Middle Platonists, then, could preserve the analytic value of the Stoic *category* πάθος (despite the ambiguity of the *term* from a Platonic perspective) by focusing on the term ὁρμή and endorsing—albeit reinterpreting—the Stoic idea that a πάθος consists of a πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή.

What did the Stoics mean by "excessive impulse"? In accordance with Stoic psychology, the impulse had to be a rational impulse, a function of the mind, because the Stoics denied the existence of non-rational impulses in adult human beings. But in what sense is the impulse "excessive"?¹¹¹ Ultimately, the excess lies in a faulty—but nevertheless *reasoned*—assessment of something's

¹¹⁰ E.g., DL 7.110: αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωννα . . . ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα [=SVF III 99, 32-33]; ESE 10: πάθος δ' εἶναι φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν [=SVF III 92, 11].

¹¹¹ On this question, see Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 165-73.

value: an excessive, exorbitant *appraisal*.¹¹² The notion is strictly qualitative: an excessive impulse differs in quality from a non-excessive impulse in the same way that strict alternatives like "correct" and "incorrect" differ from one another. In this qualitative model, the only way to eliminate an "excessive impulse" is to abandon an incorrect rational assessment and make a different (correct) rational assessment. Nothing in the Stoic sources suggests a *quantitative* notion of excess: the idea that an impulse, whose essential nature never changes, proceeds along an incremental scale of measurement until at some point it goes too far, becoming too powerful, too intense, too big. On the contrary, the term *πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή* denoted for the Stoics the *quality* of a *rational* impulse.

The earliest extant evidence for a *Middle-Platonic* definition of *πάθος* using the *Stoic* terms *πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή* comes from Eudorus of Alexandria.¹¹³

Unfortunately, no explanation survives from Eudorus of what he *meant* by that definition. If he simply meant what the Stoics meant, he would have endorsed the

¹¹² Cf. Frede, "Stoic Affections," 107: Due to their faulty assessments of objects, moral agents "feel impelled towards them or away from them, with an intensity which stands in no comparison to their real value, and which hence is excessive."

¹¹³ Impulse was a principal topic in Eudorus' system of ethics: Ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ πρῶτα μέρη τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγου θεωρητικόν, ὁρμητικόν, πρακτικόν (Mazz. 1.10 [=Eclog. 42.23]; cf. Bonazzi, "Eudorus' Psychology"). He took an interest in both the taxonomy of impulse (εἶδος) and the relation between impulse and passions, in particular the notion of passion as an "excessive impulse": Τοῦ δὲ περὶ τῆς ὁρμῆς λόγου ὁ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς ὁρμῆς, ὁ δὲ περὶ παθῶν. Ἦτοι γὰρ πᾶν πάθος ὁρμῆ πλεονάζουσα, ἢ τὰ γε πλεῖστα μεθ' ὁρμῆς καὶ [τὰ] ἀρρωστήματα (Mazz. 1.23-24 [=Eclog. 44.3-6]). Ps.-Timaeus (TL 73-74) similarly attests a Middle-Platonic use of Stoic terminology (πλεονάζεν . . . ὁρμάς) with reference to the passions (τὰ πάθη), which both Tobin (*Timaios of Locri*, 79, n. 35) and Baltes (*Timaios Lokros*, 206-07) identify as an allusion to the Stoic definition, *πάθος* = ὁρμῆ πλεονάζουσα. Plutarch uses the same Middle-Platonic concept of *πάθος*: τὰ δὲ πάθη σφοδρότητες ὁρμῶν (*An. corp.* 501 D [identified as an allusion to the Stoic definition also by Francesco Becchi, "Plutarco tra Platonismo e Aristotelismo: La Filosofia come ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ," in *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles: Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S. : Madrid-Cuenca, 4-7 de mayo de 1999* (ed. Aurelio Pérez Jiménez et al.; Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 1999), 25-43, 32] cf. *Virt. mor.* 444 B-C).

Stoic theory of impulse, which in turn implies an endorsement of Stoic monistic psychology. In that case, his association with Middle *Platonism*, which disagreed so sharply with the Stoics on the fundamentals of moral psychology, becomes difficult to explain. A more likely conjecture would have Eudorus revising the Stoic definition in accordance with the tenets of Middle-Platonic moral psychology.¹¹⁴ Given Middle Platonism's strong association of impulse with the non-rational part of the soul, the impulse in question would most certainly be a non-rational impulse (ἄλογος ὁρμή).¹¹⁵ Since non-rational impulses (like emotions) are not problematic as such, but only *become* problematic when they overstep the bounds of reason, "excessive" would then denote a non-rational impulse whose measure *exceeds* proper limits and becomes "immoderate" in a quantitative sense. When the bounds of reason are transgressed—precisely at that moment—an otherwise benign impulse of *emotion* (say, fear or desire) becomes a *passion*, a morally problematic, injurious force within the soul. In other words, *based on what is otherwise known of Middle-Platonic moral psychology*, a Middle Platonist speaking of πάθος as πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή would almost certainly have meant the excessive *quantity* of a *non-rational* impulse, not

¹¹⁴ Cf. Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 122: "Eudorus' terminology is as fully Stoic as that of Antiochus [of Ascalon], although, like Antiochus, he would not have admitted that it was distinctively Stoic, but would claim it as the normal current language of philosophic discourse. We, from our perspective, attach too much importance to ferreting out Stoic, and even Epicurean, terms, in Platonic writers. By Eudorus' time, the technical language of philosophy was very largely uniform. *Only the meanings given to certain terms by the various schools might differ*" (emphasis added). For an example of Eudorus' revision of Stoic formulations in the area of *physics*, see Mauro Bonazzi, "Eudoro di Alessandria alle origini del platonismo imperiale," in *L'eredità platonica: studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo* (ed. Mauro Bonazzi and Vincenza Celluprica; Elenchos 45; Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), 117-60, esp. 127-49.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Bonazzi, "Eudorus' Psychology."

the aberrant *quality* of a *rational* impulse.¹¹⁶ Exactly this sort of Middle-Platonic reinvention of Stoic ideas appears in the writings of Philo.

In his most obvious citation of the Stoic definition, Philo *adds* one qualifying term, as if to clarify precisely what he means:

On the one hand, every "passion" (πάθος) is reprehensible (ἐπίληπτον), since we are responsible (ὑπαίτιος) for every unmeasured "excessive impulse" (ἄμετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή). (*Spec.* 4.79)¹¹⁷

Philo grants, along with the Stoics, that a passion is an "excessive impulse"—but by "excessive" *he* means "immoderate" (ἄμετρος), something quite different from what the Stoics had in mind. The term ἄμετρος denotes quantitative excess:

going beyond the proper *measure* (μέτρον) imposed by reason.¹¹⁸ As a natural

¹¹⁶ John Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 77, entertains this idea as a possibility but does not explore it further or mention it in connection with Eudorus. Speaking of Antiochus of Ascalon, he writes: "Antiochus, then, accepted the Stoic ideal of *apatheia* (freedom from passion) as opposed to the Academic-Peripatetic *metriopatheia* (moderation in the passions). It is not impossible, however, that Antiochus took the Stoic term and gave it a meaning consonant with Peripateticism. After all, he could argue, a passion is defined as an 'immoderate impulse' (*hormē pleonazousa*); if an impulse is under the control of moderation, it is not *pleonazousa*, and therefore not a passion 'within the meaning of the Act'. There were, after all, in Stoic theory, so-called 'equable states' (*eupatheiai*) corresponding to all of the *pathē* (except Distress, of which there could be no reasonable form), and it would not have been beyond the wit of Antiochus to equate these with the Peripatetic 'means'. The difference, he might well say, is more verbal than real." Just such a connection between the Peripatetic notion of mean (μέσον) and the *term* πλεονάζειν appears in *Eth. nic.* 1106 a 29-33: λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταῦτὸν πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει (cited by Francesco Becchi, "Platonismo medio ed etica Plutarchea," *Prometheus* 7 (1981): 125-45 [part one], 263-84 [part two], 275, in the context of Middle-Platonic theories of virtue).

¹¹⁷ My translation. Cf. *Virt. mor.* 444 B-C. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, cites *Virt. mor.* 450 E – 451 B & 444 C (304, n. 193) understanding Plutarch to mean that "excessiveness of impulse" is "a reference to the exceeding of some ideal and moderate degree of emotion in the soul" (170).

¹¹⁸ Cf. *Agr.* 70: σὺν πλείονι ὀρμῇ πέραν ἐκφέρηται τοῦ μέτρου. NB the task of reason in *Spec.* 4.79: μέτρα ταῖς ὀρμαῖς ὀρίζειν (cf. Petit, *QE* N° 24 [*Fragments non identifiés*]: Τὰ μέτρα πλεονάζοντα τὸν ὄρον ὑπερβαίνει ὡς γίνεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἄμετρον φρόνησιν πανουργίαν, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην φειδωλίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν θρασύτητα); cf. Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 444 B: τὴν δ' ὀρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος, λόγου δεομένην ὀρίζοντος, ὅπως μετρία παρῆ καὶ μήθ' ὑπερβάλλη μήτ' ἐγκαταλείπη τὸν καιρόν. On the ethics of *measure* in Middle Platonism,

component of the human soul, non-rational impulse (ὁρμή) poses no threat while it operates within the bounds of reason. If, however, an impulse *exceeds* those bounds (i.e., if the non-rational force *usurps* reason's control), it becomes morally problematic (a "passion"). For a Middle Platonist like Philo, the term ἄμετρος best captured what was actually going wrong with the impulse; but the Stoic technical term πλεονάζειν worked as a synonym, and this equivalence enabled a deliberate pressing of the Stoic definition of "passion" into Middle-Platonic service.¹¹⁹

This Middle-Platonic reinvention of Stoic technical terminology allowed Philo to speak with greater precision about *problematic* desire over against amoral desire. Desire itself—understood variously as the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἄλογος ὄρεξις, a type of ὁρμή, a useful *emotion* (πάθος), or some other expression of the non-rational soul (e.g., αἴσθησις)—was unobjectionable. But *passionate desire*—understood as an excessive (i.e., immoderate) desiderative impulse, and thus a "passion" by Stoic definition—was unquestionably a moral problem. In *Her.* 245, among the "deadly and irreconcilable enemies of the soul," Philo lists ὄσαι ἄλλαι ἐκ πλεοναζούσης ὁρμῆς εἰώθασι φύεσθαι ἄλογοι

see Opsomer, "L'âme du monde et l'âme de l'homme," esp. 45-49 (cf. idem, "Plutarch's Platonism Revisited," in *L'eredità platonica: studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo* (ed. Mauro Bonazzi and Vincenza Celluprica; Elenchos 45; Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005), 163-200, esp. 180-83 [= "Moral psychology and ethics"].

¹¹⁹ Cf. *Didask.* 32.2 [186.6-7]: πλεονάζει μέντοι ἐν τῷ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ὀχλεῖσθαι, on which Whittaker, *Alcinoos*, 148, n. 519: "Le terme stoïcien πλεονάζω (cf. SVF I. 205 et III. 479, etc.) a été adopté tant par les Moyen-platoniciens (cf. Eudore d'Alexandrie *ap.* Stobée, *Anth.* II. 44. 5 W.; Philon d'Alexandrie, *De spec. leg.* IV. 79; Plutarque, *De virt. mor.* 441 C; *Timée de Locres* 222. 14 M.) que par les Péripatéticiens (cf. Arius Didyme *ap.* Stobée, *Anth.* II. 38. 18-24 W.)."

ἐπιθυμῖαι, stating plainly that ἄλογοι ἐπιθυμῖαι stem from "excessive impulse" (ἐκ πλεοναζούσης ὀρμῆς). He is obviously making use of the Stoic definition, but in Stoic theory an "excessive" desiderative impulse would simply be ἐπιθυμία: the term "irrational desire" (ἄλογος ἐπιθυμία), from their perspective, makes no sense, because ἐπιθυμία is *always* irrational—there is no other type. For a Middle Platonist, however, the term ἐπιθυμία by itself denotes the non-rational desire inherent in the soul, whose presence and operation do not necessarily result in irrational behavior, *provided that reason stays in control*. Only when the impulse of non-rational desire oversteps the bounds of reason does desire become "irrational": a non-rational desire usurps reason and becomes a dangerous force, capable of motivating a rational being to act contrary to reason (i.e., irrationally). So for Philo, as *Her.* 245 illustrates, ἄλογος ἐπιθυμία designates "irrational desire"—in other words, *problematic desire*, which appears only when an otherwise natural desiderative impulse oversteps reason and becomes "immoderate" (πλεονάζουσα / ἄμετρος).¹²⁰ In connection with the

¹²⁰ Cf. *Somn.* 2.276: οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ συνηγορίαν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ πάσης πλεοναζούσης ὀρμῆς ἐτράποντο, ἄλογον πάθος ἐπιτειχίζοντες ἡγεμόνι λογισμῶ (NB the equivalence of ἐπιθυμία, πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή, and ἄλογον πάθος). Despite the apparently Stoic identification of ἐπιθυμία with πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή, Philo betrays his Middle-Platonic position by referring to this as an ἄλογον πάθος. For the Stoics *every* πάθος was irrational, so the term ἄλογον πάθος would strike them as redundant. But for a Middle-Platonist, who believes that non-rational ἐπιθυμία need not be "irrational," the term ἄλογον πάθος makes perfect sense: an *excessive* desiderative impulse represents an otherwise useful emotion (πάθος) that has *become* problematic and thus "irrational" (ἄλογον). This is precisely the idea underlying Philo's use of ἄλογος ἐπιθυμία in *Her.* 245. In other words, a non-rational force no longer under the control of reason, operating contrary to reason, is "irrational." Cf. εὐλογον πάθος in *Her.* 192, in reference to a non-rational emotion that is not *irrational* (opposed to reason) but "*eurational*" (obedient to reason). This is the Middle-Platonic version of Stoic εὐπάθεια (see also Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 448 F: πάθος . . . ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ λόγῳ; 449 A: πάθη προστιθέμενα . . . τῷ λογισμῶ; 449 B: γίνεται

revised Stoic definition of passion (ἄμετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή), Philo cites the task of reason as μέτρα ταῖς ὀρμαῖς ὀρίζειν (see *Spec.* 4.79). Reason must impose boundaries on non-rational desire as such (ἐπιθυμία), lest it become *passionate desire* (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία).¹²¹ This Middle-Platonic revision of Stoic terminology underlies expressions such as μέτρα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις περιθεῖναι (*Cherub.* 33) and [ἐπιθυμίας] μέτροις περιορίζειν (*Spec.* 4.217).¹²² Since ἐπιθυμία bears analysis as an impulse, πλεονάζουσα (ἄμετρος) ἐπιθυμία simply represents a more specific instance of πλεονάζουσα (ἄμετρος) ὀρμή, both of which are morally problematic. With the concept of "immoderation" (ἄμετρία), Philo was able to clearly distinguish *passionate desire* from amoral desire, using a reinvented Stoic definition of passion.¹²³

γὰρ εὐπάθεια τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἀναιροῦντος ἀλλὰ κοσμοῦντος καὶ τάττοντος ἐν τοῖς σωφρονοῦσιν). Philo's Middle-Platonic take on Stoic εὐπάθεια explains his willingness to defy the Stoic doctrine of *no* rational counterpart to grief by naming δηγμός in *QG* 2.57 as the "good emotion" corresponding to λύπη (see John Dillon and Abraham Terian, "Philo and the Stoic Doctrine of ΕΥΠΑΘΕΙΑΙ: A Note on *Quaes Gen* 2.57," *SPh* 4 [1976-77]: 17-24). For Philo, δηγμός would indicate the *emotion* of grief properly measured by reason. Rather than "a significant modification in basic Stoic doctrine" (ibid., 18), Philo offers a fundamental Middle-Platonic revision of Stoic *terminology* (εὐπάθεια) similar to the reworking of πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή (cf. Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:275-77). On *QG* 2.57, see also Graver, "Stoic ΠΡΟΠΑΘΕΙΑΙ," 213-16.

¹²¹ NB *Plant.* 105: ἀμέτρων ἐπιθυμιῶν; *Legat.* 162: τῆς ἀμέτρου . . . ἐπιθυμίας; *Prov.* 2.70: τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν; *Migr.* 21: ἐπιθυμιῶν . . . ἀμετρίαις. Cf. *Leg.* 2.77: ἀμετρία τῶν ἡδονῶν; *Leg.* 3.111: ἡδονῆς ἀμέτρου; *Conf.* 117: ἀμέτροις ἡδοναῖς (cf. TL 72: ἀδοναὶ ἄμετροι).

¹²² Cf. *Spec.* 1.343: τὸ δ' ἄμετρον μέτροις ἐπιστομίζουσα.

¹²³ And since ἐπιθυμία bears analysis as also a useful *emotion* (πάθος), the Middle-Platonic use of ἄμετρος terminology to analyze non-rational impulse applies also to the analysis of non-rational *emotion*, particularly in connection with the idea of "moderate" emotion (μετριοπάθεια). In *Virt.* 195, Philo explicitly contrasts μετριοπάθεια with ἡ ἀμετρία τῶν παθῶν, "immoderation of the emotions" (cf. *Migr.* 18: τὰς . . . παθῶν ἀμετρίαις; *Migr.* 21: παθῶν ἀμετρίαις; *Mut.* 143: παθῶν ἀμετρίαις; *Spec.* 3.209: τὰς ἀμετρίαις τῶν παθῶν). For Middle Platonists, the need to distinguish between emotion (πάθος) and passion (πάθος) posed an obvious terminological problem. So they often denoted *passion* by using terms that ascribed excess or lack of measure to *emotion*: ἀμετρία τῶν παθῶν designates a "passionate emotion,"

Tyrannical Desire (ἔρωσ)

Along with passionate desire (πλεονάζουσα [ἄμετρος] ἐπιθυμία), Philo recognizes a second and even worse type of problematic desire, a "tyrannical desire" (ἔρωσ), which does not simply overstep the bounds of reason, but instead takes control of the entire soul. Philo's characterization of tyrannical desire relies not on reinvented Stoic terminology but on the writings of Plato himself, who believed that ἔρωσ can operate as a consuming, injurious, relentless desire for a single beloved object. He describes this type of desire in Books VIII – IX of the *Republic* through his portrait of the "tyrannical soul."¹²⁴ Just as governments

an amoral, potentially useful emotion (πάθος) that exceeds rational bounds and become morally problematic, or "passionate" (cf. πλεονάζουσα [ἄμετρος] ὄρμη). Plutarch describes this phenomenon in *Virt. mor.* 444 C, where he associates τὰς ἀμετρίας τῶν παθῶν with an impulse (ὄρμη) that goes too far (ἐκφέρεται . . . πολλή . . . σφοδρόν; cf. ὑπερβάλλοντες τὸ μέτριον [444 B]). Evidence of the terminological problem faced by Middle Platonists appears in *Didask.* 30.5-6 [184.20-36], where Alcinoos uses the terms ἀμετριόπαθής and ὑπερπαθής to designate excessive (i.e., "passionate") emotion (cf. ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀμετρία 30.5 [184.20-21]). (On ἀμετρία in Middle Platonism [including *Virt.* 195], see Whittaker, *Alcinoos*, 62, n. 504, who cites *Resp.* 486 D and *Phileb.* 52 C in connection with the term; cf. Dillon, *Alcinoos*, 188-89.)

¹²⁴ See esp. *Resp.* 572 C – 576 B (but note also 545 C: τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν; 577 E: ἡ τυραννομένη . . . ψυχὴ). On ἔρωσ as a tyrant, see 573 B: τύραννος ὁ ἔρωσ λέγεται; 573 D: ἔρωσ τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν; 574 E: τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ ἔρωτος; 575 A: τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἔρωσ. This clearly *negative* image of ἔρωσ from the *Republic* corresponds with a similar image in *Phaedr.* 237 D – 238 C, where Socrates defines ἔρωσ as an ἐπιθυμία that usurps reason and becomes tyrant (238 B: τυραννεύσασα; cf. 238 A: ἐπιθυμίας . . . ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν; 238 B: [sc. ἐπιθυμίας] δυναστεύουσης . . . κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία). Plato's *positive* image of ἔρωσ, by contrast, sees it as a means by which the soul of the philosopher ascends to the realm of true beauty and goodness (see *Symp.* 210 A – 212 C; *Phaedr.* 245 B – 257 B). Philo employs also this *positive* understanding of ἔρωσ in his writings (e.g. *Contempl.* 11-12; *Praem.* 84: ὑπ' ἔρωτος οὐρανοῦ; *Gig.* 44; cf. *Didask.* 1.2 [152.11-12]: πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ἐρωτικῶς), on which see esp. Dieter Zeller, *Charis bei Philon und Paulus* (SBS 142; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1990), 75-79 [= "Der himmlische Eros"] (cf. Peder Borgen, "Heaven Ascent in Philo: An Examination of Selected Passages," in *The Pseudepigrapha and Early Biblical Interpretation* [ed. James Charlesworth and Craig Evans; JSPSup 14; SSEJC 2; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993], 246-68, esp. 253-56; Holger Thesleff, "Notes on Eros in Middle Platonism," *Arctos* 28 [1994]: 115-28, esp. 119-20). Both views ascribe to ἔρωσ a consuming motivational power capable of directing the course of one's life (cf. *Post.* 157). On Platonic ἔρωσ in general, see Halperin, "Platonic *Erōs*"; idem, "Plato and the Metaphysics of Desire," *PBACAP* 5 (1989): 27-52.

degenerate stepwise from a best to a worst type, souls can degenerate from a best to a worst type, with tyranny representing the worst of both states and souls. The "tyrannical soul" suffers under the hegemony of an overgrown desire (ἐπιθυμία)—a preeminent, tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) that dominates not only other competing desires but also the collective operation of the entire soul.¹²⁵ Without explicitly citing Plato's text, Philo nevertheless clearly demonstrates a familiarity with Plato's description of soul tyranny in the *Republic*.¹²⁶ In particular, he incorporates Plato's notion of tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) into his moral psychology to describe the ultimate victory of non-rational desire (ἐπιθυμία) over reason (λόγος).¹²⁷

¹²⁵ See *Resp.* 572 E: ἔρωτά τινα . . . προστάτην τῶν . . . ἐπιθυμιῶν; 573 B: [ἔρωσ] ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς; 573 D: ἔρωσ τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν διακυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα; 573 E: ἔρωτος, πάσαις ταῖς ἄλλαις [ἐπιθυμίαις] ὅσπερ δορυφόροις ἡγουμένου; 575 A: ὁ ἔρωσ . . . αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος. Ἐρωσ is a type of desire (*Phaedr.* 237 D: ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρωσ), originating in the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν. Philo clearly associates ἔρωσ with ἡ ἐπιθυμία (i.e. the ἐπιθυμητικόν) in *Conf.* 21. Cf. the scholium on *Didask.* 34.3 [188.30-35] from the ninth-century codex Parisinus Graecus 1962 (see Whittaker, *Alcinoos*, 167), which correlates the various constitutions of *Resp.* IX with the corresponding parts of the Platonic soul: κατὰ τὸ λογικόν: ἡ ἀριστοκρατική; κατὰ τὸ θυμικόν: ἡ τιμοκρατική; κατὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν: ἡ δημοκρατική, ἡ ὀλιγαρχική, and ἡ τυραννίς.

¹²⁶ *Esp. Agr.* 45-46, where Philo speaks of "bad governments" (κακοπολιτειῶν), noting the danger of "mob rule" (ὄχλοκρατία [= δημοκρατία of *Resp.* VIII]), and the even *greater* danger of an arising tyrant (τύραννος), which *in cities* involves a man (πόλεων μὲν ἄνθρωπος), but *in body and soul* involves a savage mind (σώματος δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς . . . θηριωδέστατος νοῦς). See also *Leg.* 2.91: τυράννου τρόπον; *Leg.* 3.80: ὁ . . . τύραννος νοῦς; *Conf.* 164: τὰς τῶν τυράννων τύχας (cf. Colson, PLCL 4, 558); *Prob.* 45: ὅσπερ τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν ὀλιγαρχοῦμεναι καὶ τυραννοῦμεναι δουλείαν ὑπομένουσι . . . οὕτως καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων; *Abr.* 242: ἀντὶ τυραννίδων καὶ δυναστειῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

¹²⁷ Cf. Emma Wasserman, *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7* (WUNT 256; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 60-76 [= "The Death of the Soul in Philo of Alexandria"]. Wasserman similarly notes the influence of *Resp.* VIII and IX on Philo's Platonic notion of an inferior part of the soul utterly defeating reason, but she does not explore this connection in terms of ἔρωσ (tyrannical desire). Instead, she suggests a link between Philo's motif of "soul death" (e.g., *Leg.* 1.105-107) and the "extreme immorality" (broadly conceived) represented by Plato's image of tyranny in the *Republic* (see 67-76 [= "Extreme Immorality in Platonic Discourse"], esp. 67-70).

Ἔρως as Advanced Grade of Desire

Unlike *useful desire*, which dutifully submits to reason's command, *passionate desire* and *tyrannical desire* both counteract reason, but to different extents, and in different ways. Generally speaking, passionate desire and tyrannical desire correspond to the ethical categories of "lack of self-control" (ἀκρασία) and "intemperance" (ἀκολασία), which in turn represent two distinct dynamic relations between non-rational desire (ἐπιθυμία) and reason (λόγος) within the soul.¹²⁸ In the case of passionate desire, ἐπιθυμία impulsively counteracts the dictates of reason—overstepping the bounds of reason (becoming ἄ-μετρος)—despite reason's attempt to enforce those dictates. In other words, desire forcibly asserts its inclination over against the inclination of reason *in a contest of power*.¹²⁹ The moral agent simply does not have the requisite power (κράτος) to control desire (i.e., ἀ-κρασία), and thus acts under compulsion "against his or her will." In the case of tyrannical desire, however, the moral agent no longer experiences internal conflict, because desire has defeated reason entirely. Desire has become the undisputed ruler of the soul, a tyrant

¹²⁸ In descending order of moral value, the four relations are "self-mastery" (σωφροσύνη), in which reason enjoys uncontested dominion over compliant desire; "self-control" (ἐγκράτεια), in which reason asserts contested control over opposing desire; "lack of self-control" (ἀκρασία), in which desire asserts contested control over opposing reason; and "intemperance" (ἀκολασία), in which desire enjoys uncontested dominion over compliant reason. The ethical theory underlying this scale of morality comes from Book VII of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (see Helen North, *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* [CSCP 35; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966], 203). For the scale from a Middle-Platonic perspective similar to Philo's, see Plutarch *Virt. mor.* 445 B – 446 C.

¹²⁹ E.g., *Ab.* 135: ὁ δ' ἔλεγχος πρὸς οὐδὲν ἢν ὄφελος, ὑπὸ βιαιοτέρας νικωμένων ἐπιθυμίας.

whose agenda determines the overall orientation and course of life.¹³⁰ The moral agent, whose reason offers no opposition—no correction (κόλασις) of desire's errant ways (i.e., ἀ-κολασία)—acts as the compliant *slave* of desire.¹³¹ In terms of moral psychology, what this means is that the invariable, sole aim of ἐπιθυμία, which the Platonic tradition identifies as pleasure (ἡδονή), has become the invariable, sole aim of the moral agent, who thus becomes a "Lover of Pleasure" (φιλήδονος).¹³²

Just as ἐπιθυμία can invariably seek pleasure through a variety of means (food, money, fame), tyrannical desire (ἔρωσις) can invariably represent "love of pleasure" (φιληδονία) despite a variety of distinct *means* to pleasure. Philo speaks of the trouble caused by:

¹³⁰ Cf. Annas, "Humans and Beasts," on *Resp.* VIII – IX: "[T]he 'tyrannical' man is the only one to have lost all overall control, once a master desire has been implanted within him" (129).

¹³¹ Cf. *Ios.* 40: ἐξ ἔρωτος ἀκολάστου; *Spec.* 3.65: ἀκολασίας . . . ἦν ἔνιοι . . . ἔρωτα ὀνομάζουσι. On the *slavery* imposed by (tyrannical) desire, see *Her.* 269: ἡ δουλεία . . . ὅταν δὲ ἐπιθυμία κρατήσῃ, ἔρωσις ἐγγίνεται τῶν ἀπόντων. In *Leg.* 2.90-91, Philo associates the absence of discipline (παιδεία [cf. κόλασις]) with the eventual rise of tyranny in the soul.

¹³² Philo sees ὁ φιλήδονος as a particular type (τρόπος) of soul (*Leg.* 3.212: φιλήδονος τρόπος; *Sobr.* 24: φιλήδονον . . . ἐν ψυχῇ τρόπον) equivalent to the tyrannical soul—in other words, a soul dominated by desire and possessed of ἀκολασία: e.g., *Ios.* 151-153: ὁ φιλήδονος . . . ταῖς ἀκαθέκτοις ἐπιθυμίαις χαριζόμενοι οἷς ἂν προσάττωσιν εἴκοντες.; *Leg.* 3.37-38: τὸν . . . τέλος ἡγούμενον τὰς ἡδονάς . . . τὸν φιλήδονον; *Opif.* 165-66: δελεασθεῖς [λογισμὸς τῆς ἡδονῆς] ὑπήκοος ἀνθ' ἡγεμόνος, δούλος ἀντὶ δεσπότου; *Spec.* 3.23: ἡ δ' ἀκολασία καὶ φιληδονία; *Leg.* 2.90: ἐὰν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀπορρησῇ τὴν παιδείαν (cf. ἀκολασία), γέγονε φιλήδονος. Cf. Ronocchia, "Anti-Epicurean Polemic," 93: "Philo never tires of attacking in his writings the 'pleasure-seeker' (ἡδονικός) or 'pleasure lover' (φιλήδονος) who has chosen pleasure as the only yardstick of judgment and has made it his supreme rule of life" (emphasis added). Philo's disdain for the φιλήδονος may indeed reflect a polemic against Epicurean philosophy, but he understands the moral psychology of hedonism along fundamentally Platonic lines. (On the Epicurean notion of pleasure as "the good," see LS 21A-X, esp. 21B, line 2 [from Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*]: τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν· ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν; cf. John Cooper, "Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus," in *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999], 485-514.)

[A] tyrannical desire for money (χρημάτων ἔρωσ) or a woman (ἡ γυναικός) or fame (ἡ δόξης) or *any other source of pleasure* (ἡ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ἡδονῆν ἀπεργαζομένων) . . . (*Decal.* 151)¹³³

Plato's general theory of ἔρωσ makes a distinction between the *object* and the *aim* of ἔρωσ, which explains for tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) the relation between various means and the *one* ultimate end—pleasure (ἡδονή).¹³⁴ For Plato, ἔρωσ engages the rational mind, whose scope includes the convictions and aspirations of the moral agent, not just the impulsive activity of a non-rational element within the soul.¹³⁵ Ἐρωσ fundamentally involves a passionate pursuit of the Beautiful (τὸ καλόν), the *object* of ἔρωσ, in an effort to secure the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), the ultimate *aim* of ἔρωσ.¹³⁶ By properly evaluating *reflections* of the Beautiful manifested in a variety of sources in the sensible realm, the student of philosophy can ultimately ascend to the one *source* of those reflections in the intelligible realm, the Beautiful *itself*, in order to secure the Good *itself*, which

¹³³ My translation. Cf. *Ios.* 70: τιμῶν ἔρωσ; *Leg* 2.107: ὁ βίος ὁ τῶν φαύλων δεσπόζεται ὑφ' ἡδονῆς· τὰ γοῦν ποιητικὰ αὐτῆς εὐρίσκεται διὰ πανουργίας πάσης, χρυσοῦς ἄργυρος δόξα τιμαὶ ἀρχαί, αἱ ὕλαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ τέχνη αἱ βάνησσοι ὅσαι ἄλλαι κατασκευαστικαὶ ἡδονῆς πάνυ ποικίλαι. Plutarch speaks of Epicurus' ἔρωσ for δόξα in *Suav. viv.* 1100 A-D; cf. the discussion of Caesar's καινῆς ἔρωτα δόξης and ὁ τῆς βασιλείας ἔρωσ in Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, 86-87.

¹³⁴ On this distinction, see Halperin, "Platonic *Erōs*, esp. 176-82.

¹³⁵ Cf. J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Reason and Eros in the 'Ascent'-Passage of the *Symposium*," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (ed. J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971), 283-302, 290: "Plato is using 'eros' in a wide sense, including any over-all desire or wish for what is taken to be good. The qualification 'over-all' is needed, for Plato is not talking about momentary impulses but about wishes, desires, aspirations that determine the ultimate goals of one's life. Thus eros is not blind passion; it is the wish or desire . . . for things deemed on account of their nature to be worthy of having their attainment become a man's ultimate goal." NB *Symp.* 205 D: οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα· τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν; 206 A: οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἔρωσιν ἄνθρωποι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ . . . οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐρώσιν.

¹³⁶ Cf. Gerasimos Santas, "Plato's Theory of Eros in the *Symposium*," in *Plato and Freud: Two Theories of Love* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 14-57, esp. 32-34 [= "Generic Desire: Desire for the Good to be One's Own Forever"].

results in happiness (εὐδαιμονία). But this philosophical use of ἔρωσ presumes that the moral agent values as good what is *truly* good. In the case of tyrannical desire, the moral agent operates under the erroneous conviction that *pleasure* (ἡδονή) is good and thus worthy of pursuit.¹³⁷ Enamored of a false good, the moral agent vehemently pursues objects that secure the "good"—pursues, in other words, objects capable of producing pleasure. The moral agent focuses only on what is "good" for non-rational desire, which has commandeered all faculties of the soul—including the rational faculty—to serve its pursuit of pleasure.¹³⁸ Tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) thus represents the terminal stage of a disastrous process that begins with reason *outmatched* by ἐπιθυμία and ends with reason *enslaved* by ἐπιθυμία.¹³⁹

Philo emphasizes the distinct nature of ἔρωσ as an advanced grade of desire by representing passionate desire (and thus ἀκρασία) as a preliminary condition that *engenders* tyrannical desire (and thus ἀκολασία):

When desire prevails within the soul (ὅταν δὲ ἐπιθυμία κρατήσῃ), a tyrannical desire arises for things one does not have (ἔρωσ ἐγγίνεται τῶν ἀπόντων)—a tyrannical desire that racks the soul on unmet expectation as

¹³⁷ Cf. *Leg.* 3.60-62. Pleasure *appears* to be good and thus has a deceptive charm that leads people to embrace it as good (see esp. Jessica Moss, "Pleasure and Illusion in Plato," *Ph&PhenR* 72 [2006]: 503-35).

¹³⁸ Tyrannical desire has made pleasure "the good" (cf. *Symp.* 205 D).

¹³⁹ Cf. Kahn, "Plato's Theory of Desire," 88: "If reason is able to rule in the soul, it will specify the life of virtue (the life of philosophy) as the good to be aimed at. If it does not succeed in doing so, that is because it has been so 'overpowered' by spirit or appetite that it mis-identifies the good. Since it is only the rational part that can form any conception of the good, even an erroneous conception, the domination of the other parts has the consequence of *causing reason to make a mistake* in its recognition of the ends to be pursued. That is what it means for reason to be enslaved" (original emphasis) (see also Cooper, "Human Motivation," 132, n. 18; Lorenz, *Brute Within*, 46: "the rule of the appetitive part consists in the fact that its central object of desire has become the person's central object of desire . . .").

if hanging it on a rope (καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὡσπερ ἀπ' ἀγχόνης ἐλπίδος ἀτελοῦς ἐκρέμασε). Always thirsty, yet never able to drink, such a soul suffers the awful fate of Tantalus (διψῆ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ, πιεῖν δὲ ἀδυνατεῖ ταντάλειον τιμωρίαν ὑπομένουσα). (*Her.* 269)¹⁴⁰

In order for tyrannical desire to come into existence, ἐπιθυμία must first overpower reason (κρατεῖν), subjecting the soul to passionate desire—or, to put it differently, tyrannical desire is born *only* in souls predisposed to its genesis by passionate desire and the accompanying state of incontinence (ἀκρασία). Advancement to this terminal grade of desire invariably brings disaster.

Negative Impact of Ἔρως

Once established, tyrannical desire's hegemony ravages the soul by imposing the “fate of Tantalus” (*Her.* 269). For Tantalus, this meant the torturous circumstance of being *always* thirsty yet *never* able to take a drink.¹⁴¹ Framed as a more general predicament, this means suffering under an insatiable desire: *always* wanting something yet *never* able to get it.¹⁴² This experience of *chronic* insatiability (ἀπληστία) distinguishes tyrannical desire (ἔρως) from all other types.¹⁴³ In fact, *only* the abject defeat of reason (ἀκολασία) presupposed by tyrannical desire can explain the phenomenon of chronic insatiability. Unlike a physical receptacle such as the stomach, whose physical limits can be reached

¹⁴⁰ My translation. For the same idea of passionate desire as a preliminary condition engendering ἔρως, see *Spec.* 4.80-81.

¹⁴¹ See *Od.* 11.582-92.

¹⁴² Cf. *Resp.* 578 A: ψυχὴν ἄρα τυραννικὴν πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι. See Halperin, “Metaphysics of Desire,” esp. 36-43 [=“Eros: Suffering Without Satisfaction”].

¹⁴³ *Gig.* 31: ἀπληστος . . . ἔρως (cf. *Leg.* 3.39: ἀπληστοὶ τῶν ἀρετῆς ὄντες ἐρώτων).

to induce satiety, desire itself (ἐπιθυμία)—as a function of the *soul*—has no inherent limit. Philo explains:

[T]he craving of the soul that is out of control is not restricted as the bodily organs are by their size (οὐ γὰρ ἀναλογεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς ὄγκοις ἢ τῆς ἀκράτορος¹⁴⁴ ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμία). These are vessels of a fixed capacity admitting nothing that exceeds it (ἄμετρον οὐδέν), but ejecting all that is superfluous. Desire is never filled up (ἢ δὲ ἐπιθυμία πληροῦται μὲν οὐδέποτε), but continues always thirsty and in want of more (μένει δὲ ἐνδεῆς καὶ διψαλέα ἀεὶ). (*Leg.* 3.149)¹⁴⁵

Once activated in the soul, desire impulsively extends toward its object, with nothing to limit it *other than reason*. In the virtuous soul, reason imposes limits, allowing desire to pursue its object only so far as that pursuit serves a rational end: to secure, for example, something necessary or useful. But in the soul under tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ), reason *never* exercises its limiting capacity, so nothing counteracts this appetitive extension. The moral agent consumed with tyrannical desire continually holds the object of desire in mind, causing non-rational desire to pursue reflexively the pleasure afforded by that object, which in turn leads to the unending frustration of insatiable desire in a soul racked with longing.

Although Philo alludes to this phenomenon in a variety of passages, he finds it signified explicitly under the allegorical figure of Tubal (LXX: Θοβέλ), a

¹⁴⁴ What applies here to the ἀκράτος soul applies also to the ἀκόλοστος soul. Desire itself is insatiable, whether the absence of restraining reason is temporary (ἀκρασία) or chronic (ἀκολασία).

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Ebr.* 206: κὰν τὰς τοῦ σώματος δεξαμενὰς ἀποπληρωθῶσι πάσας, ἔτι κενοὺς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὄντας; *Contempl.* 55: τὰς μὲν γαστέρας ἄχρι φαρύγγων πεπληρωμένοι, κενοὶ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας (also *Ebr.* 6: ἀπληστίας δὲ [αἴτιον] ἢ ἀργλεωτάτη παθῶν ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμία).

descendant of Cain mentioned in Gen 4:22.¹⁴⁶ Tubal represents for Philo the torturous extension of a soul consumed by a tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) ¹⁴⁷ for the pleasure (ἡδονή) of false "goods" (ἀγαθά):

[T]he soul of someone vexed by the pleasures derived from either bodily or external "goods" (τοῦ γὰρ σεσοβημένου περὶ τὰς ἢ σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἢ τὰς ἡδονὰς [ἢ] τὰς ἐκτὸς ὕλας ἢ ψυχῆ) ¹⁴⁸ gets hammered thin as if on an anvil, driven by the long and cavernous extensions of its desires

¹⁴⁶ On Philo's etymological interpretation, see Lester L. Grabbe, *Etymology in Early Jewish Interpretation: The Hebrew Names in Philo* (BJS 115; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988). On "Θοβέλ," see idem, 165-66 (cf. 29-33). Grabbe correctly notes that Philo, generally speaking, does not so much *draw* meaning as *inject* meaning: "Philo has a definite philosophical and theological system in mind. While certain modifications have been made to accommodate it to Judaism, this system is still evidently a representative of Middle Platonism. Philo is not in reality exegeting the biblical text, any more than the Stoic allegorists exegeted the text of Homer. He is only building an extensive bridgework between the Jewish sacred text and his philosophico-theological system. Although Philo probably would not have thought consciously in such terms, his question is, ultimately, not what the text means but how can he funnel his philosophical system into it" (116). See also David Runia, "Etymology as an Allegorical Technique in Philo of Alexandria," *SPhA* 16 (2004): 101-21.

¹⁴⁷ Although the *term* ἔρωσ does not appear in *Post.* 116, Philo clearly has ἔρωσ in mind: (1) the broader context of the passage (*Post.* 113: esp. ὡς δι' ἀναβαθμῶν) alludes to Plato's teaching on ἔρωσ in the *Symposium* (211 C: esp. ὡσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς; cf. Arnaldez, PAM 6, 110, n.3); (2) Philo links the term σεσοβημένου, which Colson translates as "vehemently concerned," with ἔρωσ elsewhere (*Her.* 70: ἔρωτι οὐρανίῳ σεσοβημένης); (3) the terms οἶστρον and ἴμερον, which appear in *Post.* 116, signal the involvement of ἔρωσ (e.g., οἶστράω and ἴμερος in *Phaedr.* 251 C-E). Philo describes a person whose *state of mind* is characterized by ἔρωσ, although distinct *instances* of desire still bear description with terms like ἐπιθυμία and ὄρεξις, which are both found in *Post.* 116.

¹⁴⁸ Cohn emends the text as follows: τοῦ γὰρ σεσοβημένου περὶ τὰς ἢ σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς [ἢ τὰς ἡδονὰς] ἢ τὰς ἐκτὸς ὕλας ἢ ψυχῆ, suggesting that Philo means "*either* (1) bodily pleasures *or* (2) the materials of external things." But the phrase τὰς ἢ σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς (*not* ἢ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς) suggests that Philo has in mind one type of pleasure over against another: τὰς ἢ (1) σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἢ (2) τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἐκτὸς ὕλας. The context of Philo's statement (*Post.* 112-15) clearly shows that he has in mind two classes of false "goods," those related to the body (e.g., health) and those related to the external world (e.g., wealth): "Sella" is a symbol (σύμβολον) of the "goods" of the body and external "goods" (esp. §112: τῶν περὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν) and "Tubal" is the "son" of "Sella." In this context, τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς must refer to pleasures derived from (associated with) "goods" of the body, and τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἐκτὸς ὕλας, although an awkward expression, must refer to pleasures derived from (associated with) external "goods," with τὰς ἐκτὸς ὕλας serving as an adjective modifying ἡδονὰς, just as σωματικὰς modifies ἡδονὰς. This emphasis on *pleasure* complements Philo's subsequent emphasis on *desire* (τὰς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν μακρὰς καὶ διωλυγίους ἐκτάσεις), since he understands that ἐπιθυμία fundamentally involves a desire for pleasure.

(καθάπερ ἐπ' ἄκμονος σφυρηλατεῖται κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν μακρὰς καὶ διωλυγίους ἐκτάσεις ἐλαυνομένη). (*Post.* 116)

Philo notes that such people have literally boundless appetites (ταῖς ἀορίστοις αὐτῶν ὀρέξεσιν [*Post.* 116]), meaning that their desire is insatiable.¹⁴⁹

Tyrannical desire harms not only the individual, but also the community at large *through* the individual, whose obsessive pursuit of pleasure via false "goods" leads to lawless behavior and violent conflict. Plato associates tyrannical desire with lawlessness in the *Republic*, in his portrait of the tyrannical man:

Consumed by tyrannical desire (τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ ἔρωτος), he regularly becomes by day the sort of person he scarcely dreamed of becoming at night. He will kill anyone, eat anything, do anything, because the tyrannical desire inside of him (τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἔρωτος) lives in absolute anarchy and lawlessness (ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ). As the undisputed ruler of the soul (αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος), tyrannical desire will drive (ἄξει) its host, its subject "city" (πόλιν), to dare anything (ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν) . . . (*Resp.* 574 E – 575 A)¹⁵⁰

Philo also links inner tyranny with lawless behavior, in a clear allusion to Plato's *Republic*:

Anarchy (ἀναρχία) . . . is not our only danger. We have to dread also the uprising of some aspirant to sovereign power, forcibly setting law at naught (ἢ καὶ παρανόμου καὶ βιαίου τινὸς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίαν ἐπανάστασις). For a tyrant is a natural enemy (τύραννος γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως ἐχθρός). In cities this enemy is man (πόλεων μὲν ἄνθρωπος); to body and soul and all the interests of each of these (σώματος δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκάτερον πραγμάτων), it is an utterly savage mind, that has turned our inner citadel into a fortress from which to assail us (ὁ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐπιτετειχικῶς ἐκάστῳ θηριωδέστατος νοῦς). (*Agr.* 46)¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *Conf.* 117: σὺν ἀμέτροις ἡδοναῖς ἀόριστος ἐπιθυμία.

¹⁵⁰ My translation.

¹⁵¹ Ὁ ὁ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐπιτετειχικῶς ἐκάστῳ θηριωδέστατος νοῦς, see André Pelletier, "Les passions à l'assaut de l'âme d'après Philon," *REG* 78 (1965): 52-60, 56. Cf. *Leg.* 3.79-80: "[A] king (βασιλεὺς) is a thing at enmity with a despot (τυράννῳ), the one being the author of laws, the other of lawlessness (ἀνομίας . . . εἰσηγητής). So mind, the despot (ὁ . . . τύραννος

People consumed by tyrannical desire will do *anything* to get what they want: nothing deters them, not even the law. For instance, Philo in *Spec.* 4.7 speaks of someone "crazed with a tyrannical desire for what belongs to others" (ἔρωτι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιμανείς), who as a result "attempts to steal" (κλέπτειν ἐπιχειρῆ). As in *Agr.* 46, the tyrannical desire for possessions has "set law at naught." Tyrannical desire leads not only to individual acts of lawlessness, but also to violent conflict among entire groups of people. Philo states this most clearly in his exposition of the Tenth Commandment:

[A]mong the passions, only passionate desire deserves the name "Master Vice," whose one little offspring (ἔγγονον) tyrannical desire (ἔρωτος) has repeatedly filled the world with unspeakable disasters—which, too numerous for land, have spilled out into the sea. Everywhere the vast watery expanse has been filled with ships of war and all the terrible inventions of war. Charging out to sea, their violence runs its course then crashes back like a tide upon the shores of home. (*Spec.* 4.85)¹⁵²

This same idea appears in Philo's allegorical reading of Tubal, who represents the soul consumed by tyrannical desire (ἔρωτος)¹⁵³ and thus all "war makers" (δημιουργοί . . . πολέμου):

[A]nd that is why they are said to be workers in iron and bronze,¹⁵⁴ and these are the instruments with which wars are waged (δι' ὧν οἱ πόλεμοι). For any who are looking into the matter would find, that the greatest quarrels both of men individually and of states corporately, have arisen in the past, and are going on now, and will take place in the future, either for

νοῦς), decrees for both soul and body harsh and hurtful decrees (ἐπιτάγματα ἐπιτάττει τῇ τε ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι βίαια καὶ βλαβερὰ) working grievous woes (καὶ σφοδρὰς λύπας ἐργαζόμενα), conduct, I mean, such as wickedness prompts (τὰς κατὰ κακίαν λέγω πράξεις), and free indulgence of the passions (τὰς τῶν παθῶν ἀπολαύσεις)" (also *Abr.* 242).

¹⁵² My translation. Cf. *Decal.* 151-53.

¹⁵³ On ἔρωτος in *Post.* 116-17, see above, n. 142.

¹⁵⁴ See Gen 4:22: χαλκεὺς χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου.

a woman's beauty (ἡ εὐμορφίας γυναικὸς εἵνεκα), or for money (ἡ χρημάτων), or glory (δόξης) or honor (τιμῆς) or dominion (ἀρχῆς), or acquisition (κτήσεως), or, in a word, to gain advantages pertaining to the body and outward things (ἡ συνόλως ὅσα σώματος καὶ τῶν ἐκτός ἐστι πλεονεκτήματα). (*Post.* 117)¹⁵⁵

Tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) thus poses a unique threat to both individual and society, representing the maximum ill effect of unrestrained ἐπιθυμία.

CONCLUSION

Philo holds a coherent, consistently Middle-Platonic theory of ἐπιθυμία, involving a great variety of terms and concepts. Philo consistently locates ἐπιθυμία in the non-rational part of the soul, but he uses different terms to *describe* that part. This makes ἐπιθυμία a fundamentally non-rational phenomenon, which operates according to a non-rational mechanism of stimulus (pleasurable object) and response (pursuit). Discrete *instances* of ἐπιθυμία may receive different labels (ἐπιθυμία, ὄρεξις, ὁρμή, πάθος), but each describes the *same* phenomenon, only from a different conceptual perspective. Desire serves a variety of useful purposes for human beings—most notably the *necessary* desire for food and drink—and so forms an integral part of life. If not properly managed by reason, however, desire can become an injurious force. Passionate desire signals the partial victory of non-rational desire over reason, in which desire forcibly oversteps the bounds of reason, despite the moral agent's knowledge of what reason requires. Tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) signals the complete defeat of reason by non-rational desire, in which desire *enslaves* reason, compelling the

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *Conf.* 45-50.

entire soul to pursue desire's single aim of pleasure. So the non-rational desire (ἐπιθυμία) found in every human soul poses a latent threat, and tyrannical desire (ἔρως) represents the absolute realization of that threat. Instead of a useful source of non-rational motivation, desire becomes an awful tyrant, whose despotic rule harms both the individual and the surrounding community.

Clearly, effective management of the threat posed by non-rational desire requires preemptive intervention, an effort to *contain* the threat before it ever matures. Since the terminal state of intemperance (ἀκολασία) accompanying tyrannical desire always develops from a prior lack of self-control (ἀκρασία), preemptive therapeutic intervention must target the preliminary state and the *passionate desire* associated with it. If non-rational desire always remains within rational bounds, then passionate desire can never emerge, which in turn removes the precondition for tyrannical desire and so precludes its development. The moral quality necessary for keeping non-rational desire in check is self-control (ἐγκράτεια)—literally the *power* (κράτος) to restrain desire when it tries to usurp the dictates of reason. So a complete system of practical ethics must include provisions for the development and exercise of self-control (ἐγκράτεια).

CHAPTER THREE

PHILO ON SELF-CONTROL (ΕΓΚΡΑΤΕΙΑ) AND PRACTICE (ΑΣΚΗΣΙΣ)

INTRODUCTION

Philo considers non-rational desire (ἐπιθυμία) a necessary, even useful component of human life, but its innate and invariable tendency to pursue pleasure (ἡδονή) apart from rational calculation (λογισμός) threatens human well being. The initial danger lies in the ability of ἐπιθυμία to oppose and overpower the dictates of reason, to compel moral agents to pursue pleasure against their better judgment in an instance of ἀκρασία ("lack of self-control"). When an otherwise benign *emotion* overpowers reason in this way, it becomes a malignant *passion*, and Middle Platonists conceptualized this transformation as an impulse (ὁρμή) becoming "immoderate" (ἄμετρος) as it transgresses the limit or "measure" (μέτρον) set by reason. Passionate desire unquestionably harms the soul, but the ultimate danger of ἐπιθυμία lies not so much in its ability to get the occasional upper hand as in its ability to usurp reason entirely, to rule the moral agent without opposition in a state of "ἀκολασία" ("intemperance"). At this terminal stage, ἐπιθυμία becomes an all-consuming tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) and the moral agent becomes thoroughly corrupt.

Self-control (ἐγκράτεια) involves the moral agent's ability to assert the dictates of reason over against the demands of desire whenever the two conflict, and by preventing desire from *ever* getting the upper hand, ἐγκράτεια eliminates the risk of tyrannical desire entirely. Recognizing its critical importance for the overall health of the soul, Philo speaks highly of ἐγκράτεια and gives it a prominent role in his ethical theory.¹ This chapter explains Philo's concept of ἐγκράτεια in light of Middle-Platonic moral psychology, addressing in turn the fundamental questions of *what* ἐγκράτεια is and *how* to acquire it.

THE NATURE OF Ἐγκράτεια

Philo has a coherent but multi-faceted concept of ἐγκράτεια, whose character emerges best by considering three of its aspects. First, ἐγκράτεια simply involves a *power dynamic*, in which reason engages and overpowers a separate, unruly element of the soul. Second, ἐγκράτεια involves the *curtailing of excessive impulse*, and so it figures prominently in a Middle-Platonic theory of passion, especially through the Platonic image of reason as charioteer. Finally, ἐγκράτεια involves a *predominance of rational motivation*, in which the urge to secure a rationally determined, *ultimate* benefit for the entire soul outweighs the urge to experience an immediate pleasure.

¹ E.g., *Spec.* 1.173: τὴν ὠφελιμωτάτην τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἐγκράτειαν (cf. *Spec.* 1.175); *Contempl.* 34: ἐγκράτειαν δὲ ὡς περ τινὰ θεμέλιον προκαταβαλλόμενοι τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς ἄλλας ἐποικοδομοῦσιν ἀρετὰς. A similar emphasis on ἐγκράτεια appears in Xenophon's portrait of

Ἐγκράτεια -- Victory of Rational over Non-Rational

The Platonic tradition associates *ἐγκράτεια* with the victory of reason, but it characterizes reason's opponent in different ways. One *broad* formulation simply pits reason against the rest of the soul, understood more or less as a single inferior "part" whose inferiority stems from a lack of reasoning capacity. One *narrow* formulation pits reason against *only* desire (*ἐπιθυμία*), based on a theoretical correlation of specific virtues with specific elements of the tripartite Platonic soul. Philo uses both of these formulations in his ethical discourse.

The broad formulation appears in Plato's *Republic* as a reflection on the division within the soul presumed by the *term* *ἐγκράτεια* itself, which commonly denotes power (*κράτος*) *over oneself*.² Socrates notes the association of "self-control" (*ἐγκράτεια*) with the expression "κρείττω αὐτοῦ," whose literal sense—"stronger than himself"—creates confusion:

Now the phrase "stronger than himself" (*κρείττω αὐτοῦ*) is ridiculous, is it not? For anyone stronger than himself (*ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων*) would also be weaker than himself (*ἥττων . . . αὐτοῦ*), and anyone weaker (*ὁ*

Socrates in the *Memorabilia* (see Louis-André Dorion, "Akrasia et *enkrateia* dans les *Mémorables* de Xénophon," *Dialogue* 42 (2003): 645-72, esp. 646-50 [= "La prééminence de l'*enkrateia*"].

² See *Resp.* 430 D – 432 A. *κράτος* takes the genitive to indicate the domain of power: power *over* someone or something (see LSJ, s.v.). Walter Grundmann suggests that *ἐγκράτεια* derives from "ἐν κράτει ὄν," which implies a "status of power" ("*ἐγκράτεια*," *TDNT* 2:339-42, 340)—i.e., a state of *being in power*, namely *over oneself*. As with *κράτος*, the term *ἐγκράτεια* can also take the genitive, at least in earlier usage (e.g., *Resp.* 390 B: *ἐγκράτειαν ἑαυτοῦ*). But the reflexive pronoun eventually became unnecessary (see A. A. Long, "Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power," in *Hellenistic History and Culture* [ed. Peter Green; HCS 9; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993], 138-56, esp. 144. Philo never uses *ἐγκράτεια* with the reflexive pronoun, despite his use of equivalent expressions elsewhere: *Post.* 42: *ὃς μὴδ' αὐτοῦ κρατεῖν* ἰκανὸς ὢν; *Agr.* 37: οὐκέτι *κρατεῖν ἑαυτῶν* δύνανται; and *Ebr.* 221: οὐκέτι *κρατεῖν ἑαυτῶν* δυνάμενοι.

ἤττων) would be stronger (κρείττων). For the same person (ὁ αὐτός) figures in all of these expressions. (*Resp.* 431 A)³

Socrates, however, further explains what people really *mean* by such expressions, despite the obscurity:

[T]he soul of man within him has a better part (τὸ μὲν βέλτιον) and a worse part (τὸ δὲ χεῖρον), and the expression "being stronger than himself" (τὸ κρείττω αὐτοῦ) really means the control of the worse by the naturally better part (τὸ βέλτιον φύσει τοῦ χείρονος ἐγκρατές). (*Resp.* 431 A)

Here the "naturally better part" (τὸ βέλτιον φύσει) stands for reason, which ought to be in control (ἐγκρατές). But Plato never clearly identifies the "worse part" (τὸ χεῖρον), here or elsewhere, because he never clearly formulates a bipartite model of the soul.⁴ Middle Platonists, however, ultimately *preferred* a bipartite model of the soul, envisioning simply a "rational part" over a "non-rational part," and they developed a broad conception of ἐγκράτεια along these lines:

Whenever the rational part of the soul overpowers the non-rational part (τὸ λογιστικὸν μέρος τᾶς ψυχᾶς ἐπικρατῆ τῷ ἀλόγῳ), self-control comes into existence (γίνεται . . . ἐγκράτεια). Whenever the non-rational part of the soul overpowers the rational part (τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τᾶς ψυχᾶς τῷ λογιστικῷ), lack of self-control comes into existence ([γίνεται] ἀκρατία). (*Ps.-Metop.* 117.16-18)⁵

³ On this passage, see also Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 450 D-E. Cf. *Leg.* 626 E: "[T]he victory over self (τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὐτόν) is of all victories the first and best while self-defeat (τὸ δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ) is of all defeats at once the worst and the most shameful. For these phrases signify that a war exists within each one of us (πολέμου ἐν ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς)."

⁴ Despite evidence for the concept of bipartition (see Rees, "Bipartition").

⁵ My translation. Cf. Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 442 A: "[The soul of man] has as one part the intelligent and rational (ἕτερον μὲν ἔχει τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικόν), whose natural duty is to govern and rule the individual (ὧ̄ κρατεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄρχειν προσήκόν ἐστιν), and as another part the passionate and irrational (ἕτερον δὲ τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον), the variable and disorderly (πολυπλανῆς καὶ ἄτακτον), which has need of a director (ἐξεταστοῦ

Although Philo never *defines* ἐγκράτεια in this way, he presumes this sort of definition when, for example, he interprets biblical references to "shepherding" (ποιμενικὴ τέχνη) along allegorical lines as an ethical discourse about reason's management of the "herd" (ἀγέλη) of non-rational powers within the soul (*Agr.* 26-66).⁶ Consistent with Philo's Middle-Platonic moral psychology, this line of interpretation envisions a basic power dynamic in the soul between a *rational* component fit to govern and a separate, *non-rational* component in need of governance.⁷ As long as the non-rational component tractably *accepts* governance, all is well. But when the two components conflict, moral well being hinges on the presence or absence of ἐγκράτεια. Its *presence* consists in the

δεόμενον)" (unless otherwise noted, all translations of Plutarch's writings are from the Loeb Classical Library); also *Eclog.* 38.5-6: " Ἀλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς εἰθισμένον ὑπακούειν τῷ λόγῳ.

⁶ Moses uses the figures of "shepherd" (ποιμήν) and "feeder of livestock" (κτηνοτρόφος) respectively to speak of the rational faculty engaged in either *good* or *bad* management of its non-rational "herd" (ἀγέλη) (esp. *Agr.* 29: φαῦλος μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ ἀγελάρχης οὗτος [λογισμός] καλεῖται κτηνοτρόφος, ἀγαθὸς δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖος ὀνομάζεται ποιμήν) (cf. *Sacr.* 104-06). Figurative representations of the soul as a combination of "Man" (rational) and "Beast" (non-rational) suit the Platonic moral psychology particularly well. See Annas, *Platonic Ethics*, 117-36 [= "Humans and Beasts: Moral Theory and Moral Psychology"], esp. 134-36. Cf. Theo Heckel, *Der innere Mensch: Die paulinische Verarbeitung eines platonischen Motivs* (WUNT 53; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1993). Heckel considers the Platonic image of the tripartite soul as "man" (τὸ λογιστικόν, the "inner man"), lion (τὸ θυμοειδές), and many-headed beast (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) (*Resp.* 588 B-D), especially its use among authors postdating Plato (see his ch. 3, "Der Aufstieg der Metapher vom 'Inneren Menschen' und die neue Platonhermeneutik ab dem ersten Jh. v. Chr.," 31-88, esp. 42-76 [= "Der 'Innere Mensch' bei Philon"]).

⁷ Philo's subdivision of the non-rational component into five senses, the organs or speech, and the organs of reproduction (*Agr.* 30) in no way undermines the fundamentally *bipartite* conception of the soul presumed in his shepherding allegory (see above, 72-77). In this case, the manifold nature of the non-rational part simply fits the characterization of reason as manager of a non-rational "herd." On Philo's conviction that the "better" (rational) part ought to govern the "worse" (non-rational) part, note for example *Leg.* 1.72: δίκαιον γὰρ τὸ μὲν κρείττον ἄρχειν ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἄρχεσθαι· κρείττον μὲν δὴ τὸ λογικόν, χεῖρον δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ τὸ θυμικόν [= τὸ ἄλογον] (cf. *Leg.* 3.222; *Fug.* 24; *Praem.* 59; QG 4.218). In

ability of the rational to overpower the non-rational, and Philo attributes precisely this ability to "shepherds," who use their rational powers to rule (κρατεῖν) over the non-rational forces within.⁸ The *absence* of ἐγκράτεια (ἀκρασία) similarly involves a question of power, but in this case *non-rational* forces overpower the rational. Philo can use the shepherding allegory to depict this disastrous situation:

[T]he stream of these evils becomes most grievous when the non-rational forces of the soul attack and overpower the forces of reason (ἐπειδὴν αἱ ἄλογοι δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθέμεναι ταῖς τοῦ λογισμοῦ κρατήσωσιν). While the herd obeys its herdsman (βουκόλια βουκόλοις . . . πειθαρχεῖ), or the flocks of sheep or goats obey the shepherd or goatherd (ἢ ποιμέσι ποίμνια ἢ αἰπόλοις αἰπόλια), all goes well with them; but, when the controlling herdsmen (ἀγελάρχαι) prove weaker than their charges (ἀσθενέστεροι τῶν θρεμμάτων), everything goes awry. (*Somn.* 2.151-52)

Although Philo sees reason engaged in a struggle against certain "powers of the soul" (δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς), he disregards the specific *identity* of those powers and notes only a common *property*, their lack of reason (ἄλογοι). Here he construes ἐγκράτεια in the broadest possible terms: a variety of distinct opponents may contend with reason (desire, anger, fear, etc.), but they necessarily offer only one *type* of opposition, non-rational opposition. The value of such a broad formulation lies in its ability to construe the forcible control of *any* non-rational movement as an instance of ἐγκράτεια.

Opif. 83-86, Philo expresses a similar conviction: human beings (rational) ought to govern animals (non-rational).

⁸ E.g., *Agr.* 63: δύνανται κρατεῖν τῶν ἀλόγων [δυνάμεων] . . . χρώμενοι ταῖς λογικαῖς [δυνάμεσι] (cf. *Agr.* 40; *Sacr.* 49).

The *narrow* formulation of ἐγκράτεια ultimately derives from a development within Platonic tradition regarding the nature of σωφροσύνη, "self-mastery." Plato himself had conceived of σωφροσύνη in terms of "order" (κόσμος) or "concord" (ξυμφωνία) among all parts of the soul as to which part should rule (ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν).⁹ But Middle Platonists, dogmatically assigning a single cardinal virtue to each of the soul's parts, narrowed the scope of σωφροσύνη from an agreement involving the entire soul to simply a governance of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the seat of ἐπιθυμία.¹⁰ Philo reflects this trend:

We must understand, then, that our soul has three parts (ἐστὶν ἡμῶν τριμερῆς ἡ ψυχὴ): the rational (τὸ μὲν λογικόν), the assertive (τὸ δὲ θυμικόν), and the desirous (τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν). . . . and that to each of the parts an appropriate virtue has been attached (ἀρετὴν δὲ ἐκάστῳ τῶν μερῶν οἰκείαν προσηρμόσθαι): prudence to the rational part (τῷ μὲν λογικῷ φρόνησιν) . . . courage to the assertive part (τῷ δὲ θυμικῷ ἀνδρείαν); and self-mastery to the desirous part (τῷ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικῷ σωφροσύνην). For it is by self-mastery that we heal and cure our desires (σωφροσύνη γὰρ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀκούμεθα καὶ ἰώμεθα). (*Leg.* 1.70)¹¹

⁹ See *Resp.* 430 E and 432 A. On σωφροσύνη in Plato's writings, see North, *Sophrosyne*, 150-96.

¹⁰ Cf. North, *Sophrosyne*, 173: "[S]ophrosyne must be practiced by all three parts of the soul; it is never, for Plato, as for many later Platonists, solely the virtue of the appetitive part" (cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 78, n. 2). On the doctrine of virtues for each part in Middle Platonism, see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 72-84, esp.80-83. In addition to the passages Lilla cites, note also *Ps.-Metop.* 118.9-13: τῷ μὲν γὰρ λογιστικῷ μέρει τὰς ψυχᾶς ἀρετὰ ἀφρόνασις . . . τῷ δὲ θυμοειδέος ἀνδρεία . . . τῷ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἀσωφροσύνη . . . ὅλας δὲ τὰς ψυχᾶς ἀδικαιοσύνη; cf. *Didask.* 29.1 [182.22]: τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τῆς σωφροσύνης. On Philo's understanding of the cardinal virtues, see Carl Joachim Classen, "Der platonisch-stoische Kanon der Kardinaltugenden bei Philo, Clemens Alexandrinus und Origenes," in *Kerygma und Logos: Beiträge zu den geistesgeschichtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Antike und Christentum* (ed. Adolf Ritter; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 68-88, esp. 70-75; Wofson, *Philo*, 2:218-35; and in general, Pierre Daubercies, "La vertu chez Philon d'Alexandrie," *RTL* 26 (1995): 185-210.

¹¹ My translation.

As the "appropriate virtue" for the ἐπιθυμητικόν, σωφροσύνη accordingly manages the non-rational desires (τὰς ἐπιθυμίας) generated in that part of the soul—and it manages them well. Philo associates σωφροσύνη with the "healing" and "curing" of desire, suggesting a state of moral wellness in which desire operates only as it should. In other words, σωφροσύνη represents the *ideal* sort of management, in which ἐπιθυμία plays the obedient servant of reason, acting only with reason's authorization and never opposing its dictates. Plutarch characterizes the man of self-mastery along similar lines:

And you would say, as you looked at the man, "Then, indeed ceased the gale; a windless calm arose; some god had laid the waves to rest" [*Od.* 12.168], since by reason the violent, raging, and furious movements of the desires (κινήματα τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν) had been quenched and those movements which Nature absolutely requires (ὧν δ' ἡ φύσις ἀναγκαίως δεῖται) had been made sympathetic (ὁμοπαθῆ), submissive (ὑπήκοα), friendly (φίλα), and, when the man chose a course of action, willing to cooperate (συνεργά), so that they did not outstrip the dictates of reason (μὴ προεκθεῖν τοῦ λογισμοῦ), nor fall short of them (ὑπενδιδόναι), nor misbehave (ἀτακτεῖν), nor disobey (ἀπειθεῖν), but so that every impulse was easily led (πάσαν ὀρμὴν εὐάγωγον οὔσαν). (*Virt. mor.* 446 D-E)¹²

Plutarch situates this concept of self-mastery at the top of a four-point scale depicting four possible relations between reason and desire: reason rules desire *without* conflict (σωφροσύνη), reason rules desire *with* conflict (ἐγκράτεια), desire rules reason *with* conflict (ἀκρασία), and desire rules reason *without*

¹² Cf. TL 82: ὄρος σωφροσύνας εὐπείθεια.

conflict (ἀκολασία).¹³ Despite occasional lapses in technical precision, Philo demonstrates a fundamental acceptance of this same scale in his ethical theory. For example, he identifies moral "opposites" according to the terms of the scale, correlating the terms denoting *absence* of conflict (σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία) and the terms denoting its *presence* (ἐγκράτεια and ἀκρασία).¹⁴ Furthermore, Philo's ethical theory presumes and depicts, in a variety of ways, the four types of relation between reason and desire outlined by the scale, so he affirms its distinctions by implication if not always by name.¹⁵ Philo's general acceptance of such a well-developed scheme, especially its distinction between self-mastery and self-control, helps to clarify his concept of ἐγκράτεια.

Like σωφροσύνη, which in Middle-Platonic theory deals specifically with the ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἐγκράτεια deals specifically with ἐπιθυμία, but in a different way. In *Spec.* 1.149, Philo calls ἐγκράτεια desire's "antagonist" (ἀτίπαλον ἐπιθυμίας), and this image captures the essential difference between ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη. In the case of "self-mastery," reason placidly manages an ever docile desiderative faculty. But in the case of "self-control," reason struggles against desire in an active contest of power: reason *does* manage to assert its

¹³ Plutarch gives a detailed overview of this scale in *Virt. mor.* 445 B – 446 E. The ethical theory underlying the scale comes from Book VII of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (see North, *Sophrosyne*, 203).

¹⁴ For σωφροσύνη opposed to ἀκολασία, see for example *Opif.* 73: τάναντία . . . σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀκολασίαν; *Her.* 209: ἐναντία . . . σωφροσύνη, ἀκολασία; for ἐγκράτεια opposed to ἀκρασία, see for example *Abr.* 103: πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν ὁ ἀκρατής; *Mos.* 1.161: ἀκράτορες μεταβάλλουσι πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν; *Virt.* 180: ἐξ ἀκρατείας εἰς ἐγκράτειαν.

¹⁵ See above, 87-93.

directives, but only against—and over—desire's positive opposition to those directives. Plutarch characterizes the man of self-control along these lines:

[T]he self-controlled man (ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής), while he does indeed direct his desire by the strength and mastery of reason (ἄγει μὲν ἐρρωμένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ κρατοῦντι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν), yet does so not without pain, nor by persuasion (οὐδὲ πειθομένην), but as it plunges sideways and resists (πλαγίαν καὶ ἀντιτείνουσαν), as though with blow and curb (ὑπὸ πληγῆς καὶ χαλινού), he forcibly subdues it and holds it in (καταβιαζόμενος καὶ ἀνακρούων), being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil (ἀγῶνος ὧν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ θορύβου μεστός). (*Virt. mor.* 445 B-C)

Because self-control involves an active conflict between reason and desire, Plutarch uses terms of strength, force, and violent opposition to characterize it. Philo demonstrates a similar view of self-control and uses similar language in his own characterizations, although he never states his theoretical positions quite as clearly as Plutarch.¹⁶ He does, however, encapsulate his understanding of ἐγκράτεια in an interpretive reflection on the creature known as the "snake-fighter" (ὄφιομάχης):

For the snake-fighter is, I think, nothing but a symbolic representation of self-control (συμβολικῶς ἐγκράτεια εἶναι), waging a fight that never ends and a truceless war against intemperance and pleasure (μάχην ἀκαθαίρετον καὶ πόλεμον ἄσπονδον ἐκφέρουσα πρὸς ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἡδονήν). (*Opif.* 164)

The notions of "never ending fight" (μάχην ἀκαθαίρετον) and "truceless war" (πόλεμον ἄσπονδον) obviously convey the element of conflict characteristic of ἐγκράτεια. And despite Philo's naming here of ἀκρασία and ἡδονή as the

¹⁶ Cf. *Leg.* 1.86 (NB οἱ ἐγκρατέστατοι): ἀγαπητὸν οὖν ἐστὶν ἀντιβῆναι καὶ μαχέσασθαι τῷ γένει τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.

opponents of ἐγκράτεια, he in no way contradicts the notion of a fundamental opposition between ἐγκράτεια and ἐπιθυμία. By pitting ἐγκράτεια against ἀκρασία, Philo simply notes that self-control subverts the victory of desire over reason (ἀκρασία) by enforcing the victory of reason over desire (ἐγκράτεια). By pitting ἐγκράτεια against ἡδονή, Philo simply recognizes pleasure as the constant and necessary counterpart of desire. Since Platonic ἐπιθυμία invariably seeks ἡδονή as its object, pleasure and desire ultimately represent twin aspects of the same phenomenon, and for that reason ἐγκράτεια interchangeably represents the antagonist of either one.¹⁷ But in either case ἐγκράτεια involves active management of one part of the soul, the ἐπιθυμητικόν.

Whether formulated *broadly* as the dominance of rational over non-rational forces or *narrowly* as the dominance of reason over desire, ἐγκράτεια always involves a decisive contest of power. Since only *reason* can successfully direct the soul on a virtuous course of life, moral well being demands an ability to overcome *any* opposition to reason, no matter the source. Conceiving ἐγκράτεια along these lines, as simply a power dynamic, rightly identifies self-control with the victory of reason, but it does nothing to *define* that victory. A more precise

¹⁷ In Philo's discussion of σωφροσύνη in *Leg.* 1, he links self-mastery with the ἐπιθυμητικόν alone (§§70-71) yet—in line with the Platonic view of ἐπιθυμία—presumes its dealing with *both* desire *and* pleasure (§86: ἀδυνατεῖ κυκλώσασθαι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ ἡδονήν). Since it deals with the same part of the soul, ἐγκράτεια deals also with both desire and pleasure: either the forcible *subjugation* of ἐπιθυμία or the forcible *abstention* from ἡδονή (cf. Ps.-Metop. 117.21-22: ἀ δὲ ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ ἀντέχεν ἀδονᾶ).

concept of ἐγκράτεια emerges through Philo's use of what he and other Middle Platonists took as a model of self-control in action: the two-horse chariot.

Ἐγκράτεια -- Curtailing Excessive Impulse

While he owes the analogy between soul and chariot to Plato's *Phaedrus* (esp. 246 A-B; 253 D – 256 D), Philo's particular use of the chariot figure to depict ἐγκράτεια reflects a decidedly *Middle-Platonic* moral psychology and a set of didactic aims different from Plato's.¹⁸ In the *Phaedrus*, the chariot figure helps to narrate a myth of the soul's journey to transcendent reality, *not* to expound moral theory.¹⁹ The struggle between charioteer and horse obviously symbolizes conflict within the soul, but Plato examines this conflict strictly in terms of the myth, not as a separate ethical concern.²⁰ In Philo's writings, by contrast, the chariot figure serves as a working model for moral psychology, stripped of any explicit connection with the *Phaedrus* myth and framed according

¹⁸ On Philo's use of the *Phaedrus* image, see esp. Méasson, *Char ailé*, 141-76; also Billings, *Platonism of Philo*, 88-92. On the broader use of the *Phaedrus* image in Middle Platonism, see Vander Waerdt, "Moral Psychology," 390 (cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 92-103, esp. 97). Within Middle Platonism, Philo's use takes precedence, as Méasson notes: "l'œuvre de Philon est sans doute le plus ancien témoignage subsistant de l'utilisation de cette image destiné à devenir un des thèmes familiers du moyen platonisme" (176). On the chariot as a model of ἐγκράτεια, see esp. Plutarch's explicit statement to that effect in *Virt. mor.* 445 B-D. On the *Phaedrus* image in Plutarch, see François Fuhrmann, *Les images de Plutarque* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1964), 141, n. 2; cf. Opsomer, "L'âme du monde," 46-47; Rhiannon Ash, "Severed Heads: Individual Portraits and Irrational Forces in Plutarch's *Galba* and *Otho*," in *Plutarch and his Intellectual World: Essays on Plutarch* (ed. Judith Mossman; London: Duckworth, 1997), 189-214, 192-96.

¹⁹ See Anne Lebeck, "The Central Myth of Plato's *Phaedrus*," *GRBS* 13 (1972): 267-90

²⁰ See Jacqueline de Romilly, "Les conflits de l'âme dans le *Phèdre* de Platon" *WS* 16 (1982): 100-13, esp. 112, where she concludes concerning the conflict depicted through the chariot figure: "Il s'agit, en commandant mieux à l'attelage de notre âme, de pouvoir monter jusqu'au lieu supracéleste, et, pour finir, d'échapper au cycle des incarnations. Ou bien il s'agit, dans le cas contraire, de s'empêtrer dans la matière et les souffrances infinies au'entraîne cette déchéance."

to Middle-Platonic conceptions of the soul. Gone, for example, are the wings of the chariot-soul so indispensable to the mythical narrative.²¹ And just as Middle-Platonic bipartition recast θυμός as more of an *opponent* of reason than an ally, Philo pits *both* horses against the driver, replacing the *Phaedrus* notion of a "bad" horse (ἐπιθυμία) yoked to an obedient "good" horse (θυμός).²² In further agreement with Middle-Platonic moral psychology, which offered variant conceptions of the soul's non-rational part (ἄλογον μέρος) over against its rational part (λογικὸν μέρος), Philo offers variant conceptions of what exactly the soul's driver, reason, must manage. Reflecting Middle Platonism's configuration of tripartition as bipartition, Philo can speak of either *two* horses, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, or a *single* horse, representing simply the non-rational part of the soul.²³ Elsewhere, he identifies the team of horses more broadly as emotion(s).²⁴ He can also envision the team as sense-perception (αἴσθησις).²⁵ But no matter what team Philo envisions, he always casts the soul's rational element as the

²¹ E.g., *Phaedr.* 246 A: εἰκέτω ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου; 246 E: τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα.

²² See Méasson, *Char ailé*, 148-49 [= "De l'attelage de Platon à celui de Philon"]; 158-60 [= "Le «thumos» chez Platon et chez Philon"].

²³ Horses θυμός and ἐπιθυμία: e.g., *Agr.* 72-73; *Migr.* 67 (cf. *Leg.* 1.72); single horse: e.g., *Leg.* 2.99, cited in Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 142, n. 63. On the single horse variation (142), Inwood writes: "In Plato the two horses represent the two distinct irrational elements in the soul. When a dualistic contrast of reason and the irrational part of the soul in its undifferentiated formulation was preferred, an analogy with only one horse was substituted."

²⁴ E.g., *Leg.* 193: ὀχήματα παθῶν.

²⁵ E.g., *Leg.* 3.222-24: e.g., νοῦς δὲ κρείττον αἰσθήσεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντος μὲν ἡνιόχου καὶ ταῖς ἡνίαις τὰ ζῶα ἄγοντος ἢ βούλεται ἄγεται τὸ ἄρμα. See Méasson, *Char ailé*, 160-63.

charioteer charged with *controlling* the team.²⁶ In this way, his chariot figure *always* serves as a model of ἐγκράτεια in action—as a model of reason managing or "driving" the non-rational elements of the soul—and in this respect it perfectly suits the Platonic tradition's *broad* formulation of ἐγκράτεια as a power dynamic of rational versus non-rational. But since it can *also* depict reason managing the discrete *movement* of those elements—managing, in other words, discrete instances of non-rational *impulse* (ὀρμή)—the figure accommodates a more precise concept of ἐγκράτεια tailored to a Middle-Platonic view of "passion."

Philo's use of the concept of impulse (ὀρμή) to develop his chariot figure into a more elaborate model of ἐγκράτεια presumes a suitable basis in the *actual* dynamic between horses and drivers:²⁷

Drivers (ἡνίοχοι) . . . lead [their team] just as they please by keeping hold of the reins (τῶν ἡνιῶν). Sometimes they give rein for a brisk trot (ἐφιέντες πρὸς ὄξυν δρόμον), other times they pull back violently

²⁶ In *Agr.* 93, Philo characterizes the "art of driving" (τέχνην τὴν ἡνιοχικήν) as an ability κρατεῖν ἵππων (cf. *Virt.* 13: ὑγεία δὲ ψυχῆς εὐκρασία δυνάμεων ἐστὶ τῆς τε κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον, ἐπικρατοῦσης τῆς λογικῆς καὶ ὡσπερ ἀφηνιαστὰς ἵππους ἡνιοχοῦσης ἐκατέρας). Conversely, Philo assumes the capacity of the *team* to overpower the *driver* (cf. ἀκρασία) and bring everything to ruin (see esp. *Leg.* 3.223: ὡσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντος μὲν ἡνιόχου ταῖς ἡνιάις τὰ ζῶα ἄγοντος ἢ βούλεται ἄγεται τὸ ἄρμα, ἀφηνιασάντων δὲ ἐκείνων καὶ κρατησάντων, ὃ τε ἡνίοχος κατεσύρη πολλάκις τὰ τε ζῶα ἔστιν ὅτε τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς φορᾶς εἰς βόθρον κατηνχθῆ πλημμελῶς τε πάντα φέρεται).

²⁷ Philo himself had seen chariots in action: "Thus in chariot races (ἐν ἵπποδρομίαις) . . . I have seen (εἶδόν) people giving way to thoughtlessness who, instead of sitting in their places as they should as orderly spectators, stood in the middle of the course and pushed over by the rush of the chariots were crushed under the feet and wheels, a proper reward for their folly" (*Prov.* 58). Philo's knowledge of chariots included familiarity with obscure technical terminology, on which see H. A. Harris, "The Foot-Rests in Hippolytus' Chariot," *CR* 18 (1968): 259-60. On Philo's extensive familiarity with a variety of competitive sports, see esp. H. A. Harris, *Greek Athletics and the Jews* (TSP 3; Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1976), 51-95.

(ἀναχαιτίζοντες), if an excessive surge gets the team running (εἰ φορᾶ τοῦ δέοντος πλείονι θεοί). (*Opif.* 88)²⁸

Here Philo reviews the fundamentals of managing an unruly team. Of course, the problem lies not in the team's movement per se, but in its movement *beyond* what the driver sanctions, in its "excessive surge." Philo uses the term φορᾶ—a synonym of ὀρμή—to describe this surge and qualifies it with the expression πλείων τοῦ δέοντος, "greater than the need," meaning greater than the movement needed to accomplish the driver's purpose. Philo elsewhere denotes this type of unruly, excessive movement using a number of specialized terms, most commonly ἀφηνιάζειν, "to throw off the reins."²⁹ To counter this unruliness, drivers must reassert their control, whether by "pulling back violently" (ἀναχαιτίζειν), as Philo indicates here, or by some other technique, such as "curbing" (ἐπιστομίζειν), as Philo indicates elsewhere.³⁰ In any case, Philo envisions controlling a team of horses as a matter of curtailing their excessive movements, which bear description in terms of impulse. Philo's characterization of chariot driving applies also to the mounted horseman:

When the horse goes forward in obedience to the reins (εὐηνίως), the horseman gives a few pats as if to praise the horse, but when the horse gets carried away beyond proper measure by excessive impulse (ὅταν δὲ σὺν πλείονι ὀρμῇ πέραν ἐκφέρηται τοῦ μετρίου), the horseman pulls

²⁸ My translation.

²⁹ ἀφηνιάζειν and its variants appear over fifty times in Philo's writings. Méasson (*Char ailé*, 146) considers it part of a larger vocabulary "inspiré du *Phèdre*."

³⁰ ἀναχαιτίζειν: lit. *to throw back the mane* (χαίτη), i.e., *to cause to rear up*. In other words, the driver pulls back with such violence that the team rears up. ἐπιστομάζειν: *to curb with the bit* (cf. στόμα).

back violently with force (μετὰ βίας εὐτόνως ἀναχαιτίζει) to slow the horse down. (*Agr.* 70)³¹

Here again Philo equates *control* with the curtailing of excessive impulse (πλείονι ὀρμῇ), which involves movement beyond the limit or measure (πέραν . . . τοῦ μετρίου) set by the horseman's purpose. He also highlights a key element of managing *any* unruly non-rational power, horse or not: the use of brute force (μετὰ βίας). By the application of force, a horseman bends the steed to his will, not to *eliminate* its movement, but simply to *control* it. Technically, neither of these passages describes the *soul*, but they clearly allude to the Middle-Platonic definition of "passion" Philo formulates in *Spec.* 4.79:

- ἄμετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή (*Spec.* 4.79)
- φορὰ τοῦ δέοντος πλείων (*Opif.* 88)
- πλείονι ὀρμῇ πέραν . . . τοῦ μετρίου (*Agr.* 70)

In other words, Philo sees in the management of horses an effective means of representing the management of non-rational impulse, specifically the "excessive" impulse Middle Platonists counted as "passion." Capitalizing on this analogy, Philo applies the language of horsemanship *directly* to the realm of moral psychology to characterize ἐγκράτεια as the curtailing of excessive impulse.

Since Middle Platonists defined passion in terms of non-rational impulse, Philo can depict the *management* of passion strictly in terms of non-rational impulse, without ever naming a specific *type* of passion (desire, fear, grief, etc.):

³¹ My translation.

For ["horsemen"] are able, by applying a bridle to the soul's non-rational faculties (χαλινὸν ταῖς ἀλόγοις δυνάμεσιν ἐμβαλόντες), to curb the surge of their excessive impulse (αὐτῶν ἐπιστομίζειν τῆς πλεοναζούσης τὴν φορὰν ὀρμῆς). (*Agr.* 94)³²

As Philo suggests here, the soul has a variety of non-rational faculties (ἄλογοι δυνάμεις), whose existence *in itself* poses no problem. But since these faculties can usurp reason's authority and become "passionate," the moral agent must be able to exercise ἐγκράτεια, which Philo depicts here as "applying a bridle" (χαλινόν . . . ἐμβαλόντες). In particular, the moral agent must be able to curb the surge of *excessive* non-rational impulses, whatever their source. Desire (ἐπιθυμία), for example, represents a perfectly natural faculty of the soul. But when the impulses of desire become *excessive*, ἐπιθυμία the benign emotion becomes ἐπιθυμία the malignant passion. Controlling ἐπιθυμία (exercising ἐγκράτεια) specifically involves the curtailment of this excess:

But there are others, boastful persons, of the sort that is puffed up by arrogance, who in their craving for high position determine to have nothing to do in any way with the frugal, the truly profitable mode of living. Indeed, if any rebuke them in order to rein in the unruliness of their desires (ἔνεκα τοῦ τὸν ἀφηνιασμὸν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀναχαιτίσαι), they regard the admonition as an insult. (*Spec.* 2.18)³³

The rebuke here stands against *passionate* desire, since it involves "pulling back violently" (ἀναχαιτίσαι) not on desire per se but on the "unruliness" of desire

³² My translation. Cf. *Leg* 3.118: ἡ . . . ὀρμὴ πάθους; *Agr.* 58: τὰ περιττὰ τῆς εἰς ἀπληστίαν ὀρμῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιστομίζοντες; *Spec.* 1.193: ἐπιστομίζοντας τὰς ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ὀρμάς.

³³ Cf. *Spec.* 2.135: χαλινόν . . . ἐμβαλεῖν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀνασκιρτᾶν ἐπὶ πλεόν; *Virt.* 113: οὐκ εἶασεν ἀχάλινον φέρεσθαι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπαυχενίζουσαν, ἐστείλατο τὸ σφοδρόν . . . χαλάσας.

(τὸν ἀφηνιασμόν), which represents the movement *in excess* of the "frugal mode of living" reason would otherwise allow. And the dynamic envisioned here relative to ἐπιθυμία applies in theory to *any* emotion. In *Leg.* 3.118-37, for example, Philo uses the chariot figure to represent the work of Aaron, who stands as the allegorical exemplar of the *moderation of emotion* (μετριοπάθεια).³⁴ While cues in the biblical text prompt Philo to highlight θυμός in his allegorical consideration of μετριοπάθεια, he clearly has *all* emotions in view.³⁵ In general, he portrays the moderating effect of ἐγκράτεια as bringing *reason* (λόγος) to bear on the *emotions* (πάθη), "so that [reason] like a charioteer may curb their surge to excess (ἵν' οὗτος ἡνιόχου τρόπον ἐπιστομίζῃ τὴν ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῶν φοράν)" (*Leg.* 3.134). In other words, reason seeks not to eliminate emotions but simply to curb their *excessive impulse*. With reason in command, emotion never oversteps the limits of moderate expression—never becomes, in other words, a

³⁴ *Leg.* 3.131: 'Ααρὼν μετριοπάθειαν . . . ἀσκεῖ, ἐκτεμεῖν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ στήθος καὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἀδυνατεῖ· φέρει δ' ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸν ἡνιόχον . . . λόγον. Philo contrasts the μετριοπάθεια of Aaron, a lower ethical stage, with the ἀπάθεια of Moses, a higher ethical stage (*Leg.* 3.128-29). For this distinction between μετριοπάθεια and ἀπάθεια in Middle Platonism, see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 92-106 (cf. John Dillon, "Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtue," in *Platonismus und Christentum: Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie* [ed. Horst-Dieter Blume and Friedhelm Mann; JACE 10; Münster: Aschendorff, 1983], 92-105, esp. 102-03).

³⁵ On reason as the "charioteer" of θυμός, see, for example, *Leg.* 3.123: ἐπὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ, ἵν' οὗτος ἡνιοχῆται λόγῳ; *Leg.* 3.127: ἡνιοχθήσεται ὁ θυμὸς ὑπὸ τε λόγου. Philo, however, sets this long discourse on "Aaronic" moderation in the broader context of a Middle-Platonic bipartite opposition between *reason* (λόγος) and *emotion* (πάθος). At the outset (*Leg.* 3.115), he seems to endorse Platonic *tripartition*, but he immediately reveals his Middle-Platonic affinities in *Leg.* 3.116 by making bipartition the overarching frame: the soul consists of reason opposed to *emotion* (μάχεται ὁ λόγος τῷ πάθει), for instance *pleasure* (κρατούντος . . . λόγου φροῦδος ἡ ἡδονή, νικώσης . . . ἡδονῆς φυγᾶς ὁ λόγος), or of reason opposed to θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, elements of the *non-rational part* (ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, μέρη τοῦ ἀλόγου), abode of *the emotions* (τὰ πάθη). In Philo's Middle-Platonic tripartition as bipartition, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία

"passion": a disruptive force that overpowers reason and leads the soul to destruction, like a runaway horse pulling a hapless chariot to ruin. Here again Philo conceives ἐγκράτεια as the curtailing of *excessive* non-rational impulse, and he formulates this concept in light of a Middle-Platonic definition of "passion." While this notion of *curtailing excess* certainly lends precision to Philo's concept of ἐγκράτεια, his most practical concept of what it means for a rational part to rule over non-rational parts within the soul—especially for reason to rule over *desire* (ἐπιθυμία)—involves the different and often conflicting sources of human motivation.

Ἐγκράτεια -- Predominance of Rational Motivation

Reason and desire represent two distinct sources of motivation in the human soul, each with its own characteristic aim.³⁶ Desire (ἐπιθυμία) represents a source of motivation whose invariable aim is pleasure (ἡδονή). Given a sensory impression of something pleasurable, desire *always* responds by motivating the moral agent to pursue pleasure. Reason (λόγος), by contrast, represents a source of motivation whose invariable aim is the good (ἀγαθός). Given a set of circumstances, reason—unless captive to another component of the soul—*always* responds by motivating the moral agent to do what rational calculation

represent emotions (πάθη) stemming from the soul's non-rational part, but they are only two of many (cf., *Agr.* 78: θυμοῦ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ συνόλως ἀπάντων παθῶν).

³⁶ For analysis of the Platonic theory in terms of *motivation*, see for example Lohrenz, *Brute Within*, 35: "the embodied human soul is a composite object, composed of a number of parts which (strictly and accurately speaking) are the *subjects or bearers of different kinds of*

(λογισμός) deems best in those circumstances. These two sources of motivation do not necessarily oppose one another, but they obviously *can*. Desire overcomes reason (ἀκρασία) whenever the moral agent acts *for the sake of* pleasure despite reason's contrary motivation to act *for the sake of* rational benefit.³⁷ Conversely, reason overcomes desire (ἐγκράτεια) whenever the moral agent acts *for the sake of* rational benefit despite desire's contrary motivation to act *for the sake of* pleasure.³⁸ Conceived in terms of conflicting motivations, ἐγκράτεια imposes onto desire the "measure" of rational benefit: desire may pursue its aim of pleasure, *as long as* that pursuit serves a rational end and bears rational justification.³⁹ The pursuit of pleasure *beyond* reasonable measure—the pursuit of pleasure for pleasure's sake—represents the triumph of desire (as a source of motivation) over reason (as a source of motivation), and desire at that moment, as *its* characteristic motivation predominates, becomes "excessive" and so "passionate." While this dynamic applies in theory to *any* desire, the most basic of desires, the desire for food, illustrates it well.⁴⁰

motivating conditions" (emphasis added; cf. passages in the General Index under "Motivating condition" [218]); see also Cooper, "Human Motivation."

³⁷ E.g., *Def.* 95: τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀποδεχόμεθα ἐγκράτειαν πέραν ὄρων ἐλαύνοντες.

³⁸ E.g., *Agr.* 48: χρῆ . . . ἄρχειν τὸν ἡμέτερον νοῦν . . . τὸ συμφέρον πρὸ τοῦ ἡδέος . . . αἰρούμενον.

³⁹ E.g., QG 2.68 (Petit): πίνει δι' ἐγκράτειαν δι' ἣν ἐμέτρει τὴν χρῆσιν.

⁴⁰ For an illustration of this basic dynamic relative to *sexual* desire, see Kathy L. Gaca, "Philo's Principles of Sexual Conduct and Their Influence on Christian Platonist Sexual Principles," *SPhA* 8 (1996): 21-39, esp. 22-27, where Gaca outlines Philo's (Pythagorean) "procreationist principle." Although Gaca does not analyze it in terms of moral psychology, the procreationist principle nevertheless envisions ἐγκράτεια as the predominance of rational motivation by endorsing sex for the sake of reproduction (*reason* as source of motivation) and rejecting sex for the sake of pleasure (*desire* as source of motivation). Niehoff (*Philo on Jewish Identity*, 99-102) examines the same principle of limiting sex to reproduction but downplays the

With regard to food, desire invariably seeks *only* the pleasure of eating, while reason seeks the moral agent's overall well being.⁴¹ Desire always urges indulgence, due to its reflexive, non-rational mode of operation—in other words, given an opportunity to eat pleurably, desire always says "yes." Reason, by contrast, taking all factors into account, can accordingly urge either *for* or *against* indulgence on an ad hoc basis. While reason could not in principle *categorically* endorse a certain type of indulgence, human beings must eat to live, so—barring exceptional circumstances—reason always approves eating for nourishment as the unavoidable indulgence of a "necessary" desire, an indulgence perfectly consistent with the demands of ἐγκράτεια:

Mark you not that even the most self-controlled of men (οἱ ἐγκρατέστατοι) under compulsion of the mortal element in them (ἀνάγκη τοῦ θνητοῦ) resort to food and drink (παραγίνονται ἐπὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά), out of which the pleasures of the appetite develop (ἐξ ὧν αἱ γαστροῦς ἡδοναὶ συνεστᾶσιν)? (Leg. 1.86)⁴²

Pythagorean associations, instead framing the issue in terms of Philo's ideal of Jewish ἐγκράτεια.

⁴¹ Much of Philo's discourse on ethical eating reflects elements of the diatribe tradition, especially the works of Musonius Rufus (see Paul Wendland, "Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe," in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion* [Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1895], 1-75, esp. 8-15; cf. Bréhier, *Idées philosophiques et religieuses*, 261-62; Niehoff, *Philo on Jewish Identity*, 105). Musonius, for example, endorses the standard of *need* over *pleasure*: e.g., *Troph.*^B 116.9-11: γαστριμαργία τί ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἢ ἀκρασία περὶ τροφήν, δι' ἣν ἄνθρωποι τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν σίτῳ τοῦ ὠφελίμου προτιμῶσιν; 118.6-7: ἀσκῶν καὶ ἐθίζων αὐτὸν αἰρεῖσθαι σίτον οὐχ ἵνα ἡδῆται ἀλλ' ἵνα τρέφῃται. Such similarities, however, do not signal the acceptance of Cynic-Stoic *philosophical* commitments on Philo's part but simply the use of a widespread ethical topos (cf. A. C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* [trans. B. L. Hijmans; rev. ed.; WTS 8; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1963], 106: "Like nearly all moralists who treat the problem of food, Musonius rejects pleasure as the aim"). Although he sometimes frames ethical discourse in ways comparable to Musonius, Philo presupposes a moral psychology quite different from Musonius or any other Stoic.

⁴² Cf. Leg. 3.147: τοῖς γὰρ ἀναγκαίοις σιτίοις καὶ ποτοῖς ἡ φύσις βιάζεται χρῆσθαι; *Ebr.* 131: σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ὕπνου καὶ πάντων ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα τῇ φύσει. For Plato's understanding of "necessary desires," see *Resp.* 558 C – 559 D.

So a moral agent who genuinely *needs* to eat can satisfy both reason and desire with a good meal: rational calculation (λογισμός) motivates the eating as a logical means of sustaining life and health, while desire (ἐπιθυμία) motivates the eating as a pleasurable experience. Of course, rational calculation (λογισμός) may compel the same hungry moral agent to *reject* a meal despite desire's pressing motivation to eat for the sake of pleasure—if, for instance, the meal is poisoned or belongs to someone else. But the conflict between reason and desire in matters of food more commonly involves the question of eating *in excess of* rational necessity. Having eaten enough to survive in good health, and so having no real *need* to eat, how does the moral agent handle further *opportunities* to eat? At this point, Philo's moral theory can explain indulgence and abstinence in terms of ἀκρασία and ἐγκράτεια, understanding each as the victory of a certain type of motivation. *To eat* represents a victory of desire over reason (ἀκρασία), since the moral agent eats strictly for the sake of pleasure: the motivation for pleasure has in effect *overpowered* the motivation for rational benefit, which urges abstinence as the reasonable course. Philo understands ἀκρασία along these lines in *Mos.* 1.160-61, where he attributes a lack of ἐγκράτεια to those who incite desires, including the desires of the stomach (τὰς γαστρὸς ἐπιθυμίας), *beyond necessities* (ἔξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων)—by eating more than they need, they eat for pleasure and reflect the predominance of ἐπιθυμία

as a motivating disposition.⁴³ Conversely, *not to eat* represents a victory of reason over desire (ἐγκράτεια), since the moral agent *controls* the desire for food by keeping it within the bounds of rational necessity. Philo equates ἐγκράτεια with eating (and drinking) according to need, since it involves reason motivating the moral agent to indulge desire only *to the point of need* and no further. Commenting on Exodus 23:25b⁴⁴ Philo writes:

In this passage, he symbolically indicates nourishment and health (τροφὴν καὶ ὑγίειαν αἰνίττεται): nourishment through the mention of food and water, and health through the expression "turn away weakness" (διὰ τοῦ μαλακίαν ἀποστρέφειν). Second, he represents self-control (ἐγκράτειαν εἰσηγεῖται) by talking about the consumption of necessities only (τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετουσίαν μόνον). (QE 2.18)⁴⁵

Philo's identification here of ἐγκράτεια with the indulgence of *necessary* desire enhances the notion of curtailing excess from the chariot figure by further characterizing "excessive" as "unnecessary." Conceived in these terms,

⁴³ In this passage, Philo contrasts ἀκρασία and ἐγκράτεια (NB §161: οἱ . . . ἀκράτορες μεταβάλλουσι πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν), associating the former not only with desire ἔξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων, but also with the enjoyment of pleasure (καθηδύπαθεῖν [cf. ἡδύς]); cf. *Det.* 95: τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀποδεχόμεθα ἐγκράτειαν πέραν ὄρων ἐλαύνοντες; *Opif.* 158: ὁ φιλήδονος . . . ἐκτραχηλιζούσης καὶ ὑποσκελιζούσης τῆς ἀκρασίας; *Somn.* 2.48: πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν ἡδονῆς μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς μετουσίαν τροφῆς. In *Det.* 113, Philo associates ἀκρασία with those whose desires continue despite a full stomach. With no rational motivation for eating, only a desire for pleasure can explain their behavior (cf. *Leg.* 2.16: πότερον ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀναγκαίου μόνον . . . ἢ καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀμέτρου καὶ περιττοῦ).

⁴⁴ LXX: εὐλογήσω τὸν ἄρτον σου καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ σου καὶ ἀποστρέψω μαλακίαν ἀφ' ὑμῶν. As Marcus notes (PLCL suppl. 2, 56, n. c), "Philo agrees with Heb. against LXX in omitting 'and wine' after 'bread.'" (cf. Petit, 254, n. b).

⁴⁵ My translation of Petit's text of the Greek fragment (Petit, 254). The passage continues from the Armenian, "for bread is a plain food without anything extra, and flowing water is (a similarly plain) drink, and upon these (depends) health" (trans. Marcus; PLSL suppl. 2, 56). In *Leg.* 3.154, Philo likewise associates the restraint of desire (συνεστάλθαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας) with only necessary indulgence(s) (μόνοις χρῆσόμεθα τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις, τῶν δὲ περιττῶν ἀφεξόμεθα) (cf. *Mos.* 1.28: γαστρί τε γὰρ ἔξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων δασμῶν, οὓς ἡ φύσις ἔταξεν, οὐδὲν πλέον ἐχορήγει).

ἐγκράτεια works to counteract *passionate* desire (πλεονάζουσα [ἄμετρος] ἐπιθυμία) by consistently enforcing the "measure" urged by reason (necessity) over against desire's persistent urge toward pleasure. In other words, ἐγκράτεια eliminates excessive, *unnecessary* desire and the *unnecessary* pleasure it entails. Philo symbolically interprets the rite of circumcision along these lines:

They say that circumcision of the skin is a symbol, as if (to show that) it is proper to cut off superfluous and excessive desires (τὰς περιττὰς καὶ πλεοναζούσας ἐπιθυμίας) by exercising self-control (ἐγκράτειαν) . . . For just as the skin of the foreskin is superfluous in procreation . . . so the excess of desire is superfluous . . . It is superfluous because it is not necessary . . . (QG 3.48)

So the moral agent possessed of ἐγκράτεια moderates ἐπιθυμία and avoids passion by indulging according to *need*, curtailing the excess of unnecessary indulgence by ensuring the predominance of a motivation to secure rational benefit (necessity) over a motivation to secure pleasure.

Summary

Although Philo never offers a direct, extended explanation of ἐγκράτεια, he nevertheless reveals through incidental remarks a substantive concept of ἐγκράτεια framed along three distinct but complementary lines. First, ἐγκράτεια involves a power dynamic of rational over non-rational forces, understood either broadly as λόγος defeating *any* challenge from elsewhere in the soul, or narrowly as λόγος defeating ἐπιθυμία. Second, ἐγκράτεια involves the curtailing of excessive impulse. Finally, ἐγκράτεια involves the predominance of rational

motivation over against a non-rational urge toward pleasure. But how, in Philo's view, does the moral agent acquire *ἐγκράτεια*?

THE ACQUISITION OF 'Εγκράτεια

Because *ἐγκράτεια* involves the control of *non-rational* forces, the means of acquiring it have a correspondingly non-rational character, insofar as they do not involve the formulation or deployment of rational argument. Without a *capacity* for reason, *ἐπιθυμί*" simply cannot accept or reject a moral agent's reasoned guidance. Instead, the moral agent must manage *ἐπιθυμί*" through the application of *force*—just as the charioteer does not *reason* with an unruly team (he cannot), but simply *acts* to bring it into submission. In other words, *ἐγκράτεια* comes from *doing*, not *thinking*: the moral agent becomes good at controlling *ἐπιθυμί*" only by *exerting* or *practicing* control, not by theoretical reflection.⁴⁶

Philo's philosophical contemporaries considered the importance of *practice* in moral development under the conceptual rubric of *ἄσκησις*.⁴⁷ Although the term

⁴⁶ Philo clearly distinguishes between theoretical and *practical* virtue: e.g., *Leg.* 1.57: ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ καὶ θεωρητικὴ ἐστὶ καὶ πρακτικὴ; *Congr.* 46: ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ πράξεως θεωρία ψιλὴ πρὸς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τοῖς ἐπιστήμοσιν.

⁴⁷ As noted earlier (16, n. 45), the term *ἄσκησις* in Philo's usage has little to do with modern terms such as "ascetic" or "asceticism," whose connotations derive mostly from Christian monasticism. The Greek term has no intrinsic association with religious practice (see Dressler, *Use of 'Ασκέω*). For use the term in Middle Platonism, see, for example, *Didask.* 24.4 [177.14-15]: τοῦ μὲν [λογιστικοῦ] διὰ διδασκαλίας, τοῦ δὲ [παθητικοῦ] διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἔθους ἀσκήσεως; (cf. 30.3 [184.1-2]: ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγινόμεναι καὶ ἀσκήσεως); Plutarch, *Garr.* 510 C: τῶν γὰρ παθῶν κρίσει καὶ ἀσκήσει περιγινόμεθα; *Eclog.* 37.18 – 38.1: Ἡθικὴ ἐστὶ δύναμις ψυχῆς, δι' ἧς ἀσκηθείσης καλῶς ἡ πρακτικὴ κατασκευάζεται ἀρετῇ. For the concept in contemporary Stoicism, see, for example, Musonius Rufus, "On Training" (Περὶ ἀσκήσεως) (see also Richard Valantasis, "Musonius Rufus and Roman Ascetical Theory," *GRBS* 40 [1999]: 207-31; cf. B. L. Hijmans, *ἈΣΚΗΣΙΣ: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System* [WTS 2; Assen: Von Gorcum,

appears nowhere in the Pentateuch, Philo has much to say about ἄσκησις, because he believes that Moses considered the topic *allegorically* under the figure of Jacob.

Ἐγκράτεια through Ἄσκησις

Philo's view of Jacob fits into a broader interpretive scheme involving the *three* patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who each represent a different way of acquiring virtue: through instruction (μάθησις), nature (φύσις), and practice (ἄσκησις) respectively:

For the holy word seems to be searching into the types of souls (τρόπους ψυχῆς), all of them of high worth, one which pursues the good through teaching (ἐκ διδασκαλίας), one through nature (ἐκ φύσεως) and one through practice (ἐκ ἀσκήσεως). The first called Abraham, the second Isaac and the third Jacob, are symbols of virtue (σύμβολ[α] . . . ἀρετῆς) acquired respectively by teaching (διδασκαλικῆς), nature (φυσικῆς) and practice (ἀσκητικῆς). (*Abr.* 52)⁴⁸

Although Philo ostensibly discovers this threefold scheme through allegorical exegesis of the Pentateuch, the notion of virtue accruing by nature, instruction, and practice comes from Greek philosophy, appearing in systematic formulation at least as early as Aristotle and gaining later acceptance among Philo's philosophical contemporaries, including his fellow Middle Platonists.⁴⁹ Philo's

1959]). For the concept in Cynic philosophy, see Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, *L'ascèse cynique: un commentaire de Diogène Laërce VI 70-71* (2d ed.; Paris: J. Vrin, 2001).

⁴⁸ Cf. *Mut.* 12; *Ios.* 1; *Mos.* 1.76.

⁴⁹ Diogenes Laertius (5.18), attributes the formulation to Aristotle: "Three things he declared to be indispensable for education: natural endowment (φύσεως), study (μαθήσεως), and constant practice (ἀσκήσεως)" (trans. R. D. Hicks). Noting the tripartite method in *Didask.* 28.4 [182.3-6], Dillon writes (also citing *Abr.* 52-54) that "it is thus likely to be the basic Middle-Platonic doctrine" (xxiii) (cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 66-68). For the doctrine among contemporary Stoics, see Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus*, 28-29.

reason for choosing *Jacob* as the model of practice (ἄσκησις) derives mainly from the patriarch's wrestling match at the ford of the Jabbok (Gen 32:22-32).⁵⁰ Since *wrestling* plays a definitive role in the life of Jacob, Philo makes it an essential attribute of the type of *soul* Moses represents through the *story* of Jacob. Wrestlers are athletes, and in the athletic discourse of antiquity "ἄσκησις" refers to the *practice* (i.e., *exercise, training*) that every athlete—wrestler or not—must undergo to achieve excellence. And the discourse of ἄσκησις belongs to an even larger stock of athletic imagery and terminology deployed in connection with the Jacob soul: an "agon motif" that suits Philo's allegorical method well because it operates on two levels.⁵¹ Literally, the agon motif speaks of an athlete's

⁵⁰ Gen 32:25: ἐπάλαιεν ἄνθρωπος μετ' [Ἰακωβ] ἕως πρωί; Gen 32:26: ἐν τῷ παλαίειν αὐτὸν μετ' αὐτοῦ. For Philo, the etymological tale of Jacob's "heel grabbing" (Gen 25:26: esp. ἡ χεὶρ αὐοῦ ἐπειλημμένη τῆς πτέρνης Ησαυ) illustrates his skill as a wrestler, who grabs the heel to trip up and overthrow an opponent (e.g., *Leg.* 3.190; cf. *Leg.* 3.18, 93; *Sacr.* 42). On Philo's portrait of Jacob in terms of ancient wrestling, see Harris, *Greek Athletics*, 68-71. On Philo's understanding of Jacob more broadly, see Petra von Gemünden, "La figure de Jacob à l'époque hellénistico-romaine: l'exemple de Philon d'Alexandrie," in *Jacob: commentaire à plusieurs voix de Gen 25-36 : mélanges offerts à Albert de Pury* (ed. Jean-Daniel Macchi and Thomas Römer; *MdB* 44; Genève: Labor et Fides, 2001), 358-70; C. T. R. Hayward, "Philo, the Septuagint of Genesis 32:24-32 and the Name 'Israel': Fighting the Passions, Inspiration and the Vision of God," *JJS* 51 (2000): 209-226; Michael Poliakov, "Jacob, Job, and Other Wrestlers: Reception of Greek Athletics by Jews and Christians in Antiquity," *JSH* 11 (1984): 48-65, esp. 63-65; Mark Sheridan, "Jacob and Israel: a Contribution to the History of an Interpretation," in *Mysterium Christi: Symbolgegenwart und theologische Bedeutung* (ed. M. Löhrer and Elmar Salmann; SA 116; Rome: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1995), 219-42.

⁵¹ On the agon motif in Philo, see esp. Martin Brändl, *Der Agon bei Paulus: Herkunft und Profil paulinischer Agonmetaphorik* (WUNT 222; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 85-115 [= "Die Agon-Metaphorik bei Philo von Alexandrien"]. On Philo's knowledge of agon terminology, Brändl notes: "Dabei handelt es sich nicht nur um das gängige agonistische Wortfeld, sondern auch um detaillierte Einzelheiten und zahlreiche *termini technici*" (87). As examples of "das gängige agonistische Wortfeld," Brändl lists: "ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀθλεῖν, ἀλείφειν, ἀσκεῖν, βραβεύειν, γυμνάζειν, κηρύσσειν, κονιοῦσθαι, πανκρατιάζεσθαι, παλαίειν, πενταετηρίς, πόνος, πυκτεύειν, σταδιεύειν, στεφανοῦν, τρέχειν mit ihren Derivaten und Komposita" (87, n. 39). On Philo's agon motif, see also Uta Poplutz, *Athlet des Evangeliums: Eine motivgeschichtliche Studie zur Wettkampfmotivmetaphorik bei Paulus* (HBS 43; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2004), 174-201 [= "Die Agonmetaphorik im hellenistischen Judentum: Philo von Alexandrien"]; Victor C.

struggle to train in pursuit of tangible prizes. But figuratively, the motif speaks of the *soul's* struggle to train in pursuit of intangible—yet more valuable—prizes, especially virtue. While *ἄσκησις* can in theory yield a number of virtues, Philo sees it primarily as a means of acquiring *ἐγκράτεια*.⁵² He thematically highlights *ἐγκράτεια* as a prominent goal of the Jacob soul by characterizing its struggle as a contest with non-rational forces—a wrestling match against *emotion* (*πάθος*).⁵³

While the *patriarch* Jacob played the athlete by literally wrestling with a physical opponent, the Jacob *soul*—the soul possessed of Jacob's athletic qualities—takes its practice (*ἄσκησις*) by figuratively wrestling with an intangible

Pfifzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 38-48 [= "Hellenistic Judaism and the Agon Tradition: Philo"].

⁵² When Philo lists the elements of *ἄσκησις*, he mentions only the virtue of *ἐγκράτεια*: *Leg.* 3.18: *μέρη τῆς ἀσκήσεως = ἀναγνώσεις, μελέται, θεραπείαι, τῶν καλῶν μνήμαι, ἐγκράτεια, τῶν κτηκόντων ἐνέργειαι; Her.* 253: *πάντα γὰρ τὰ τῆς ἀσκήσεως = ἡ ζήτησις, ἡ σκέψις, ἡ ἀνάγνωσις, ἡ ἀκρόασις, ἡ προσοχή, ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ἡ ἐξαδιαφρησις τῶν ἀδιαφόρων.*

⁵³ Cf. Völker, *Fortschritt und Vollendung*, 126-37 [= "Der Kampf gegen die *πάθη*"], esp. 129-30: "Daneben fordert Philo eine willensmäßige Anspannung, um die *πάθη* zu überwinden, ein systematisches Sich-Üben in der *ἐγκράτεια*." Although a *prominent* goal, *ἐγκράτεια* clearly does not represent for Philo the *ultimate* goal of the Jacob soul. Philo translates "Israel" as "seeing God" (*Conf.* 51: *Ἰσραὴλ γὰρ ὁρῶν θεὸν ἐρμηνεύεται*; cf. *Ebr.* 82: *ὄρασιν γὰρ θεοῦ μηνύει τοῦνομα*; on the etymology see Grabbe, *Etymology*, 172-73), so the Jacob soul must become "Israel" and obtain a vision of God to achieve its *final* end. This ultimate emphasis on *seeing* God—representing detachment from the sensible world in favor of the intelligible—gives Philo's understanding of Jacob, and thus his concept of *ἄσκησις*, an overarching *Platonic* framework (see esp. *Praem.* 36-40; cf. *Migr.* 214; *Somn.* 1.46; on the Platonic nature of such a vision, see David Bradshaw, "The Vision of God in Philo of Alexandria," *ACPQ* 72 [1998]: 483-500; Frederick E. Brenk, "Darkly Beyond the Glass: Middle Platonism and the Vision of the Soul," in *Platonism in Late Antiquity* [ed. Stephen Gersh and Charles Kannengiesser; CJA 8; Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992], 39-60; cf. Irl Goldwin Whitchurch, *The Philosophical Bases of Asceticism in the Platonic Writings and in Pre-Platonic Tradition* [CSP 14; New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1923]; Sarah J.K. Pearce, *The Land of the Body: Studies in Philo's Representation of Egypt* [WUNT 208; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007], 30-33 [= "Migration and Allegory"]). So despite his identification of Cynic *elements* in Philo's concept of *ἄσκησις*, Émile Bréhier's suggestion that it derives *entirely* from Cynicism must be rejected (*Idées philosophiques et religieuses*, 261: "L'on ne saurait réduire toute la morale philonienne au cynisme . . . nous allons essayer de montrer que *tout son ascétisme en provient*" [emphasis added]; see 261-71 [= "Le cynisme et l'ascétisme"]).

yet dangerously *real* opponent, the emotions (πάθη).⁵⁴ Philo's vision of the moral agent grappling with, and so struggling *against*, the emotions reflects above all the division of soul presumed in Middle-Platonic moral psychology, where πάθος has an independent existence over against the rational faculty. The Jacob soul, in other words, contends with distinct, non-rational πάθη—but *how* and *to what end*? Philo clearly depicts the Jacob soul engaged in a contest of power whose outcome rests solely on the relative strength of opponents: the moral agent, exemplified by reason (λόγος), either *is* or *is not* stronger than emotion, and so either *will* or *will not* succeed in forcibly controlling it.⁵⁵ And the Jacob soul clearly does, in Philo's view, wrestle for *control* of the emotions, not their elimination or absolute suppression. Specifically, the Jacob soul seeks to *moderate* emotion and keep it from overstepping the limits or bounds set by reason in a given circumstance.⁵⁶ In Philo's view, the *historical* patriarch Abraham exhibits this type of soul, as he "wrestles" with the emotion of grief at the loss of Sarah and rightly aims for μετριοπαθεῖν (*Abr.* 257):

⁵⁴ E.g., *Leg.* 3.93: ὁ πτερνιστῆς τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἀσκητῆς ἀρετῆς Ἰακώβ; *Sobr.* 65: ὁ τὴν πρὸς πάθη πάλιν γεγυμνασμένος Ἰακώβ (cf. *Leg.* 3.190; *Sacr.* 17; QG 4.163).

⁵⁵ E.g., *Leg.* 3.18: ὁ ἀσκητῆς οὖν Ἰακώβ νοῦς, ὅτε μὲν ὄρα ταπεινὸν τὸ πάθος, περιμένει λογιζόμενος αὐτὸ νικήσειν κατὰ κράτος; *Mut.* 85: ὁ δ' ἀσκητῆς καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον ἔχων αὐτὸ μόνον καὶ τοῦτο γυμνάζων καὶ συγκροτῶν, ἵνα τὸ οἰκεῖον πάθος τῷ γενητῷ καταβάλλῃ.

⁵⁶ In general, Philo suggests a necessary correlation between μετριοπάθεια and ἄσκησις as characteristics of a moral agent occupying a lower stage of ethical development (i.e., making progress [προκόπτων] *toward* perfection): e.g., *Leg.* 3.132: ὁ γε προκόπτων δεύτερος ὢν Ἰακώβ μετριοπάθειαν . . . ἀσκεῖ; *Det.* 65: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἄσκησις μέσον, οὐ τέλειον; *Post.* 78: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀσκηταῖς προκόπτουσι καὶ βελτιουμένοις. Ἐγκράτεια fits into this nexus, insofar as it always involves *conflict* and thus always denotes a measure of imperfection on the part of the moral agent, who has failed at some level to settle the issue of who—or what—shall rule the soul.

[W]hen grief was making itself ready to wrestle with his soul (τῆς λύπης ἐπαποδυομένης ἤδη καὶ κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κονιομένης), he grappled with it, as in the arena, and prevailed (ὥσπερ ἀθλητῆς ἐπεκράτησε). He gave strength and high courage to the natural antagonist of emotion, reason (τὸν ἀντίπαλον φύσει τῶν παθῶν λογισμὸν), which he had taken as his counselor throughout his life and now particularly was determined to obey. (*Abr.* 256)⁵⁷

Philo's conception of what the ascetic soul achieves in grappling with the emotions mirrors the Middle-Platonic theory of "passion" sketched elsewhere in his writings. Benign emotions become malignant "passions" by becoming "immoderate" (ἄμετρος), so the Jacob soul targets any expression of emotion *in excess of the measure* (μέτρον) set by reason, "wrestling" it down into a more appropriate form.⁵⁸ Allegorically interpreting the "numbing of the broad part" (πλάτους νάρκη)⁵⁹ as a "prize" (βραβεῖον) awarded to Jacob the "practiser" (ὁ ἀσκητής) after his wrestling match, Philo writes:

[N]othing is so profitable (σύμφορον) as that the laxity and free play of the impulses (τὸ κεχαλασμένον καὶ ἀνειμένον τῶν ὁρμῶν) should be hampered and numbed (ἀνακοπήναι τε καὶ ναρκῆσαι) with their vitalizing forces paralyzed so that the inordinate strength of the emotions may be exhausted (ἴν' ἡ τῶν παθῶν ἄμετρος ἰσχὺς ἐξασθενήσασα) and thus provide a breadth in which the better part of the soul may expand (πλάτος ἐμπαράσχη ψυχῆς τῷ βελτίονι μέρει). (*Praem.* 48)⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Substituting "grief" for Colson's "sorrow," and "emotion" for "passion."

⁵⁸ Note also in *Abr.* 257 Philo's characterization of μετριοπαθεῖν as μήτε πλέον τοῦ μετρίου σφιδάζειν.

⁵⁹ Gen 32:26: ἐνάρκησεν τὸ πλάτος τοῦ μηροῦ Ἰακωβ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν αὐτὸν μετ' αὐτοῦ.

⁶⁰ Substituting "impulses" for Colson's "appetites"; "emotions" for "passions"; "paralyzed" for "paralysed." On κεχαλασμένον, see Philo's interpretation of "girding the loins" (ὁσφύς περιεζῶσθαι) which likewise speaks of moderating emotion (e.g., *Leg.* 3.153-54: ἀνεζῶσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ἡμᾶς τὰ πάθη, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνειμένα καὶ κεχαλασμένα φορεῖν; cf. *Leg.* 2:28: ἐπὶ τοῦ πάθους, ὃ ἀνεζῶσθαι χρὴ καὶ μὴ ἐὰν κεχαλάσθαι καὶ ἀνεισθαι).

Since *curtailing excess* stands in Philo's mind as one aspect of ἐγκράτεια, he characterizes here the laborious wrestling of the Jacob soul as the *practice* (ἄσκησις) of ἐγκράτεια.⁶¹ Speaking allegorically of "Jacob," Philo elsewhere notes:

[The Man of Practice (ὁ ἀσκητής)] . . . wrestles with the emotions (πρὸς τὰ πάθη παλαίων) and . . . goes into training to gain self-control (πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν ἀλειφόμενος) . . . (Congr. 31)⁶²

Insofar as he identifies the emotions *generically* as the wrestling opponent of the Jacob soul, Philo brings a *broad* formulation of ἐγκράτεια ("rational" over "non-rational") to his consideration of ἄσκησις. But the emotions obviously include ἐπιθυμία, and the *narrow* formulation of ἐγκράτεια singles it out as the principal antagonist of reason. When Philo considers the specific types of practice needed to acquire ἐγκράτεια, he tends to have this narrow formulation—with its emphasis on ἐπιθυμία—in mind.

Ἐγκράτεια through Ascetic Precepts

Based on his understanding of what Jacob represents, Philo sees the acquisition of ἐγκράτεια as a matter of *practice* (ἄσκησις): strenuous, active engagement with an opponent (ἐπιθυμία), in a contest of power that builds strength and skill. But exactly what *sort* of practice endows the moral agent with ἐγκράτεια? What *sorts* of exercises make for good training? In general, Philo

⁶¹ Cf. *Praem.* 100: ἐγκράτειαν ἀσκήσαντες; *Hypoth.* 7.11: πρὸς ἀσκήσεως . . . ἐγκρατείας; *Hypoth.* 11.14: ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν.

⁶² Substituting "emotions" for Colson's "passions."

believes that the Law of Moses promotes virtue among its adherents.⁶³ But he also believes that Moses designed *specific* laws to promote *specific* virtues, including ἐγκράτεια.⁶⁴ In other words, Moses had a clear grasp of the activities of soul capable of effecting ἐγκράτεια, and—like a good trainer—he *prescribed* those activities through specific laws.⁶⁵ Apart from any *religious* significance, such precepts have great *philosophical* significance, because their formulation reflects principles of moral psychology and ἄσκησις derived from Philo's philosophical milieu.⁶⁶ To coin a term, they are "ascetic precepts," and they

⁶³ Esp. *Spec.* 4.179: νόμοις ἐξαιρέτοις χρωμένω· σεμνοὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἅτε πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν ἀρετὴν ἀλείφοντες; cf. *Mos.* 2.10-11. See Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:200-225 [= "Commandments and Virtues"] (cf. John W. Martens, *One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law* [AMMTC; SPhAMA 2; Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003], 95-99 [= "The Law of Moses"]; André Myre, "La loi de la nature et la loi mosaïque selon Philon d'Alexandrie," *ScEs* 28 (1976): 163-81, esp. 167-71 [= "La loi mosaïque et la loi morale"]; Michael Satlow, "Philo on Human Perfection," *JTS* 59 [2008]: 500-519, 517-18;). For a consideration of the role of Torah in ethical training in ancient *rabbinic* Judaism, see Jonathan Wyn Schofer, *The Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), esp. 84-115 [= "The Heart and Its Formation"].

⁶⁴ E.g., *Spec.* 2.163: ὑψηγήσει νόμων θείων, οἱ τὰς τε γαστρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ ὑπογαστρίους ἔστειλαν . . . καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρίτους καὶ πλεοναζούσας ὀρμὰς ἀνέκοψαν καὶ ἀνεχαίτισαν. On the valorization of ἐγκράτεια among Philo's contemporaries as a context for his own emphasis on ἐγκράτεια in regard to the Tenth Commandment (and dietary laws), see Stowers, *Romans*, 46-56; also Niehoff, *Philo on Jewish Identity*, 75-110 [= "Jewish Values: Religion and Self-Restraint"]; cf. Long, "Ethics and Power."

⁶⁵ In Philo's view, Moses could formulate helpful exercises in ἐγκράτεια because he himself had mastered desire: "When [Moses] was now passing beyond the term of boyhood, his good sense became more active. He did not, as some, allow the lusts of adolescence to go unbridled (οὐχ ὡς ἔνιοι τὰς μερακιώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἀχαλινώτους ἐὼν), though the abundant resources which palaces provide supply numberless incentives to foster their flame. But he kept a tight hold on them with the reins, as it were, of temperance and self-control (σωφροσύνη καὶ καρτερία ὡσπερ τισὶν ἡνίαις ἐνδησάμενος αὐτάς), and forcibly pulled them back from their forward course (τὴν εἰς τὸ πρόσω φορὰν ἀνεχαίτιζε βίᾳ). (*Mos.* 2.25-26). On Philo's view of Moses, see Hywel Clifford, "Moses as Philosopher-Sage in Philo," in *Moses in Biblical and Extra-Biblical Traditions* (ed. Axel Graupner and Michael Wolter; BZAW 372; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007), 151-67;

⁶⁶ These *Mosaic* philosophical exercises fit the definition of "sittliches Exerzitium" (also "sittliche Übung"), the term Paul Rabbow offers to describe a type of methodical practice popular among philosophers of the early Roman Era: "a particular exertion, a calculated act of self-

signal Philo's attempt to understand Mosaic legislation in light of contemporary Middle-Platonic ethical concerns.⁶⁷ Although Philo casts a number of laws as exercises in ἐγκράτεια (ascetic precepts), he never couples an individual law with a complete explanation of how it works. But considering his remarks on *several* such laws provides enough material to create an adequate concept of the ascetic precept.

In the law regarding a year of Sabbath rest for the land (Lev 25:2-7; Exod 23:10-11), the law regarding fasting on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:29-31;

influence, carried out with the express purpose of achieving a specific ethical effect; it always transcends itself, insofar as it is either repeated or forms part of a larger network of acts designed for the same purpose" (my translation of Paul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* [München: Kösel, 1954], 18).

⁶⁷ In general, research into Philo's theory of ἄσκησις has overlooked the place of Mosaic legislation within that theory. Studies of Philo that deal directly with ἄσκησις but do not consider the ascetic function of precepts include Bréhier, *Idées philosophiques et religieuses*, 261-71 ["Le cynisme et l'ascétisme"]; Völker, *Fortschritt und Vollendung*, 198-239 ["Die ἄσκησις als Weg zur Vollkommenheit"]; and Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," esp. 405-14 ["Asceticism"]. Similarly, David Charles Aune, "Mastery of the Passions," while he intends in part to "illustrate Philo's . . . ascetic program" (128), does not consider the role of precepts. Siegfried, *Philo*, does speak of "das mosaische Gesetz als das zweckmässigste Anleitungsmittel für . . . sittlichen Uebungen" (257) in the context of Philo's theory of ἄσκησις (Uebung), but he does not explore the precept-ἄσκησις connection in depth (cf. 21 [on 4 Macc]: "durch die Uebung des Gesetzes . . . diese vier Tugenden Entstehen"). In their study of Jacob as Philo's allegorical paradigm of ἄσκησις, Hayward ("Philo and the Name 'Israel'") and Sheridan ("Jacob and Israel") also overlook the role of precepts within that paradigm. Steven Fraade notes the role of precepts in his "Ascetical Aspects of Ancient Judaism" (in *Jewish Spirituality* [ed. Arthur Green; New York: Crossroad, 1986], 253-88, 265: "Such strength is only *gradually* achieved with the help of the commandments of the Torah, which are often interpreted by Philo as exercises intended to strengthen the soul by repeatedly accustoming it to abstinence from and moderation of desires for food, drink, sex, etc." But Fraade does not explore the precept-ἄσκησις connection in depth, or from the standpoint of moral psychology. There are also important treatments of ἄσκησις per se that mention Philo yet fail to consider ascetic precepts (e.g., Bernhard Lohse, *Askese und Mönchtum in der Antike und in der alten Kirche* [RKAM; ed. Carsten Colpe and Heinrich Dörrie; Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1969], 102-10). Pierre Hadot, "Spiritual Exercises," provides an excellent survey of therapeutic exercises in Greco-Roman philosophy, including Philo. He cites Philo's general lists of what constitutes ἄσκησις (*Her.* 253, *Leg.* 3.18) (84) but nowhere mentions Mosaic precepts, which are for Philo just the sort of therapeutic exercises Hadot seems to have in mind.

Num 29:7-11), and the law regarding marrying female prisoners of war (Deut 21:10-13), Philo recognizes deliberate efforts on Moses' part to promote *ἐγκράτεια* through *ἄσκησις*.⁶⁸ First of all, Moses understood that the dominance of *λόγος* over *ἐπιθυμία* can involve either the complete suppression of desire (no indulgence) or simply the constraint of desire within certain limits (moderate indulgence). In either case, the moral agent controls desire and effectively *exercises* a capacity for *ἐγκράτεια*. The law of Sabbath rest, for example, calls for a *moderate* indulgence of *ἐπιθυμία*, because it prohibits farmers from working their land every seventh year. By enjoining the *deliberate* forgoing of potential gain (*κέρδος*), this law trains its adherents not only to bear unexpected deprivation (*ἔνδεια*) but *also* to keep their desires within moderate bounds.⁶⁹ In Philo's view, the command targets *πλεονεξία*, a form of *excessive* desire.⁷⁰

Speaking of those who do *not* observe the law of Sabbath rest, Philo writes:

⁶⁸ On the law of Sabbath rest, see esp. *Spec.* 2.86-109, *Spec.* 4.212-18, and *Praem.* 153-56 (cf. *Hypoth.* 7.15-18). On fasting, see esp. *Spec.* 1.186-88 (cf. *Spec.* 1.192-93; *Mos.* 2.23-24) and *Spec.* 2.193-203 (esp. §195). On female prisoners of war, see *Virt.* 110-13. Philo himself seems to acknowledge the barbaric setting of a law treating women as spoils of war subject to nonconsensual marriage. He takes an apologetic tack, including this law in his discussion of Mosaic *humanity* (*φιλανθρωπία*) and highlighting the kindness it enjoins (NB *Virt.* 110: μὴ ὡς αἰχμαλώτῳ, φησὶν, ἐναπερύγῃς τὸ πάθος, ἀλλ' ἡμερώτερον οἰκτισάμενος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἐπικουφίσον τὴν συμφορὰν, μεθαρμοσάμενος πάντα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον; *Virt.* 114: ἐλεεῖ τὴν αἰχμάλωτον). Unlike the laws of Sabbath rest and fasting, which had practical application in Philo's day, the law regarding marrying female prisoners of war presumably had only a theoretical interest for Philo.

⁶⁹ On training for unexpected hardship, see *Spec.* 2.87-88, where Philo makes the ascetic function of this precept explicit: *καλοῖς ἐνασκούμενοι νομίμοις* (§88). Philo's explanation of how this precept works to moderate desire comes in *Spec.* 4.212-18, as part of an explication of the law against sowing two kinds of seed (Lev 19:19; Deut 22:9), to which Philo attributes the same ascetic function (see esp. *Spec.* 4.215-18).

⁷⁰ Cf. *πλεονέκτης* (= ὁ πλέον ἔχων) (see LSJ s.v.). On *πλεονεξία* and excessive desire, see *Spec.* 4.5: τοῖς οὖσιν οὐκ ἀρκοῦμενος περιττοτέρων ὀρέγεται, πλεονεξίαν, ἐπίβουλον καὶ

They have burdened the fields by continually pursuing unjust gains based on greedy cravings (ἀεὶ κέρδη μεταδιώκοντες ἐκ πλεονεξιῶν ἄδικα), adding to otherwise reasonable desires (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἐπιστάντες) unbridled and unjust impulses incapable of fulfillment (ἀχαλίλους καὶ ἀδίκους ὀρμὰς εἰς τὸ ἀκόρεστον). (*Praem.* 154)⁷¹

Philo clarifies here the nature of πλεονεξία as *excessive desires* in terms of Middle-Platonic theory. The ἐπιθυμία he names represent the unobjectionable *emotion* desire, whose otherwise benign impulse becomes malignant *with the addition* (ἐπιστάντες) of excessive impulse. In other words, the ἀχαλίλους καὶ ἀδίκους ὀρμὰς correspond to the πλεονάζουσα (ἄμετρος) ὀρμή of Middle-Platonic theory, the *quantitative* excess constituting passion. To observe the law, farmers need not *deny* their reasonable desire for produce; they exercise ἐγκράτεια and *curtail* their desire within limits prescribed by Moses.⁷² *Outright denial*—at least for a time—figures in the laws of fasting on the Day of Atonement and marrying female prisoners of war. Here reason cedes *nothing* to ἐπιθυμία, compelling it to wait for a fixed interval of time deprived of the pleasure it seeks. The fast, for example, involves *one day* of "bridling impulses for

δυσίατον πάθος, ἐπιτειχίζων; also *Spec.* 4.129: αἱ γὰρ ἄγαν πλεονεξίαι μέτρον οὐκ ἔχουσι (cf. *Spec.* 1.270, *Virt.* 100).

⁷¹ My translation. The phrase ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἐπιστάντες ἀχαλίλους καὶ ἀδίκους ὀρμὰς εἰς τὸ ἀκόρεστον has caused some difficulty (e.g., PLCL 8, 411, n. d), but it makes sense in light of a Middle-Platonic concept of passion, *without* Cohn's emendation of present (ἐφιστάντες) for the manuscript aorist (ἐπιστάντες).

⁷² In *Spec.* 4.217, Philo compares violators of the law of Sabbath rest to those who προσαναρρηγνὺς τὰς ἀδίκους ἐπιθυμίας αὐτοῦ, μέτροις αὐτὰς μὴ περιορίζων (cf. *Cher.* 33: μέτρα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις περιθρῖναι).

pleasure" (*Spec.* 1.193: ἐπιστομίζοντας τὰς ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ὀρμάς).⁷³ The marriage law involves *thirty days* of postponing consummation, reflecting Moses' unwillingness to "let desire get swept away in unbridled disobedience" (*Virt.* 113: οὐκ εἶασεν ἀχάλινον φέρεσθαι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπαυχενίζουσιν).⁷⁴ In either case, Moses has designed an effective exercise in ἐγκράτεια, since obedience requires a stark denial of desire on reason's part. Like the moderation enjoined by the law of Sabbath rest, the abstinence enjoined by these laws of fasting and marriage strengthen the capacity of λόγος to subjugate ἐπιθυμία, which in turn promotes self-control in contexts beyond those contrived by Moses.

In fact, the ascetic value of these laws hinges on their *not* being ends in themselves, since training exercises necessarily serve as a *means* for cultivating broader proficiencies. In other words, Philo admires Moses' ascetic precepts not so much for the successful *instances* of ἐγκράτεια they enjoin as for the successful *life* of ἐγκράτεια they collectively promote. The moral capacities derived from observing particular commands transfer broadly to analogous situations Moses never addressed, so those trained by Mosaic legislation can operate *apart from law* as free moral agents possessed of ἐγκράτεια. Philo illustrates this principle of transference in *Spec.* 4.218, where he praises the law

⁷³ τὰς ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ὀρμάς = ἐπιθυμίας, in accordance with Platonic theory. Philo contrasts this restraint with the *incitements* to desire characteristic of pagan holidays (e.g., *Spec.* 1.192: τὰς γαστρὸς ἀκορέστους ἐπιθυμίας ἐγείρουσαι; *Spec.* 2.193: δι' ὧτων ἐγείρει τὰς ἀκαθέκτους ἐπιθυμίας).

⁷⁴ Cf. *Virt.* 113: λογισμὸς γὰρ πεδήσει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδὲν ὑβριστικὸν εἶασας αὐτὴν ἐξεργάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν μηνιαίαν προθεσμίαν ἐπισχεῖν.

of Sabbath rest for the land as one of two precepts—along with the law against planting two types of seed in a vineyard (Deut 22:9; cf. Lev 19:19)—designed to restrain "by extension" (μακρόθεν) the madness of greedy cravings (πλεονεξιῶν τὴν λύσσαν) aimed at *people* (ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις) rather than plants.⁷⁵

For he who as a commoner has learned to shun unjust gains (κέρδος ἄδικον) in the treatment of his plants will, if he becomes a king with greater matters in his charge (λαβόμενος μειζόνων πραγμάτων), follow his acquired habit (τῷ ἔθει) when he comes to deal with men and also women. He will not exact a double tribute nor wring the life out of his subjects with his imposts (δασμοῖς). For long familiar habit (τὸ σύντροφον ἔθος) has the power to soften harsh temperaments and in a sense to tutor and mould them to better forms (πρὸς βελτίονας τύπους). (*Spec.* 4.218)

Through the repeated *practice* (ἄσκησις) of Moses' agricultural laws, the moral agent develops a "habit" (ἔθος) of successfully dealing with desire.⁷⁶ Since ἐγκράτεια *per se* stands as the ultimate goal, the original context of the precept has little significance, except that it stages a contest of power between λόγος and ἐπιθυμία whose result is the moral *habit* of moderating desire. Once acquired

⁷⁵ For this use of μακρόθεν, see also *Spec.* 4.104: μακρόθεν ἀνείρξαι βουλόμενος τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ λεχθέντα ὀρμήν. For the language of restraint Philo uses in *Spec.* 4.218 to describe the function of these laws (ἀνείργουσι καὶ ἀνακόπτουσιν), see also *Decal.* 173 (πέμπτον δὲ τὸ ἀνείργον τὴν τῶν ἀδικημάτων πηγὴν, ἐπιθυμίαν) and *Spec.* 2.163 (τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρίτους καὶ πλεοναζούσας ὀρμὰς ἀνέκοψαν), which also speak of the *function* of law.

⁷⁶ Aristotle clearly articulated a theory of the role played by ἔθος in the acquisition of moral virtue (e.g., *Eth. nic.* 1103 a 17-18: ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται; cf. Nancy Sherman, "The Habituation of Character," in *Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays* [ed. Nancy Sherman; CEC; Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999], 231-60). In Middle-Platonic moral theory, the concepts of ἄσκησις and ἔθος bear a close relation, since both involve a process of training non-rational elements of the soul to obey reason. E.g., *Didask.* 24.4 [177.15]: διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἔθους ἀσκήσεως; *Didask.* 30.3 [184.1-2]: ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγινόμεναι καὶ ἀσκήσεως; *Didask.* 28.4 [182.4-5] cites the threefold means to acquiring virtue familiar to Philo (e.g., *Abr.* 52), expanding ἄσκησις to include ἔθει τε καὶ ἀγωγῇ καὶ ἀσκήσει τῇ κατὰ νόμον; Plutarch, *Garr.* 510 C-D: ἀσκήσει . . . ἐθίζεται. The association appears in Plato as well: e.g., *Resp.* 518 D-E: τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ [ἀρεταὶ] ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθει τε καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν.

through Moses' ascetic precepts, this habit of moderation transfers to "greater matters" (μειζόνων πραγμάτων), such as the duties of a king. Instead of indulging an *inordinate* desire for revenue, a ruler trained by Moses' regimen will exercise moderation and not exhaust the wealth of his subjects. The same principle of transference appears in Philo's analysis of the fasting prescribed for the Day of Atonement, which he calls a day "devoted to ἐγκράτεια" (*Spec.* 2.195: ἐξάιρετον ἡμέραν ἀναθείς αὐτῇ [ἐγκράτεια]):

To one who has learnt to disregard food and drink which are absolutely necessary (σιτίων γάρ τις καὶ ποτῶν μαθὼν ἀλογεῖν τῶν οὕτως ἀναγκαίων), are there any among the superfluities of life (τίνος . . . τῶν περιττῶν) which he can fail to despise, things which exist to promote not so much preservation and permanence of life (ἃ γέγονεν οὐ διαμονῆς καὶ σωτηρίας ἔνεκα) as pleasure with all its powers of mischief (μᾶλλον ἢ βλαβερωτάτης ἡδονῆς)? (*Spec.* 2.195)

Philo admires the *lifestyle* of ἐγκράτεια this law promotes, not simply the temporary *exercise* of ἐγκράτεια it requires. By practicing on a limited basis the more challenging denial of *necessary* desires, the moral agent masters the comparatively easy denial of *superfluous* desires. And this broader capacity for consistent denial of superfluous desires amounts to ἐγκράτεια, because it involves the *enforcement* of reason's measure (necessity) over against desire's tendency to pursue pleasure in excess of that measure.

CONCLUSION

Philo has a multi-faceted but theoretically consistent understanding of ἐγκράτεια. In essence, ἐγκράτεια involves the rule of reason over antagonistic

non-rational forces within the soul, especially ἐπιθυμία. In particular, ἐγκράτεια involves the curtailing of excessive non-rational impulses through the enforcement of limits set by reason. Framed in terms of human motivation, this involves reason's consistent enforcement of *its* goal, the greatest overall good for the soul, over against *desire's* goal of pleasure. In any case, ἐγκράτεια stands as the indispensable guard against passion, because it keeps the *emotion* ἐπιθυμία from ever usurping reason's authority and overtaking the soul. For this reason, Philo commends the acquisition of ἐγκράτεια, identifying ἄσκησις as the principle means to that end. By repeatedly *practicing* reason's dominance over desire, the moral agent develops a capacity for ἐγκράτεια. Moses understood this principle and so designed a number of ascetic precepts, which enjoin the subjugation of desire in a limited, artificial setting in order to cultivate a broader lifestyle of ἐγκράτεια among those trained by his precepts.

CHAPTER FOUR

PHILO'S EXPOSITION OF THE TENTH COMMANDMENT: TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

PHILO'S EXPOSITORY AGENDA

In his exposition of the Tenth Commandment, Philo uses the conceptual nexus of ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις as an overarching frame of reference for his work. Within that frame, his concept of *desire* figures most prominently, since a serious attempt to explain the prohibition οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις requires an equally serious concept of ἐπιθυμία, serious enough to enable a precise statement of what *exactly* the Tenth Commandment prohibits. For Middle Platonists, the operation of ἐπιθυμία can represent either a perfectly natural, amoral *emotion* (πάθος) or an immoral *passion* (πάθος), depending on whether or not reason stays in control. Reading οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις as a categorical prohibition of the *emotion* desire—ἐπιθυμία *itself*—makes no sense from a Middle-Platonic standpoint for two reasons: (1) the emotion itself involves nothing morally objectionable and (2) human existence requires, at minimum, the indulgence of necessary desires for food and drink. So on theoretical grounds alone, Philo must take οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις as a prohibition of *passionate* desire, which in fact he *does* in the course of his exposition, justifying the prohibition in light of dangers posed by passionate desire itself *and* its dangerous propensity to

burgeon into tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ). But how does someone actually observe a prohibition of passionate desire? Here the concept of ἐγκράτεια figures into Philo's frame of reference as the *solution* to the problem addressed by the Tenth Commandment. Because Middle Platonists conceived passionate desire as "immoderate" desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία), abstaining from the *passion* (thereby observing the prohibition) means keeping the *emotion* within the bounds of moderation, which in turn requires ἐγκράτεια. For this reason, Philo's exposition programmatically commends ἐγκράτεια as the means to observing the Tenth Commandment. But Philo also outlines the Mosaic program for *acquiring* ἐγκράτεια, which brings ἄσκησις into his frame of reference. In particular, he casts the Mosaic dietary laws as a set of ascetic precepts designed to inculcate ἐγκράτεια *through* ἄσκησις. So Philo's entire exposition can be summarized in terms of these three concepts: (1) the Tenth Commandment prohibits passionate ἐπιθυμία, (2) obeying the prohibition amounts to the exercise of ἐγκράτεια, and (3) the Mosaic dietary laws inculcate ἐγκράτεια *through* ἄσκησις.

Recognizing ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις as Philo's ultimate frame of reference helps to explain the various interpretive moves he makes in connection with both the prohibition οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις and the dietary laws presumed to support its observance. Before composing an exposition of the Tenth Commandment, Philo understood these three concepts to stand in a certain theoretical relationship, conceived along Middle-Platonic rather than

biblical lines. So when he encounters a biblical prohibition of ἐπιθυμία, he tries to make sense of it in light of the Middle-Platonic theory at his disposal, framing a *philosophical* notion of the type of desire proscribed, the reason for its proscription, and the means of observing the proscription. Similarly, once Philo identifies the dietary laws as the legal species of the genus οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, his interest lies not so much in the laws per se as in the Mosaic program of ἄσκησις they represent. In other words, Philo operates according to a clear *expository agenda*: a deliberate effort to correlate the Tenth Commandment and its dietary laws with the best of contemporary philosophy (Middle Platonism) by carefully highlighting the principles of ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις at work in their formulation. Philo implements this agenda in a variety of ways throughout his exposition, but two *particular* ways involve his prior knowledge of (1) traditional interpretations of the dietary laws, particularly laws concerning clean and unclean animals, and (2) contemporary genres of philosophical literature. Giving preliminary consideration to these topics clarifies their relevance to Philo's expository agenda.

Traditional Interpretations of Clean and Unclean Animals

In his extended interpretation of the Mosaic regulations concerning clean and unclean animals (*Spec.* 4.100-118), Philo demonstrates familiarity with a line of interpretation developed by an earlier generation of Hellenistic Jews in Alexandria—namely, the symbolic interpretation of clean and unclean animals

attributed to the High Priest Eleazar in the *Letter of Aristeas*.¹ Essentially, Eleazar argues that Moses formulated his legislation on clean and unclean animals to promote *justice* (δικαιοσύνη) among his followers.² The designations "clean" and "unclean" have little to do with the properties of animal flesh *for eating*—instead they derive from physical and behavioral traits that symbolize certain ethical traits among human beings.³ Eleazar's most extensive interpretation along these lines involves various species of birds (*Let. Arist.* 145-50). Unclean birds, for example, "are wild and carnivorous and with their strength oppress the rest and procure their food with injustice" (*Let. Arist.* 146). As Eleazar explains further:

Through these creatures then, by calling them 'unclean' (ἀκάθαρτα), [Moses] set up a symbol (παράσημον) that those for whom the legislation was drawn up must practice justice (δικαιοσύνη) in spirit and oppress no one, trusting in their own strength, nor rob anyone of anything, but must guide their lives in accordance with justice (ἐκ δικαίου) . . . (*Let. Arist.* 147)

¹ See esp. *Let. Arist.* 144-69. On the question of Philo's knowledge of the *Letter of Aristeas*, see Moses Hadas, *Aristeas to Philocrates: Letter of Aristeas* (New York: Harper, 1951; repr., Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 21-26. Hadas concludes: "The balance of probability seems to be rather on the side of Philo's having read our Aristeas" (25-26). Cf. Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 124, n. 10: "Whether or not Philo knew the *Letter of Aristeas* or simply inherited a similar exegetical tradition is difficult to determine with certainty. The situation is analogous to the famous crux of whether Philo derives his story of the origin of the LXX (*Mos.* 2.25-44) from Aristeas or an independent tradition. On balance, the wide circulation eventually attained by the *Letter of Aristeas* favors Philo's knowledge of that document." Berthelot ("L'interprétation symbolique," 253) suggests a shared tradition: "Bien que l'inspiration de Philon soit très proche de celle d'Aristée, il n'est pas sûr que Philon dépende à strictement parler de celui-ci; il semble plutôt que les deux auteurs aient puisé à une tradition commune." On Philo's relation to the *Letter of Aristeas*, see also Hecht, "Patterns of Exegesis," 112-14.

² E.g., *Let. Arist.* 144: δικαιοσύνης ἔνεκεν . . . πάντα ἀνατέτακται; 148: διὰ τῶν τοιούτων . . . ὁ νομοθέτης σημειοῦσθαι τοῖς συνετοῖς εἶναι δικαίους; 169: περὶ βρωτῶν οὖν καὶ τῶν ἀκαθάρτων ἐρπετῶν καὶ κνωδάλων καὶ πᾶς λόγος ἀνατείνει πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.

³ On this sort of ethical interpretation, see Berthelot, "L'interprétation symbolique."

Moses' prohibition functions as a symbolic discourse in which the command to abstain from a certain type of bird translates directly into a moral exhortation to abstain from violent oppression. This line of interpretation makes *actual* abstinence seem irrelevant, since eating an unclean bird would not in fact undermine Moses' purpose, as long as the moral agent abstains from the type of *behavior* the bird represents.⁴ Similarly, the clean birds are all "gentle" (ἡμερα) herbivores, which never violently oppress another creature (*Let. Arist.* 147). By calling them "clean," Moses commends the disposition they represent, again with no real concern for the consumption (or not) of their flesh:

By such examples, then, the lawgiver has commended to men of understanding a symbol (σημειοῦσθαι τοῖς συνετοῖς) that they must be just (δικαίους) and achieve nothing by violence (βίβα), nor confiding in their own strength (ισχύι), must they oppress others (ἐτέρους καταδυναστεύειν). (*Let. Arist.* 148)

In sum, then, the exegetical method of Eleazar involves recognizing in the designations "clean" and "unclean" an animal *behavioral* trait analogous to a human *ethical* trait—and further recognizing Moses' *primary* intention as the commendation or condemnation of ethical traits, not types of meat. As a result of this method—interpreting mainly the traits of "savage" and "carnivorous," "tame" and "herbivorous"—Eleazar identifies justice (δικαιοσύνη) as Moses' real ethical concern.

⁴ Eleazar downplays the literal significance of the dietary laws at the beginning of his interpretation (*Let. Arist.* 144): "Do not accept the exploded idea that it was out of regard for 'mice' and the 'weasel' and other such creatures that Moses ordained these laws with such scrupulous care."

Although he uses elements of this traditional interpretation, Philo fundamentally reworks these elements to suit his expository agenda, adapting Eleazar's method *and* its results to his own particular frame of reference: ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις. Above all, Philo tries to show that Moses had in mind the promotion of ἐγκράτεια—not δικαιοσύνη—when he formulated laws concerning clean and unclean animals. As a result, Philo tends to emphasize the *literal* significance of Moses' regulations in two important respects: (1) in drawing a connection between the *actual* eating (or not) of certain meats and the operation of ἐπιθυμία in the human soul, and (2) in casting the commands to eat or abstain as the *substance* of a practical regimen of ἄσκησις, not the dispensable symbolic *form* of Moses' ethical exhortations. And when Philo *does* use a symbolic mode of interpretation comparable to Eleazar's, he uses it to demonstrate Moses' ultimate concern for issues of ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις.

Contemporary Genres of Philosophical Literature

Philo models his exposition of the Tenth Commandment on a type of philosophical literature whose attention to issues of πάθος, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις resonates with Philo's exegetical agenda. Five examples of the genre appear among the *Moralia* of Philo's Middle-Platonic near contemporary Plutarch—treatises Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp calls "praktische

Seelenheilungsschriften."⁵ Essentially, the *Seelenheilungsschrift* names one particular passion (πάθος) as its topic and consists of two parts: a *diagnosis* (κρίσις) of that passion and a prescription for *treatment* (ἄσκησις).⁶ Plutarch explains the relation between the two parts:

[W]e get well by the diagnosis and treatment of our passions (τῶν γὰρ παθῶν κρίσει καὶ ἀσκήσει), but the diagnosis must come first (προτέρᾳ δ' ἢ κρίσις); since no one can become habituated to shun or to eradicate from his soul what does not distress him (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐθίζεται φεύγειν καὶ ἀποτρίβεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ μὴ δυσχεραίνει), and we only grow distressed with our passions (τὰ πάθη) when we have perceived, by the exercise of reason, the injuries and shame which result from them (τὰς βλάβας καὶ τὰς αἰσχύνας τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν). (*Garr.* 510 C-D)

In other words, a *Seelenheilungsschrift* tries to convince the reader of the horrible nature of a particular passion, in hopes of motivating the reader to embrace the practical exercises offered as a therapeutic treatment or cure for that passion. Philo most likely encountered the genre through acquaintance with the philosophical milieu of Plutarch's teacher, Ammonius, a contemporary of Philo and native of Alexandria.⁷ In that case, the *Seelenheilungsschrift* most likely to represent the genre *as Plutarch learned it*, and thus *as Philo knew it*, would be the earliest of the five, *De garrulitate* or *On Talkativeness*.⁸

⁵ See Ingenkamp, *Schriften*, 7, where he introduces the term and lists the five treatises: *De curiositate*, *De cohibenda ira*, *De garrulitate*, *De vitioso pudore*, and *De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando*.

⁶ See Ingenkamp, *Schriften*, 74-124. Cf. Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, 340: "Plutarchs System der Seelenheilung scheidet κρίσις und ἄσκησις; die κρίσις gibt die Erkenntnis des Übels in seinem Wesen, seiner Schädlichkeit; die ἄσκησις die praktische Übung gegen das Übel."

⁷ See above, 43, n. 12.

⁸ Ingenkamp identifies *De garrulitate* as the earliest of the five *Seelenheilungsschriften*, written sometime after A.D. 68 (*Schriften*, 116-18). And of the five, *De garrulitate* bears the least

Although Plutarch makes *talkativeness* (ἀδολεσχία) the explicit subject of his earliest *Seelenheilungsschrift*, he ultimately considers the issue of *desire* (ἐπιθυμία)—but desire considered under just *one* of its aspects, a desire for listeners:

[B]ut even in that which they desire (περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν) especially they fail miserably. For in other diseases of the soul (νοσήμασι τῆς ψυχῆς), such as love of money (φιλαργυρία), love of glory (φιλοδοξία), love of pleasure (φιληδονία), there is at least the possibility of attaining their desires (τυγχάνειν ὧν ἐφίενται), but for babblers (τοῖς δ' ἀδολέσχοις) this is very difficult: they desire listeners (ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἀκροατῶν) and cannot get them, since every one runs away headlong. (*Garr.* 502 E)

Here Plutarch suggests that ἐπιθυμία *as it relates to speech* can manifest itself in a "diseased" way as talkativeness (ἀδολεσχία), even though the desire itself involves nothing objectionable.⁹ Thinking along Middle-Platonic lines, Plutarch understands the critical importance of *reason's* position over against this type of desire, consistently framing his discussion of talkativeness as a matter of self-control (ἐγκράτεια) or its absence (ἀκρασία).¹⁰ With reason in control, the moral

evidence of Plutarch's personal development of the genre (*Schriften*, 118, 145). While this particular Middle-Platonic *Seelenheilungsschrift* postdates Philo, the unmistakable conformity of Philo's exposition with the basic structure and function of *De garrulitate* indicates Plutarch's use of a preexisting genre known also to Philo. On *De garrulitate*, see also William A. Beardslee, "De Garrulitate (Moralia 502B-515A)," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. Hans Dieter Betz; SCHNT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 264-88.

⁹ *Garr.* 504 E: "[S]peech, which is the most pleasant and human of social ties, is made inhuman and unsocial by those who use it badly and wantonly." Philo never explicitly links ἐπιθυμία with ἀδολεσχία, but he *does* link the adjective "talkative" (ἀδολέσχης) with the "lover of pleasure" (*Sacr.* 32). He also speaks of desire "overtaking the tongue" (ἐπὶ γλώτταν φθάσασα), recognizing that some people ἐπιθυμοῦσιν . . . τὰ ἡσυχαστέα λέγειν (*Spec.* 4.90).

¹⁰ E.g., ἐγκράτεια: 505 E, 506 A-B, 506 E (cf. 504 F; 511 D; 515 A); ἀκρασία: 503 C, 503 E, 506 F, 507 E, 508 B, 508 F (cf. 503 C: ἀχαλίνων . . . στομάτων). Cf. Jacques Boulogne, "L'intempérance verbale: L'imaginaire de Plutarque dans la thérapie des maladies de l'âme," in

agent speaks in an appropriate manner. But if the moral agent's desire for listeners becomes excessive and overcomes reason, a "passion" (πάθος) results, and since the excessive desire here involves *speech*, the resulting passion accordingly manifests as an irrational, excessive type of speech, talkativeness.¹¹ Following the basic format of a *Seelenheilungsschrift*, Plutarch's approach to the problem of talkativeness involves first a diagnosis (κρίσις), then a treatment (ἄσκησις).

Plutarch's *diagnosis* of talkativeness includes both broad denunciations of the passion and specific examples of its ill effects.¹² With chiasmic flair, he characterizes ἀδολεσχία as worst among the passions:

Now of the other passions and diseases some are dangerous (ἐπικίνδυνα), some detestable (μισητά), some ridiculous (καταγέλαστα); but talkativeness has all these qualities at once (τῇ δ' ἀδολεσχία πάντα συμβέβηκε); for babblers are derided (χλευάζονται) for telling what everyone knows, they are hated (μισοῦνται) for bearing bad news, they run into danger (κινδυνεύουσι) since they cannot refrain from revealing secrets. (*Garr.* 504 F)¹³

Plutarch supports his rhetoric with anecdotal evidence of the trouble talkativeness brings, such as the destruction and ruin attending revealed

Les passions antiques et médiévales (ed. Bernard Besnier et al.; Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2003), 161-69.

¹¹ Plutarch understands "passion" in the Middle-Platonic sense of *πλεονάζουσα* (ἄμετρος) ὀρμή (see above, 79-86). Cf. *Garr.* 514 C: τὸ λάλον . . . πλεονάζον.

¹² Philo, too, vilifies immoderate speech: e.g., *Somn.* 2.274-75.

¹³ Substituting "passions" for Helmbold's "affections" (παθῶν), "diseases" for "maladies" (νοσημάτων), "talkativeness" for "garrulousness" (ἀδολεσχία).

secrets.¹⁴ King Seleucus, for example, escaping a disastrous battle incognito, received food from a farmer whose *ἀδολεσχία* brought death (*Garr.* 508 D-F).

The farmer recognized Seleucus and could not restrain himself (οὐ κατέσχευεν):

[O]n taking leave, [he] said, "Farewell, King Seleucus." And Seleucus, stretching out his right hand to him and drawing him towards himself as though to kiss him, gave a sign to one of his companions to cut off the man's head with a sword. (*Garr.* 508 E)

Plutarch frames this as a deadly case of *ἀκρασία* (508 F), a lack of *verbal* self-control characteristic of everyone possessed of talkativeness. By this and other examples, framed with disparaging rhetoric, Plutarch hopes to accomplish the express purpose of his diagnosis: revealing the "injuries and shame" (τὰς βλάβας καὶ τὰς αἰσχύνας [510 D]) of *ἀδολεσχία*, so that his readers will embrace the practical treatment he offers in the second part of his treatise.¹⁵

Having made his diagnostic case against talkativeness, Plutarch turns to a course of *treatment* (ἄσκησις), offering specific exercises (ἔθισμοι) designed to rid the moral agent of talkativeness by inculcating verbal self-control (ἐγκράτεια). These exercises work by orchestrating a contest of power between the soul's rational and non-rational parts—in the case of *ἀδολεσχία*, reason contends against *ἐπιθυμία* as it relates to speech. With each successful

¹⁴ *Garr.* 508 D: "[S]ecrets, when they escape, destroy and ruin (ἀπολλύουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσι) those who cannot keep them."

¹⁵ In *Garr.* 510 D, Plutarch summarizes everything learned from his diagnosis: "Thus, in the case of babblers [we perceive] that they are hated when they wish to be liked, that they cause annoyance when they wish to please, that they are laughed at when they think they are admired, that they spend their money without any gain, that they wrong their friends, help their enemies, and destroy themselves."

exercise, the moral agent's capacity to control this type of desire increases, while the likelihood of desire usurping reason to engender *talkativeness* correspondingly decreases. Plutarch offers two basic types of ἐθισμός; the first involves refraining from speech for a period of time:

In the first place (πρῶτον), then, when questions are asked of neighbors, let him accustom himself to remaining silent (ἐθιζέτω σιωπᾶν) until all have refused a response (μέχρι οὗ πάντες ἀπείπωνται τὴν ἀπόκρισιν). (Garr. 511 F)¹⁶

In other words, the moral agent *waits* to speak and in so doing subjugates and restrains desire's impulse toward the pleasure(s) of speech. Plutarch again commends the exercise of delayed response when he considers how the moral agent ought to deal with direct questions (Garr. 512 D-F).¹⁷ Neatly summarizing the thrust of his remarks, he identifies the ultimate *goal* of these exercises as the training of non-rational desire:

In any case, this ravenous hunger for talking (πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ὀξύπεινον) must be checked so that it may not seem as though a stream (ῥεῦμα) which has long been pressing hard upon the tongue were being gladly discharged at the instance of the question. Socrates, in fact, used to control his thirst in this manner—he would not allow himself to drink after exercise until he had drawn up and poured out the first bucketful, so that his non-rational part might be trained to await the time dictated by reason (ἐθίζηται τὸν τοῦ λόγου καιρὸν ἀναμένειν τὸ ἄλογον). (Garr. 512 F)

¹⁶ Plutarch indirectly labels this abstention an ἄσκημα, because after this first example (πρῶτον) he goes on to describe a second (δεύτερον) ἄσκημα in Garr. 512 D. He describes this sort of exercises as "mastering the disease by habituation" (511 F: ἔθει . . . κρατῆσαι τοῦ νοσήματος).

¹⁷ NB Garr. 512 D: ἐθιστέον ἐφιστάναι καὶ ποιεῖν τι διάλειμμα μεταξύ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως; 512 E: τὸν δὲ βουλόμενον ἐμμελῶς ἀποκρίνασθαι δεῖ . . . ἀναμείναι.

A second type of ἐθισμός commended by Plutarch involves not the *delay* of speaking but complete *abstinence* from speaking on certain topics that incite talkativeness because of the excessive pleasure they afford:

Moreover, just as Socrates used to urge men to be on their guard (φυλάττεσθαι) against those foods which induce us to eat when we are not hungry, and against those liquids which induce us to drink when we are not thirsty, so it is with the babblers as regards subjects for talk (τῶν λόγων): those in which he takes most delight (οἷς ἡδεται μάλιστα) and employs *ad nauseam* he should fear and stoutly resist (ἀντιβαίνειν) when they stream in upon him. (*Garr.* 513 D)¹⁸

In terms of moral psychology, the danger of especially pleasurable topics lies in their capacity to draw the moral agent into speech for the wrong motive—for *pleasure itself* and not for *good reason*, such as a legitimate *need* to speak.¹⁹ By avoiding such topics, the moral agent develops verbal ἐγκράτεια, since rejecting pleasure as a motivation amounts to a subjugation of ἐπιθυμία on the part of λόγος. So within Plutarch's therapeutic program, *delay* and *avoidance* represent two fundamental techniques of ἄσκησις, directed against a *passion* to develop ἐγκράτεια.

Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment exhibits the form and function of a *Seelenheilungsschrift*. First of all, it has as its topic one particular

¹⁸ Cf. *Garr.* 514 A: "[H]e that has a greater weakness for one class of subjects than for the other should be on his guard against these subjects and force himself to hold back and withdraw as far as possible from them (ὀφείλει τούτους φυλάττεσθαι καὶ ἀνέχειν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τούτων), since they are always able, because of the pleasure they give (δι' ἡδονήν), to lure him on to dilate upon them."

¹⁹ On the compelling force of pleasurable speech, note also *Garr.* 513 E: τὸ ἡδόμενον ἔλκει τὴν φωνὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτό. On *need* as the proper measure for speech, see *Garr.* 513 A-C.

passion, ἐπιθυμία.²⁰ Second, it essentially divides into the two-part structure characteristic of the genre: a "diagnosis" (κρίσις) and a "treatment" (ἄσκησις). In *Spec.* 4.79-94, Philo considers the horrible nature of desire, offering—like Plutarch—both broad denunciations of the passion and specific examples of its ill effects, especially its capacity to burgeon into ἔρωσ. In *Spec.* 4.95-130, he considers the proper treatment of desire, casting the Mosaic dietary laws as therapeutic exercises comparable to those prescribed by Plutarch in *De garrulitate*. The Mosaic exercises in Philo's exposition mirror not only the ascetic techniques used in *De garrulitate*—for example, delay and avoidance—but also the overall purpose of Plutarch's "treatment": to cure a passion by cultivating ἐγκράτεια *through* ἄσκησις.

STRUCTURE OF PHILO'S EXPOSITION²¹

- I. Introduction (**§78b**)
- II. Diagnosis (Κρίσις) (§§79-94)
 - A. Problem: Every Passion (**§79**)
 - B. Problem: Passionate Desire Burgeoned into Tyrannical Desire (§§80-94)
 - i. Overview of Tyrannical Desire (**§§80-83**)
 - a. Origin (§80a)
 - b. Character (§§80b-83): Insatiable, Oppressive, All-Consuming

²⁰ Not the amoral *emotion* ἐπιθυμία, but the immoral *passion* ἐπιθυμία.

²¹ The structure of the commentary follows the text-units marked with boldface type.

ii. Tyrannical Desire as "Source of All Ills" (§§84-91)

a. Statement of the Claim (§§84-85)

b. Illustrations (§§86-91)

1. Mode of Operation
2. Tyrannical Desire for Money
3. Tyrannical Desire for Fame
4. Tyrannical Desire for Power
5. Tyrannical Desire for Beauty
6. Tyrannical Desire over the Tongue
7. Tyrannical Desire over the Belly

C. Location of Ἐπιθυμία (§§92-94)

III. Treatment (Ἄσκησις) (§§95-130)

A. Overview of Moses' "Paradigmatic Instruction" (§§95-97)

B. Elements of Moses' "Paradigmatic Instruction" (§§98-125)

i. First Fruits (§§98-99)

ii. Clean and Unclean Animals (§§100-118)

a. Introduction (§100-102)

b. Land Animals (§§103-109)

c. Aquatic Animals (§§110-112)

d. "Reptiles" (§§113-115)

e. Birds (§§116-117)

f. Conclusion (§118)

iii. Dead Animals (§§119-121)

iv. Blood and Fat (§§122-125)

C. Concluding Moral Narrative (§§126-131)

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

§78b: Introduction

[§78b] Let us turn now to the last of the Ten Words, which like each of the others was delivered in the form of a summary: "You shall not desire."

Philo finally arrives at the Tenth Commandment, after commenting in depth on the other nine in *Spec.* 1.12 – *Spec.* 4.78a. He does little more than announce his transition to the last of the "Ten Words," noting only that this Commandment, like the others, has the form of a summary. Naturally, he also cites the Tenth Commandment, providing the basis of his exposition, but he cites an abbreviated version (cf. Exod 20:17; Deut 5:21), placing emphasis on ἐπιθυμία *itself* and not any of its objects.

§79: Problem: Every Passion

[§79] On the one hand,²² every "passion"²³ is reprehensible, since we are morally responsible for every unmeasured, "excessive impulse"²⁴ and for

²² *On the one hand* (μέν): Philo here compares the passions as a class (Πάν μὲν πάθος) with one particular passion in §80 (τῶν δὲ παθῶν).

²³ "passion" (πάθος): Philo's use of the terms ἐπίληπτον (*reprehensible*) and ὑπαίτιος (*morally responsible*) indicates an immoral "passion," not an amoral "emotion" (πάθος).

²⁴ *every unmeasured, "excessive impulse"* (πάσα ἄμετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή): Philo cites the Stoic definition of "passion" (πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή) but fundamentally recasts it for Middle-Platonic use by adding the qualifying term ἄμετρος (cf. DL 7.110: ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα . . . ὀρμὴ πλεονάζουσα).

the soul's "irrational and unnatural movement."²⁵ After all, what do these terms describe if not an unleashing of the emotional part of the soul?²⁶ So if anyone fails to place limits on the impulses of emotion,²⁷ fails to bridle, so to speak, his team of unruly horses, he ends up indulging a malignant "passion."²⁸ And by giving free rein to the team's unruliness, he will careen like an unwitting charioteer into some ditch or chasm, from which he will barely escape—if at all.

To begin his exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆσεις, Philo summarizes the problem posed by every passion (Πᾶν μὲν πάθος) and not just desire, which he will consider at length beginning in §80 (τῶν δὲ παθῶν . . . ἐπιθυμία). In agreement with the Stoics, he notes that passions categorically indicate a moral lapse by using the terms ἐπίληπτον and ὑπαίτιος.²⁹ But Philo differs radically in his

²⁵ *the soul's "irrational and unnatural movement"* (τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις): Philo cites an alternative Stoic definition of "passion" (cf. DL 7.110: ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἢ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις), in which ἄλογος clearly denotes a morally problematic "irrational" (vs. "non-rational") movement.

²⁶ *After all, what do these terms describe if not* (ἐκάτερον γὰρ τούτων <τί> ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἢ) *an unleashing of the emotional part of the soul* (παλαιὸν πάθος ἐξηπλωμένον): The addition of τί in PCW seems necessary, since the phrase παλαιὸν πάθος ἐξηπλωμένον further explains, from a Middle-Platonic perspective, the phenomena Philo denotes using Stoic definitions. In the explanatory phrase, πάθος refers to the non-rational part of the soul as seat of emotion(s) (i.e., παθητικὸν μέρος; cf. *Eclog.* 38.5-7: "Ἀλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς . . . ἢ πάθος ἢ παθητικὸν μέρος). So παλαιὸν has the sense of "longstanding," indicating an enduring component of the soul activated intermittently (cf. *QE* 1.7 [Gk. Petit]: τὴν ἄρτι φυομένην ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐν ψυχῇ καθελούσης τῆς παλαιᾶς ὀχλοκρατίας, where ὀχλοκρατία stands for the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν, as in *Resp.* VIII – IX). ἀπλόω (LSJ, s.v.): *to unfold, stretch out.*

²⁷ *place limits on the impulses of emotion* (μέτρα ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ὀρίζει): Philo undoubtedly has in mind non-rational impulses of the emotional part of the soul—in other words, discrete impulses of desire, fear, grief, pleasure, etc. requiring the proper "measure" (μέτρον) of reason (cf. *Opif.* 81: τῶν παθῶν ὁρμαί; *Conf.* 90: τῶν παθῶν ὁρμάς; *Mut.* 173: τάς . . . παθῶν ὁρμάς).

²⁸ *indulging a malignant "passion"* (πάθει χρήται δυσιάτω): Philo speaks of the state *resulting from* a lack of measure: an "emotion" (πάθος) has become a "passion" (πάθος).

²⁹ Philo often uses "reprehensible" (ἐπίληπτος) as an antonym of "praiseworthy" (ἐπαινετός) (e.g., *Post.* 75; *Deus* 71; *Spec.* 3.209). As he states elsewhere, the deeds of the unjust are reprehensible (ἐπίληπτα), due to lack of measure in their emotions (διὰ . . . τὰς ἀμετρίας τῶν παθῶν)—i.e., due to "passions" (*Spec.* 3.209). In addition, the moral agent is "morally responsible" (ὑπαίτιος) not for emotion, but for passion. The moment of moral accountability lies not in the *experience* of desire, distress, pleasure, or fear, but in the *victory* of these emotions over reason, which signals reason's failure to properly restrict or *measure* their

concept of what those passions fundamentally *are*. Reworking a standard Stoic definition, he uses the term ἄμετρος to express the Middle-Platonic notion of passion as a *quantitative* excess of the *non-rational* impulses of emotion.³⁰ In similar Middle-Platonic fashion, Philo suggests that the moral agent avoids passion by *moderating* these non-rational impulses (metriopatheia), and he uses the Platonic chariot figure to make his point.³¹ In other words, having framed the *problem* of passion as "unmeasured impulse" (ἄμετρος ὀρμή), Philo frames the *solution* as "measured impulse" (μέτρα ταῖς ὀρμαῖς)—only when the charioteer fails, when emotion oversteps the "measure" of reason's directing authority, only

activity. Cf. Marguerite Harl, "Adam et les deux arbres du paradis (Gen. II-III) ou l'homme milieu entre deux termes (μέσος-μεθόριος) chez Philon d'Alexandrie," *RSR* 50 (1962): 321-88, 341, n. 38: "Ἰπαίτιος est typiquement l'épithète de la γνώμη, volonté, lieu de la responsabilité. On trouve cependant le plus souvent chez Philon l'opposition ὑπαίτιος-ἀνυπαίτιος pour signifier non pas « responsable-irresponsable » mais « coupable-innocent »."

³⁰ In Philo's view, every instance of passion involves an "unmeasured" (ἄμετρος) impulse, one excessive in *quantity*, not in *quality* as the Stoics believed. The term ἄμετρος, which appears not a single time in *SVF* (see index, s.v.), is patently *not* Stoic, but commentators persist in labeling ἄμετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή a "Stoic" definition without accounting for the anomaly of ἄμετρος (e.g., Colson, *PLCL* 8, 57, n. b; Heinemann, *PCH* 2, 270, ns. 1-2; Mosès, *PAPM* 25, 246, n. 2; also David Charles Aune, "Mastery of the Passions," 126; Bréhier, *Idées philosophiques et religieuses* 253, n. 9; Gaca, *Making of Fornication*, 200; Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 92; Pohlenz, *Philon*, 457; Völker, *Fortschritt und Vollendung*, 80; Reydams-Schils, "Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology," 193; Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:230). The other definition of passion Philo cites (τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις) must be understood along similar Middle-Platonic lines: An unmeasured impulse entails a movement of the soul inconsistent with the dictates of reason and thus "irrational" (vs. non-rational). Such a movement is also "unnatural," since Nature prescribes the rule of the superior over the inferior, in this case reason over the emotions. Philo's reference to an "unleashing of the emotional part of the soul" appears as a clarification of the Middle-Platonic moral psychology underlying the Stoic terminology he has just used. An unmeasured (excessive) impulse of desire, distress, fear, or pleasure indicates *not* the sudden genesis of passion as something qualitatively distinct within the soul, but instead the "unleashing" (ἐξαπλόω—in the sense of a "loosening" or removal of restraint) of a preexisting emotional faculty (παλαιὸν πάθος). Elsewhere, Philo allegorically interprets the biblical prescription for "girded loins" (ὀσφύς περιεζῶσθαι) as an injunction against just this sort of "slackening" (χαλάω) of the emotions (e.g., *Leg.* 3.151-54).

³¹ Cf. Mosès, *PAPM* 25, 246, n. 3. On Philo's chariot figure, see above, 111-18.

then does passion arise in the soul (πάθει χρήται δυσιάτῳ). Finally, he portrays the disaster in store for all who allow passion to arise in their souls, all who allow otherwise useful *emotions* to run wild, usurping the directing authority of reason. This lack of restraint (ἀφηνιασμόν) "wrecks" the soul, as the non-rational "horses" are given free rein.

By commending moderation at the outset of his exposition, Philo gives an early indication of how he interprets οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις. While obviously a prohibition, the Tenth Commandment does not prohibit ἐπιθυμία per se, since Philo recommends the *limitation* of impulse, not its elimination. In other words, the Tenth Commandment prohibits *passionate* desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία), understood as the impulse(s) of the *emotion* ἐπιθυμία exceeding the measure set by reason.

§79 Excursus: Parallel Material in Decal. 142-46

In *Decal.* 142-46, Philo introduces his preliminary comments on the Tenth Commandment with similar μέν . . . δέ comparisons of *all* πάθη (πάντα μὲν γὰρ τὰ ψυχῆς πάθη; τῶν μὲν ἄλλων) to the *one* πάθος desire (χαλεπώτατον δ' ἐπιθυμία; μόνη δ' ἐπιθυμία). But unlike *Spec.* 4.79, which emphasizes the moral culpability of a failure to moderate the impulses of emotion—in other words, the moral culpability of a "passion"—Philo notes merely that all πάθη are

"troublesome" (χαλεπά), without condemning them explicitly.³² In fact, his analysis of pleasure (ἡδονή), distress (λύπη), and fear (φόβος) ascribes virtually *no* moral culpability to these πάθη, since they originate from without and *compel* the moral agent to experience their effects involuntarily (ἀκούσιον).³³ As Philo explains in *Decal.* 143-45, the perceptions of a present good (ἀγαθόν), an impending ill (κακόν), or a present ill (κακόν) automatically generate the sensations of the corresponding πάθη. Although Philo's account of the sensations of pleasure, distress, and fear echoes Stoic *terminology*, his account of the mechanics of these passions flatly contradicts Stoic *doctrine*.³⁴ Above all, Stoics maintained the full accountability of the moral agent for *all* passions, which *all* result from voluntary, rational assent (συγκατάθεσις).³⁵ So Philo's association of πάθη with involuntary responses to external stimuli clearly reflects a different perspective.

Decal. 142-46 in fact represents a Middle-Platonic account of *emotions* (πάθη), not—as in *Spec.* 4.79—of *passions* (πάθη). Philo gives an unusual account of ἐπιθυμία *because* he needs to show why the Decalogue restricts only

³² Emotions are "troublesome" in their capacity to "unnaturally move and jar the soul, preventing its healthy operation (κινούντα καὶ σείοντα αὐτὴν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἐώντα)" (*Decal.* 142).

³³ Cf. *Mut.* 241: τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων οὐδὲν ὑπαίτιον (also *Deus* 48).

³⁴ I.e., he does *not* offer a Stoic account of the passions, *pace* Colson (PLCL 7, 612).

³⁵ See Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 42-101 ["The Psychology of Action"], e.g., 44: "the power to give or withhold assent . . . makes men morally responsible for their actions"; 54: "Man is responsible because of assent"; 72: "Assent . . . is vital to the Stoic analysis of action because it is the locus of moral responsibility." The term συγκατάθεσις appears nowhere in *Decal.* 142-46 nor *anywhere* in Philo's analysis of the passions (see Pohlenz, *Philon*, 456, n. 1).

this emotion, but he otherwise reflects standard Middle-Platonic views comparable to *Didaskalikos* 32.1 [185.24-42].³⁶ For example, both *Decal.* 142-46 and *Didask.* 32.1 speak of emotions as *movement* in the soul, with the *Didaskalikos* stating explicitly what Philo certainly presumes: that the movement occurs in the soul's *non-rational* part.³⁷ Both speak of emotions as *involuntary* responses to the perception of an apparent good or ill.³⁸ Both speak of four cardinal emotions, and describe the respective causes of pleasure, distress, and fear in similar terms.³⁹ Since Philo, as a Middle-Platonist, acknowledges the existence of both *emotions* (πάθη) and *passions* (πάθη), he attempts to distinguish ἐπιθυμία both from other *emotions* (πάθη), as in *Decal.* 142-46, and from other *passions* (πάθη), as in *Spec.* 4.79-80. Given the unique prohibition of ἐπιθυμία over against other πάθη, Philo must articulate a fundamental difference between ἐπιθυμία and other πάθη, discernable both at the level of emotion per

³⁶ *Didask.* 32.1 clearly speaks of "emotion" (πάθος), not "passion" (πάθος), since the Middle-Platonic concept of *passion* appears later in 32.4 [186.14-29], which contrasts "wild" (ἄγρια) and "tame" (ἡμερα) emotions: "'Tame' are such as belong naturally to man (κατὰ φύσιν), being necessary and proper to him (ἀναγκαῖά τε καὶ οἰκεῖα). They remain in this state as long as they preserve moderation (ἕως ἂν σύμμετρα ὑπάρχη); if they come to exhibit lack of moderation (ἀμετρίας), they become bad (ἡμαρτημένα)" (trans. Dillon).

³⁷ *Decal.* 142: κινούντα καὶ σείοντα; *Didask.* 32.1 [185.26]: κίνησις ἄλογος ψυχῆς; *Didask.* 32.1 [185.27-29]: "Ἀλογος μὲν οὖν εἴρηται κίνησις ὅτι οὐ κρίσεις τὰ πάθη οὐδὲ δόξαι ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν κινήσεις.

³⁸ Involuntary: *Decal.* 142: τῶν μὲν ἄλλων . . . ἀκούσιον; *Decal.* 144: ἄκουσαν; *Didask.* 32.1 [185.31-32]: "Ἀκουσι γοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται πολλάκις καὶ ἀντιτείνουσιν. Response to perception of good or ill: esp. *Decal.* 143: τοῦ παρόντος καὶ νομισθέντος ἀγαθοῦ φαντασία διεγείρει καὶ διανίστησι τὴν ψυχὴν (NB φαντασία as subject, causing a response in the soul); *Didask.* 32.1 [185.38-39]: πάντα γὰρ [πάθη] συνίσταται ἢ κατὰ ἀγαθοῦ ἔμφασιν ἢ κατὰ κακοῦ.

³⁹ ἡδονή: τοῦ παρόντος καὶ νομισθέντος ἀγαθοῦ φαντασία (*Decal.* 143); ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἐὰν μὲν παρῆναι ὑπολάβωμεν, ἡδόμεθα (*Didask.* 32.1 [185.39-40]); λύπη: τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἀγαθῶ κακόν, ἐκβιασάμενον (cf. παρῆναι) (*Decal.* 144); κακὸν γὰρ ἐὰν μὲν παρῆναι ὑπολάβωμεν,

se (*Decal.* 142-46) and at the level of passion—i.e., the excessive, unmeasured expression of emotion (*Spec.* 4.79-80).

§§80 – 83: Overview of Tyrannical Desire

[§80] On the other hand, *among* the passions, none proves quite so agonizing as a passionate desire for objects of fantasy that seem valuable but really are not,⁴⁰ because longing of this kind eventually gives birth to oppressive tyrannical desires incapable of fulfillment.⁴¹ And consider the plight of those subject to tyrannical desire!⁴² Free of restraint and fixed on the thought of a beloved object,⁴³ desire just keeps stretching and driving the soul farther and farther out into a boundless expanse, pursuing a pesky mocker who flees backwards in a brazen taunt. [§81] The quarry notices desire trying hard to catch up, then stops for a moment—just long enough to provide a teasing hope of capture—only to pull away out of reach, jeering mercilessly. And so desire, constantly eluded, constantly

λυπούμεθα (*Didask.* 32.1 [185.41]); **φόβος**: ὅταν δὲ τὸ κακὸν . . . μέλλῃ . . . ἀφικνεῖσθαι (*Decal.* 145); τὸ δὲ μέλλον [κακὸν] φοβούμεθα (*Didask.* 32.1 [185.41-42]).

⁴⁰ *a passionate desire for objects of fantasy that seem valuable but really are not* (ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀπόντων ὅσα τῷ δοκεῖν ἀγαθῶν, πρὸς ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ὄντων): In light of his introductory remarks on "passion" (§79), Philo must have in mind *passionate* desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία), although he simply refers to it as ἐπιθυμία. He notes two characteristics of the objects desired: (1) they are not present to the moral agent, and (2) they are "false goods." The first characteristic speaks to *how* the objects are desired: they are not materially present, so they must be visualized in the mind in order to be desired (cf. *Decal.* 146: ἐπειδὴν δὲ λαβῶν τις ἔννοιαν ἀγαθοῦ μὴ παρόντος). The moral agent compulsively "fantasizes" about the objects, because desire has captured the mind, compelling it to incorrectly esteem as "good" (valuable) something that is not. Only people enmeshed in the world and its system of values care about such things—Philo says as much in *Spec.* 4.82: ὅσα κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον ζηλωτὰ καὶ περιμάχητα εἶναι δοκεῖ (cf. *Deus* 148: τὸν βασιλέα τῶν φαινομένων ἀπάντων ἀγαθῶν τὸν γήινον Ἐδῶμ—ὄντως γὰρ τὰ τῷ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὰ πάντα γήινα).

⁴¹ *longing of this kind eventually gives birth to oppressive tyrannical desires incapable of fulfillment* (χαλεποὺς καὶ ἀνηνύτους ἔρωτας ἐντίκτουσα): The participial clause explains *why* ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀπόντων (subj. of ἐντίκτουσα) proves so "agonizing" (ἀργαλέον)—*because* it gives birth to "tyrannical desires" (ἔρωτας), whose harmful effects ("oppressive . . . incapable of fulfillment") Philo describes in §§80b-83. Mosès also takes the clause as explanatory: "Mais aucune d'entre les passions n'est aussi cruelle que le désir des biens absent, biens d'opinion qui n'en sont pas en réalité: car ils engendrent interminablement des caprices tyranniques."

⁴² *And consider the plight of those subject to tyrannical desire!* (γάρ): Philo now turns to a detailed characterization of life for those subject to tyrannical desire.

⁴³ *Free of restraint and fixed on the thought of a beloved object*: Philo presupposes but does not explicitly state these conditions. Desire has triumphed over reason (cf. *Decal.* 149: ὃ τε κρατηθεὶς ἐπιθυμία), whose restraining force consequently no longer exists. The birth of ἔρωσ signals the involvement of the mind (see above, 87-93).

deprived, struggles endlessly in vain,⁴⁴ dooming the poor soul to a Tantalus fate. You remember that wretch. As the story goes, he could never quench his thirst, because the water would instantly recede every time he tried to take a drink. Likewise, whenever he reached for some fruit on the nearby trees, it would all disappear—the loaded branches would suddenly turn barren. [§82] Now, just as those hard, implacable taskmasters hunger and thirst rack the body more painfully than an inquisitor cranking his torture wheel—often to the point of death, unless someone appeases their savagery with food and drink—desire can create even harsher taskmasters for the soul by creating a grumbling emptiness within. People forget what's right in front of them and become obsessed with what's somewhere off in the distance, working themselves into a frenzied and unending madness. They become just like Tantalus, racked with "hunger" and "thirst," but not for something to fill the void in their bellies—they hunger for money, fame, power, voluptuous bodies, or any of the countless other things that seem to them enviable and worthy of struggle.⁴⁵ And don't think that passionate desire, once indulged, will ever stop short of this full-blown agony.⁴⁶ [§83] Just as what physicians call the "creeping disease" never stays in one place, but moves about and as its name suggests "creeps" through the whole body, spreading and seeping, taking over the different parts of the body one after another, from head to toe, so too desire spreads quickly and eventually infects every last part of the soul in its drive for absolute tyranny. Think of it as a fire with plenty of fuel, which keeps burning once it's lit until the flames consume everything.

Having sketched briefly the problem posed by passions *in general*, Philo now considers ἐπιθυμία *in particular*. Any emotion (πάθος) can become a passion (πάθος) when reason fails to set proper limits—and passion, understood in this way as a failure of restraint, typically brings disaster to the soul (§79). Of course,

⁴⁴ *struggles endlessly in vain* (σφαδάζει): Cf. *Praem.* 140: ἔξω δὲ τοῦ σφαδάζειν οὐδὲν ἐργάσασθαι δυνήσονται.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Decal.* 151: χρημάτων ἔρωσ ἢ γυναικὸς ἢ δόξης ἢ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ἡδονῆν ἀπεργαζομένων.

⁴⁶ Some such thought underlies Philo's introduction of disease and fire imagery in §83, which otherwise seems out of place. The agony he has just described inevitably comes once desire oversteps the bounds of reason unchecked. Philo states this more plainly in *Decal.* 150: ὡσπερ τε τὰ ἐρπηνώδη τῶν νοσημάτων, εἰ μὴ προανακρουσθεῖη τομαῖς ἢ καύσειν, ἐπιθέοντα σύμπασαν ἐν κύκλῳ καταλαμβάνει τὴν τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίαν οὐδὲν ἀπαθὲς μέρος, οὕτως,

this general rule applies also to ἐπιθυμία, which turns from useful emotion to destructive passion when it oversteps the measure of reason. But passionate desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία) poses a *unique* problem and deserves *unique* censure, because it fosters the awful menace of tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ). Philo wants to describe that menace in detail and so illustrate just how bad ἐπιθυμία can be, not ἐπιθυμία per se—and certainly not ἐπιθυμία the moderated, useful emotion—but ἐπιθυμία at its full-blown worst, ἐπιθυμία burgeoned into ἔρωσ. In §§80-83, Philo introduces the topic of tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) then begins his "diagnosis" (κρίσις) in earnest by explaining its torturous effect on the soul.

Philo first makes a precise statement of the *type* of desire he has in mind (§80a): a *longing* (ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀπόντων) after false goods gives birth to *tyrannical desires* (ἔρωτας ἐντίκτουσα).⁴⁷ Here Philo repeats the close Platonic association of ἔρωσ with πόθος, a distinct *aspect* of ἔρωσ.⁴⁸ Both terms suggest an obsessive desire, but with different emphases. Πόθος specifically involves objects *not* in the subject's physical presence.⁴⁹ As Philo plainly states, the desire

λόγος ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἰατροῦ δίκην ἀγαθοῦ ρέουσας τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπίσχοι, πάντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ τοῦ βίου πράγματα κινηθήσεται παρὰ φύσιν.

⁴⁷ Cf. *Resp.* 586 C: ἔρωτας . . . ἐντίκτειν; *Leg.* 870 A: ἔρωτας μυρίουσ ἐντίκτουσα; *Her.* 269: ὅταν δὲ ἐπιθυμία κρατήσῃ, ἔρωσ ἐγγίνεται τῶν ἀπόντων.

⁴⁸ *Symp.* 197 D: ἰμέρου, πόθου πατήρ [ἔρωσ] (cf. *Phaedr.* 250 D). Philo elsewhere notes the association explicitly: *Opif.* 5 (also *Opif.* 111): ἔρωτι καὶ πόθῳ; *Opif.* 77 (also *Somn.* 2.150; *Spec.* 4.161): ἔρωτα καὶ πόθον; *Congr.* 166: ἔρωσ ἐστὶ καὶ πόθος. Cf. Ps-Andr. 231.93: Πόθος δὲ ἐπιθυμία κατὰ ἔρωτα ἀπόντος [=ESE 10c]. The phrase οἴστρον καὶ μανίαν ἀκάθεκτον (§82) also suggests the involvement of ἔρωσ (e.g., *Phaedr.* 240 D: ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τε καὶ οἴστρου ἐλαύνεται; 251 D: ἡ ψυχὴ οἴστρῳ; 241 A: ἀντ' ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας; 256 D: τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μανίας).

⁴⁹ *Crat.* 420 A: "πόθος" αὐτὸ καλεῖται σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἄλλοθι ποῦ ὄντος καὶ ἀπόντος.

is τῶν ἀπόντων, which makes it a *longing*, a *pinning*, for something remote and invisible. Since there is by definition nothing to perceive through the senses, the moral agent must *produce* and *hold in mind* an image of the beloved object. And ἔρωσ specifically involves objects deemed "good" (ἀγαθός) and thus worthy of ultimate pursuit. So tyrannical desire, as Philo points out, tragically involves a *mistaken* perception of what is good, compelling the moral agent to pursue fervently *as good* what really is not (ὅσα τῷ δοκεῖν ἀγαθῶν, πρὸς ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ὄντων). In terms of Middle-Platonic moral psychology, this happens when the emotion ἐπιθυμία not only oversteps the bounds of reason to become passionate desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία), but defeats reason entirely, compelling the vanquished moral agent to embrace *its* false notion of the good—namely, pleasure, which various false goods *seem* to afford.⁵⁰

Once he identifies tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) as his topic, Philo explains its characteristic ill effects, beginning with the tortuous *insatiability* ἔρωσ creates in the soul (§§80b-82). Philo uses both the image of a maddening, futile chase and the mythical figure of Tantalus to portray vividly the same dreadful experience: fervently, endlessly reaching for something but *never* getting hold of it.⁵¹ While

⁵⁰ In *Phaedr.* 237 D – 238 C, the term ἔρωσ applies to one in whom ἐπιθυμία has conquered (238 B: κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία; cf. *Leg.* 870 A: ἐπιθυμία κρατούσα . . . ἔρωτας μυρίου ἐντίκτουσα; *Her.* 269: ὅταν δὲ ἐπιθυμία κρατήση, ἔρωσ ἐγγίνεται τῶν ἀπόντων; *Decal.* 149: ὁ τε κρατηθεὶς ἐπιθυμία, διψῶν ἀεὶ τῶν ἀπόντων).

⁵¹ Note Philo's language of "stretching" and "driving" (ἐπιτείνει γὰρ καὶ ἐπελαύνει). Cf. *Gig.* 18: τὰς μηκίστας ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τείνοντες ἐπιθυμίας; *Migr.* 132: ἐπιτείνων δὲ τὸν ἀκάθεκτον πόθον τοῦ καλοῦ; *Spec.* 3.44: ἔρωσ οὐ μετρίως ἐπιτείνεται; *Praem.* 159: πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἐλαύνεται (cf. *Phaedr.* 240 D: ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τε καὶ οἴστρου ἐλαύνεται). Elsewhere, Philo

the chase image conveys an *impression* of the experience, Philo's commentary on Tantalus provides a genuine analysis in terms of moral psychology. Hunger and thirst are desires *of the soul* especially linked to *physical* states of "emptiness."⁵² As long as the physical emptiness remains, ἐπιθυμία (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) remains activated, in reflexive pursuit of the *pleasure* of a physical "filling" with food or water.⁵³ The physical emptiness acts as an inherent trigger, constantly goading the "taskmasters" hunger and thirst, which in turn compel the moral agent to eat and drink. But the goading and compelling disappear when the emptiness disappears. Similarly, tyrannical desire creates something like a physical emptiness, insofar as it creates an inherent trigger for the soul's ἐπιθυμία (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). Obsessed with a false good, the moral agent continually brings an image of that "good" to mind, and because that "good" promises pleasure, ἐπιθυμία remains in a state of continual arousal in pursuit of that pleasure. Unlike physical hunger, which can end once the physical emptiness is filled, this "hunger" *cannot end*, because there is no corresponding

associates ἔρως with the "unreachable" (ἀνεφίκτος): e.g., *Leg.* 1.75: ἀνεφίκτων ἐρῶν; *Spec.* 1.44: τῶν ἀνεφίκτων ἔρως. On Tantalus, see *Od.* 11.582-92 (cf. *Her.* 269: διψῆ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ, πειεῖν δὲ ἀδυνατεῖ ταντάλειον τιμωρίαν ὑπομένουσα).

⁵² On the relation of hunger and thirst, as desires *of the soul*, to physical states of the *body*, see *Phileb.* 31 E – 35 D (cf. Hackforth, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure*, 61; also 79, n. 4, 112, n. 2., 140, n. 2).

⁵³ Of course, reason may or may not authorize the pursuit of food or water, depending on the circumstances. In *Resp.* 439 C-D, Plato describes the moral agent who simultaneously *desires* something to drink but *refuses* to drink, because reason keeps desire in check.

physical emptiness to fill.⁵⁴ So the soul under tyrannical desire endures an oppressive, agonizing (ἀργαλέον) fate with no hope of relief.⁵⁵

Next, Philo notes the all-consuming nature of tyrannical desire (§83). If left unchecked, desire eventually spreads throughout the *entire* soul (δι' ὅλης . . . τῆς ψυχῆς), just as disease consumes *all* of the body (πάσαν τὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν) and fire consumes *all* available fuel (πάσαν αὐτήν).⁵⁶ These images suit Philo's Middle-*Platonic* psychology, because they portray desire as a distinct power capable of malignant, independent operation—of spreading its influence from one *part* of the soul to another. Once desire has broken free of reason's restraint, it settles for nothing less than complete domination.⁵⁷ In this way, tyrannical desire represents the terminal stage of desire's unrestrained activity: ἐπιθυμία has "consumed" the rational part of the soul, replacing any proper notion of "the good" with its singular focus on pleasure.

§§80 – 83 Excursus: Parallel Material in Decal. 146-50

In *Decal.* 146-50, Philo gives a similar account of tyrannical desire, describing its insatiability and all-consuming nature. The initial context, however, deals with desire, pleasure, fear, and distress as *emotions* (πάθη), not *passions*

⁵⁴ Cf. *Agr.* 36: κὰν αἱ τῆς γαστρὸς ἀποπληρωθῶσι δεξαμεναί, σπαργῶσαν ἔτι καὶ μαιμῶσαν τὴν ἀεὶ κενὴν ἐπιθυμίαν περιβλέπεσθαι καὶ περιφοιτᾶν . . . ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο παμφάγου πυρὸς δίκην ἐπιλιχμήσῃται.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Ebr.* 6: ἀπληστίας δὲ [αἴτιον] ἡ ἀργλεωτάτη παθῶν ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμία.

⁵⁶ On passion as "disease," see Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (MCL n.s. 2; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 13-77.

⁵⁷ See A. Pelletier, "Les passions à l'assaut de l'âme d'après Philon." *REG* 78 (1965): 52-60. Cf. *Decal.* 142: νεωτεροποιδὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν εἰδῶς.

(πάθη), addressing the question of how ἐπιθυμία (which alone the Decalogue prohibits) differs from the other three (§142). Philo claims that desire alone is "voluntary" (ἐκούσιος), because desire alone has its origin *within us* (τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λαμβάνει), and he carries this idea into the ensuing descriptions of how each emotion works (§§143-45).⁵⁸ In the case of pleasure, distress, and fear, the *perceptions* of present good, present ill, or impending ill—perceptions that originate *outside* the moral agent—cause the corresponding emotion to occur involuntarily, and Philo signals this grammatically by making the *perception* the subject in each description.⁵⁹ But when he comes to desire (§146), the subject of his description becomes *the moral agent* (τις), who himself brings an apparent "good" to mind (λαβὼν . . . ἔννοιαν ἀγαθοῦ μὴ παρόντος). So Philo's descriptions of the four cardinal emotions *do* in fact support his initial claim about the unique genesis of desire, but only because he manipulates his account of ἐπιθυμία to that end. He elsewhere understands ἐπιθυμία to operate according to the same non-rational mechanism of stimulus and response underlying the other emotions.⁶⁰ So consistency of doctrine would have required him to give an account of the *emotion* desire similar to his accounts of pleasure, distress, and fear. But instead, beginning in §146 and continuing through §150, he describes

⁵⁸ Wolfson (*Philo*, 2:232-35) explains the unique "voluntary" aspect of desire in light of Philo's concept of human free will (choice). But from a Platonic perspective, non-rational ἐπιθυμία moves reflexively and so *independently* of the moral agent's "will."

⁵⁹ §143: φαντασία διεγείρει καὶ διανίστησι τὴν ψυχὴν; §144: τὸ . . . κακὸν . . . αὐτὴν ἀναπίμπλησιν ἄκουσαν; §145: τὸ κακὸν . . . πτοίαν καὶ ἀγωνίαν . . . προεκπέμπει.

⁶⁰ E.g., *Leg.* 3115: ἐπιθυμία = ὄρεξις ἄλογος (cf. above, 67, n. 76).

not the *emotion* ἐπιθυμία but its vicious offspring, tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ), in terms that mirror *Spec.* 4.80-83.

Although Philo does not use the *term* ἔρωσ in §146 when he introduces his topic (as he does in *Spec.* 4.80 using the term ἔρωτας), he nevertheless speaks of tyrannical desire. The moral agent holds in mind a *concept* (ἔννοιαν) of an absent "good" (ἀγαθοῦ μὴ παρόντος) and "reaches" to get it (ὀρέγεται τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ). Setting the mind on what is *deemed* good signals Platonic ἔρωσ—in particular, a tyrannical desire set on any number of *false* goods and the pleasures they promise.⁶¹ Philo states the involvement of tyrannical desire *explicitly* in §151: χρημάτων ἔρωσ ἢ γυναικὸς ἢ δόξης ἢ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ἡδονῆν ἀπεργαζομένων. The *absence* of the beloved object (μὴ παρόντος) suggests Platonic πόθος, to which Philo refers explicitly in §146: ψαῦσαι τοῦ ποθουμένου γλιχόμενος (cf. πόθος in §148).⁶² With the beloved "good" set up *in the mind*, ἐπιθυμία (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) reflexively "reaches" (ὀρέγεται) to attain the pleasure it offers.⁶³ Desire has completely defeated the moral agent, imposing its ultimate "good" of pleasure upon the rational faculty and so establishing an object of hopeless pursuit for the non-rational ἐπιθυμία within.⁶⁴ As in *Spec.*

⁶¹ As in *Spec.* 4.80: ὅσα τῷ δοκεῖν ἀγαθῶν, πρὸς ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ὄντων.

⁶² Plato also links γλίχομαι with ἔρωσ, as in *Phaedr.* 248 A: γλιχόμεναι . . . τοῦ ἄνω. Cf. Philo, *Opif.* 166: γλίχεται τυχεῖν ἐραστοῦ.

⁶³ Cf. Plato's use of ὀρέγεται to indicate the "reaching" or "yearning" of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν to drink (*Resp.* 439 A).

⁶⁴ §149: ὁ τε κρατηθεὶς ἐπιθυμία, διψῶν ἀεὶ τῶν ἀπόντων.

4.80-83, Philo vividly portrays the endless, futile striving to grasp an ever-elusive object.

Instead of elaborating the image of an exasperating, futile chase (mentioned summarily in §146), Philo appeals in §§147-149a to the senses of sight and hearing to illustrate the straining, agonizing, fruitless effort to apprehend the beloved object of tyrannical desire.⁶⁵ The eyes, he says (§147), are often hard pressed for the "apprehension" (κατάληψις) of some far-off object. Despite their intense and continued effort, they are *unable* to get hold of what they "desire" and exhaust themselves.⁶⁶ Likewise, the ears (§148-149a) can be "aroused" (ἀνεγερθέντα)⁶⁷ by an indistinct, far-off noise, which produces a "longing" (πόθος) for clarity. The sound, however, *remains* indistinct, provoking an even greater yearning for "apprehension" (τοῦ καταλαβεῖν ἡμέρον).⁶⁸ These analogies from the realm of sense-perception not only present a novel image of insatiability—they also reflect the Middle-Platonic moral psychology underlying Philo's exposition. By choosing to compare the mechanism of tyrannical desire

⁶⁵ Philo introduces the analogy in §147: ὁμοιον δέ τι καὶ περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἔοικε συμβαίνειν.

⁶⁶ In Philo's account (§147), note esp. τείνοντες αὐτούς (cf. §146: ἐκτείνων; §149: ἐπιτείνεσθαι; *Spec.* 4.80: ἐπιτείνει); πλέον τῆς δυνάμεως; σφαλέντες; τῷ βιαίῳ καὶ συντόνῳ τῆς ἀτενοῦς προσβολῆς ἀσθενήσαντες.

⁶⁷ Philo often uses ἀνεγείρω in connection with the emotions (e.g., *Ebr.* 98, *Fug.* 91), which makes sense in light of the moral psychology of ἔρωσ; the rational part of the soul, consumed with tyrannical desire, holds in mind an image that continually arouses the *emotion* ἐπιθυμία, creating the maddening experience of insatiability (cf. *Spec.* 1.92: ἐπιθυμίας ἐγείρουσαι; *Spec.* 2.193: ἐγείρει . . . ἐπιθυμίας; *Spec.* 4.129: ἐπιθυμίαν ἐγείραντες).

⁶⁸ Like πόθος, ἡμέρος represents an *aspect* of ἔρωσ; for both Plato and Philo. Examples for Plato: *Symp.* 197 D: ἡμέρου, πόθου πατήρ [ἔρωσ;] (cf. *Phaedr.* 251 C-E); for Philo: *Opif.* 70-71:

with the *non-rational* mechanism of sense-perception (αἴσθησις), Philo reaffirms his understanding of ἐπιθυμία as a fundamentally *non-rational* power, which *non-rationally* pursues the "good" (pleasure) set before it.⁶⁹

As in *Spec.* 4.81-82, Philo cites the mythical figure Tantalus to illustrate the operation of tyrannical desire (§149b). Although brief, his remarks plainly state the condition of someone consumed by ἔρως, someone "conquered by desire" (κρατηθεὶς ἐπιθυμίας). Desire, in other words, has reached the height of power, supplanting reason and making its *own* goal of pleasure the goal of the moral agent. In this condition, the moral agent "thirsts" always for what is absent (διψῶν ἀεὶ τῶν ἀπόντων) without ever being "filled" (οὐδέποτε πληροῦται). In fact, there is no *possibility* of being filled, since the appetite aroused by an image of false goods has no *capacity* for fulfillment—it is an "empty," in the sense of "vain" or "pointless," appetite (κενήν . . . τὴν ὄρεξιν).

As in *Spec.* 4.83, Philo compares desire to disease and fire (§150), both of which spread until they have consumed everything available to them. Again, the imagery reflects Middle-Platonic moral psychology by depicting ἐπιθυμία as a destructive force originating in one *part* (of the body, of the combustible mass, of the soul) and spreading to other parts.⁷⁰ Revealing his Middle-Platonic affinities

ἐπόμενος ἔρωτι σοφίας . . . γεμισθεὶς ἡμέρου καὶ ἰπόθου; *Somn.* 1.36: ἔρωτες . . . ἀκάθεκτοι καὶ λελυττηκότες ἡμεροί.

⁶⁹ Cf. Philo's bipartite model of reason over against αἴσθησις (see above, 72-75).

⁷⁰ Philo describes a disease spreading throughout the body leaving no "part" (μέρος) unaffected (ἀπαθές) (§150).

even further, Philo uses this imagery to reflect the adversarial relationship *between* parts (*between* reason and desire) so fundamental to the Platonic perspective. He notes that the soul will suffer infection "lest philosophical reason hold back the stream of desire" (εἰ μὴ λόγος ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν . . . ῥέουσιν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπίσχοι).⁷¹ Here reason acts to *restrain* desire, in order to preclude an overpowering of reason *by* desire. If reason fails to hold back the stream, then desire will have its way, ultimately overrunning the entire soul with the tyranny of ἔρωσ. Similarly, if the "flame" of desire is granted "freedom" (ἄδεια)⁷² and "leisure" (ἐκεχειρία)⁷³—in other words, if reason fails to *restrain* desire and gives it free rein instead—then it will eventually spread and destroy everything through the tyranny of ἔρωσ. Philo deploys the imagery in this way because he understands the importance of ἐγκράτεια: reason must either *impose* its rule on non-rational ἐπιθυμία or in the end *suffer* the rule of desire's tyrannical offspring ἔρωσ.

§§84 – 91: Tyrannical Desire as "Source of All Ills"

[§84] So great and egregious an ill, then, is passionate desire. In fact, if truth be told, it is the source of all the world's ills. Think for a minute about the underlying cause of looting, robbery, and swindling; of flattery and insult; of seduction, adultery, murder—of all wrongdoing involving matters private or public, sacred or secular. Do these ultimately have any source other than desire? [§85] For this reason, among the passions, only

⁷¹ Cf. *Legat.* 65: τὴν πολλὴν αὐτοῦ ῥύμην τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐφέξοντα. On "stream of desire," see also *Resp.* 485 D-E; cf. *Crat.* 419 E – 420 B.

⁷² Cf. esp. *Leg.* 2.91, where Philo associates this same "freedom" (ἄδεια) with the eventual rise of tyranny within the soul (τυράννου τρόπον) (also *Post.* 98; *Congr.* 158).

⁷³ Cf. Philo's use of ἐκεχειρία in connection with the Sabbath (e.g., *Mos.* 2.22; *Spec.* 2.69).

passionate desire deserves the name "Master Vice," whose one little offspring tyrannical desire has repeatedly filled the world with unspeakable disasters⁷⁴—which, too numerous for land, have spilled out into the sea. Everywhere the vast watery expanse has been filled with ships of war and all the terrible inventions of war. Charging out to sea, their violence runs its course then crashes back like a tide upon the shores of home. [§86] We can better understand the effect of passionate desire⁷⁵ by thinking of it as a venomous creature or lethal poison, both of which cause an overall change for the worse anytime they take hold of someone. What exactly do I mean by that? Think of tyrannical desire as the fatal "bite" of passionate desire, a terminal "taking hold" akin to a "taking over."⁷⁶ [§87] For example, if a tyrannical desire for money takes over of the soul,⁷⁷ it turns people into thieves and pickpockets, larcenists and burglars—it makes them likely to swindle and scam, to accept bribes, to violate sacred trusts, to perform any other similar act of greed. [§88] If a tyrannical desire for reputation takes over, it makes people pretentious, arrogant, unsteady and unsettled in character. With eager ears they listen for the pronouncements of other people,⁷⁸ becoming at the same time dejected and elated as they

⁷⁴ *among the passions, only passionate desire deserves the name "Master Vice," whose one little offspring tyrannical desire* (ἀψευδῶς ἂν λεχθὲν ἀρχέκακον πάθος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, ἧς ἐν τῷ βραχύτατον ἔγγονον, ἔρωσ): Here taking τὸ βραχύτατον not as the littlest of many, but simply as very little (cf. *Her.* 155: τὸ βραχύτατον ζῶον, ἄνθρωπον) In other words, the genesis of ἔρωσ in the soul seems slight in comparison with the "unspeakable disasters" (ἀμυθήτων . . . συμφορῶν) it eventually creates.

⁷⁵ *the effect of passionate desire* (τοῦ πάθους ἐνέργειαν): Reading ἐνέργειαν with MSS (SM) rather than ἐνάργειαν proposed by Mangey and adopted by Cohn-Wendland. Philo, after all, explains in §§87-91 the *work* of desire in the soul (cf. *Leg.* 2.101: ὁ ἀποπίπτων τῶν παθῶν καὶ ὑπερίζων τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν; *Leg.* 3.22: ταῖς τῶν παθῶν ἐνεργείαις).

⁷⁶ *Think of tyrannical desire as the fatal "bite" of passionate desire, a terminal "taking hold" akin to a "taking over."* Since the Greek of §86 ends with τί δ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγω ("What exactly do I mean by that?"), this sentence attempts to clarify the logic of Philo's venom/poison simile in light of the examples given in §§87-91. He presupposes passionate desire as the condition from which tyrannical desire—the worst, terminal grade of desire—is born. Passionate desire represents a genuine danger to the soul, but it fatally "bites" the soul by burgeoning into tyrannical desire, which consumes the moral agent and thoroughly corrupts the character.

⁷⁷ *if a tyrannical desire for money takes over of the soul* (εἰ πρὸς χρήματα γένοιτο): Philo uses γένοιτο to indicate the "birth" of tyrannical desire (cf. §85: τὸ βραχύτατον ἔγγονον, ἔρωσ) *relative to* a particular beloved object, in this case χρήματα. He envisions the same phenomenon relative to other objects (δόξα, etc.) in subsequent paragraphs.

⁷⁸ *With eager ears they listen for the pronouncements of other people* (φωναῖς τὰ ὦτα πεφρακότας): The phrase φωναῖς τὰ ὦτα πεφρακότας most likely represents a play on words. The verb ἐπιφράσσω with τὰ ὦτα means "to stop one's ears" (see LSJ, s.v.), an idiom attested in Philo (e.g., *Leg.* 2.25; *Migr.* 191). But treating φράσσω as an equivalent of ἐπιφράσσω yields a sense directly opposite to what the context demands: people concerned with reputation clearly do not "stop their ears"—they *want* to know what people are saying about them, and *because* they

hear from the fickle masses, who deal out praise and blame by indiscriminate whim. Because they care only for what others have to say about them, they readily exchange love for hatred, or hatred for love, depending on what they hear—without a moment's consideration. You'll find them doing other things like this, always for the same reason. [§89] If a tyrannical desire for power takes over, it makes people contentious, inequitable, domineering by nature, cruel at heart. They become enemies of their own land, harsh masters of anyone weaker, irreconcilable enemies of their equals in strength, and deceitful flatterers of anyone stronger. If a tyrannical desire for voluptuous bodies takes over, people become seducers, adulterers, pederasts, devotees of indulgence and lust—they consider the greatest of evils to be the happiest of goods. [§90] Overtaking even the tongue, tyrannical desire has stirred up endless troubles, since we know that people are often gripped with a desire to keep quiet when they ought to speak or a desire to speak when they ought to keep quiet—and both receive their just deserts. [§91] And when tyrannical desire seizes the belly, it produces hopeless, insatiable gluttons, devotees of a life of ease and dissipation, people who revel in guzzling and gorging, base slaves of drinks and delicacies, who forage around at parties and banquets like ravenous little dogs. Such people end up with a miserable, accursed life more painful than any death.

Proceeding with his "diagnosis" (κρίσις), Philo turns from the agonizing experience tyrannical desire works in the *individual* (§§80-83) to consider the moral corruption and chaos it works in *society* through such individuals (§§84-91). Philo makes one central claim in this section: that all moral and social ills stem from ἐπιθυμία. Such a claim both expands the scope of Philo's programmatic condemnation of desire and justifies the Decalogue's prohibition of only *one* πάθος as an efficient preclusion of *all* wrongdoing. And Philo undoubtedly does mean *passionate* desire when he calls ἐπιθυμία the "source of

are listening intently to praise and blame, their mood rises and falls accordingly. Philo plays with the ἐπιφράσσω idiom, substituting φράσσω, which can connote fortification (see LSJ, s.v.; cf. *Virt.* 186; *Prob.* 152). The original effect must have been something like: "Their ears are not *stopped*, they're *propped*—eager to hear what people are saying."

all ills" (ἀπάντων πηγῆ τῶν κακῶν in §84) and "Master Vice" (ἀρχέκακον in §85), although he means it in a qualified sense.⁷⁹ He indicts passionate desire *insofar* as it gives birth to tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ), and *tyrannical desire* then does the real work of corrupting character and engendering corrupt behavior. As Philo puts it in §85, ἐπιθυμία is the Master Vice, "*whose one little offspring tyrannical desire* (ἔρωσ) has repeatedly filled the world with unspeakable disasters."

Using a series of concrete examples, Philo goes on to explain in §§86-91 just *how* tyrannical desire operates. Philo's argument presumes a direct stepwise progression from useful ἐπιθυμία, to passionate ἐπιθυμία, to ἔρωσ, which bears full responsibility for the corruption of character. In other words, unrestrained desire gives birth to ἔρωσ, whose hegemony in turn transforms the moral agent into an evildoer who stops at nothing in pursuit of the beloved object. To clarify the mechanism of this transformation, Philo compares desire to poison, suggesting that *both* effect an overall change for the worse in whomever they afflict.⁸⁰ Poison, for instance, when introduced into the body (by venomous creatures or lethal drugs), despite its initial localization, eventually transforms the *entire body* from healthy to sick, from living to dead. Similarly, ἐπιθυμία, despite the "localization" of its initial break with reason, eventually burgeons into ἔρωσ and transforms the *entire soul* from healthy to sick, from virtuous to vicious. And

⁷⁹ Philo makes the same claim in *Decal.* 173: τὴν τῶν ἀδικημάτων πηγὴν, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἀφ' ἧς ῥέουσιν αἱ παρανώταται πράξεις.

⁸⁰ §86: ὅσων ἂν . . . προσάψηται, μεταβολὴν ἀπεργάζεται τὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον.

people display different forms of moral corruption depending on which false goods they pursue under tyrannical desire's control: whether money (χρήματα), reputation (δόξα), power (ἀρχή), or voluptuous bodies (σώματος κάλλος) (§§87-89).⁸¹ In each case, the moral agent's obsessive drive for that *particular* "good" ultimately leads to a distinct profile of reprehensible behaviors detrimental to both self and society. For example, an ἔρωσ for *money* yields thieves and swindlers (§87); an ἔρωσ for *reputation* yields pretentious braggarts (§88);⁸² an ἔρωσ for *power* yields ruthless oppressors (§89); an ἔρωσ for *voluptuous bodies* yields sexual offenders (§89). In this way, Philo traces a huge spectrum of wrongdoing to *one* source, tyrannical desire. To complete this spectrum of wrongdoing, Philo adds to his list of four false goods (§§87-89) two *parts of the body* over which tyrannical desire can reign (§§90-91): the tongue (γλῶττα) and the belly (τὰ περὶ γαστέρα).

As for the tongue, Philo mentions the reprehensible desire of some either to *keep quiet* what ought to be said or to *say* what ought to be kept quiet (§90).⁸³ He describes a situation of desire having "reached" the tongue (ἐπὶ γλῶτταν φθάσασα)—that is, desire having extended its influence *even so far* as to overtake the tongue, causing people to act (speak) contrary to reason. Just as the tyranny of ἔρωσ over people enamored of false goods causes corruption and

⁸¹ Cf. Philo's list in §82: χρήματα, δόξα, ἡγεμονίαι, εὐμορφίαι.

⁸² On ἔρωσ for δόξα see also Plutarch, *Suav. viv.* 1100 B.

⁸³ §90: ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἢ τὰ λεκτέα σιωπᾶν ἢ τὰ ἡσυχαστέα λέγειν. Cf. *Garr.*

wrongdoing, the tyranny of ἔρωσ *over the tongue* causes all sorts of troubles.

Philo does not consider at length the immoralities caused by speech and silence, because tracing them to ἐπιθυμία-turned-ἔρωσ confirms his central claim that *all* moral and social ills—including these—stem from desire.

Finally, Philo speaks of desire "getting hold of the belly" (ἀψαμένη δὲ τῶν περὶ γαστέρα), which clearly indicates more than just *reasonable* desires for food and drink. He has in mind people overcome by tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ), who have established the pleasure derived from eating and drinking as their ultimate "good." Tyrannical desire has made them "base slaves" (κακοὺς δούλους) of drinks and delicacies, who lead a "miserable and accursed life" (ἀθλίαν καὶ ἐπάρατον . . . ζωὴν) more "agonizing" (ἀργαλεωτέραν) than any death.⁸⁴ As with every case of ἔρωσ, a particular *object* of affection produces a particular *brand* of immorality: those who adore the pleasures of food and drink become, above all, "gluttons" (γαστριμάργους).⁸⁵

§§84 – 91 Excursus: Parallel Material in Decal. 151-53

In *Decal.* 151-53, Philo likewise indicts desire as the source of countless troubles. He initially asks whether ἔρωσ for money, a woman, reputation, or "anything else producing pleasure" becomes the cause of only "small and

⁸⁴ Cf. §80: οὐδὲν ἀργαλέον ὡς ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀπόντων ὅσα τῷ δοκεῖν ἀγαθῶν, πρὸς ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ὄντων, χαλεποὺς καὶ ἀνηνύτους ἔρωτας ἐντίκτουσα.

⁸⁵ In the course of *Phaedr.* 237 C – 238 C, Socrates labels ἔρωσ *as it relates to food* "γαστριμαργία" (esp. 238 A-B: περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατούσα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀρίστου τῶν

incidental ills."⁸⁶ This rhetorical question functions as the thesis for §§151-53 and reflects real convictions about desire crucial to Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment: tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ), which can arise in connection with any number of pleasurable aims, in turn becomes responsible for (αἴτιος γίνεται) great and innumerable ills. In §§152-53, Philo considers warfare in particular, ultimately concluding that "all wars flow from one source: desire (ἐπιθυμία) for money, or reputation, or pleasure."⁸⁷ He essentially restates here the thesis of §151, but with less precision, metonymically replacing the *specific* term ἔρωσ with the generic term ἐπιθυμία, replacing also the carefully worded "things that produce pleasure" (τῶν ἡδονῆν ἀπεργαζομένων) with a generic reference to "pleasure" (ἡδονῆς).

§§92 – 94: Location of Ἐπιθυμία

[§92] And this overpowering desire for food and drink explains⁸⁸ why those who had not simply "tasted" philosophy but had lavishly "feasted" on its sound doctrines—once they had investigated the nature of the soul and

ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία). Philo elsewhere associates γαστριμαργία with an absolute dominance of *desire for food* (e.g., *Agr.* 36).

⁸⁶ §151: χρημάτων ἔρωσ ἢ γυναικὸς ἢ δόξης ἢ τινοσ ἄλλου τῶν ἡδονῆν ἀπεργαζομένων ἀρά γε μικρῶν καὶ τῶν τυχόντων αἴτιος γίνεται κακῶν.

⁸⁷ §153: πόλεμοι πάντες ἀπὸ μιᾶς πηγῆς ἐρρύησαν, ἐπιθυμίας ἢ χρημάτων ἢ δόξης ἢ ἡδονῆς.

⁸⁸ *this overpowering desire for food and drink explains* (ταύτης ἔνεκα τῆς αἰτίας). Philo does not *name* the reason philosophers decided to distribute (ἀπένειμαν) the soul's parts as they did, but ταύτης . . . τῆς αἰτίας must refer to some aspect of §91, because §§92-94 bear obvious connections to only that paragraph. Fundamentally, §91 and §§92-94 have in common the association of ἐπιθυμία with the same general region of the body (§91: τὰ περὶ γαστέρα; §93: ὁ περὶ τὸν ὄμφαλὸν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον διάφραγμα χῶρος) and the use of language related to eating (§91: οἰνοφλυγίαις, ὀψοφαγίαις, συμπόσια, τραπέζας; §92: γευσάμενοι, ἐστιαθέντες). Since §91 describes corrupt, compulsive eating and drinking, ταύτης . . . τῆς αἰτίας undoubtedly refers to the overpowering desire for food and drink underlying such behavior.

recognized its tripartite structure⁸⁹ (reason, spirit, desire)—distributed the various parts as they did. They put reason, which rules the soul, in the most appropriate place, the head, which is the topmost part of the body. The head also serves as headquarters for the senses, which together form a sort of entourage for the soul's "king," the mind. [§93] Next, they determined that spirit must reside in the chest, for two reasons: first, in the chest, spirit wears a breastplate, just like a soldier, and this added protection makes it very difficult to defeat, although certainly not invincible; second, in the chest, dwelling near the mind, spirit receives help from its neighbor, whose wise counsel lulls it into compliance. Finally, they determined that desire must reside in the area around the navel known as the "diaphragm." [§94] Since desire has the least to do with reason, it clearly must reside as far as possible from reason's royal domain—practically at the outskirts. Naturally, the pasture of this most insatiable and licentious of beasts is the area of the body associated with primal drives for food and sex.

Paragraphs 92-94 represent an excursus framed as a review of Platonic doctrine on the physical location of each of the soul's three parts.⁹⁰ Just before this excursus (§§86-91), Philo had been describing how ἔρωσ functions as the source of all wrongdoing, using a series of examples that matched specific false goods pursued under tyrannical desire's hegemony with specific types of moral corruption. His final example (§91) noted the ability of ἐπιθυμία-turned-ἔρωσ to "seize the belly" and so corrupt the moral agent in matters of eating and drinking. But in §92, Philo no longer considers the mechanism of ἔρωσ, choosing instead to reflect further on the *association* of ἐπιθυμία with a particular region of the body, which he now refers to as ὁ περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον

⁸⁹ *recognized its tripartite structure* (τρίττον εἶδος ἐνιδόντες αὐτῆς): PCW rightly emends the τρίτον of MSS to τριττὸν. Philo's immediate listing of the three Platonic εἶδη (λόγος, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία) indeed suggests an original reference to "*threefold* [i.e., tripartite] form" rather than "*third form*." Cf. *Aet.* 86: πῦρὸς τριττὸν εἶδος· τὸ μὲν ἄνθραξ, τὸ δὲ φλόξ, τὸ δὲ αὐγή.

⁹⁰ On Plato's theory, see *Tim.* 69 C – 71 D (cf. Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 301-14).

διάφραγμα χῶρος (§93) instead of simply τὰ περὶ γαστέρα (§91). Although Philo retains from §91 an interest in the connection between ἐπιθυμία and "belly," his question has changed from *how* ἐπιθυμία (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) tyrannizes the soul to *how* knowledgeable philosophers determined its location.

Philo's manner of juxtaposing §91 and §§92-94 implies that philosophers connected the ἐπιθυμητικόν with the the belly *because* so many people experience an overpowering, tyrannical desire for food and drink. He clearly notes in §§92-94 that these philosophers posited the connection "for this reason" (ταύτης ἔνεκα τῆς αἰτίας), and the placement of the phrase requires the "reason" to be somewhere in §91, most likely in the gluttonous immorality Philo portrays in that paragraph. But when he actually spells out the reason in §94, he says nothing about gluttonous immorality, merely citing the logical necessity that (1) the faculty having "least to do with reason" reside farthest from reason and (2) the "most insatiable and licentious of beasts" (ἐπιθυμία) inhabit the bodily regions associated with food and sex. But Philo does not simply abandon the logic of his transitional phrase in favor of an allusion to Plato's *Timaeus*⁹¹—he moves his train of thought in an entirely new direction. And, in fact, when viewed in the context of Philo's *entire* exposition, §§92-94 do not so much advance the argument as provide a transition within the exposition from the *diagnosis* section (κρίσις) to the *treatment* section (ἄσκησις).

⁹¹ Cf. *Tim.* 70 D – 71 A.

Most importantly, §§92-94 function as a transition by introducing new material crucial to Philo's upcoming argument. Part one of his treatise, designed to expose the shameful character of tyrannical desire, essentially ends with §91, since §§92-94 both *derive* and *digress* from that paragraph and bear no direct connection to earlier material. But nothing in part one of his exposition, up to and including §91, gives Philo a theoretical basis for asserting the preeminence of desires for food and drink over against any other type of desire. In fact, the desire for food and drink appears as only part of his list, last among desires for money, reputation, etc.—all of which are equally capable of causing moral ruin after burgeoning into their respective versions of tyrannical desire. Yet in his explanation of the rationale underlying Moses' therapeutic program (§96), Philo will argue that management of "the desire having to do with the belly" (τὴν περὶ γαστέρα πραγματευομένην ἐπιθυμίαν) serves as the paradigmatic model for managing *all* corruptible desires, since that one desire is fundamental, being the "eldest" (τὴν πρεσβυτάτην) and "chief" (ἡγεμονίδα) of them all. Paragraphs 92-94 give Philo the theoretical justification for such a claim, because they endorse a Platonic view of the soul, which grants preeminence to desires for food and drink while still tracing all corruptible desires to one part of the soul.

In addition, §§92-94 effect a smooth transition from part one (esp. §91) to part two (esp. §§95-97) by considering ἐπιθυμία in a new light without disrupting a basic continuity of content involving the nexus of desire, food and drink, and

the belly. Before §§92-94, Philo considers ἐπιθυμία in a decidedly negative light, limiting his concern almost exclusively to the disastrous tyranny of ἔρωσ, which represents the terminal stage of ἐπιθυμία overstepping the bounds of reason. But the treatment section of Philo's exposition concerns itself with how to *prevent* ἐπιθυμία from overstepping the bounds of reason. In other words, the topic of part two is not *tyrannical* desire, but *useful* desire—the kind a moral agent may rightly condone and exercise without compromising virtue, provided reason stays in control. By commenting in §§92-94 on the location of ἐπιθυμία within Platonic tripartition, Philo shifts the emphasis from desire as raging tyrant to desire as a natural component of the soul, without entirely losing sight of its dangerous capacity for misconduct (§94: πάντων ἀπληστότατον καὶ ἀκολαστότατον . . . θρεμμάτων). He can then begin in §§95-97 his consideration of how best to manage ἐπιθυμία, particularly the ἐπιθυμία for food and drink, which—though prone to excess—forms a natural part of every human life.

§§95 – 97: Overview of Moses' "Paradigmatic Instruction"

[§95] Now, the most holy Moses, in my view, took all of this into account when he designed a special set of laws for managing desire.⁹² His goal was to eliminate passionate desire,⁹³ having come to detest it as both a horrible disgrace in itself and—as I just explained—the ultimate cause of disgraceful behavior, a sort of siege-engine within us, bent on overtaking

⁹² *he designed a special set of laws for managing desire* (ἀπέειπεν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν): Unlike the Tenth Commandment itself, which categorically prohibits passionate desire, *Moses'* prohibition (ἀπέειπεν) operates through the cumulative effect of a whole set of dietary laws promoting virtuous management of the *emotion* desire.

⁹³ *to eliminate passionate desire* (ἐκδύσασθαι τὸ πάθος): Moses' goal is that of the Tenth Commandment: to eliminate the *passion* desire (τὸ πάθος [ἐπιθυμία]).

and corrupting the soul.⁹⁴ He understood that a life free of passionate desire, in which desire obeys the commanding authority of reason,⁹⁵ would be filled with peace, order, and genuine prosperity, resulting in perfect happiness. [§96] And since Moses cherishes brevity and tends to address innumerable cases with just one paradigmatic instruction, he builds a comprehensive therapeutic program on the chastisement and training of just one desire, desire involving the belly.⁹⁶ He reasons that once the most primal and commanding desire has learned to submit to the laws of self-mastery, all other desires will likewise become obedient to the rein and accept the authority of reason. [§97] So what sort of instruction lies at the heart of Moses' therapeutic program? Obviously, its two fundamental concerns are food and drink, and Moses left neither of these unregulated. Instead, he curtailed their use by means of dietary laws whose observance leads to self-control, not to mention philanthropy and—most important of all—piety.

Philo begins the "treatment" section (ἄσκησις) of his exposition by summarizing briefly the "diagnosis" section (κρίσις) he has just completed (§§79-94). He

⁹⁴ *a sort of siege-engine within us, bent on overtaking and corrupting the soul* (ὥς τινα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλέπολιν): A ἐλέπολις was a machine of war, designed for hostile assault of an enemy fortification. By using this term, Philo suggests that ἐπιθυμία seeks to overthrow reason. By "storming the citadel" and taking over the soul, ἐπιθυμία-turned-ἔρωσ becomes the *cause* of disgraceful behavior ("ὥς" demands some connection between "disgraceful" and "siege-engine"). The independent, hostile agency of ἐπιθυμία conveyed by the metaphor illustrates Philo's fundamentally Platonic perspective. See Pelletier, "Passions à l'assaut de l'âme," esp. 57-58. Cf. Abraham Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983): 143-73, esp. 145-47.

⁹⁵ *a life free of passionate desire, in which desire obeys the commanding authority of reason* (ἥς [ἐπιθυμίας] ἀναιρεθείσης ἢ πειθαρχούσης κυβερνήτη λογισμῶ): At face value, the Greek suggests *two* ways of managing ἐπιθυμία to achieve peace and happiness: abolish ἐπιθυμία entirely (ἀναιρεθείσης) *or* (ἢ) make it obedient to reason (πειθαρχούσης . . . λογισμῶ). But Philo's statement of the issue reflects the inherent *Middle-Platonic* ambiguity of the term ἐπιθυμία, which refers either to the *passion* desire or the *emotion* desire. He clearly calls for the abolition of *passionate* desire (cf. ἐκδύσασθαι τὸ πάθος [§95]), but this amounts to the *emotion* desire obeying reason. In other words, the ἢ indicates not an alternative *solution* to the problem of desire but an alternative *formulation* of a single solution: the elimination of passionate desire—*id est*, the obedience of desire to reason.

⁹⁶ *he builds a comprehensive therapeutic program on the chastisement and training of just one desire* (παραδειγματικὴ διδασκαλία μίαν τὴν περὶ γαστέρα πραγματευομένην ἐπιθυμίαν ἄρχεται νουθετεῖν τε καὶ παιδεύειν): Philo believes that by training the desire for food and drink Moses expected to train all desire(s). So the training of this one desire stands as the foundation (ἄρχεται) for what amounts to a "comprehensive therapeutic program," insofar as *all* desires are in view.

attributes to "the most holy Moses" (ὁ ἱερώτατος Μωυσῆς) an understanding of everything (πάντα) he has just explained about the nature, function, and problematic *malfunction* of ἐπιθυμία. This philosophical insight created in Moses a determination that Philo expects the *reader* to share at this point in the exposition: a determination "to eliminate passionate desire (ἐκδύσασθαι τὸ πάθος), having come to detest it (μυσαξάμενος) as both a horrible disgrace in itself (ὡς αἰσχιστον) and—as I just explained—the ultimate cause of disgraceful behavior (τῶν αἰσχίστων αἴτιον)."⁹⁷ Passionate desire, in other words, proves not only reprehensible in itself—it also *generates* reprehensible behavior whenever it overtakes and tyrannizes the soul. For this reason, Moses sought to eliminate the *passion* desire by training the *emotion* to obey the commanding authority of reason ([ἐπιθυμίας] πειθαρχούσης κυβερνήτη λογισμῶ)—which calls for the exercise of "self-control" (ἐγκράτεια) on the moral agent's part.⁹⁸ He addressed this critical need for self-control through his legislation, as Philo explains in §§96-97.

⁹⁷ Cf. *Garr.* 510 C-D: "[W]e get well by the diagnosis and treatment of our ailments (τῶν γὰρ παθῶν κρίσει καὶ ἀσκήσει περιγιγνόμεθα), but the diagnosis must come first (προτέρα δ' ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν); since no one can become habituated to shun or to eradicate from his soul what does not distress him (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐθίζεται φεύγειν καὶ ἀποτρίβεισθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ μὴ δυσχεραίνει), and we only grow distressed with our ailments (δυσχεραίνομεν δὲ τὰ πάθη) when we have perceived, by the exercise of reason, the injuries and shame which result from them (ὅταν τὰς βλάβας καὶ τὰς αἰσχύνας τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ κατανοήσωμεν)."

⁹⁸ The term κυβερνήτης invokes Philo's premier model of ἐγκράτεια, the chariot figure (cf. §79): e.g., *Leg.* 3.224: ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡνίοχος ἢ κυβερνήτης ὁ νοῦς; *Sacr.* 45: τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀλόγων δυνάμεων ἡνίοχος τε καὶ κυβερνήτης.

According to §96, Moses ingeniously crafted *one* "paradigmatic instruction" (παραδειγματική διδασκαλία) for the management of ἐπιθυμία, which—though ostensibly geared only to the desire for food and drink—applies in fact to *every* type of desire.⁹⁹ Of course, this "instruction" appears nowhere in the Pentateuch as a distinct, coherent, continuous discourse. Instead, Philo must gather the scattered elements of Moses' instruction and cobble them together into a meaningful unit. He believes that *as a set* the various precepts governing food and drink reveal, upon careful examination, an ulterior motive on Moses' part: to inculcate self-control relative to *gastric* desire, which extends in turn to *all* desire. And because the dietary laws promote the management of ἐπιθυμία, Philo identifies them as the specific laws falling under the generic heading οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις.

To explain a single therapeutic program whose benefits extend throughout the whole range of desires, Philo relies on the principle of transference, which gives him a much-needed warrant for reconciling parts one and two of his exposition.¹⁰⁰ Without it, he is left "diagnosing" in part one a problem involving *many* desires (for money, reputation, etc.), while "treating" in part two only *one* desire (for food and drink). By casting the Mosaic dietary laws as a paradigmatic instruction, Philo effectively accounts for *all* of the desires mentioned in part one,

⁹⁹ Cf. Philo's notion of circumcision as a sort of "paradigmatic instruction" in *Spec.* 1.9: αἰνιττομένοις περιτομήν περιττῆς ἐκτομήν καὶ πλεοναζούσης ἡδονῆς, οὐ μιᾶς, ἀλλὰ διὰ μιᾶς . . . καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπασῶν; also QG 3.48.

¹⁰⁰ On the principle of transference, see above, 135-37.

since *their* successful management follows from the successful management of gastric desire. This approach not only solves a practical problem for Philo—it also makes good sense in light of Middle-Platonic theoretical principles. First, the idea that gastric desire predominates—being, as Philo puts it, τὴν πρεσβυτάτην καὶ ὡς ἡγεμονίδα—comes from Plato himself, who highlights desires for food and drink in his characterizations of ἐπιθυμία.¹⁰¹ Second, Philo believes that gastric desire's ability "to obey the laws of self-mastery" (τοῖς σωφροσύνης νόμοις πειθαρχεῖν) yields restraint among the other desires (οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως ἀφηνιάσειν . . . σταλήσεσθαι), reasoning that *because* desires for food and drink are most powerful, *their* compliance necessarily engenders compliance among other desires stemming from the ἐπιθυμητικόν, which are by definition less powerful.¹⁰² Plutarch envisions a similar transference of the moral agent's capacity to manage desire—but in his method of training, restraint develops first in *less* difficult situations then applies stepwise to progressively *more* difficult situations.¹⁰³ Moses' method exhibits greater efficiency by reversing the

¹⁰¹ E.g., *Resp.* 437 D.

¹⁰² Philo's language of restraint in this passage—esp. his use of ἀφηνιάσειν and σταλήσεσθαι (στέλλω)—reflects his Middle-Platonic view of passion. For example, within the model of ἐγκράτεια posed by Philo's chariot figure, the term ἀφηνιάζω (cf. ἀφηνιασμός) denotes "excess"—namely, the excess movement responsible for transforming an *emotion* into a *passion* (see above, 111-18). By claiming that all other types of ἐπιθυμία will no longer ἀφηνιάσειν upon successful implementation of Moses' therapeutic dietary program, Philo means that they will become moderate in the Middle-Platonic sense of *measured* or *without excess*. In other words, they will become restrained (σταλήσεσθαι) in the very sense he suggests elsewhere in his writings: e.g., *Prov.* 2.70: τὴν ἀμετρίαν [cf. ἀφηνιασμός] τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν στεῖλαι; *Virt.* 113: ἐστείλατο τὸ σφοδρὸν [cf. ἀφηνιασμός] αὐτῆς [sc. ἐπιθυμίας]; *Det.* 25: στέλλοντες τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν μέγεθος [cf. ἀφηνιασμός].

¹⁰³ See Ingenkamp, *Schriften*, 105, esp. the first on his list of three ἐθισμοί.

progression, training the most difficult desire *first* and so removing the need to address less demanding calls for self-control from less difficult desires.

In §97, Philo summarizes the *method* of Moses' paradigmatic instruction. Clearly, the instruction must deal with food and drink, since *they* are the objects of gastric desire. As Philo explains, Moses restricted their use (ἐπεστόμισε) with specific ordinances *whose observance leads to self-control* (διατάγμασι . . . πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν . . . ἀγωγοτάτοις).¹⁰⁴ In other words, Moses designed the dietary laws as ascetic precepts to promote ἐγκράτεια among members of his commonwealth—first with respect to food and drink, but ultimately with respect to every object of desire.¹⁰⁵ Viewed in terms of moral philosophy, Moses' method looks much like the recommendation of *practical exercises* aimed at eliminating a passion (πάθος) through the practice (ἄσκησις) of self-control (ἐγκράτεια). His "ordinances" (διατάγματα) serve the same function as the ἐθισμοί of Plutarch's *Seelenheilungsschriften*. In the case of *De garrulitate*, followers of Plutarch's philosophy will eliminate the passion of talkativeness (ἀδολεσχία) from their lives

¹⁰⁴ Philo's use of ἐπεστόμισε again suggests the chariot figure (see above, 111-18). Along with the inculcation of ἐγκράτεια, Philo mentions also philanthropy and piety, but these do not figure prominently in his exposition until the end, where he revisits the notion of *piety* in §§128-131. He mentions them here because he sees each of the Ten Commandments as promoting the more generic virtues, although each has its special purpose(s). On Philo's view of piety (εὐσέβεια), see esp. Gregory E. Sterling, "The Queen of the Virtues': Piety in Philo of Alexandria," *SPhA* 18 (2006): 103-23.

¹⁰⁵ Philo actually names ἐγκράτεια here, but note further indications of ἐγκράτεια in §§95-97: §95: [ἐπιθυμίας] πειθαρχούσης κυβερνήτη λογισμῶ; §96: ἐπιθυμίαν . . . ἄρχεται νοθετεῖν τε καὶ παιδεύειν; τὰς ἄλλας [ἐπιθυμίας] οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως ἀφηνιάσειν; τὰς ἄλλας [ἐπιθυμίας] . . . σταλήσονται; τῷ τὴν πρεσβυτάτην καὶ ὡς ἡγεμονίδα μεμαθηκέναι τοῖς σωφροσύνης νόμοις πειθαρχεῖν.

by developing ἐγκράτεια with respect to speaking, as they engage in behaviors enjoined by his ἔθισμοί. Similarly, followers of *Moses'* philosophy will eliminate the passion of gluttony (γαστριμαγία) from their lives by developing ἐγκράτεια with respect to eating and drinking, as they engage in behaviors enjoined by *his* ἔθισμοί, the dietary laws. But with Moses' ingenious program, as Philo presents it, the elimination of gluttony entails the elimination of *all* passions similarly characterized by excessive desire for a certain object (wealth, reputation, etc.). While Plutarch treats passions one at a time, Moses treats passions all at once.

§§98 – 99: *First Fruits*¹⁰⁶

[§98] For example, Moses commands the people to bring as first fruits some of their grain, wine, oil, livestock, and other goods. They are instructed to designate one portion of these first fruits for sacrifice and another portion for the priests—the former out of gratitude to God for bountiful produce and abundance of goods, the latter out of gratitude for the sacred temple-service, in order that the priests might receive a reward for their performance of holy duties. [§99] He completely forbids anyone to sample these goods or take hold of them until the first fruits are duly apportioned. This command functions as an exercise in the self-control that proves so beneficial to all of life.¹⁰⁷ You see, Moses knew that by learning to restrain their eager rush to enjoy the season's harvest, by waiting for the consecration of the first fruits, the people were in fact training themselves to check the unruliness of their impulses, quieting any passionate desire within.

Philo begins his study of Moses' "paradigmatic instruction" with the law of First Fruits, which of course involves food *and* drink: Philo lists "grain, wine, oil, and

¹⁰⁶ See Deut 18:4.

¹⁰⁷ *This command functions as an exercise in the self-control that proves so beneficial to all of life* (ἅμα καὶ πρὸς ἄσκησιν τῆς βιωφειλεστάτης ἐγκρατείας): In other words, obedience to this command, insofar as it enjoins the *practice* (ἄσκησις) of ἐγκρατεία, *amounts to* an exercise in self-control—i.e., an ascetic precept.

livestock" as items falling under the commandment's purview. His reference here to "wine" (οἶνος) stands alone in the treatment portion of the exposition, which cites no other laws mentioning wine or any other drink.¹⁰⁸ So despite his earlier framing of Moses' instruction as a matter of ἐδωδὴ καὶ πόσις (§97), Philo really ends up discussing only food. He mentions both because he knows that ἐπιθυμία of the belly theoretically involves both eating and drinking, a fact duly noted in the diagnostic portion of his exposition (§91). But Philo does not see any significant role for laws governing drink(s) or drinking in Moses' instruction on desire.

Philo explicitly identifies the law of First Fruits as an exercise in self-control (πρὸς ἄσκησιν . . . ἐγκρατείας). Essentially, the law requires people eager to consume fresh stores of food and drink to *wait* (ἀναμένων) until a ceremonial dedication has first taken place. In terms of moral psychology, this involves ἐπιθυμία *activated* by the pleasurable prospect of consuming a variety of goods but forcibly *restrained* for a time by reason. To indulge the initial impulse to eat and drink, ignoring the law, would be to act strictly on a motive for pleasure, which amounts to indulging an unmeasured, excessive impulse—or, in this case, indulging a *passionate* desire. By waiting until reason authorizes the indulgence of desire, the moral agent effectively removes the *excessiveness* of

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Colson 67, n. b: "This is the only way in which restraint in drinking is enjoined throughout these sections." But note *liquor* (ἀκράτου) in §113.

the impulses of desire (τὸν ἀφηνιασμὸν τῶν ὀρμῶν . . . ἀναχαιτίζειν),¹⁰⁹ which amounts to a quieting of the *passionate* aspect of the desire (ἐξευμαρίζων τὸ πάθος).¹¹⁰ This exercise clearly employs a *delay technique*, which appears both elsewhere in Philo's writings and in Plutarch's *De garrulitate*.¹¹¹

§§100 – 102: Introduction to Clean and Unclean Animals¹¹²

[§100] As for foods not otherwise regulated by the law of First Fruits,¹¹³ Moses did not in the least allow members of the sacred commonwealth simply to eat whatever they wanted without restriction. In fact, he strictly prohibited all of the richest, most succulent types of meat—meat that tickles and teases our treacherous foe pleasure—by prohibiting just the right animals from land, sea, and sky. He knew that these meats could bring about the insatiability of tyrannical desire, once they had ensnared the most slavish of the senses, taste.¹¹⁴ And insatiability represents a practically incurable problem not only for souls but also for bodies, since an insatiable desire for food naturally leads to overeating, which in turn leads to indigestion, a foundation and wellspring of diseases and infirmities. [§101] Now, the most obvious prohibitions of pleasurable fare involve the pig, whose meat everyone acknowledges as the most delectable among land animals, and scaleless sea creatures.¹¹⁵ In these

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Spec.* 2.18: τὸν ἀφηνιασμὸν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀναχαιτίζειν. With ἀφηνιασμόν and ἀναχαιτίζειν, Philo again invokes the chariot figure (see above, 111-18).

¹¹⁰ Cf. *Opif.* 81: ἐξευμαρισθεῖεν αἱ ἄμετροι τῶν παθῶν ὀρμαί.

¹¹¹ Cf. §99: ἀναμένων, ἄχρις ἂν αἱ ἀπαρχαὶ καθοσώθωσι; *Garr.* 511 F: ἐθιζέτω σιωπᾶν μέχρι οὗ πάντες ἀπέιπωνται τὴν ἀπόκρισιν. On the same technique at work in other ascetic precepts, see above, 130-35.

¹¹² See Lev 11; Deut 14:1-21

¹¹³ *As for foods not otherwise regulated by the law of First Fruits* (Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων μετουσίαν): Philo moves on to foods *not* under the purview of the First Fruits regulation (cf. Mosès 259, n.10: "Ceux qui ne sont pas assujettis à une offrande préalable").

¹¹⁴ *He knew that these meats could bring about the insatiability of tyrannical desire, once they had ensnared the most slavish of the senses, taste* (εἰδὼς ὅτι τὴν ἀνδραποδωδεστάτην τῶν αἰσθησῶν δελεάσαντα γεῦσιν ἀπληστίαν ἐργάσεται): *Pace* Colson, ἀπληστία indicates "insatiability," not "gluttony" (cf. Heinemann: "Unersättlichkeit"; Mosès: "l'insatiabilité"). And ἀπληστία signals the presence of tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) in the soul—in this case, ἔρωσ as it relates to food.

¹¹⁵ PCW posits a lacuna in the Greek text of §101: ἐνύδρων δὲ τὰ γένη τῶν ἀλεπίδων [...] πρὸς γὰρ ἐγκράτειαν, εἰ καὶ τις ἄλλος, ἱκανὸς ὢν ἀλείψαι τοὺς εὐφυῶς ἔχοντας πρὸς ἄσκησιν ἀρετῆς. Cohn's note suggests the emendation τούτων δὴ χρήσεως ἀνέχειν κελεύει. The text, however, makes sense as it stands. Philo mentions the prohibitions of pork and

and other restrictions, self-control was Moses' ultimate concern, and he—if anyone—had the philosophical expertise to train those with natural aptitude in the practice of virtue. He accomplishes this inculcation of self-control by training and drilling people to be sparing and easily satisfied, targeting the removal of extravagance. [§102] Determined to promote neither a life of austerity, like the Lacedaemonian lawgiver, nor of daintiness, like the man who introduced habits of feebleness and luxury to the Ionians and Sybarites—cutting instead a straight path right between the two—Moses relaxed what was too severe in one and tightened what was too lax in the other. As with a musical instrument, he sought to blend the excesses of either end of the scale into a moderate tone, promoting a life of harmony and blameless integrity. So he was not at all haphazard when he drew up his legislation on dietary matters. On the contrary, he took the utmost care in determining foods to be eaten and foods to be avoided.

Philo devotes by far the majority of his discussion of the content of Moses' "paradigmatic instruction" to the legislation governing various species of clean (καθαρά) and unclean (ἀκάθαρτα) animals (ζῶα).¹¹⁶ The designations "clean" and "unclean" of course refer to an animal's legal status as either a *permitted* or *prohibited* food source.¹¹⁷ So with this new topic Philo abides by his initial framing of Moses' instruction as a matter of "food and drink" (§97: ἐδωδὴ καὶ πόσις)—or, in this case, *only* food—but the issue now becomes *whether or not* the people may eat a certain meal, not *how* or *when*, as with the law of First Fruits. In any case, his exegetical task remains the same: to explain how these dietary laws

scaleless sea creatures, emphasizing the *pleasure* they afford, because they illustrate Moses' *real* purpose for the dietary laws: the promotion of ἐγκράτεια.

¹¹⁶ Compare Clean-Unclean Animals (§§100-118) to First Fruits (§§98-99), Dead Animals (§§119-121), and Blood and Fat (§§122-125). On Philo's discussion of clean-unclean animals in §§100-118, see especially Rhodes, "Diet and Desire."

¹¹⁷ E.g., §113: φησὶν εἶναι πρὸς ἐδωδὴν οὐ καθαρά.

promote ἐγκράτεια in service to the Tenth Commandment's prohibition of passionate desire, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις.

According to Philo, the legislation on clean and unclean animals reflects in general an unwillingness on Moses' part to permit the "unrestricted use" (χρήσιν ἀδεᾶ) of foods not otherwise regulated by the law of First Fruits.¹¹⁸ In particular, Moses selected for prohibition the "fattest" (εὐσαρκότατα) and "richest" (πιότατα) animals from land, sea, and sky, knowing that they yield the tastiest meats. He did this because he understood the dangerous capacity of delicious foods to "ensnare" (δελεάσαντα) the palate and, in so doing, cause people to eat strictly for the *pleasure* of eating.¹¹⁹ In terms of moral psychology, eating for pleasure represents a victory of ἐπιθυμία over reason: in particular, a victory of ἐπιθυμία as *motivating disposition* (whose aim is *pleasure*) over reason as *motivating disposition* (whose aim is *rational benefit*: survival, good health, etc.). The victory of ἐπιθυμία produces in the soul an "insatiability" (ἀπληστία), which in turn causes overeating and leads to indigestion, a "foundation and wellspring" (ἀρχὴ τε καὶ πηγὴ) of diseases and infirmities. Philo's incidental remark here on the danger of tasty meat echoes and corroborates his earlier, extended remarks in §§79-91 on the danger, broadly speaking, of passionate desire. In either case, he envisions a torturous Tantalus fate of *insatiable* desire—the mark of *tyrannical*

¹¹⁸ Cf. χρήσιν ἀδεᾶ in *Prov.* 2.70, where Philo also speaks of restricting desires for food (NB οἷς ἐμέλησε τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν στείλαι).

¹¹⁹ Cf. *Garr.* 514 B: δელεαζομένη γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἡ ἀδολεσχία.

desire (ἔρωσ) —looming as the eventual outcome of ἐπιθυμία gaining the upper hand over reason. And just as he earlier associated the terminal grade of desire with a condition of *soul* generating further *moral* decline (§§86-91), Philo here associates the terminal grade of eating for pleasure with a condition of *body* generating further *physical* decline.¹²⁰ These parallels suggest an attempt on Philo's part to coordinate the "diagnosis" and "treatment" portions of his exposition by using similar terms to frame both *problem* and *solution*. Here, the solution Moses offers amounts to a simple principle: avoiding especially pleasurable meats eliminates the risk of indulging passionate desire, which in turn eliminates the even greater risk of suffering tyrannical desire.¹²¹ But understood in this way, Moses' prohibitions only steer the moral agent away from a *specific*—and thus limited—set of dietary incitements to passionate desire, without addressing the broader concern of cultivating ἐγκράτεια in observance of the *general* prohibition οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις. In §§101-102, Philo traces a broader connection between avoiding tasty meats and a *lifestyle* of ἐγκράτεια.

He begins by citing two examples, presumably his best, of prohibited animals commonly acknowledged "by those who partake" (παρὰ τοῖς χρωμένοις)

¹²⁰ In §100, Philo calls "insatiability" (ἀπληστίαν) α δυσίατον κακὸν ψυχᾶς τε καὶ σώμασιν. Philo described its harm to *souls* at length in the diagnosis portion of his exposition, using images like the frustrated pursuit and Tantalus (§§80-81). He describes its harm to *bodies* in §100, where he links it to indigestion.

¹²¹ Philo earlier described those enslaved to a tyrannical desire for food and drink in §91.

as "delicious" (ἡδιστον): pigs and scaleless sea creatures.¹²² Philo then immediately deploys the agon motif in order to cast these prohibitions as *exercises* designed by Moses to train moral athletes in the practice of ἐγκράτεια.¹²³ But how exactly does Moses' training program work? Since Moses prescribed these exercises in an effort to remove *extravagance* (ἀφελεῖν πολυτέλειαν), he evidently considered anything done for pleasure's sake to be an extravagance by definition. No one, in other words, ever *needs* to eat something delicious—one only *needs* to eat. By prohibiting delicacies, Moses in effect trained the people to eat according to their *need*—not their *pleasure*—instilling the virtues of "frugality" (ὀλιγοδείας) and "contentment" (εὐκολίας).¹²⁴ And the consistent practice of living according to *need* amounts to the consistent practice of ἐγκράτεια, since it represents, in terms of moral psychology, the consistent dominance of *reason* (as motivating disposition seeking the rational

¹²² Philo's reference to creatures of both land (pigs) and sea (scaleless creatures) proves that he still speaks in general, introductory terms at this point (cf. §100: χερσαίων ἢ ἐνύδρων ἢ πτηνῶν). His failure to give an example of an especially tasty *bird* may stem from his not having one to give. Cf. Heinemann PCH 2, 276, n. 2: "Auf die Vögel wird hier nicht eingegangen, da bekanntlich, was Philo §100 allerdings ausser acht lässt, sehr wohlschmeckende Vögel zum genusse erlaubt sind." His discussion of each distinct domain of creatures begins in earnest with land animals in §103.

¹²³ §101: πρὸς γὰρ ἐγκράτειαν . . . πρὸς ἄσκησιν ἀρετῆς [sc. ἐγκρατείας]. Note esp. the terms in §101 associated with Moses' training: ἀλείψαι (*to anoint with oil* [before gymnastic exercises]), γυμνάζει (*to train*), συγκροτεῖ (*to drill*). Cf. *Spec.* 2.98: τὸ παραπλήσιον μέντοι καὶ τοὺς ἀλείπτας ἔστιν ἰδεῖν δρώντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν· ὅταν γὰρ αὐτοὺς συγκροτήσωσιν ἐπαλλήλοισι καὶ συνεχέσι γυμνασίαις, πρὶν εἰς ἄκρον καμῆν, ἀνακτῶνται παρέχοντες ἀνέσεις . . . τῶν ἐν ἀθλήσει πόνων. On Philo's agon motif, see above, 125-30.

¹²⁴ Philo elsewhere connects ἐγκράτεια and (esp.) ὀλιγοδεία: e.g., *Opif.* 164: ἡ [ἐγκράτεια] εὐτέλειαν καὶ ὀλιγοδείαν καὶ ὅσον ἀναγκαῖον . . . ἀσπάζεται; *Mos.* 1.28-29: γαστρί τε γὰρ ἔξω τῶν ἀναγκαίων δασμῶν, οὓς ἡ φύσις ἔταξεν, οὐδὲν πλέον ἐχορήγει . . . γενόμενός τε διαφερόντως ἀσκητῆς ὀλιγοδείας; *QG* 4.172 (Petit): ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος οὐ

benefit of sustenance) over *desire* (as motivating disposition seeking the pleasure of delicious food). In other words, ἐπιθυμία trained to accept the measure set by reason never becomes *passionate*. At the same time, since the challenge of limiting indulgence to reasonable need accompanies *any* expression of ἐπιθυμία (for food, wealth, etc.), the habits of ἐγκράτεια Moses cultivates by prohibiting voluptuous *foods* apply more broadly to *any* situation requiring the moral agent to abstain from extravagant (i.e., unnecessary) pleasures.

According to Philo, the lifestyle of ἐγκράτεια Moses promotes through his legislation on clean and unclean animals strikes a perfect balance between two extreme positions. On the one hand, Moses avoids the overly austere approach (σκληραγωγίαν) of Lycurgus (ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος νομοθέτης), "loosening" the severity of the Spartan way (τὸ μὲν σφοδρὸν ἐχάλασε).¹²⁵ On the other hand, he avoids the overly indulgent (τὸ ἀβροδίαιτον) approach of Sardanapalus—"the man who introduced habits of feebleness and luxury to the Ionians and Sybarites" (ὁ τοῖς Ἴωσι καὶ Συβαρίταις τὰ περὶ θρύψιν καὶ χλιδὴν εἰσηγησάμενος)—"tightening" the laxity of his dissolute way of life (τὸ δ' ἀνεμείνον ἐπέτεινε).¹²⁶ To convey the harmonious moderation of *Moses'* approach, Philo uses the image of a musical instrument (ὄργάνω μουσικῶ)

πλεονέκτης, ἅτε ὀλιγοδεείας καὶ ἐγκρατείας ἑταῖρος; *Spec.* 1.173: ἐγκράτειαν, ἢ δορυφορεῖται πρὸς εὐτελείας καὶ εὐκολίας καὶ ὀλιγοδείας.

¹²⁵ Cf. *Contemp.* 69: τὴν . . . Λακωνικὴν σκληραγωγίαν.

¹²⁶ On Sardanapalus, see also §122 (cf. Sandnes, *Belly and Body*, 65-68; Abraham Malherbe, "The Beasts of Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71-80, esp. 76-77). The tomb of

sounding a beautiful "middle chord" (τῆ μέση) in place of extreme tones.¹²⁷

Despite the obvious rhetorical function of these appeals, Philo has in mind genuine ethical concerns. Moral agents of the Sardanapalus type, for example, would eat the delicious foods Moses prohibited, indulging in pleasure for pleasure's sake *because* desire rules their souls without the restraint or "measure" of reason. Moral agents of either the Lycurgus or Moses type would of course avoid *overly* pleasurable foods, but Philo gives no clear indication of what would otherwise distinguish their respective dietary habits. Presumably, Philo envisions the Spartan approach as determined avoidance of *any* pleasure: food serves only to sustain life, and pleasure—because it contributes nothing to that purpose—has no place in the Spartan diet.¹²⁸ Philo seems to envision *Moses'* approach as less severe, but similarly geared toward eating for sustenance over pleasure. While strictly opposed to eating *for pleasure's sake*, Moses nevertheless allows for the *incidental* pleasures accompanying a healthful diet. After all, he prohibits only the most delectable meats, generously allowing the people to enjoy a variety of other meats as they choose.

Sardanapalus supposedly read: ἔσθιε, πίνε, παίζε (see Sandness, *Belly and Body*, 66; Malherbe, "Beasts of Ephesus," 76). On the Sybarites, see also *Spec.* 3.43.

¹²⁷ §102: τὰς ἐφ' ἑκατέρων τῶν ἄκρων ὑπερβολὰς ὡς ἐν ὀργάνῳ μουσικῷ κερασάμενος τῆ μέση (cf. *Mut.* 87). Cf. *Resp.* 443 D-E; Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 444 E; Ps.-Metop. 121.8-9. On the relevant music theory, see Martin L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 219-23. More generally, see also Louis Feldman, "Philo's Views on Music," *JJML* 9 (1986): 36-54.

¹²⁸ Some Spartan dishes notoriously offered *no* pleasure to the palate, esp. "black broth" (μέλας ζωμός), a pork stew (e.g., see Plutarch *Lyc.* 12.6-7).

Plutarch offers similar praise of balanced moderation in *De garrulitate*, though he has in mind ἐπιθυμία *affecting the tongue*, not the stomach.¹²⁹ Just as Philo acknowledges three basic approaches to eating, Plutarch acknowledges three basic approaches to answering questions: "the barely necessary" (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον), "the polite" (τὸ φιλόνητον), and "the superfluous" (τὸ περισσόν).¹³⁰ And, like Philo, Plutarch associates the "barely necessary" with Spartan austerity:

For example, if someone asks, "Is Socrates at home?" one person may reply . . . "Not at home" (οὐκ ἔνδον). And if he wishes to adopt the Laconic style (λακωνίζειν), he may omit the "At home" (ἔνδον) and only utter the bare negative (αὐτὴν μόνην . . . τὴν ἀπόφασιν). So the Spartans, when Philip wrote to ask if they would receive him into their city, wrote a large "No" on the paper and sent it back. (*Garr.* 513 A)

Plutarch disapproves of the Spartan refusal to speak beyond what absolute necessity requires, just as Moses disapproves of the austere Spartan diet's emphasis on necessity *at the expense* of pleasure. But Plutarch disapproves also of *excessive* indulgence in speech, which involves a failure of "the indulgent and talkative man" (ὁ δὲ περιττὸς καὶ ἀδολέσχης) to tailor his answer to the questioner's need (τῆς χρείας τοῦ πυνθανομένου). In fact, Plutarch identifies the questioner's "need" (χρεία) as the "measure" (μέτρον) of a proper response (*Garr.* 513 C). Here Plutarch deploys the same Middle-Platonic concept of ἐπιθυμία attested in Philo's writings, understanding "passionate" desire as

¹²⁹ *Garr.* 513 A-C.

¹³⁰ *Garr.* 513 A.

immoderate desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία). In Plutarch's example, a desire to speak becomes *passionate* when it oversteps the reasonable measure (μέτρον) of politely providing needed information and motivates the moral agent to indulge in speaking *for the sake of speaking*, in particular for the *pleasure* derived from speaking. In Philo's example, a desire to eat becomes passionate (ἄμετρος) when it oversteps the reasonable measure (μέτρον) of amply providing needed sustenance and motivates the moral agent to indulge in eating *for the sake of eating*, in particular for the *pleasure* derived from eating.

Taken as a unit, §§100-102 undoubtedly serve as a thesis governing *all* of Philo's comments on Moses' legislation concerning clean and unclean animals. Not only do §§100-102 form a discrete text-unit preface to the detailed analyses of specific laws, but they also speak in the broad, synoptic terms characteristic of an overarching claim. Philo asserts, in sum, that Moses recognized throughout the animal kingdom (land, sea, and sky) the dangerous incitement to ἐπιθυμία posed by delicious meats, and he obviated the risk by declaring those animals "unclean." By removing the incitement, he sought to lessen the incidence of *passionate desire*, which so easily burgeons into *tyrannical desire*. Although Philo explains how such prohibitions promote also a *lifestyle* of ἐγκράτεια (§§101-102)—thereby subsuming all of §§100-118 under his earlier, express purpose of showing how *all* dietary laws promote ἐγκράτεια (§§95-97)—his thesis regarding the legislation on clean and unclean animals *specifically* asserts

Moses' intention to eliminate passionate desire by prohibiting delicious meats. He makes this claim *prospectively* in §§100-102, but also *retrospectively* in §118, where he recapitulates it, creating an unmistakable interpretive frame for §§103-117.¹³¹ So Philo ostensibly draws just *one* fundamental conclusion from his investigation of clean and unclean animals—a conclusion he prompts the *reader* to accept by placing it prominently at both the beginning and end of his work. Composing §§100-118 in this way, Philo inadvertently offers a criterion for assessing his work, since each consideration of a certain animal or type of animal either *does* or *does not* support the overarching thesis. If it does, then Philo reveals consistency in his analysis of the clean and unclean animals. If it does *not*, then Philo reveals an inconsistency, which calls for some sort of explanation. And a consideration of the *inconsistencies* in Philo's work helps to illustrate his underlying expository agenda.

§§103 – 109: *Land Animals*¹³²

[§103] Take the case of man-eating beasts. Someone might easily consider it perfectly just for them to endure from man the same fate they impose. But Moses, carefully considering what befits a gentle soul, thinks we should abstain from enjoying the meat of such creatures—which do provide, by the way, a most suitable and delicious feast. You see, while perpetrators certainly deserve to suffer in kind, it should not be at the hands of their victims, lest we become beasts unknowingly by indulging a passionate desire for revenge against man-eaters.¹³³ [§104] In fact, Moses

¹³¹ Rhodes ("Diet and Desire," 133) notes the "inclusio" formed by §§100-102 and §118.

¹³² See Lev 11:1-8; Deut 14:3-8

¹³³ *lest we become beasts unknowingly by indulging a passionate desire for revenge against man-eaters* (μη λάθωσιν ὑπ' ὀργῆς, ἀγρίου πάθους, θηριωθέντες): Philo's consideration of ὀργή in an exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις makes sense in light of Aristotle's consideration of ὀργή in *Rhetoric* 1378a30 – 1378b10, where he defines it as an *appetite* (ὄρεξις) for *retribution*

makes so extreme an effort to prevent such behavior as to forbid categorically the eating of *all* carnivorous animals, wanting to restrain preemptively the impulse for revenge against man-eaters.¹³⁴ He designated instead the herbivores as suitable livestock fit for eating, since they are tame by nature and eat only the gentle yield of the earth. Such creatures never plot mischief against anyone. [§105] Now, of the herbivores, Moses lists ten approved for eating: the calf, the lamb, the kid, the deer, the gazelle, the fallow deer, the ibex, the addax, the oryx, and the giraffe. Because of his constant devotion to numerical theory, which he acutely understood as being of the greatest possible significance in every matter, Moses legislates nothing great or small without first considering the appropriate number and, as it were, affixing that number to the precepts. And of the numbers following the monad, the decad represents absolute perfection—a most holy and sacred number, as Moses declares. Here he places it on the various types of clean animals as a seal of approval, once he decided to grant their use to members of his commonwealth. [§106] He also provides a simple way of authenticating and approving these ten animals, based on a pair of traits they all exhibit: each has split hooves and chews its cud. Animals that exhibit neither of these traits, or only one of them, are in Moses' view unclean. You see, these two traits are really symbolic representations of the most enlightened methods of teaching and learning, which can, when put into practice, lead to the clear discernment of moral excellence from its opposite. [§107] Consider the ruminating animal. After taking a few initial bites, the food settles in its gullet. Then after a short while, bringing it up again, the animal works it into a smoother substance, before finally sending it down into the stomach. In the same way, a student takes in through his ears various philosophical doctrines and theories from his teacher. But unable to comprehend immediately and grasp the lesson

(τιμωρία) (cf. Ps.-Andr. 231.81: Ὀργή . . . ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας τοῦ ἡδίκηκεναι δοκοῦντος), conceivable in broader terms as an *appetite* (ὄρεξις) for *pleasure* (ἡδονή)—namely, the pleasure of retribution (cf. *Spec.* 3.85). The issue here is not a desire for revenge *per se*, but the danger of such a desire becoming excessive (passionate) due to the personal involvement of the agent of justice. On ὄργη and other terms for "anger," see William V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 50-70 [= "The Greek and Latin Terminology"]. On the likelihood of Philo's concept of ὄργη being similar to Aristotle's, note esp. Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 61: "All or most of the many definitions of *orgē* which later writers offer are more or less simplified versions of the one in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, not that most of their authors will have known the Aristotelian text."

¹³⁴ *wanting to restrain preemptively the impulse for revenge against man-eaters* (βουλόμενος τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ λεχθέντα ὀρμὴν ἀπαγορεύσαι): The ὀρμή Philo has in mind of course involves eating the meat of man-eaters, but for him such eating *amounts to* an act of revenge. In other words, Moses sought to legislate against the ὀρμή (cf. ὄρεξις, ἐπιθυμία) for τιμωρία, which could too easily become excessive (passionate) when killing and eating this type of animal.

firmly, he continues to hold onto it, until by bringing it up again over and over in his memory through repeated exercises, which act as a sort of cement for ideas, he imprints it securely onto his soul. [§108] But the firm grasp of ideas, it seems, does no good at all without the added ability of sorting through them and making decisions about which to accept and which to reject. This ability to discriminate appears under the symbol of the split hoof, indicating that there are just two roads in life: one leading to vice and one leading to virtue. Of course we must turn from one and never leave the other. [§109] So animals whose hooves are either not split at all or split more than once are equally unclean, but for different reasons. The first kind represents the idea that good and evil have one and the same nature—in the sense that one spherical surface has both a concave and a convex aspect, or one road runs both up and down a hill at the same time. The second kind, far from offering no choice at all, deceives the traveler by presenting many different roads in life. With a multitude of options, finding the best and most productive path becomes difficult.

Philo's consideration of land animals begins at §103, continues through §109, and divides easily into three sections: (1) an explanation of why Moses did not sanction the slaughter of man-eating animals (or *any* carnivores) for food (§§103-104a), (2) an introduction and listing of the ten "clean" herbivores, with special emphasis on the number ten (§§104b-105), and (3) a symbolic interpretation of Moses' criteria for designating a land animal "clean" (§§106-109).¹³⁵ Of these, only his discussion of man-eating animals bears any clear relation to the issues of ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις raised more broadly throughout his exposition—but even here the relation seems contrived in two respects. First, Moses never *explicitly* prohibits man-eating animals—or *any* carnivorous land animals, for that matter—despite their obvious failure to meet the criteria for

¹³⁵ Philo gives no formal introduction to this section, but note his retrospective comment in §110: τούτους ἐπὶ τῶν χερσαίων τοὺς ὄρους θείας.

clean animals.¹³⁶ So Philo's decision to make any comment at all on man-eating animals stems from his own agenda, not an exegetical imperative. Second, the case of man-eaters does not, strictly speaking, confirm the thesis Philo has just formulated in §100 about *how* Moses' dietary restrictions promote ἐγκράτεια. But the "prohibition" of man-eaters does *resemble* the type of restriction, and the accompanying strategy for promoting ἐγκράτεια, that Philo's thesis attributes to Moses. All of this suggests an effort on Philo's part to find at least *one* other example, in addition to the pig, of a land animal whose flesh incites ἐπιθυμία and whose removal from the diet is meant therefore to obviate passion.

While man-eating animals, in Philo's estimation, no doubt make "a most suitable and delicious feast" (§103), he evidently does not consider them as *dangerously* delicious as pigs and scaleless sea creatures (§101), because he explains their prohibition on different—though analogous—grounds. Because these animals kill and eat human beings, retributive justice warrants their *being* killed and eaten in return.¹³⁷ Moses, however, recognized a great moral danger whenever victims take the place of dispassionate agents of justice in executing a sentence, since victims easily succumb to their own *desire* for revenge—succumb, in other words, to the emotion of "wrath" or "anger" (ὀργή). If the followers of Moses were, for example, allowed to eat lions, they might do so *not*

¹³⁶ Which Philo reviews in §§106-109. This technicality may account for Philo's wording: Μωσῆ δὲ τῆς τούτων ἀπολαύσεως ἀνέχειν δοκεῖ.

¹³⁷ §103: δίκαιον εἶναι τὰ αὐτὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων πάσχειν οἷς διατίθησι; τοῖς διατιθεῖσιν ἀρμόττει τὰ παραπλήσια παθεῖν.

from a reasonable desire to nourish their bodies but from a passionate desire to avenge all who have fallen prey to lions. As Philo puts it, they might "become beasts" (θηριωθέντες) by indulging the "savage passion of wrath" (ὑπ' ὀργῆς, ἀγρίου πάθους). So the lion, like the pig, represents a delectable meal, but in a fundamentally different sense. The pig incites ἐπιθυμία by promising abundant pleasure through the sweet taste of delicious meat. The lion incites ἐπιθυμία by promising abundant pleasure, too, but through the sweet taste of *revenge*.

Moses, understanding the meat of man-eating animals to be especially pleasurable in this qualified sense, recognized a danger and did not allow his followers to consider such animals a source of food. In fact, as Philo goes on to explain in §104, Moses was so eager to protect against the dangerous "impulse" (ὀρμή) to kill and eat *with a vengeance*, that he forbade as a precaution the consumption of any animal that kills and eats other *animals*—let alone human beings.¹³⁸ Herbivores, Moses reasoned, never plot mischief against anyone, man or animal (μηδὲν εἰς ἐπιβουλὴν πραγματευόμενα), so no one runs the risk of eating them *with a vengeance*. In other words, no one could ever reasonably perceive *herbivores* as reprehensible aggressors, so no one could ever reasonably harbor a dangerous, potentially overwhelming desire to punish them.

In some respects, Philo's discussion of man-eating land animals, including his ensuing remarks on carnivores and herbivores, invites comparison with

¹³⁸ §104: ὥστε μακρόθεν ἀνείρξαι βουλόμενος τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ λεχθέντα ὀρμήν.

Eleazar's discussion of clean and unclean birds in the *Letter of Aristeas*.¹³⁹ Both discussions highlight the contrasting characteristics of carnivores and herbivores, both label the former "savage" or "wild" (ἄγριος) and the latter "gentle" or "tame" (ἥμερος), and both draw attention to correspondingly "savage" (ἄγριος) and "gentle" (ἥμερος) characteristics in human beings. But despite these notable similarities, the two discussions represent radically different understandings of what Moses sought to accomplish through his dietary legislation.¹⁴⁰ The *Letter of Aristeas*, on the one hand, believes that the ethical benefit of Moses' legislation on unclean, savage, carnivores and clean, gentle, herbivores derives from a *symbolic* application.¹⁴¹ The animals exemplify certain noble and ignoble character traits, which Moses either commends or condemns *symbolically* through the designations "clean" and "unclean." To eat or abstain as prescribed does not *in itself* affect the character of the moral agent, who must first correctly discern and then embrace the moral exhortations Moses expresses symbolically through his legislation. Philo, on the other hand, believes that the ethical benefit of the carnivore-herbivore legislation derives from a strictly *literal* application.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ See esp. Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 123-25.

¹⁴⁰ Pace Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," esp. 125: "[B]oth Philo and Aristeas discern a similar logic operative in the dietary legislation."

¹⁴¹ *Let. Arist.* 148-49: "By such examples, then, the lawgiver has commended to men of understanding a symbol (σημειοῦσθαι) that they must be just and achieve nothing by violence, nor, confiding in their own strength, must they oppress others. For if it is lawful not even to touch the creatures aforementioned because of their several natures, how must we not in every way guard our characters from degenerating to a similar state."

¹⁴² In other words, Philo attributes *no* symbolic significance to Moses' legislation on unclean, savage, carnivores and clean, gentle, herbivores. Philo obviously *does* engage in symbolic interpretations through much of §§100-118: namely, §§106-109 (criteria for clean land

Man-eating animals do not, in Philo's view, *represent* a reprehensible character trait. They *actually* eat human beings—who might *actually* eat them in return, indulging an *actual* vengeance that overshadows reason. By literally abstaining from the meat of man-eaters, the soul literally abstains from a troublesome passion. Similarly, Moses does not prohibit carnivores as a class because they *represent* violence, oppression, or some other vicious trait, but because a person accustomed to eating all sorts of carnivores will have difficulty abstaining from one particular sort, the man-eaters.¹⁴³ As for herbivores, both Eleazar and Philo commend them as "gentle" (ἡμερος) creatures satisfied with the fruit of the

animals), §§110-112 (criteria for clean aquatic animals), §§113-115 (clean and unclean "creeping" animals). But he invariably *announces* his symbolic interpretations: ταυτὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα ἀμφοτέρωθεν σύμβολα (§106), σύμβολα δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ (§112), πάλιν αἰνιττόμενος διὰ μὲν ἐρπετῶν (§113), πάλιν διὰ συμβόλων (§114). He makes no such announcement in §103-105. Heinemann (*Bildung*, 161) acknowledges: "Philon kennt für die Speisegesetze allegorische und wörtliche Begründungen"—and he gives examples of the two approaches (161-66). Under "wörtliche Begründungen," Heinemann mentions first the prohibition of "besonders wohlschmeckende Tiere" (such as pork), recognizing Moses' goal of "zur Selbstbeherrschung anregen" (163). In Heinemann's view, the prohibition of man-eaters involves "wörtliche Begründungen" as well, but he does *not* situate this prohibition within the larger context of promoting self-control in service to the Tenth Commandment.

¹⁴³ Pace Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 123: "Philo advances an allegorical argument that explains why no carnivores are among those permitted for food." Unlike Eleazar (*Let. Arist.* 146-149), Philo attributes to Moses no objection to carnivores *per se*, on allegorical, symbolic, or any other grounds. In Philo's view, Moses prohibits *all* carnivores only to increase the likelihood of his followers successfully abstaining from the *one* type of carnivore whose meat endangers the soul—namely, man-eaters (cf. Heinemann, *Bildung*, 164: "Das Verbot anderer Fleischfresser betrachtet Philon als Schutzmaßnahme, um die Begier nach menschenfressenden Tieren zu unterdrücken). In other words, Moses' tacit prohibition of all carnivores really only targets creatures that grievously offend human beings. The behavior of carnivores *as carnivores* has at best an incidental significance. Eleazar, by contrast, understands Moses to have concerned himself *first* with the nature of carnivores *per se*, whose aggression *happens* to affect human beings in some cases: "But of the winged creatures which are forbidden you will find that they are wild and carnivorous and with their strength oppress the rest and procure their food with injustice at the expense of the tame fowl mentioned above. And not only these, but they also seize lambs and kids, and they do violence to men too (καὶ τοὺς ἀθρώπους δὲ ἀδικοῦσι), both the dead and the living" (*Let. Arist.* 146).

earth.¹⁴⁴ But they again differ as to the *symbolic* or *literal* significance of this disposition. For Eleazar, a person who merely follows Moses' instruction to eat only herbivores misses Moses' real purpose, which was to promote the sort of life herbivores *represent*: a life of justice that oppresses no one.¹⁴⁵ For Philo, the person who eats only herbivores—even with no reflection on the *significance* of the rule—fulfills Moses' purpose, which was to safeguard his followers from a passionate desire for revenge by allowing them to eat only harmless creatures.

So despite superficial similarities, Philo's remarks in §§103-104 represent a radical departure from Eleazar's discussion of clean (herbivorous) and unclean (carnivorous) birds in the *Letter of Aristeas*. Eleazar, for his part, understood the dietary laws in terms of moral exhortation. Once decoded properly, obscure regulations about "clean" and "unclean" animals become straightforward ethical maxims—such as, "Be just and achieve nothing by violence" (*Let. Arist.* 148). But while they inform a moral agent's *theoretical* conception of what virtue requires, actual observance of the dietary laws yields no *practical* benefit, no *training* in virtue. In other words, they involve *learning* (μάθησις) and not *practice* (ἄσκησις). Philo, by contrast, understands these dietary laws in terms of moral psychology, construing them as practical exercises designed to eliminate passionate desire

¹⁴⁴ *Let. Arist.* 145: πάντα ἡμερα; *Let. Arist.* 147: τὰ . . . ἡμερα ζωα τὰ φυόμενα τῶν ὀσπρίων ἐπὶ γῆς δαπανᾷ; *Spec.* 4.104: ἡμέρους ἀγέλας, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ τιθασά, τροφαῖς ἡμέροις αἷς ἀναδίδωσι γῆ χρώμενα.

¹⁴⁵ *Let. Arist.* 147: ἐκ δικαίου τὰ τοῦ βίου κυβερνᾶν . . . οὐ καταδυσστεύει πρὸς τὴν ἐπαναίρεσιν τῶν συγγενικῶν.

and promote ἐγκράτεια.¹⁴⁶ Everyone who puts them into *practice* benefits from them, with or without an awareness of the ethical *theory* Moses used to formulate them.¹⁴⁷ In fact, *only* those who put them into practice benefit from them. The relative unimportance of knowledge and understanding stems from the fact that these laws involve the training and management of the soul's non-rational part. In other words, they ultimately involve *practice* (ἄσκησις), not *learning* (μάθησις)—and this fits Philo's overall agenda in the exposition. In fact, his effort to construe the dietary laws as a matter of ἄσκησις explains his treatment of split hooves and rumination.

After a brief listing of the ten species of clean herbivores (§105), Philo considers the two authenticating "signs" (σημεῖα) common to all ten: split hooves and rumination (§§106-109).¹⁴⁸ Because he ascribes a symbolic significance to these two traits, Philo's commentary begins at this point to resemble more closely the *Letter of Aristeas*, which also interprets split hooves and rumination symbolically (*Let. Arist.* 150-60). But despite his application of the same mode of interpretation to the same material, Philo manages to draw different conclusions *because of* his different interpretive agenda. Although Philo cannot make split hooves and rumination speak directly to issues of ἐπιθυμία and ἐγκράτεια, he

¹⁴⁶ This fits the overall purpose(s) of his exposition. NB the discourse of moral psychology in *Spec.* 4.103-04: ὀργῆς, ἀγρίου πάθους; τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ λεχθέντα ὀρμῆν.

¹⁴⁷ In other words, not eating man-eaters helps to eliminate passionate desire for revenge, whether or not someone understands *why* it helps.

¹⁴⁸ See Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 125-27. Philo considers the same "signs" in a similar way in *Agr.* 131-45.

can make them speak to the issue of ἄσκησις, which in turn allows him to maintain the coherence of his work by tying this particular portion to his broader expository agenda.¹⁴⁹ Philo engages the notion of ἄσκησις *primarily* through his remarks on rumination, which both he and Eleazar identify as a symbol of "memory" (μνήμη).¹⁵⁰ But unlike Eleazar—who interprets rumination in terms of the *content* of memory: namely, remembrance of God¹⁵¹—Philo interprets rumination in terms of the *faculty* of memory *per se*: namely, memory as a type of ἄσκησις, which serves the learning process by making thoughts of *whatever content* secure in the mind through repetition (§107).¹⁵² This type of ἄσκησις obviously differs from the type of ἄσκησις used to acquire ἐγκράτεια, which involves forcibly training a non-rational power (ἐπιθυμία) to obey reason. But in both cases the moral agent must actively engage certain faculties to achieve

¹⁴⁹ So §§106-109 fit sensibly into Philo's exposition, even though he seems to have lost all sight of issues pertinent to the Tenth Commandment—namely, ἐπιθυμία and ἐγκράτεια. Because Colson misses the importance of ἄσκησις to Philo's expository agenda, he does not see the relevance of §§106-109: "In [§§100-105] the prohibition of certain kinds of beasts, fishes, and birds is based on the supposition that they are the most appetizing and to abstain from them encourages self-control. It will be seen that from §106 onwards a totally different line of argument is adopted, viz. that philosophical and moral lessons are intended by the distinctions" (68, n. a); cf. Rhodes, "Diet and Desire," 127: "One cannot help but think that in his discussion of rumination and cloven hooves, Philo has wandered from his initial theme of desire and self-control." Rhodes, however, does *not* miss the relevance of Philo's other symbolic interpretations (§§110-115) to issues of ἐγκράτεια and ἐπιθυμία ("Diet and Desire," 127-31).

¹⁵⁰ Philo's special interest in *memory* comes through in the ordering of his commentary on the two traits: *first* rumination (memory), *then* the split hoof, despite his initial listing of first the split hoof, then rumination (§106: τό τε διχληεῖν καὶ τὸ μηρυκᾶσθαι). The Pentateuch mentions *first* the split hoof, *then* rumination (Lev 11:3; Deut 14:6)—and Eleazar naturally comments on the traits in that order. Philo's reversal suggests a deliberate reorganizing of the material.

¹⁵¹ E.g., *Let. Arist.* 155: μνεῖα μνησθήση κυρίου; *Let. Arist.* 157: μνημονεύειν τοῦ κρατούντος θεοῦ; *Let. Arist.* 158: πρὸς τὸ μνεῖαν . . . θεοῦ (cf. *Let. Arist.* 160).

¹⁵² In *Leg.* 3.18, Philo lists τῶν καλῶν μνημαῖ among the μέρη τῆς ἀσκήσεως. On Philo's understanding of the role of μνήμη in the learning process, see *Post.* 148-49 (cf. *Agr.* 131-35).

certain ends. Furthermore, in both cases the engagement takes the form of discrete exercises, since memory employs "constant exercises" (συνεχέσι μελέταις) as the "cement of thoughts" (κόλλα νοημάτων).¹⁵³ So in the symbolic interpretations that follow (§§110-115), Philo does *not* construe the dietary laws as practical exercises designed to inculcate ἐγκράτεια, as he did, for example, with the prohibition of pork. Rather, he construes them as repositories for the *principles* of ἐγκράτεια, which—once properly discerned—are indeed mastered and secured in the mind through practice.¹⁵⁴ Here Philo's symbolic method corresponds to that of the *Letter of Aristeeas*, which likewise extracts ethical *principles* from the dietary laws with little concern for the practical implications of their literal observance. Yet even when Philo *does* replicate Eleazar's technique, the technique serves a different agenda. Philo ultimately has in mind a very practical program of desire management, which the theoretical principles outlined in §§110-115 commend.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ On the association of μελέτη with ἄσκησις, see, e.g., *Leg.* 3.18: μέρη τῆς ἀσκήσεως . . . μελέταις; *Sacr.* 85-86: μελέτην καὶ ἄσκησιν αὐτῶν ποιείσθαι συνεχῆ . . . συνεχῆς γὰρ ἄσκησις ἐπιστήμην πάγιον ἐργάζεται (cf. *Gig.* 26; *Conf.* 110; *Migr.* 31). See also Pierre Hadot, "La philosophie antique: une éthique ou une pratique?," in *Problèmes de la Morale Antique* (ed. Paul Demont; Amiens: Université de Picardie-Jules Verne, 1993), 7-37, esp. 23-24; and Mosès, 264-65, n. 4: "La μελέτη mémorisante peut être également évoquée à travers l'image de la simple mastication (*Leg.* I, 98) ou à travers le symbole de la manne concassée (*Sacrif.* 86). Ce type d'exercice mental appartient à la plupart des ascèses philosophiques de l'époque."

¹⁵⁴ Cf. §107: τὰ σοφίας δόγματα καὶ θεωρήματα.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *Somn.* 1.169: "There being, then, three methods by which virtue accrues, it is the first and third that are most intimately connected (τοὺς ἄκρους μάλιστα συμβέβηκεν ἠνώσθαι); for what comes by practice is the offspring and product of that which comes by learning (τὸ γὰρ ἀκῆσει ἔγγονον τοῦ μαθήσει) . . ."

§§110 – 112: *Aquatic Animals*¹⁵⁶

[§110] After establishing these restrictions for land animals, Moses begins to list aquatic animals that are clean and approved for eating. Here again he clearly marks the clean species with a pair of traits—fins and scales—rejecting with disapproval any animal that exhibits neither or only one of them. Now, this requires an accurate explanation. [§111] You see, creatures lacking either or both of these traits get dragged along by the current, unable to withstand the force of its movement. But creatures equipped with both face the current head-on and repel it. Eager to contend with the opponent, they train themselves with zeal and invincible daring: pushed they push back, chased they turn and charge, hemmed in they clear wide swaths for an easy escape. [§112] As with the land animals mentioned earlier, these two types of aquatic creatures are also symbols: the first represents the soul of a lover of pleasure, the second represents the soul enamored of endurance and self-control. After all, the road to pleasure is downhill all the way—easier than any other. So instead of a path for walking, it ends up being more like a slippery slope. By contrast, the road to self-control is a steep uphill climb—laborious, to be sure, but more beneficial than any other. The road to pleasure whisks us away and compels our descent, bearing us down headlong until at last it flings us off into the lowest depths. But the other road leads upward to heaven, granting immortality to those who do not grow weary, who have the strength to endure its rough and challenging climb.

In his symbolic interpretation of the criteria for clean land animals, Philo had to reckon with a traditional, perhaps even authoritative, understanding of the significance of rumination and split hooves, but his interpretation of fins and scales, the criteria for clean *aquatic* animals, seems like a novel venture. While he does use the traditional *technique* of correlating animal behavior with human character—just as Eleazar did in the case of carnivorous birds (*Let. Arist.* 145-49)—Philo's *results* seem original, given their tailored fit to his expository agenda. He begins with a characterization of the unclean aquatic animal, which

¹⁵⁶ See Lev 11:9-12; Deut 14:9-10.

lacks fins, or scales, or both. Such a creature, he notes, get swept away by the current, "unable to withstand the force of its movement" (ἀντέχειν ἀδυνατοῦντα τῇ βίᾳ τῆς φορᾶς) (§111). Since Philo commonly uses the term φορά ("movement") as a synonym for the technical term ὁρμή ("impulse"), his wording here mirrors the discourse of moral psychology deployed elsewhere in his writings.¹⁵⁷ In particular, he portrays the plight of someone mastered by the non-rational impulse(s) of ἐπιθυμία, someone identified explicitly in §112 as the φιλήδονος ψυχῆ. Consistent with his Middle-Platonic view of the soul, Philo portrays a contest of power within the moral agent whose reason (λόγος) suffers abject defeat, unable (ἀδυνατοῦντα) to withstand the *force* (τῇ βίᾳ) of the dominating non-rational power (ἐπιθυμία). Just as the *current* absolutely directs the movement of a finless, scaleless creature, so ἐπιθυμία-turned-ἔρωσ absolutely directs the movement of a φιλήδονος ψυχῆ, as it travels along the easy path to pleasure (ἐφ' ἡδονῆν).¹⁵⁸ By contrast, aquatic animals *with* fins and

¹⁵⁷ On τῇ βίᾳ τῆς φορᾶς, cf. *Leg.* 1.73: τῇ βίᾳ τῆς ὁρμῆς; *Agr.* 94: ἐπιστομίζειν τῆς πλεοναζούσης τὴν φορὰν ὁρμῆς. On the virtual synonymy of ὁρμή and φορά, note the generic Stoic definition of impulse: λέγουσιν . . . ὁρμὴν εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι κατὰ τὸ γένος (*ESE* 9). On Philo's use of φορά in the context of moral psychology, note e.g. *Leg.* 3.134: ἴν' οὗτος ἡνιόχου τρόπον ἐπιστομίζῃ τὴν ἐπὶ πλέον [τῶν παθῶν] φορὰν; *Leg.* 3.155: ἐπιστομιεῖ γὰρ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἐγκαλινῶσει τὴν ῥύμην καὶ φορὰν τοῦ πάθους; *Agr.* 88: τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀλόγου καὶ ἀμέτρου καὶ ἀπειθοῦς φορᾶς; *Fug.* 91: τὴν τῶν παθῶν ἀνεγείρει φορὰν; *Virt.* 14: ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν παθῶν φορᾶς κατακλύζεσθαι. Philo elsewhere equates water (ὑδωρ) with the φορά of the passions (πάθη), e.g. *Leg.* 2.103: ὑπὸ τὸ ὑδωρ τουτέστιν ὑπὸ τὴν φορὰν τῶν παθῶν; *Conf.* 70: "ὑπὸ τὸ ὑδωρ" . . . τουτέστιν ὑπὸ τὴν παθῶν φορὰν.

¹⁵⁸ The φιλήδονος ψυχῆ, mastered by tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ), orients its life toward the "good" invariably sought by desire, which is pleasure (ἡδονή) (see above, 87-94). In §112, Philo signals the presence of *harmful* ἔρωσ in the φιλήδονος ψυχῆ by contrasting it with the soul enamored of endurance and self-control (καρτερίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν ποθοῦσης), whose longing

scales stoutly oppose the current (§111). Philo characterizes *their* behavior using the agon motif, portraying the sort of struggle against ἐπιθυμία engaged by those who acquire ἐγκράτεια through *practice* (ἄσκησις).¹⁵⁹ In his view, these creatures symbolize the soul that yearns for endurance and self-control (καρτερίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν ποθοῦσης [ψυχῆς]). This soul travels a difficult, yet profitable, path, which leads not only to ἐγκράτεια but ultimately to heaven (εἰς οὐρανόν) for those strong enough to endure it. By highlighting issues of ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις, Philo incorporates his interpretation of clean aquatic animals into the larger purpose of his exposition.

§§113 – 115: "Reptiles"¹⁶⁰

[§113] Moses applies the same idea to reptiles, declaring both creatures with no feet, which wriggle about by sliding on their stomach, and four-legged creatures with many feet unclean for eating—but he is once again hinting here at something else. Reptiles with no feet represent people who live for their bellies, who gorge themselves like cormorants, bringing a series of endless tributes to their sovereign ruler, the wretched belly. With liquor, pastries, seafood, and in general whatever baked treat or tasty relish the exacting culinary arts produce for every sort of dish, these people fan and stoke their boundless and insatiable desires. Reptiles with four legs and many feet represent the miserable slaves of not just *one* passion, desire, but of all passions, which generically are four in number, each having many species. The tyranny of one passion is hard enough—how oppressive and unbearable the tyranny of many! [§114] But among reptiles, Moses designates as "clean" creatures with legs above their feet enabling them to leap up off of the ground. These are the various kinds of grasshoppers, along with the creature known as the "snake fighter." Once

(πόθος) indicates the presence of *beneficial* ἔρωσ (on the ἔρωσ-πόθος connection, see above, 161, n. 48).

¹⁵⁹ §111: πρὸς τὸν ἀντίπαλον . . . γυμνάζεται. Cf. *Spec.* 1.149: ἀντίπαλον δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἐγκράτεια. For "resisting current," the passions, and the agon motif, see esp. *Mut.* 214-15.

¹⁶⁰ See Lev 11:2-23, 41-45. Here "reptiles" in the broad sense of creatures that "creep" (τῶν ἐρπετῶν) (cf. Lat. *repere*).

again, Moses is using symbols to carefully examine the different habits and dispositions of a rational soul. In this case, we learn that the powerful pull of the body naturally weighs foolish people down, strangling and crushing them as it adds its force to the great sinking mass of mortal existence. [§115] Some happy souls, however, can resist the downward force of that pull with a superior counterforce. Taught by the principles of proper instruction to leap upward from earth and all earthly concerns into the ethereal circuits of heaven, these souls glimpse a vision deemed worthy of envy and struggle by all who forgo half-hearted efforts and attain it through determined resolve.

In his explicit references to the structure of his commentary on clean and unclean animals, Philo acknowledge only *three* major elements—animals of land, sea, and sky—leaving no place in his outline for the reptiles (τὰ ἔρπετά) of §§113-115, *except* as part of his discussion of aquatic animals (§§110-112).¹⁶¹ He obviously does *not* place reptiles in the same *physical* domain, but they do, in his view, share with aquatic creatures the same *symbolic* domain, which justifies their standing together with aquatic creatures under the same rubric. In Philo's view, Moses formulated dietary restrictions for the reptiles using "the same idea" (τῆς δ' αὐτῆς ιδέας) he had used when formulating restrictions for aquatic creatures (§113).¹⁶² Generally speaking, Moses' "idea" involved the correlation of animal behavior with human character, a correlation noted also by Eleazar in the *Letter of Aristeas* (esp. 145-49). But *specifically*, Moses saw in both aquatic

¹⁶¹ When he finally begins his discussion of birds in §116, Philo claims to have considered only *two* classes of animal (land and aquatic) up to that point, so apparently none of the creatures mentioned in §§113-115 represent a distinct class (§116: Ἐπεληλυθὼς οὖν τῷ λόγῳ τὰς τε τῶν χερσαίων καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνύδρων ζῴων ιδέας). Elsewhere, Philo plainly states that his discussion of clean and unclean animals involves only three distinct varieties of creature: of *land*, *sea*, and *sky* (§100: ὅσα τῶν χερσαίων ἢ ἐνύδρων ἢ πτηνῶν; cf. §118).

¹⁶² Cf. §113: πάλιν αἰνιττόμενος διὰ μὲν ἔρπετῶν.

creatures *and* reptiles certain physiological traits indicative of ἐγκράτεια: either its abject absence, amounting to φιληδονία, or its salutary presence. By designating creatures either "clean" or "unclean" in accordance with their traits, Moses instructs students of his dietary laws in matters bearing on the Tenth Commandment, either commending the vigorous management of ἐπιθυμία (ἐγκράτεια) or denouncing enslavement to ἐπιθυμία (φιληδονία). In the case of aquatic creatures, Moses explores the symbolic significance of fins and scales, while in the case of reptiles, he considers the symbolic significance of *feet*.

Philo subdivides the unclean reptiles into those "with *no* feet" (ἄποδα) and those "with four legs and *many* feet" (τετρασκελή καὶ πολύποδα), and both represent souls utterly devoid of ἐγκράτεια (§113).¹⁶³ By creatures "with no feet," Philo clearly means *serpents*, which of necessity "wriggle about by sliding on their stomach" (συρμῶ τῆς γαστρὸς ἰλυσπώμενα).¹⁶⁴ Symbolically, serpents represent people who live *for their bellies* (ἐπὶ κοιλίας), specifically for the *pleasure* derived from eating and drinking. Holding pleasure as their ultimate aim, such people embody φιληδονία, the condition of soul indicative of tyrannical

¹⁶³ The actual terms Philo uses to classify unclean reptiles do not appear in the biblical prohibition in Lev 11:41-42: καὶ πᾶν ἔρπετόν, ὃ ἔρπει ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, βδέλυγμα τοῦτο ἔσται ὑμῖν, οὐ βρωθήσεται. καὶ πᾶς ὁ πορευόμενος ἐπὶ κοιλίας (cf. ἄποδα) καὶ πᾶς ὁ πορευόμενος ἐπὶ τέσσαρα διὰ παντός (cf. τετρασκελή), ὃ πολυπληθεῖ ποσὶν (cf. πολύποδα) ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔρπετοῖς τοῖς ἔρπουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, οὐ φάγεθε αὐτό, ὅτι βδέλυγμα ὑμῖν ἔστιν (Lev 11:41-42). Philo offers a similar interpretation of Lev 11:42 in *Leg.* 3.139.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Lev 11:42: πᾶς ὁ πορευόμενος ἐπὶ κοιλίας. Cf. the serpent's curse in Gen 3:14: ἐπὶ τῷ στήθει σου καὶ τῇ κοιλίᾳ πορεύσῃ (on which see *Leg.* 3.65, 114-16, 160).

desire.¹⁶⁵ Philo further suggests the involvement of tyrannical desire with his description of those who live "for their bellies," echoing his earlier description of those consumed by tyrannical desire affecting the belly (§91).¹⁶⁶ Instead of controlling desire with ἐγκράτεια, such people end up constantly *stimulating* desire, which in their case can never reach satiety because the deposed rational faculty sets no limit.¹⁶⁷ Similarly, creatures "with four legs and *many* feet" represent people who, in general, fail to master the soul's non-rational forces through ἐγκράτεια and become instead mastered *by* those forces. In particular, Philo has in mind souls dominated by *all* of the passions (πάθη): not just the four generic passions (τετρασκελῆ [ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή, φόβος, λύπη]), but also their many various species (πολύποδα). Philo's symbolical reflection at this point involves *all* passions, clearly transcending the scope of his overarching topic, the prohibition of *one* passion in οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις. But he still singles out ἐπιθυμία for special mention in his description of reptilian souls, comparing their subjugation to *many* passions to the miserable slavery and harsh despotism

¹⁶⁵ Cf. *Leg.* 3.159: ὁ μὲν φιλήδονος ἐπὶ κοιλίαν βαδίζει.

¹⁶⁶ Apart from general similarities, note especially the terms common to both passages: γαστέρα (§91) and γαστρός/γαστρί (§113); ἀκορέστους (§91) and ἀκορέστους (§113); ἀκράτου (§91) and ἀκράτου (§113); ἰχθύων (§91) and ἰχθύων (§113); ἐδεσμάτων (§91) and ἐδεσμάτων (§113); ἰλυσπωμένους (§91) and ἰλυσπώμενα (§113). Philo does, however, compare gluttonous people to other sorts of animals in the two passages: *dogs* in §91 (τρόπον κυνιδίων) and *cormorants* in §113 (τὸν αἰθυίης τρόπον). The cormorant (αἰθυία; genus *Phalacrocorax*), a voracious bird emblematic of gluttony (see also *Leg.* 3.155; *Det.* 101; *Contemp.* 55), would have fit perfectly into Philo's discussion of birds (§§116-117), had Moses designated it "unclean."

¹⁶⁷ §113: ἀναρριπίζουσαι καὶ προσαναφλέγουσαι τὰς ἀπλήστους καὶ ἀκορέστους ἐπιθυμίας.

imposed by *one* passion, ἐπιθυμία, whose tyranny brings trouble enough.¹⁶⁸ By framing such a comparison, Philo presumes to have *already* spoken on the nature and effects of tyrannical desire. And indeed he has, in both his symbolic interpretations (§§110-113) *and* the theoretical reflections of the exposition's "diagnosis" portion (esp. §§80-91). So even though Philo's remarks on four-legged multipeds deny a *particular* significance to tyrannical desire in the interpretation of that restriction, they nevertheless confirm the *preeminence* of tyrannical desire in Philo's exposition.

Philo interprets also the *clean* reptiles symbolically (§§114-115), exploring the significance of *their* distinguishing trait: legs above their feet enabling them to leap from the ground (πηδᾶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς δύνασθαι).¹⁶⁹ Like their unclean counterparts, these reptiles represent for Philo a certain type of *soul*, which in this case Moses sought to *commend*, not condemn.¹⁷⁰ In particular, Philo correlates their ability to leap from the ground (πηδᾶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς) with the ability of souls to "leap" upward from the earth and from all earthly concerns (ἄνω πηδᾶν . . . ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν χαμαιζήλων), which secures for them a vision of the divine (ἡ θεὰ ζηλωτὴ καὶ περιμάχητος).¹⁷¹ Here Philo deploys the agon motif in

¹⁶⁸ NB in §113: τοὺς μὴ ἐνὸς πάθους, ἐπιθυμίας, . . . κακοὺς δούλους; χαλεπὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ ἐνὸς δεσποτεία.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Lev 11:21: ἃ ἔχει σκέλη ἀνώτερον τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ πηδᾶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. NB Philo's emendation of ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς to ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς to suit his exegetical purpose.

¹⁷⁰ §114: πάλιν διὰ συμβόλων ἦθη καὶ τρόπους λογικῆς ψυχῆς διερευνώμενος.

¹⁷¹ Cf. *Her.* 239: "Conversely Moses gives high approval to those reptiles which can leap upwards (ἄνω δύναται πηδᾶν). Thus he says, 'These shall ye eat of the flying reptiles which go on four legs, which have legs above their feet (ἃ ἔχει σκέλη ἀνωτέρω τῶν ποδῶν), so as to leap

its distinctively Platonic aspect, casting the practice of ἐγκράτεια as a means of escaping the body's entanglement with the sensible realm.¹⁷² While he does not use the *term* ἐγκράτεια, the *concept* undoubtedly informs his notion of a "leaping" soul that wrestles successfully against the "pull of the body" (ἡ τοῦ σώματος ὀλκή) by resisting *with superior strength* (κραταιοτέρᾳ δυνάμει πρὸς τὴν ῥοπὴν τῆς ὀλκῆς ἀντιβιάσασθαι).¹⁷³ Also, Philo's specific mention of the "snake fighter" (ὄφιομάχης) suggests an effort on his part to characterize this type of soul as a model of ἐγκράτεια, since he elsewhere interprets the snake fighter in precisely those terms:

with them from the earth (ὥστε πηδᾶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς).¹⁷² These are symbols of the souls (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ σύμβολα ψυχῶν) which though rooted like reptiles to the earthly body (ὅσαι τρόπων ἐρπετῶν προσερριζωμέναι τῷ γηίνῳ σώματι) have been purified and have strength to soar on high (καθαρθεῖσαι μετεωροπολεῖν ἰσχύουσιν), exchanging earth for heaven (οὐρανὸν ἀντικαταλλάζαμεναι γῆς), and corruption for immortality (φθορᾶς ἀθανασίαν)."

¹⁷² On the Platonic aspect of Philo's agon motif, see above, 127, n. 53.

¹⁷³ On "escaping the body," see *Gig.* 31; *Somn.* 1.43-44. By the term "pull of the body" (ἡ τοῦ σώματος ὀλκή), Philo undoubtedly means the compelling force of primal desires (ἐπιθυμῖαι) for pleasure (ἡδονή) closely associated with the body yet residing in the soul (cf. *Gig.* 33: ταῖς φίλαις καὶ συγγενέσι σώματος ἡδοναῖς; *Gig.* 60: γῆς μὲν οἱ θηρευτικοὶ τῶν σώματος ἡδονῶν ἀπόλαυσίν τε καὶ χρῆσιν ἐπιτηδεύοντες αὐτῶν; *Somn.* 2.13: αἱ σώματος ἡδοναῖ). In other words, Philo envisions in this passage a moral agent resisting ἐπιθυμῖα, which amounts to a moral agent exercising ἐγκράτεια (cf. *Somn.* 2.106: σώματος ἡδονῆν . . . ἀποστρέφεται διὰ πόθον ἐγκρατείας). On Philo and the body, see Pierre Courcelle, "Tradition platonicienne et traditions chrétiennes du corps-prison (*Phédon* 62 b; *Cratyle* 400 c)," *REL* 43 (1965): 406-43, esp. 413-14; Kenneth Fox, "Paul's Attitude toward the Body in Romans 6-8: Compared with Philo of Alexandria" (Ph.D. diss., University of St. Michael's College, 2001), 215-58 ["Philo's Double Attitude toward the Body"]; Josef Groß, *Philons von Alexandria Anschauungen über die Natur des Menschen* (Inaugural Dissertation, University of Tübingen, 1930), 10-21 ["Der Körper des Menschen"]; Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 258-78 ["(M)an's descent into the body"], 321-22; Alexander Sand, *Der Begriff "Fleisch" in den paulinischen Hauptbriefen* (BU 2; Regensburg: Pustet, 1967), 281-84 ["Philo von Alexandrien"]; Eduard Schweizer, "Die hellenistische Komponente im neutestamentlichen σὰρξ-Begriff," *ZNW* 48 (1957): 237-53, 246-50 ["Philo"]; David Winston, "Philo and the Rabbis on Sex and the Body," in *The Ancestral Philosophy: Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism: Essays of David Winston* (ed. Gregory Sterling; SPhM 4; BJS 331; Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2001), 199-219.

For the snake-fighter is, I think, nothing but a symbolic representation of self-control (συμβολικῶς ἐγκράτεια εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ), waging a fight that never ends and a truceless war against intemperance and pleasure (πρὸς ἀκρᾶσίαν καὶ ἡδονήν). (*Opif.* 164)¹⁷⁴

So Philo equates the *clean* reptiles with souls possessed of ἐγκράτεια, which prove themselves superior to their unclean counterparts by *rejecting* pleasure instead of embracing it (φιληδονία).

§§116 – 117: *Birds*¹⁷⁵

[§116] Having provided a rational account of the nature of land-based and aquatic animals, and having made the most appropriate distinctions among them by the laws he enacted, Moses begins to examine the essence of the last type of creature—the myriad kinds of winged creatures. He rejects a great number of birds, in particular those that prey either on other animals or on human beings. The prohibition includes every carnivorous, every venomous bird, and in general every bird that uses aggressive force of any kind. [§117] But Moses includes ring-doves, pigeons and turtle-doves, and the various types of cranes, geese, and birds of that sort all in one class of tame and gentle creatures. He allows these birds without restriction to anyone who chooses to use them for food.

Philo completes his survey of clean and unclean animals from land, sea, and sky with a short consideration of the legislation governing birds (γέννη τῶν πτηνῶν).

Philo's brevity contrasts sharply with Eleazar's elaborate interpretation of these same laws in the *Letter of Aristeas*.¹⁷⁶ While Philo does recognize along with

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *Leg.* 2.105. Philo's symbolic interpretation of the snake fighter, although modeled on Eleazar's method, reveals Philo's unique *appropriation* of that method. Eleazar's method assumes some animal trait *reasonably analogous* to a human ethical trait. Nothing about "fighting snakes," as an animal trait, suggests a comparison with human self-control. The snake-fighter can *only* represent self-control if the "snake" represents pleasure (see Calabi, "Il serpente e il cavaliere"; Siegfried, *Philo*, 247), and this identification involves Philo's *allegory of the soul* (on which see Tobin, *Creation of Man*, 135-76).

¹⁷⁵ See Lev 11:13-19; Deut 14:11-18.

¹⁷⁶ *Let. Arist.* 145-49.

Eleazar the Mosaic correlation of "clean" with docility (herbivores) and "unclean" with aggression (carnivores), he does *not* make Eleazar's connection between these behavioral traits and similar character traits. In fact, Philo makes *no* application to the realm of ethics at all, taking the laws neither *literally* as practical exercises in ἐγκράτεια nor *symbolically* as theoretical promotions of ἐγκράτεια. Such an omission clearly defeats the purpose of Philo's exposition, which presumes to show how Moses' dietary laws promote the observance of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις by fostering proper management of ἐπιθυμία within the soul. By citing a set of dietary laws and tracing *no* connection to his overall expository agenda (ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, ἄσκησις), Philo seems to deny the existence of any connection.

But Philo earlier proved his creative ability to *find* such connections for the sake of his expository agenda, using a variety of literal and symbolic techniques.¹⁷⁷ So his failure to produce an interpretation here along lines of moral psychology hardly stems from an *inability* to do so, but more likely from an *unwillingness*. The reluctance makes sense, if in fact Philo knew the *Letter of Aristeas*, or at least the symbolic interpretation of clean and unclean birds it contains. After all, the careful explication of how Moses ingeniously used obscure regulations about eating birds to commend justice and condemn violent

¹⁷⁷ In fact, the logic of Philo's interpretation of the prohibition of man-eaters (§§103-104), however strained, could just as well apply here to the prohibition of carnivorous birds, since they too—as both Philo and Eleazar acknowledge—injure human beings and could therefore incite

oppression stands as the highlight of Eleazar's discourse on the dietary laws. Such a notable interpretation probably either *was* standard before its inclusion in the *Letter of Aristeas* or *became* standard as a result. In either case, a well-established traditional understanding of the laws governing birds, especially one at odds with his expository agenda, would put Philo in an awkward exegetical position. According to Eleazar, Moses had one clear objective in prohibiting or permitting certain species of birds: the promotion of δικαιοσύνη. But, according to Philo, Moses formulated the dietary laws in an effort to promote ἐγκράτεια, *not* δικαιοσύνη. Rather than flatly contradict a venerable traditional interpretation, Philo offers no interpretation at all. As a result, he gives absolutely *no* support to one element of his original thesis about the laws of clean and unclean (§§100-102), which states that Moses regulated the consumption of animals from land, sea, *and sky* with a view to eliminating passionate desire. Yet when he summarily concludes his discussion of the laws of clean and unclean, he speaks as if he had.

§118: Conclusion of Clean and Unclean Animals

[§118] So, as you can see, Moses withdrew from our use certain animals from every region of the earth: creatures from the land, from the sea, and from the sky. He was, in a sense, withdrawing fuel from a fire, intending all along to extinguish passionate desire.¹⁷⁸

passionate vengeance (§116: ὅσα . . . κατ' ἀνθρώπων φονᾶ; *Let. Arist.* 146: τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀδικοῦσι).

¹⁷⁸ *He was, in a sense, withdrawing fuel from a fire, intending all along to extinguish passionate desire* (καθάπερ ὕλην πυρός [ύφαιρών], σβέσιν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀπεργάζεται): These restrictions do nothing to "extinguish" ἐπιθυμία itself, since even those who abstain from prohibited animals indulge the amoral emotion ἐπιθυμία when they eat, and Philo nowhere

In §118, Philo completes the interpretive frame he began in §§100-102, suggesting that Moses crafted his legislation on clean and unclean animals *primarily* to remove incitements to ἐπιθυμία and obviate the risk of passionate desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία). He made the claim explicitly in §100, citing Moses' prohibition of the "fattest" (εὐσαρκότατα) and "richest" (πιότατα) animals from land, sea, and sky—animals with especially *delicious* meats likely to cause the moral agent to eat strictly for the sake of pleasure. Here in §118, Philo uses more general terms to make the same essential point: Moses' strategic prohibition of certain animals from land, sea, and sky amounts to the withdrawal of "fuel from a fire" in order to "extinguish" passionate desire.¹⁷⁹ By framing his entire discussion of the laws governing clean and unclean animals with one distinct claim about the *purpose* of those laws, Philo implies that each one of his analyses corroborates, or at least *should* corroborate, that claim. But only *two* of the animals he considers in fact support his claim: pigs and scaleless sea creatures, both of which Philo clearly identifies as especially pleasurable to eat and morally dangerous for that reason. He does manage to fit one other type of prohibited animal, the land carnivores, into his interpretive scheme, but only through a

advocates the elimination (extinguishing) of ἐπιθυμία per se. The ἐπιθυμία Philo has in mind must be *passionate* desire, which Moses' dietary regulations are designed to eliminate.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Gemünden, "Culture des Passions," 341: "[L]es homes imparfaits doivent lutter, ils doivent faire des efforts pour avancer (*Her.* 275). Dans cette lutte, c'est surtout le *logos* qui combat les passions. Pour cette lutte, le *prokoptōn* doit se référer à la philosophie et à la Loi. Cette dernière peut éteindre par exemple le désir (*epithumia*), comme Philon le démontre dans *De specialibus Legibus* IV, 118 au sujet des lois alimentaires qui peuvent éteindre le désir

strained notion of man-eaters being delicious (§103-104). Otherwise, he offers strictly symbolic interpretations of the various clean and unclean species, avoiding any sort of claim about how they actually taste. He discontinues the symbolic mode when he gets to the legislation concerning birds, but instead of interpreting that legislation in light of his claim about delicious fare, he offers no interpretation at all. So Philo hardly succeeds in demonstrating a *systematic* tendency on Moses' part to designate delicious animals "unclean" in an effort to combat passionate desire.

But in §§100-118 Philo *does* succeed in promoting the broader expository agenda he brings to *all* of the dietary laws, despite his failure to unite the laws of clean and unclean animals under one interpretive claim. In other words, Philo finds a way of making this subset of the dietary laws speak to issues of ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις, confirming their essential relation—as species to genus—to the Tenth Commandment's prohibition of desire. In particular, he shows how the Mosaic legislation on clean and unclean species, with almost perfect consistency, addresses the *problem* of ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία by posing the *solution* of ἐγκράτεια *acquired* through ἄσκησις.¹⁸⁰ The prohibitions of pork and scaleless sea creatures of course support *not only* Philo's specific thesis for

«comme un feu auquel on refuse du bois». Note fire imagery also in *Spec.* 4.83; *Decal.* 150, 173 (cf. *Fug.* 158; *Mos.* 2.58; *Sobr.* 43; *Congr.* 55; *Provid.* 2.40).

¹⁸⁰ With two significant exceptions: the laws regarding rumination and split hooves (§§106-109) and the laws governing birds (§§116-117). In the case of rumination, Philo does the best he can, turning the interpretation *toward* his exegetical agenda by highlighting the role of

§§100-118 but *also* his general thesis about the dietary laws overall, since the consistent avoidance of excessive pleasure fosters a lifestyle of ἐγκράτεια, which accepts only rational (moderate) indulgences of ἐπιθυμία. The prohibition of land carnivores promotes ἐγκράτεια through a similar mechanism, even though no one—including Philo—considers the meat of such animals especially tasty. Philo ascribes a symbolic function to all of the other regulations, explaining how the designations "clean" and "unclean" respectively either *commend* ἐγκράτεια and ἄσκησις or *condemn* the excessive indulgence of ἐπιθυμία, quite apart from the palatability of the animals involved.

§§119 – 121: *Dead Animals*¹⁸¹

[§119] In other regulations concerning food, Moses commands the avoidance of dead animals, whether dead by natural causes or savaged by a predator. As the second prohibition suggests, a human being should not dine with wild beasts, all but feasting with them on their meal of flesh. As for the first prohibition, there seem to be at least two possible reasons. To begin with, eating a creature dead by natural causes is harmful and likely to cause disease, since the vital fluid of the creature has died inside the body along with the blood. Also, a creature already claimed by death should be left untouched out of respect for the forces of nature to which it succumbed. [§120] Now, great hunters, the kind trained as expert marksmen who down their prey with rarely a miss, receive praise from most lawgivers among Greeks and barbarians. Such men boast in their successful exploits, especially when they share some of the catch with the dog handlers and even with the dogs themselves. They are praised for their character, as men who are not only brave but also generous. But the architect of our sacred commonwealth would obviously condemn such behavior, having forbidden outright the consumption of animals either dead by natural causes or—as applies in this case—savaged by a predator, for the reasons previously stated. [§121] Suppose, however, one

ἄσκησις in connection with μνήμη. In the case of birds, Philo's failure to promote his exegetical agenda likely derives from deference to the interpretive tradition found in the *Letter of Aristeas*.

¹⁸¹ See Exod 22:30; Lev 17:15; Deut 14:21.

of our commonwealth's athletes of virtue becomes fond of physical training and the hunt,¹⁸² expecting in this way to undergo exercises and preparations for wars and dangerous engagements with his enemies. Whenever he has a successful expedition, he should simply give the catch to his dogs for them to feast on, as a payment or prize for their courage and impeccable service. He himself should never even touch the dead animals, so as to learn in his dealings with non-rational creatures a proper attitude toward human enemies. In particular, he should never do battle with them in order to gain something he does not already own, which is the business of robbers, but in an effort either to avenge past wrongs or to deal with ones he considers imminent.

As part of an overarching thesis for §§100-118, Philo claimed that Moses prohibited animals yielding delicious meats in order to promote ἐγκράτεια, but his discussion in §§119-121 of animals dead from either natural causes (θνησιμαίων) or violent attack (θηριάλωτον) clearly requires a different approach.¹⁸³ Since these prohibitions *presume* edibility under different circumstances of death, they must involve only the moderately tasty "clean" animals, whose demise from old age, disease, or mauling can only make them less appetizing. Philo can no longer broach the topic of moral psychology, as he did earlier, by analyzing the dietary laws in terms of the *pleasure* (ἡδονή) certain

¹⁸² *Suppose, however, one of our commonwealth's athletes of virtue becomes fond of physical training and the hunt* (εἰ δέ τις τῶν ἀσκητῶν φιλογυμναστῆς γένοιτο καὶ φιλόθηρος): Philo considers the case of a *moral* athlete (τις τῶν ἀσκητῶν) who becomes enamored of *physical* training and an *actual* sport, the hunt (φιλογυμναστῆς . . . καὶ φιλόθηρος). Both Heinemann and Mosès read the passage in this way: "Wenn aber ein tugendbeflissener Mann auch Freund von Körperübungen und Jagd ist"; "Et si tel athlète de la vertu est aussi un amateur des exercices physiques et de la chasse". Colson does not identify τις τῶν ἀσκητῶν with a *moral* athlete, "based on the belief that ἀσκητής is not used absolutely in this way" (PLCL 8, 83, n. b). But Philo uses ἀσκητής in *precisely* this way in *Post.* 154: τινες τῶν ἀσκητῶν, οἷς τὴν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ἄγουσαν ὁδὸν τραχείαν καὶ δυσάντη καὶ χασελπὴν νομισθεῖσαν τὸ πρῶτον.

¹⁸³ See Exod 22:30: καὶ ἄνδρες ἄγιοι ἔσεσθέ μοι. καὶ κρέας θηριάλωτον οὐκ ἔδεσθε, τῷ κυνὶ ἀπορρίψατε αὐτό; Lev 17:15: καὶ πάντα ψυχῆ, ἥτις φάγεται θνησιμαῖον ἢ θηριάλωτον ἐν

animals afford when eaten. In fact, nothing in his initial explanation of why Moses prohibited the θνησιμαῖον and the θηριάλωτον (§119) speaks *at all* to the issues of ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, and ἄσκησις raised elsewhere in his exposition. To *create* a connection between these two prohibitions and his exegetical agenda, Philo uses a convoluted bit of legal reasoning to derive *from* them a brand new prohibition, found nowhere in the Pentateuch, which in his view counts as an exercise in ἐγκράτεια.

Philo contrasts Greek and barbarian lawgivers, who praise the generosity of expert hunters who share the catch even with their hounds (σκύλαξι), with Moses, who presumably would find fault with such a practice based on his prohibition of θνησιμαῖον and θηριάλωτον, particularly the latter. In other words, Moses' prohibition of mauled animals (θηριάλωτον), which Philo characterized in §119 as a prohibition of *sharing* a meal of flesh with animals (συνευωχούμενον ταῖς σαρκοφαγίαις), would forbid a hunter from *sharing* with his dogs. But Philo still has no clear application to moral psychology, so he poses yet another scenario, which holds at best a tertiary relation to Moses' original prohibition of θηριάλωτον. Suppose, says Philo, someone fond of training becomes an avid hunter (φιλόθηρος), *in order to train for warfare*.¹⁸⁴ Philo suggests that such

τοῖς αὐτόχθοσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς προσηλύτοις . . . ἀκάθαρτος ἔσται; Deut 14:21: πᾶν θνησιμαῖον οὐ φάγεσθε; cf. Lev 5:2; 11:39-40, 22:8.

¹⁸⁴ §121: μελέτας καὶ προάγωνας ὑπολαμβάνων εἶναι πολέμων καὶ κινδύνων τῶν πρὸς ἐχθρούς. In other words, Philo poses the very specialized case of someone who hunts *not* for food, but for martial training.

hunters should not even touch their dead quarry (μὴ ψαυέτω), but simply give the dogs a well-deserved feast. And because he characterized the hunt as *strictly* a preparation for warfare, Philo can interpret the practice of abstaining from the catch in a brand new way, which does *not* involve the condition of the deceased animal(s) but *does*—at long last—involve the moral condition of the hunter.

By avoiding all contact with the dead quarry, the hunter as moral agent learns through practice with animal opponents to battle human enemies *not* for "unjust gain" (διὰ κέρδος ἄδικον), but only for the just causes of retaliation or preemptive self-defense. Since he has painstakingly managed to cast the law of θηριάλωτον as an exercise in abstaining from κέρδος ἄδικον, Philo can now rest assured of its relevance to moral psychology and the management of ἐπιθυμία, though he chooses not to explore that relevance in detail. Elsewhere, however, Philo clearly associates the pursuit of κέρδος ἄδικον with the indulgence of passionate desire, with a failure to limit ἐπιθυμία properly, particularly in his interpretation of the law against sowing more than one type of seed in a vineyard.¹⁸⁵ Trying to get more than one crop from one piece of land represents an act of egregious avarice.¹⁸⁶ Whoever makes the attempt incites unjust desires (ἀδίκους ἐπιθυμίας), failing to restrict them with proper limits (μέτροις αὐτὰς μὴ

¹⁸⁵ Deut 22:9: οὐ κατασπερείς τὸν ἀμπελῶνά σου διάφορον. For Philo's interpretation, see esp. *Spec.* 4.212-18.

¹⁸⁶ *Spec.* 4.212: φιλοχρηματίας ὑπερβαλλούσης ἔργον.

περιορίζων) in the pursuit of "unjust gain" (κέρδος ἄδικον).¹⁸⁷ While seeking gain from *one* crop represents a just and reasonable course of action, seeking *more* represents an overstepping of reason's authority on the part of desire. Philo's case of the just warrior suggests a similar dynamic: while going to war for a just cause represents a *reasonable* course of action, going to war for *gain* represents a triumph of ἐπιθυμία over λόγος, since the violence no longer bears justification on rational grounds.¹⁸⁸ So in Philo's mind, a hunter training for battle who gives his catch to the dogs not only obeys a semblance of Moses' prohibition of θηριάλωτον—he also, more importantly, is training himself in going to war with a *rational* motivation, not a motivation based on ἐπιθυμία. And by encouraging the dominance of reason over desire, such training promotes ἐγκράτεια.

§§122 – 125: *Blood and Fat*¹⁸⁹

[§122] Of course, some devotees of Sardanapalus, greedily extending their ever dainty lack of self-control beyond all bounds and limits, cleverly devise new kinds of pleasure. For their culinary delight, they prepare meat unfit for any sacrifice by strangling and choking the animals to death. In this way, they entomb the blood, the essence of the soul, within the body—blood that should have been liberated and released from the body. They should be content to enjoy the flesh alone, without touching anything akin to the soul. [§123] This explains Moses' decision to legislate elsewhere concerning blood, as he does when he prohibits the consumption of both blood and fat. Blood is prohibited for the reason I mentioned: it is the essence of the soul. I do not mean the intelligent and rational soul, but the soul that operates through the senses—the soul that

¹⁸⁷ *Spec.* 4.217-18.

¹⁸⁸ Philo suggests in §121 that those who go to war for unjust gain essentially engage in robbery (λωποδυτούντων πράξεις), which is precisely the sort of behavior expected from those taken captive by a tyrannical desire for wealth (§87: εἰ πρὸς χρήματα γένοιτο, κλέπτας ἀποτελεῖ καὶ βαλαντιοτόμους καὶ λωποδύτας).

¹⁸⁹ See Lev 3:17.

provides both to us and to non-rational animals the same capacity for life in the sensible world. But the essence of the other type of soul is divine spirit, especially from Moses' perspective. In his account of the creation of the world, Moses states that God infused the first man and founder of our race with a "breath of life" into his "face," the most commanding part of the body, where the senses are stationed like an entourage for the mind as for a great king. Clearly, what God infused was ethereal spirit, and, if you will, something better than ethereal spirit: an effulgence of the blessed, the triply blessed, Nature. [§124] As for the fat of the animal, Moses prohibits its consumption because it is most succulent. Here again he wants to teach self-control and zeal for an austere life—a life that forgoes what is easiest and convenient and instead endures voluntarily the mental efforts and other labors needed to acquire virtue. [§125] For this reason, the blood and the fat are taken from every sacrificial animal and given as a whole burnt offering, as a sort of first fruits. The blood is poured out onto the altar as a drink offering, while the fat, on account of its richness, is brought instead of oil to fuel the flame of the sacred and holy fire.

Philo now turns to the prohibitions of blood and fat, taking first the prohibition of blood (§§122-123).¹⁹⁰ In the case of unclean animals, Philo cast the dietary laws as exercises in ἐγκράτεια by presuming to identify Moses' *tacit* rationale for prohibiting certain species—the pig, for example, tastes delicious and incites ἐπιθυμία, and Moses prohibits the pig for that reason. In the case of blood, however, Philo must account for a dietary prohibition whose *explicit* rationale has little or nothing to do with ἐπιθυμία, ἐγκράτεια, or ἄσκησις. Moses instead forbids blood because of its unique relation to the soul (ψυχῆ).¹⁹¹ But despite biblical data at odds with his expository agenda, Philo still broaches the topic in terms of moral psychology, characterizing the consumption of blood as one of the

¹⁹⁰ For the two prohibitions together, note esp. Lev 3:17: νόμιμον εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα εἰς τὰς γενεὰς ὑμῶν ἐν πάσῃ κατοικίᾳ ὑμῶν· πᾶν στέαρ καὶ πᾶν αἷμα οὐκ ἔδεσθε.

¹⁹¹ Lev 17:10-14 (e.g., v. 11: ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐστίν). Philo clearly knows the biblical prohibition (τὸ μὲν αἷμα δι' ἣν εἶπον αἰτίαν ὅτι οὐσία ψυχῆς ἐστίν [§123]).

decadent *pleasures* (ἡδονάς) enjoyed by some "Sardanapalus types" (Σαρδανάπαλλοι).¹⁹² These people strangle the animals they eat, "entombing" the blood within the body, and so demonstrate an egregious, effeminate lack of self-control.¹⁹³ The reprehensible luxury of such a practice lies in its being done strictly *for the sake of pleasure* by those unwilling to content themselves with the more reasonable indulgence of eating only the flesh drained of blood.¹⁹⁴ So Philo effectively frames the prohibition of blood as a deterrent to passionate desire, deploying the same λόγος-ἐπιθυμία dynamic that informs his exposition of the laws of clean and unclean animals. He implies that reason, imposing proper measure (μέτρον) on ἐπιθυμία, would in fact endorse the eating of meat properly drained of its life force. But someone subject to *passionate desire* (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία), acting on the basis of desire's motivation for *pleasure*, oversteps this reasonable limit in order to enjoy the delectable but unreasonable indulgence of blood-infused meat. By avoiding such meat, the moral agent learns by practice (ἄσκησις) to avoid eating *for pleasure's sake*, to operate on the basis of a rational motivation, and to develop the moderate lifestyle possessed of ἐγκράτεια. Of course, Philo must acknowledge, as he clearly does, that Moses did not have the *pleasures* of blood in mind when he made the prohibition, but

¹⁹² On Sardanapalus, see §102.

¹⁹³ On ἄγχοντες καὶ ἀποπνίγοντες, cf. Acts 15:29: ἀπέχεσθαι . . . αἵματος καὶ πνικτῶν (see A. J. M. Wedderburn, "The 'Apostolic Decree': Tradition and Redaction," *NovT* 35 [1993], 362-89, esp. 366-68).

¹⁹⁴ NB §122: σαρκῶν γὰρ αὐτὸ μόνον ἀπολαύειν αὐταρκες ἦν.

rather its *property* of kinship with the soul. But Philo cannot limit his commentary to the biblical data without losing the overall thrust of his exposition, which programmatically seeks to draw some connection between the individual dietary laws and the management of ἐπιθυμία. And Philo *does* draw the connection—in fact, he highlights it by discussing it *first*. Although the "Sardanapalus types" Philo mentions ought to abstain from blood *primarily* because it carries life, they clearly would also derive the *secondary* benefit of a more moderate lifestyle. And followers of Moses, who would *first* avoid the meat of strangled animals because it still contains the essence of life, nevertheless derive the same benefit of eliminating a dangerously titillating food from their diet.

The Mosaic prohibition of fat, by contrast, perfectly suits Philo's expository agenda, since it corresponds *exactly* to the prohibition of pork in its theoretical mechanism.¹⁹⁵ As Philo explained in §100, Moses prohibited animals, like the pig, whose flesh is "most succulent" (πιότατα), knowing that abstinence from delectable fare facilitates proper management of ἐπιθυμία. Echoing these remarks, Philo attributes the prohibition of fat (τὸ στέαρ) to its being "most succulent" (πιότατον), noting that Moses here "again" (πάλιν)—with *this* dietary restriction—offers a lesson in self-control (διδασκαλίαν ἐγκρατείας). By abstaining from fat, the moral agent learns to reject the life of luxury, which pursues pleasure for pleasure's sake at the prompting of ἐπιθυμία. Of course,

¹⁹⁵ Noted also by Heinemann, *Bildung*, 163.

the life of ἐγκράτεια, which pursues only *necessities* at the prompting of *reason*, demands strenuous exercise (ἄσκησις)—a point duly made by Philo through deployment of the agon motif. In particular, the command to abstain from fat promotes "zeal for an austere life" (ζῆλον ἀστηροῦ βίου), a life that voluntarily forgoes what is easy (τὰ ῥᾶστα) to endure hardships (πόνους), in order to acquire virtue (ἔνεκα κτήσεως ἀρετῆς).¹⁹⁶ In his exposition of criteria for clean aquatic creatures (§112), Philo deployed the same figure in the same way, contrasting the "easy" (ῥᾶστη) road to pleasure with the "toilsome" (ἐπίπυτος) road πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν.

§§126 – 131: Concluding Moral Narrative¹⁹⁷

[§126] Finally, remember that Moses condemns some of his contemporaries as gluttons, as people who consider the experience of pleasure to be the pinnacle of happiness. A luxurious life in the city was not enough for them, where the supplies and provisions for all their necessities were inexhaustible. They wanted the same thing in the desolate, trackless wilderness, expecting to find vendors of fish, meat, and every kind of seasonable produce. [§127] When scarcity did come, they joined forces in shouting down, denouncing, and disparaging their leader with shameless audacity. And they did not stop their revolt until they got what they wanted. Their demands were met for two reasons: first, to show that all things are possible for God, who finds a way in the midst of impossible and irresolvable situations; second, to punish the people, who were slaves of their belly and shirkers of holiness. [§128] As the story goes, a great cloud of quail, swept in from over the sea, poured out of the sky at dawn. So thick was this mass of birds that the encampment and the surrounding area—in every direction, as far as a fit man could walk in a day—were overshadowed. In addition, they were flying only a few feet off the ground, which made them easy to capture. [§129] Now, you would

¹⁹⁶ Cf. *Det* 27: οἷς ὑπὲρ κτήσεως ἀρετῆς πόνος διαθλείται; *Migr.* 200: ἀθλοῦντος καὶ ὑπὲρ κτήσεως ἀρετῆς; *Mut.* 14: ὑπὲρ κτήσεως ἀρετῆς ὁ ἀσκητῆς ἐπάλαισε.

¹⁹⁷ See Num 11:4-34.

think that the people, struck with amazement by such a marvelous demonstration of power on God's part, would have been satisfied simply with what they saw—that filled with reverence, and amply *fed* by reverence,¹⁹⁸ they would have abstained from eating any of the meat. Instead, goading their desire to an even greater pitch, they went after what seemed to them the greatest possible good fortune. Raking in the quail with both hands, they packed the folds of their garments. Storing those birds away in their tents, they went back outside to catch others, demonstrating that greedy cravings for more have no limit. Preparing their game in a variety of ways, they gorged themselves insatiably, about to be destroyed—the fools—by their bloat. [§130] And, in fact, they *did* perish before long in a pool of noxious discharges. So in keeping with the passion that destroyed them, that place was named "Tombs of Desire." Clearly, as our story teaches, there is no evil in the soul greater than desire. [§131] Taking all of this into consideration, we can admire what Moses so admirably says in his exhortations, "Let no one do what is pleasing in his own sight." He is saying, in effect, "Let no one indulge his own desire." If a person expects to become truly noble, let him be pleasing to God, the world, Nature, laws, and wise men by rejecting the love of self.

At §126, Philo abruptly turns from his serial treatment of discrete dietary laws to a moralized retelling of God's provision of quail to the Israelites in the wilderness. Philo's narrative ends in §130 with an explicit statement of what the story ultimately teaches: that "there is no greater evil (μείζον κακόν) in the soul than desire."¹⁹⁹ This sweeping indictment of ἐπιθυμία clearly resembles earlier material from the diagnosis (κρίσις) portion of Philo's exposition (§§79-94), which sought above all to illustrate the reprehensible nature and harmful effects of

¹⁹⁸ *filled with reverence, and amply fed by reverence* (γεμισθέντας εὐσεβείας καὶ ταύτη τραφέντας): Reading, with Colson and Mosès, καί (MSS) instead of κὰν (PCW).

¹⁹⁹ [ἐπιθυμίας] οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ψυχῇ . . . μείζον κακόν. Philo takes the epithet "Tombs of Desire" (LXX Num 11:34: Μνήματα τῆς ἐπιθυμίας) as an indication of the story's concern with the *passion* (πάθος) desire (§130). Cf. Philo's comments on Num 11:4 in *Migr.* 155, esp. his interpretation of ἐπεθύμησαν ἐπιθυμίαν as a reference to the genus ἐπιθυμία *itself* (αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους), not any particular *species* of ἐπιθυμία (οὐχ ἑνός τινος τῶν εἰδῶν). In other words, the story from Numbers speaks in Philo's view to *more* than just gastric desire, and for this reason it

desire, particularly of its most egregious manifestation, tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ). Insofar as the material in §§126-130 serves to depict tyrannical desire in a negative light, it too bears analysis as part of Philo's diagnosis, although it appears at the very *end* of his exposition.

Philo undoubtedly sees *tyrannical desire* as the distinct manifestation of ἐπιθυμία at work in the people's clamoring for meat and later gorging themselves with quail. In particular, they suffered from tyrannical desire *affecting the belly*, which turned them into "gluttons" (§126: γαστριμάργους), the very effect Philo described as part of the exposition's first and more extensive diagnosis.²⁰⁰ But despite the incidental involvement of the stomach as the sphere of desire's influence, the real issue—as with *any* instance of tyrannical desire—is the involvement of the rational faculty, in particular its being *overthrown* by desire, which results in the moral agent designating pleasure as "the good." As Philo puts it in §126, the people "supposed" (ὑπολαμβάνοντας) that "the experience of pleasure" (τὸ καθηδुπαθεῖν) was the "pinnacle of happiness" (εὐδαιμονικὸν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα).²⁰¹ And because they, under the tyranny of ἐπιθυμία-turned-ἔρωσ, sought the experience of pleasure *per se*, instead of a clear, rational objective such as maintaining life, their desire for meat had no limit

suits the broader scope of his exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις. On "Tombs of Desire," see also Francis Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith* (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 363-69.

²⁰⁰ §91: [ἐπιθυμία] ἀψαμένη δὲ τῶν περὶ γαστέρα παρέχεται γαστριμάργους.

²⁰¹ Cf. §129: ἐπιθυμίαν ἐγείραντες ὡς ἐπὶ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἵεντο.

(μέτρον).²⁰² They literally ate themselves to death, illustrating the destruction attending tyrannical desire.²⁰³ Consistent with the generic aims of a "diagnosis" (κρίσις), Philo not only illustrates the disastrous results of indulging a given passion (in this case, ἐπιθυμία), but also emphasizes the morally reprehensible nature of such indulgence.²⁰⁴ In this way, §§126-130 essentially restate the case made in §79-94, but through a *biblical narrative* rather than a *philosophical discourse*. This change in literary vehicle allows Philo to explore for the first time the relation between ἐπιθυμία and *piety*—a relation he only hinted at in §97, when he claimed that observance of the dietary laws leads not only to ἐγκράτεια but *also* to εὐσέβεια.²⁰⁵

Philo's retelling of Numbers 11:4-34 portrays the states of tyrannical desire and piety as radically incompatible, if not mutually exclusive. He recognizes two distinct breaches of piety within the story, and both stem from the hegemony of desire within the soul. First, because tyrannical desire compelled Moses' followers to seek pleasure *per se*, they unreasonably craved—and demanded—the luxury of meat in a trackless desert. In Philo's view, this made them "shirkers of holiness" (ἀφηνιαστὰς ὁσιότητος), since the truly pious would

²⁰² §129: αἱ γὰρ ἄγαν πλεονεξίαι μέτρον οὐκ ἔχουσι.

²⁰³ §129: οἱ κενοὶ φρενῶν ὑπὸ τῆς πλησμονῆς ἀπόλλυσθαι (cf. §127: ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ).

²⁰⁴ §126: μέμφεται; §127: ἀναισχύντῳ θράσει . . . τιμωρήσασθαι.

²⁰⁵ On Philo's understanding of εὐσέβεια ("piety"), see esp. Sterling, "Queen of the Virtues," (also Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:213-15). Philo often pairs "εὐσέβεια" with "ὁσιότης" (e.g., *Sacr.* 37). The two terms are practically synonymous, insofar as they both denote piety in a general sense (Sterling, "Queen of the Virtues," 113: "Philo used the two terms as virtual synonyms to refer to the human response to and perception of God.").

have gratefully sated their *necessary desires* for food with the manna God provided.²⁰⁶ Second, after God's miraculous provision of quail the people ought to have abstained from eating *any* meat, getting instead a nourishing fill of *piety* (γεμισθέντας εὐσεβείας καὶ ταύτη τραφέντας). But an obsession with pleasure kept them from properly recognizing both the provision and the power of God—they were unable to see any greater good beyond their own myopic indulgence of ἐπιθυμία. In other words, as the story illustrates, those ruled by ἐπιθυμία cannot count anything or anyone, including God, as more valuable than their personal experience of pleasure (ἡδονή), since ἐπιθυμία compels them to accept *its* reflexive aim (ἡδονή) as *their* ultimate good.

Philo concludes his analysis of the quail narrative, and his *entire* exposition of the Tenth Commandment, with a brief reflection on Deuteronomy 12:8, which he paraphrases as, "Let no one do what is pleasing in his own sight."²⁰⁷ To make the passage more directly relevant to both the biblical story (§§126-130) and his overall exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (§§79-125), he interprets its meaning as, "Let no one indulge his own desire (ἐπιθυμία)."²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ §127: καὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τοὺς γαστροὺς ἀκράτορας καὶ ἀφηνιαστὰς ὀσιότητος.

²⁰⁷ §131: οὐ ποιήσει ἕκαστος τὸ ἀρεστὸν ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ. Deut 12:8 actually reads: οὐ ποιήσετε πάντα, ἃ ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν ὧδε σήμερον, ἕκαστος τὸ ἀρεστὸν ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ. By opening §131 with διό, Philo signals a logical connection with the preceding narrative, which began in §126. §§126-131 stand as the final text unit in Philo's exposition, since he announces in §132 the completion of his commentary on laws pertaining to the Tenth Commandment, which in turn signals the end of his entire commentary on the Decalogue: "In these remarks we have discussed the matters relating to desire or lust (τῶν εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναφερομένων) as adequately as our abilities allow, and thus completed our survey of the ten oracles, and the laws which are dependent on them."

²⁰⁸ §131: μηδεὶς τῆ ἐπιθυμίας τῆ αὐτοῦ χαριζέσθω.

Obviously, such an exhortation applies to the cautionary tale Philo has just related in §§126-130, since *that* indulgence led unmistakably to a shameful, impious death. And just as the exhortation makes sense in light of Philo's *biblical* "diagnosis" (§§126-130), it makes sense also in light of his earlier *philosophical* "diagnosis" (§§79-94). In fact, the earlier case against desire represents a more extensive elaboration of the threats to moral and physical well being posed by ἐπιθυμία, so Philo's version of Deuteronomy 12:8 pertains at *least* as much to the first (roughly) third of his exposition as it does to the last few paragraphs—if not more.

But Philo apparently intends this simple proscription against indulging desire to conclude his *entire* exposition of the Tenth Commandment, not just the diagnosis elements—and it does so in two respects. First, μηδεὶς τῆ ἐπιθυμίας τῆ αὐτοῦ χαριζέσθω reformulates with greater precision the vague prohibition οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, offering the reader a final, more definitive encapsulation of what the Tenth Commandment actually prohibits. When Philo speaks elsewhere of "indulging" desire, or other emotions, he has in mind an indulgence *at the expense of reason*—in other words, a "giving in" to emotion that signals the *overpowering of reason* and the moral agent's consequent departure from *rational* motivation. In *Ios.* 153, for example, Philo explains how for the sake of pleasure (desire's aim) the masses disregard virtue (reason's aim) and instead indulge (χαριζόμενοι) their "unbridled desires," yielding to whatever those

desires command.²⁰⁹ So μηδεὶς τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῇ αὐτοῦ χαριζέσθω calls not for the *elimination* of desire but for its moderation, for a management of ἐπιθυμία that forbids its indulgence *beyond* the measure set by reason. In other words, Philo takes Moses' Deuteronomy exhortation as a prohibition of *passionate* desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία), just as he takes οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις as a prohibition of passionate desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία). So here at the end of his exposition, Philo appropriately offers a compact summary of what he understands the Tenth Commandment to mean in terms of moral psychology. But Philo adds one final thought on what he understands the Tenth Commandment to mean in terms of the overall orientation of the moral agent's life. To indulge *one's own* desire (τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῇ αὐτοῦ), Philo suggests, amounts to a reprehensible love of self (φιλαυτία).²¹⁰ After all, the subjective experience of pleasure—which ἐπιθυμία invariably seeks—involves only one person, the self. So valuing pleasure above all other concerns, as those tyrannized by desire *must* do, truly represents a self-

²⁰⁹ *Ios.* 153: ὁ φιλήδονος ἄγονός ἐστι τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, σωφροσύνης, αἰδοῦς, ἐγκρατείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀπάσης ἀρετῆς· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐχθρὸν ἄλλο ἄλλω, ὡς ἀρετῇ ἡδονῇ, δι' ἣν ἀλογοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὧν μόνον ἄξιον πεφροντικέναι, ταῖς ἀκαθέκτοις ἐπιθυμίαις χαριζόμενοι καὶ οἷς ἂν προστάττωσιν εἰκόντες. Cf. *Leg* 3.84: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς . . . μὴ τὰ ἡδέα χαριζόμενος [τῇ ψυχῇ], τὰ δὲ συμφέροντα καὶ ἀκούση διδοῦς; *Spec.* 4.220: μηδὲν ὀργῇ πρὸ λογισμοῦ χαριζομένη.

²¹⁰ NB Philo's correlation in §131 of μηδεὶς τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῇ αὐτοῦ χαριζέσθω and φιλαυτίαν παραιτούμενος. On Philo's concept of φιλαυτία, see esp. Frédéric Deutsch, "La philautie chez Philon d'Alexandrie," in *Philon d'Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie* (ed. Carlos Lévy; Turnhout: Brepolis, 1998), 87-97; also Walter Warnach, "Selbstliebe und Gottesliebe im Denken Philons von Alexandrien," in *Wort Gottes in der Zeit: Festschrift Karl Hermann Schelkle* (ed. Helmut Feld and Josef Nolte; Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1973), 198-214. Cf. Pearce, *Land of the Body*, 149-51.

centered life, since the chief aim necessarily involves *only* the self.²¹¹ Captive to self-interest, the φίλαυτος lacks a proper concern not just for other people, but also for God.²¹² In fact, love of self and love of God represent for Philo two radically opposed and incompatible modes of life.²¹³ And by drawing this contrast here at the end of his exposition, Philo revisits and substantiates his earlier claim that Moses' dietary laws lead to self-control (ἐγκράτεια), philanthropy (φιλανθρωπία), and—most of all—piety (εὐσέβεια).²¹⁴ By inculcating ἐγκράτεια, the dietary laws promote observance of the Tenth Commandment, which forbids passionate desire. But by training the moral agent to exercise ἐγκράτεια—in other words, not to indulge in ἐπιθυμία—those laws also undermine love of self, allowing instead a life of devotion to God.

²¹¹ In *Post.* 180, Philo pairs φιλαυτία and φιληδονία, suggesting an equivalence.

²¹² Cf. Q.G. unidentified fragments 11 (Marcus) [cf. Petit], which begins, οἱ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ἔνεκα πάντα πράττοντες φιλαυτίαν, μέγιστον κακόν, ἐπιτηδεύουσιν.

²¹³ E.g., *Spec.* 1.344: ὑπὸ φιλαυτίας ἐκλαθόμενοι τοῦ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὄντος θεοῦ; *Praem.* 12: φιλαυτίαν πρὸς εὐσεβείας ἀσπασάμενοι. Allegorically, Philo identifies Abel as the φιλόθεος δόγμα, while Cain represents the φίλαυτος δόγμα (e.g., *Det.* 32). Cf. Harl, "Deux arbres," 379: "[L]'homme est libre d'opter pour l'un ou l'autre mouvement, pour l'amour de lui-même et ce qui est proche de lui, la φιλαυτία, ou au contraire pour l'attitude proprement religieuse de l'εὐσέβεια."

²¹⁴ §97: ἐπεστόμισε διατάγμασι καὶ πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν καὶ πρὸς φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ--τὸ μέγιστον--πρὸς εὐσέβειαν ἀγωγότατοις.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND LINES OF FURTHER RESEARCH

SUMMARY

In the course of larger, systematic exposition of the Decalogue, Philo offers in *Spec.* 4.78b-131 an extended, detailed exposition of the Tenth Commandment, which he reads—despite its clear *biblical* formulation as a prohibition of desire for the goods of a neighbor—as a prohibition of desire *itself* (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις). Capitalizing on the prominence of ἐπιθυμία in contemporary ethical discourse about the "passions" (πάθη), Philo frames his interpretation of the Tenth Commandment along philosophical lines, justifying the prohibition in light of Middle-Platonic conceptions of how desire operates within, and endangers, the human soul. Philo couples this theoretical reflection with a consideration of the Mosaic dietary laws, which in his view fall under the rubric of the Tenth Commandment (as *species* under *genus*) and promote its observance by design. This two-part structure—(1) theoretical reflection on a problem (ἐπιθυμία) and (2) practical consideration of a solution (dietary laws)—signals an effort on Philo's part to frame his philosophical exposition of the Tenth Commandment in an appropriately philosophical way: as a "*Seelenheilungsschrift*," a type of philosophical literature consisting of (1) the

diagnosis of a moral problem (κρίσις) and (2) a proposal for practical *treatment* (ἄσκησις). Ultimately, then, Philo offers a philosophical essay on the problem of ἐπιθυμία, but he never loses sight of the biblical warrant for his essay, the simple prohibition οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις. In fact, by answering the two fundamental questions raised by this prohibition, the essential points of Philo's essay on ἐπιθυμία emerge:

1. In Philo's view, *what* does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? (All desire? A certain type? What type?)
2. In Philo's view, *how* is the Tenth Commandment observed? (What are the mechanics of its observance? What role do the dietary laws play in its observance?)

The first question deals with Philo's concept of ἐπιθυμία, especially its problematic *malfunction*. The second question deals with Philo's concept of ἐγκράτεια, especially the role played by ἄσκησις in its acquisition.

What, then, does the Tenth Commandment prohibit? From a strictly *verbal* standpoint, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις simply prohibits any instance of ἐπιθυμία. But the term ἐπιθυμία has a fundamental ambiguity in Philo's Middle-Platonic system of thought, due to the ambiguity of the broader rubric πάθος, which designates either an amoral *emotion* or an immoral *passion*. In other words, the abbreviated Tenth Commandment offers no clear moral imperative, *except* in the context of Philo's interpretation. And Philo clearly interprets it as a prohibition of *passionate desire*, which—by his own definition—means *excessive desire* (πλεονάζουσα

ἐπιθυμία), understood as *immoderate* desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία). So the Tenth Commandment prohibits any instance of the non-rational emotion desire (ἐπιθυμία) overstepping the *limit* (μέτρον) set by reason (λόγος). In practical terms, the moral agent violates the Tenth Commandment whenever desire's reflexive aim of *pleasure* (ἡδονή) becomes the predominate motivation for human action over against rational considerations such as *necessity*. By indulging passionate desire in this way, the moral agent not only violates the Tenth Commandment but also risks a much greater ill, tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ), which Philo sees as the final ruinous outcome of letting desire usurp reason. From an initial break with reason's hegemony, ἐπιθυμία proceeds to overtake the entire soul, *including the rational faculty*, which tragically sets desire's aim of *pleasure* as the moral agent's ultimate good. Philo makes such a strong presumption of the eventual progression from passionate to tyrannical desire that his theoretical reflection on the ills of ἐπιθυμία, in part one of his exposition (the "diagnosis"), deals mainly with the ills of ἔρωσ. So despite his explicit identification of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις as a prohibition of passionate desire (ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία), Philo sees it in effect as a *preemptive* prohibition of tyrannical desire (ἔρωσ) as well.

And *how* is the Tenth Commandment observed? Essentially, obedience to the Tenth Commandment requires the exercise of ἐγκράτεια, since regular enforcement of the dictates of λόγος over against ἐπιθυμία (when the two conflict) precludes the sort of passionate desire prohibited by the injunction οὐκ

ἐπιθυμήσεις, while eliminating also the risk of tyrannical desire. In other words, the Tenth Commandment's *proscription* of ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία amounts to a *prescription* of ἐγκράτεια. Moses understood this, so he devised a way of equipping his followers with ἐγκράτεια, by formulating a set of dietary laws that engender ἐγκράτεια through *practice* (ἄσκησις). Primarily, the dietary laws promote ἐγκράτεια through specific practical exercises: *either* the temporary restraint of desire *or* the avoidance of especially pleasurable foods. The first type of exercise orchestrates a subjugation of desire that increases the moral agent's capacity for ἐγκράτεια—just as weight training builds physical strength and so increases a wrestler's capacity to overthrow an opponent in a contest. The second type of exercise obviates the risk of passionate desire by eliminating *incitements* to passionate desire—but more broadly it promotes a lifestyle of ἐγκράτεια by training the moral agent to act from a motive of *necessity* rather than a motive of *pleasure*, which amounts to the rule of reason over desire. Secondly, the dietary laws—in particular, certain laws regarding clean and unclean animals—*symbolize* broader ideals and principles of ἐγκράτεια, reinforcing and promoting the goal of Moses' practical regimen. Taken as one comprehensive program, the dietary laws represent a course of "treatment" for the problem of passionate desire "diagnosed" in part one of Philo's exposition, even though they ostensibly deal *only* with the desire for food and drink. This apparent limitation actually reveals to Philo the genius of Moses' plan: due to the

preeminence of this *one* type of desire among all others, *its* successful management through ἐγκράτεια necessarily—a *maiore ad minus*—entails successful management of any other type of desire.

LINES OF FURTHER RESEARCH

A detailed study of Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment suggests various lines of further research. Citing one desideratum for the respective fields of Philonic studies, Hellenistic Judaism, early Christianity, and Middle Platonism illustrates the range of possibilities.

In order to understand the moral psychology presumed in his exposition of οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, Philo's conception of the soul as a bipartition between rational and non-rational parts received considerable attention. The significance of this basic, bipartite model lies in its ability to accommodate every other model of the soul Philo cites. In other words, Philo does *not* endorse different—even contradictory—models of the soul according to exegetical necessity. He instead endorses *one* model of the soul, which he then cites ad hoc in various equivalent formulations.¹ The idea of Philo's having just *one coherent model of the soul* should be further tested and either confirmed or discarded. Settling the issue in favor of one model would provide a helpful framework for further research.

Philo's exposition relates also to Hellenistic Judaism broadly, especially the issue of Alexandrian *exegetical traditions*. Philo undoubtedly reworks a

¹ Cf. Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 174-75, on Philo's reference to different soul divisions: "This is not chaotic eclecticism . . .; for Philo each of these divisions expresses some aspect of the truth, but the most basic truth remains the division into rational and irrational."

prominent traditional interpretation of clean and unclean winged creatures from the *Letter of Aristeas* to suit his own exegetical agenda. With respect to the animal traits of carnivorous (vs. herbivorous) and wild (vs. tame), Philo turns an originally *symbolic* interpretation promoting *justice* (δικαιοσύνη) into a *literal* interpretation promoting *self-control* (ἐγκράτεια). In general, this reveals something about the communal aspect of biblical exegesis in Alexandria, but it specifically reveals a nexus of text, interpretation, and cultural—especially *philosophical*—milieu worth investigating further.² The *Letter of Aristeas* found significance in otherwise obscure dietary laws by correlating its interpretation with current trends in contemporary philosophy, namely *Pythagorean* philosophy and its symbolic interpretation of dietary laws.³ Philo correlated his interpretation with *what he knew* as current trends in contemporary philosophy, namely *Middle-Platonic* philosophy. Both reflect an apologetic aspect of the relation between exegesis and cultural milieu, as they attempt to demonstrate the parity of Mosaic legislation with the highest cultural achievements of their Gentile contemporaries.⁴

² Thomas Tobin investigated this nexus in *The Creation of Man*—i.e., studying different levels of interpretation "involves the analysis of the thought patterns used in the interpretations, and the relationship of those thought patterns to the biblical text and to the philosophical milieu of Alexandria during the period" (9). Philo's interaction with an earlier level of interpretation in the case of *dietary laws* represents precisely the sort of interaction Tobin identifies in the case of the *story of man's creation*. The call for further research into this nexus amounts to a call for further corroboration and refinement of Tobin's approach.

³ See Berthelot, "L'interprétation symbolique."

⁴ On the valorization of ἐγκράτεια among Philo's contemporaries as a context for his own emphasis on ἐγκράτεια in regard to the Tenth Commandment (and dietary laws), see Stowers,

In terms of early Christianity, Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment relates most directly to the letters of Paul, especially to issues raised in Galatians and Romans about the role and purpose of Mosaic law. Paul's proclamation of Christ involves at some level a marginalization, if not repudiation, of "works of the Law" (e.g., ἔργα νόμου in Gal 2:16), and this effort on Paul's part implies the existence of an opposing viewpoint in which "works of the Law" figure prominently. So properly understanding Paul requires a historically plausible reconstruction of a role for "works of the Law" that accounts for their valorization within first-century Judaism. James Dunn's "new perspective on Paul" correctly rejects anachronistic and theologically loaded notions of ἔργα νόμου, such as "works which earn God's favour, as merit-amassing observances," arguing instead for the notion of cultural "badges" that "mark out the Jews as God's people."⁵ The food laws, for example, as "works of the Law," establish an ethnic *identity*—and Paul ultimately disputes the foisting of this *identity* on Gentiles as an addendum to their faith in Christ.⁶ Without undermining Dunn's assessment, Philo's view of the food laws nevertheless calls for the consideration of another possibility. Clearly for *some* Jews of the first century, "works of the Law" functioned as *a means to virtue*, in particular the virtue of

Rereading of Romans, 46-56; also Niehoff, *Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture*, 75-110 [= "Jewish Values: Religion and Self-Restraint"]; cf. Anthony Long, "Philosophical Power."

⁵ James D. G. Dunn, "The New Perspective on Paul," in *The New Perspective on Paul* (rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 99-120, 111.

⁶ On the food laws as identity markers, see Dunn, "New Perspective," 109-10 (e.g., 108: "[B]y 'works of the law' Paul intended his readers to think of *particular observances of the law like circumcision and the food laws*" [original emphasis]).

ἐγκράτεια.⁷ Further research into first-century perspectives on the Law *that Paul opposed* should take into account the possibility of ἔργα νόμου representing the sort of ascetic exercises Philo describes in his exposition.⁸

Finally, Philo's exposition of the Tenth Commandment brings to light not just a Middle-Platonic *concept* of "passion," but a distinct Middle-Platonic *definition* of "passion": ἄμετρος καὶ πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή (*Spec.* 4.79).

Understanding this as a deliberately revised Stoic definition, which uses ἄμετρος to reinterpret πλεονάζουσα in light of a radically different moral psychology, reveals not a superficial *eclecticism* within Middle Platonism but a thoughtful effort to appropriate *terminology* without compromising *principles*. Furthermore, Philo provides extensive evidence not only for the definition πλεονάζουσα (ἄμετρος) ὁρμή but also for its consistent *application* in matters of moral psychology in first-century Alexandrian Middle Platonism—for example, in connection with the *Phaedrus* chariot figure. Philo's use of a working Middle-Platonic definition of passion holds significance for further research into the historical development of ethical theory within Middle Platonism.

⁷ Stowers makes this point in *Romans*, esp. 58-65 [= "Judaism as a School for Self-Mastery"] (cf. idem, "Paul and Self-Mastery," 531-34). The scope of Stowers work, however, does not allow him to consider in depth either the moral psychology of Philo or precisely *how* the observance of Mosaic law leads to ἐγκράτεια.

⁸ Cf. Stowers, *Romans*, 66-74 [= "Audience, Opponents, and Self-Mastery in Paul"]; e.g., 67: "Paul's attack on these opponents who taught judaizing practices to gentiles suggests that their appeal may have centered on claims that gentiles could learn self-mastery by association with the Jewish community and by adopting certain practices that were described as methods of self-mastery."

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