

What Type of City to Be?

**Local Government Receptivity to Industrial, Commercial,
and Residential Development**

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Abstract:

The literature on urban development politics provides clues, but no consensus, regarding the orientation of local governments toward specific types of new growth. This paper examines the receptivity of cities to industrial, commercial, and residential development, drawing upon a mail survey of top administrative officials in 330 California municipalities. Bivariate data suggest that communities with highly imbalanced jobs/population ratios seek development that will rectify those imbalances. Multivariate analysis reveals more complex growth orientations, however. Cities experiencing infrastructure problems in accommodating past growth disfavor almost all types of new development, while those with housing affordability problems encourage housing construction and are less receptive to new industry and commerce. Cities with larger populations are more welcoming of most forms of growth, and other demographic, political, and urban ecological factors also shape receptivity to various land uses. The results suggest that the “growth machine” and revenue maximization perspectives may be too simplistic to adequately portray the attitudes of city policymakers.

What Type of City to Be? Local Government Receptivity to Industrial, Commercial, and Residential Development

In the United States, urban growth is predominantly a market-driven process. Land development, however, can also be systematically shaped by the regulatory powers, subdivision controls, and infrastructure provision of local governments in this decentralized political system (Lewis, 1996). While there has been some scholarship on the overall receptivity of local governments to new growth, we know little about the particular development paths and strategies cities choose. “Growth” is not undifferentiated; it comes in widely varied packages, including residential, industrial, and commercial development.

This paper examines the development orientations, vis-à-vis various types of land use, of 330 California municipalities, drawing upon a 1998 mail survey of local public officials. I examine local government receptivity to single-family and multifamily housing, light and heavy industry, office, retail, and mixed-use development, as rated in desirability by the city manager or another top local official. I seek to account for variations in local growth orientations, and to examine whether the character of past growth is related to current growth orientations. Do job-rich cities seek to balance their employment concentrations with new housing? What characteristics differentiate cities that seek office or retail development from those that seek industry? Does rapid population growth lead cities to encourage housing construction or to restrain it? In an effort to shed light upon local officials’ responses regarding the comparative attractiveness of various types of future growth, I examine factors including the job/population ratio of each community, demographic and housing market conditions, political characteristics, and the “carrying capacity” of local infrastructure.

City Orientations toward Growth

When describing localities, urban scholars often use shorthand terms to capture the land-use characteristics of these communities and their places in the regional hierarchy—for example, “industrial suburb,” “low-density bedroom community,” or “office hub.” Location theory and urban economics provide market perspectives as to why some communities occupy the particular niche that they do. Certainly, factors such as transportation accessibility, land costs, and distance to the existing job and population centers explain a great deal about development trajectories in specific communities. “But attempts to build a location science on the basis of topography, physical resources, or a “spatial geometry” are doomed to fail. They ignore the human factor of social organization in determining land use . . .” (Molotch, 1988, p. 30). In particular, there has been less systematic attention to the political processes that characterize development decision making in different types of jurisdictions, which may shape such community specialization. The local political system influences—and is influenced by—the amount, mix, and intensity of development that occur in each jurisdiction.

There have been a number of empirical studies examining local government restrictions on residential development (e.g., Logan & Zhou, 1990; Donovan & Neiman, 1992), and others focusing on cities’ use of various business-promotion policies (e.g., Donovan,

1993; Fleischmann et al., 1992). This paper builds on such studies. It differs, though, in its more holistic consideration of local growth policies—that is, its attention to the relative emphasis or mix of residential, commercial, and industrial development, in other words, the emphasis of city growth policies. I also employ a richer set of variables designed to capture local socioeconomic and political characteristics as well as to characterize the outcomes of past growth.

Several broad veins in the theoretical literature on urban politics suggest various ways one might approach the issue. I discuss five approaches here.

Development Status and City “Life-Cycles”

Measures of urbanization, namely population size and density, have often been held as having considerable importance in community decision making regarding planning and development (e.g., Eulau & Prewitt, 1973; Glickfeld et al., 1999). These “city size” variables can be expected to influence the nature of the issue environment in local politics, the heterogeneity and interdependence of the local society, and the character of local interest group activity. For example, municipalities with large populations have been found to be more likely to pursue a balance of business and residential development (Eulau & Prewitt, 1973, p. 540), and to be more interested in development as a way to create jobs (Lewis, 1999).

In addition to the amount of previous development, its timing may also be important. “Mature” cities—those communities that are more built-out and stable in population—are perhaps apt to approach growth differently. Zikmund (1975) suggests a community life-cycle effect regarding the politics of development, with communities that urbanized earlier being more wary of additional growth, as they have come to understand and experience the costs of growth. While newly urbanizing communities may have a high proportion of landowners who stand to profit from rapid development, antigrowth political orientations may arise later as more “newcomers” arrive and seek to protect their quality of life. Older cities may also have more of an established “identity” to protect.

The Growth Machine City

The well-known “growth machine” perspective on urban political economy suggests that city officials can be expected to make decisions that favor local development elites, particularly real estate firms, merchants selling to local markets, utilities, and other *rentier* interests who stand to profit from an increased intensity of development. Skilled trades and construction workers are also part of the local growth machine, notably through their unions (Logan & Molotch, 1987, pp. 81-82). “Within the local realm,” Molotch (1988, p. 42) writes, “it is the growth elites who are hegemonic.”

For a cross-sectional empirical study like the current one, this suggests that prodevelopment orientations on the part of local government are more likely where such “exchange value” elites are numerous and well-organized. It is difficult to quantitatively measure such private-sector organization, however, particularly at a level as disaggregated as municipalities. The growth machine approach, as a universalistic theory (a growth machine “system” in Molotch’s (1988) terms), makes it difficult to formulate

specific hypotheses about which types of cities would favor which types of growth, since presumably, *all* local governments would seek more development. Logan & Molotch (1987, p. 159-62) do allow for the occasional high-status outlier suburb that seeks to restrict growth, but portray such efforts as ineffective and targeted almost exclusively at residential development. It is not entirely clear, then, what the growth machine perspective would predict in terms of the particular land-use emphasis of various types of cities: A desire for more businesses (industrial or office development)? Or for more customers (residential development) for existing businesses?

The Fiscally Maximizing City

Another longstanding strand of the literature in urban political economy argues that local policymakers engage in some form of fiscal maximization. This might be specified as improving the position of the median voter or taxpayer (Peterson, 1981), achieving a fiscally optimal population size (Tiebout, 1956), or maximizing the ratio of tax revenues to services demanded, or bureaucrats' budgetary discretion (Schneider, 1989). This perspective suggests that cities will pursue higher revenue-producing, lower service-consuming land uses. In states where the property tax is the core element of local public finance, office and light industrial development probably have the optimal net fiscal effect. In states with a significant local sales tax, retail development will be viewed with favor (Lewis & Barbour, 1999).

Residential development, which generates significant service costs but typically fairly modest property tax revenues, is likely to be disfavored by local governments under the fiscal maximization perspective. "To be sure, a few suburbs continue to value their residential character above the potential benefits of industrial parks, corporate headquarters, research laboratories, and shopping centers. But most cannot resist the lure of valuable properties that by themselves add no pupils to the local school rolls" (Danielson & Doig, 1982, p. 89). However, where developer fees are widely applied to new housing, they may offset costs of single-family growth, thus perhaps altering the standard fiscal logic (Altshuler & Gomez-Ibanez, 1993). In few contexts, however, are multifamily housing or higher-density single-family housing seen as paying their own way. As a simplifying assumption, there is little in the fiscal maximization perspective that allows for much variety in municipal behavior, however. Thus, while useful as a heuristic, this approach has limitations for explaining variations in city land-use emphases.

The Pluralist City

Pluralist and neo-pluralist analyses suggest that local land-use policymaking may be less single-minded than either the fiscal maximization strategy or the growth machine theory would suggest. In its classic form (Dahl, 1961), pluralism suggests that city governments serve largely to mediate conflicts among local interest groups, although pluralism retains a considerable role for the leadership of elected representatives. If government serves as a broker among competing groups, then business influence, socioeconomic needs, local demographic characteristics, and citizen concerns over externalities of growth can all be expected to play a role in shaping local growth policies. This is because the democratically elected officials who set local policy operate in a competitive group

system, and can be expected to reflect, albeit imperfectly, local constituencies' needs and demands. In short, the pluralist perspective is largely one of bottom-up politics.

City governments presumably thus reflect, in large part, demands articulated by local constituencies, which in turn may be shaped by objective local conditions. Thus, a pluralist would expect policymakers to respond to a need for employment, or for housing, in a community deprived of such resources. At the individual level, public opinion studies of attitudes toward growth control frequently find that respondents' experience with the problems and externalities of growth, such as traffic congestion, increase their propensity to support growth controls (e.g., Baldassare, 1998). Aggregating these preferences at the city level, we might expect that localities where various measurable "costs of past growth"—traffic congestion, pollution, etc.—are high, officials will be more inclined to limit new development. Schneider & Teske (1995) have shown that under the right local conditions, "antigrowth entrepreneurs" may take advantage of disequilibria in local politics to articulate grievances about growth problems and unite frustrated residents behind a growth-limitation cause or candidacy. This model of challenge and opposition to the status quo is broadly consistent with the pluralist model. Perhaps reflecting such movements, Donovan (1993) found that cities with greater levels of controversy over growth engage in less promotion of economic development. These studies suggest that the negative externalities of past growth have a role in creating an antigrowth orientation in city government—perhaps extending to business development as well as residential policies.

The Trusteeship City

As a somewhat state-centered alternative to the determinism of growth-machine and fiscal maximization models, and the group-centeredness of pluralist models, a number of recent works have emphasized the entrepreneurship and leadership of local public officials in guiding local development policy. In a conception of representation that might be labeled trusteeship, these studies see local policymakers steering communities toward their vision of community's desirable future. Pagano & Bowman (1995, p. 2) argue, "Local officials pursue development as a means of reaching an ideal, reflecting an image they hold collectively of what their city ought to be." A trusteeship orientation suggests not merely responding to group demands, local needs, or a business elite, but positioning a city to further its long-term viability as a political and economic community. Policymakers, then, seek an optimal niche for their city within a wider network of cities, and strive for their vision of the good (local) society (Pagano & Bowman, 1995, pp. 3, 106). Similarly, Clarke & Gaile (1998, p. 181) find a "growing consensus that localities are shifting toward more interventionist and more differentiated approaches to development," even as globalization undermines nation-state economies and local growth machines. Wealth is increasingly generated through high value-added production and information resources, and many city officials are eager to actively position their cities in the evolving world market. By a wide margin, representatives of the large and medium-sized cities in Clarke & Gaile's survey dataset see globalization as a likely benefit to their economies rather than as a problem (p. 186).

Some older empirical evidence supporting this public leadership perspective can be

gleaned from Eulau & Prewitt's (1973, p. 407) finding that of 435 San Francisco Bay Area city council members interviewed for their project, 60% saw themselves filling primarily a trustee role in their representation. Only 18% espoused a "delegate" orientation. (The rest wouldn't choose or said they engaged in both roles depending on circumstances).

Summary

Although only presented here in thumbnail form, each of these five theoretical approaches to urban development politics provides a distinctive perspective that might inform an investigation of local receptivity to various types of development. The growth machine and fiscal maximization arguments provide for the least room for variation in city preferences. The former suggests a predisposition toward any growth that will boost the local real estate market, while the latter seems to predict a near-uniform quest among communities for lucrative commercial and industrial ratables, and perhaps high-value housing. The pluralist perspective suggests that a city's demographic composition, socioeconomic "need," and experience with the costs of past growth, will strongly shape its local government attitudes. Public officials will be motivated to respond to grievances and requests from groups that are likely to emerge to represent these various sectors.

The "trusteeship" perspective, for want of a better term, indicates relative autonomy of local officials in making development decisions to achieve their desired vision of the community future. How to operationalize this quite plausible approach, in terms of specifying independent variables that might explain the choice of development paths, is unclear, however. The trusteeship concept does imply a possible disconnect between city development decisions and local residents' (or groups') demands or needs for particular types of land uses.

Data: A Survey of California Cities' Development Strategies

I use a survey of municipal officials in California to shed light upon the hypotheses and predictions raised in the discussion above, focusing on overall receptivity of cities to various types of land uses. California is an excellent site for such a study. It is the nation's largest and probably most diverse state, experienced substantial growth pressures in the late 1990s, and has widely varied economic social, and political conditions among its regions and localities. The mail questionnaire was administered in 1998 to the top administrative official—generally the city manager or city administrator—in each of the 471 California municipalities then in existence. Using the Dillman (1978) method for implementing mail surveys, we obtained useable responses from 330 cities, a 70 percent response rate. The responses were quite representative in terms of city population size and regional location (for details, see Lewis & Barbour 1999, pp. 82-83, 127-137).

The survey questions were kept general and thus hopefully broadly applicable. Among other questions, respondents were asked about *how desirable* various types of new development were to their city's administration. Only those respondents indicating that their city had vacant land available for new development (68 percent of the total) were instructed to answer this question. The categories listed, which respondents rated on a seven-point scale of desirability, are single-family residential, multifamily residential,

light industrial, heavy industrial, retail, office, and mixed-use development.

Respondents were also asked about their land-use preferences in redevelopment project areas supported by the city government and/or redevelopment agency. Public redevelopment activity is extremely common among California cities, even small ones (Dardia, 1997). Three quarters (74%) of respondents assessed their city as being at least somewhat active in redevelopment, and responses are limited to those jurisdictions. They were asked about the desirability of the various land-use categories listed above, in evaluating proposed projects in redevelopment areas.

The questions differ from those in most survey-based studies of local development policy, which typically ask respondents to list or check off specific policy instruments that their localities use to promote or control growth (e.g., school impact fees levied on housing construction, or city use of tax abatements or loan guarantees for businesses). Such surveys have the advantage of specificity, but may encounter a variety of problems.

First, the reliability of the responses may be suspect, not only because of self-reporting errors of respondents, but due to differences in the implementation of these policies across jurisdictions. That is, although two cities may both have a tax abatement policy on the books, for example, the aggressiveness with which they employ this policy may differ tremendously.¹ Second, surveys with policy-specific questions normally cannot ascertain which types of businesses—or which types of residential development—are most heavily targeted by the city government for recruitment or restraint. Third, baseline conditions may make the applicability or meaning of certain policies quite different across cities. For example, an affluent bedroom community that is zoned entirely for large-lot single-family residences and is largely built-out would probably have little motivation to pass a numerical growth cap (or other such growth-control measures). By contrast, a rapidly developing community with much land available and zoned for multifamily housing might experience more pressures for a growth cap. Even though the first town might actually be more “antigrowth” in overall political sentiments and effects on the market than the second, the absence of growth-restrictive ordinances would result in a lower score on a growth-control index, measured this way. Ultimately, many analysts simply add together the use of growth-promoting or growth-retarding policies to arrive at a measure of local development policy—a summary index of growth promotion or restriction.

An advantage of the type of survey used in this study is its ability to capture the attitudes and receptivity of top local policymakers toward specific types of development (as opposed to generic pro-growth or antigrowth classifications). Such attitudes can be reasonably expected to manifest themselves in city decisions, but nevertheless might not necessarily be well captured by questions about specific ordinances and planning requirements. While our survey questions were kept quite general and thus easy to

¹ One research team using such a survey reports, “Based on our own anecdotal observations, we believe that growth policy implementation varies widely from community to community, with some adhering strictly to policy, others ignoring policy, and still others altering policy frequently [to] meet changing political conditions.” (Glickfeld et al., 1999, p. 37).

answer, they are fairly direct in querying the city managers about the desired future direction for development in their cities.

Of course, the strength of these questions is also their weakness: They cannot be held to represent specific city policies. Nor do we know how realistic the various development scenarios are for any particular community. An isolated rural town that lacks good transportation access, for example, might conceivably rate light industry or office development as highly desirable, but that city might be completely off the radar screen for developers of such properties. The seven-point scales are also subject to some problems of random variation in responses—similar to those encountered in “feeling thermometer” questions about presidential candidates in mass opinion surveys—but do allow for fairly subtle differences in preferences across land-use categories. In any event, these questions are perhaps a less blunt instrument for assessing city growth orientations than dichotomous questions about the presence or absence of specific city policies or ordinances. With these qualifications in mind, the data can be used to help compose a portrait of growth preferences across different types of jurisdictions.

Patterns of Survey Responses

Table 1 shows mean scores and standard deviations for the major survey responses relating to desirability of new development and redevelopment. These will be used as dependent variables in the subsequent regression analysis. Overall, California municipalities show a clear preference for retail development, because of the importance of local sales taxes as a component of discretionary revenues for cities (see Lewis & Barbour, 1999). Office, mixed-use, and light industrial development are also generally seen as desirable. Note that the housing categories, along with heavy industry, trail the lists.

Thus, in broad terms, the aggregate results may be seen as largely supporting a fiscal maximization perspective on land-use decisionmaking. In particular, residential development is widely seen as a losing proposition fiscally in California, where Proposition 13 seriously restricts local property taxes. Perhaps not coincidentally, housing production has increasingly trailed job and population growth in recent years, with housing affordability diminishing as a result. Demographers estimate that in 1998 the state added only one housing unit per 5.27 new residents (Kroll, 1999).

[Table 1 here]

The focus of this paper, however, is not on the statewide aggregate scores, but on comparing cities’ ratings of the various land-use categories. Table 2 displays correlation matrices for the responses to each set of survey items. I have grouped the industrial and commercial correlations in the upper-left portion of each section of the table. Doing so helps to reveal the patterns of responses:

[Table 2 here]

- Cities’ desirability scores for light industry, heavy industry, office, and retail development tend to be moderately to highly correlated with one another (although the relationship is much weaker between heavy industry and the two commercial categories).

- The desirability scores of single-family and multifamily housing are moderately correlated with one another.
- Correlations between the industry categories and the residential categories, by contrast, are weak or negative.
- However, some cities do appear to see housing as reasonably compatible with office and retail development, judging by their moderate correlations in new development areas.
- This is less apparent in redevelopment areas, where in general *all* correlations among desirability scores are lower. Cities seem to have more specific (specialized?) land-use orientations for redevelopment projects.
- Cities that desire mixed-use developments also tend to favor office and retail development and multifamily housing—not surprisingly, as these are the major likely components of mixed-use projects.

Thus, it appears that cities tend to favor housing *or* industrial growth; relatively few cities strongly desire both. Retail and offices apparently are seen as intermediate categories between industry and housing (as indeed they are positioned in most zoning ordinances); their growth is seen as somewhat complementary with both.²

What we cannot tell from correlational analysis, however, is whether cities' preferences reflect a desire to balance existing land-uses or to attract "more of the same." That is, do housing-heavy jurisdictions seek industrial and office growth to balance their residential assets, or do they seek to remain largely residential? Do more job-heavy municipalities desire housing, or do they seek to specialize in the job-producing industrial and commercial categories?

Jobs/Housing Balance and City Growth Orientations

To assess this issue, I constructed job/population ratios for each city as of 1990 using Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) data (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1994). In Table 3, mean responses to the various survey items are displayed for job-heavy and population-heavy jurisdictions—defined here as the top- and bottom-quartile cities on the job/population ratio. It is apparent that cities with an especially low job/population ratio clearly find the industrial and commercial land-use categories more desirable than do the job-heavy cities. The latter are more receptive to multifamily housing (although the single-family housing category shows no pattern). This indicates that, *at the extremes*, cities seem to be seeking to rectify their imbalances between jobs and housing, rather than seeking further specialization.

[Table 3 here]

Among the overall distribution of cities, however, simple correlations between the jobs/population ratio and the survey responses are generally weak, as the last column of

² A factor analysis of the responses to the new development desirability items (not shown here) indicates two main patterns in the data: (a) A primary factor involving positive factor loadings for all land-use categories, with particularly high scores for offices and light industry; and (b) A factor with negative loadings for the industrial categories, moderately positive scores for the housing categories, and high scores for mixed use.

Table 3 reveals. The job/population ratio shows statistically significant (negative) correlations only with light industry and retail in both parts of the survey. Also significantly negatively correlated with the jobs/population ratio is the score for the desirability of mixed-use redevelopment projects. None of the residential categories are remotely related to the ratio.

Although the relationship of job/population balance to land-use orientations raises interesting issues, particularly for cities at the “extremes,” it does not seem to be a particularly important motivator of development orientations in most cities. Clearly, cities are not one-dimensional seekers of land-use balance, nor are they extreme specialists. Rather, a more fully developed model of local land-use orientations is necessary. To this end, I have merged the survey responses with a wide variety of city demographic and fiscal characteristics from Census and state sources. Regression analysis can thus be used to examine the factors that are related to local receptivity to various types of growth.

Multivariate Model

Drawing upon the existing theoretical and empirical literature, as well as some empirically grounded hunches, I hypothesize that city receptivity to the various types of growth will be a function of five types of variables: locational and developmental characteristics of the community, socioeconomic and racial composition, housing market conditions, certain political characteristics, and externalities or costs of past growth. In this section, I review the variables selected to represent these concepts. Except where noted, the source of all (non-dummy) variables in the model is the 1990 Census.³

Locational Characteristics and Existing Development Pattern

A community’s existing development status, location, and urbanization patterns are among the sets of conditions that establish which types of growth are economically feasible and politically attractive. The urban ecological perspective and the “city life cycle” argument discussed earlier recognize most explicitly the importance of measures of urbanization, such as population size and density. Empirical studies of city decision making from other traditions often also include such variables, even if they are not explicitly theorized.

In addition to a municipality’s size and density, its place in the urban hierarchy may well be of independent importance. Suburbs tend to approach development differently than central cities and rural communities do. Given their limited role or stake in the regional economy, they may seek to occupy a particular, specialized niche and may be less inclined to worry about the regional challenges of development, such as job creation or affordable housing (Lewis, 1996, 1999). Finally, regional location may affect city development orientations, because regions differ fundamentally on the basis of their industrial composition and labor markets, and thus present different growth opportunities. Different metropolitan areas may also reflect distinctive political cultures that affect political decisionmaking and attitudes toward the interaction of politics and markets

³I use the Census “100 percent count” (or STF1A file) where possible for various population measures, but many variables must rely on sampling (STF3A file).

(Elazar, 1972), as well as other unobserved city characteristics that vary by region.

In numerous regressions, the job/population ratio proved consistently unrelated to any of the survey responses (i.e., insignificant as an independent variable) and was thus omitted. Ultimately, I selected the following seven variables to represent developmental and locational considerations:

- (1) Log of 1998 *population* (source: California Department of Finance);
- (2) Log of 1990 *population density*;
- (3) Dummy for *suburbs* (defined as municipalities that the Census classifies as urbanized, part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area, and not a central city);
- (4) *Age of the median housing unit*, representing the developmental trajectory or life cycle of the community. Cities with higher levels of median housing age reached their residential population zenith earlier in their histories, and have seen less growth recently, relative to other communities⁴;
- (5) – (7) Dummy variables for the three major geographic regions of California—the five-county *Los Angeles region*, nine-county *San Francisco Bay area*, and 18-county *Central Valley area*. (The Central Valley is the traditional farm belt of California, and includes such central cities as Fresno, Bakersfield, and Sacramento, as well as many small towns and some suburbs. This region has high levels of unemployment and poverty, and a moderate to conservative political culture.)

Socioeconomic and Ethnic Characteristics

Communities with higher socioeconomic status (SES) may eschew additional development to preserve “community character,” lifestyle, and aesthetics (Williams, 1971; Glickfeld et al., 1999). They may particularly seek to avoid industrial development, often considered noxious, and commercial development, which may generate traffic congestion and other negative externalities and bring unwanted “outsiders” to the community. Higher-density residential development may also be shunned. For analogous reasons, cities with low SES may be expected to be more welcoming of employment-producing development. Reinforcing such proclivities are the fiscal pressures of local government, with lower-status communities often suffering from weaker tax bases and revenue streams. This may increase pressures for commercial and industrial development, which are generally seen as benefiting the tax base.⁵ The fiscal maximization strategy would also lead one to expect poor cities to shun multifamily housing. In contrast, a pluralist perspective suggests that local group activity would promote additional housing to meet local needs in poor communities.

⁴ Some might view age of housing as a measure of community status, but at least in this sample it is only weakly correlated to socioeconomic “need” variables

⁵ However, a variable directly measuring local fiscal strength—the log of own-source revenues per capita—is omitted from the model, as it proved insignificant in all estimations.

Another relevant demographic characteristic is age. Senior citizens, many of them on fixed incomes, are often thought to be more fiscally conservative local political actors than younger residents. This may lead citizens with high shares of seniors to favor commercial and industrial projects, and disfavor multifamily housing. The housing needs of seniors might counteract this tendency, however, and thus the expected effect of senior citizen share on residential growth orientations is uncertain.

Ethnic and racial characteristics may amplify or alter the impact of other SES variables. Generally, African-American and Latino populations are believed to be less embracing of “postmaterialist” values, thus making them more likely to support growth—presumably for both housing and industrial/commercial development—and less inclined to back slow-growth movements. However, the variable for percent black was subsequently dropped when it proved consistently insignificant in any of the regressions.

As in many contexts, estimating separate effects for race and SES are complicated in practice, since local racial make-up is often heavily collinear with income, education, and other status variables. Specifically, in California, where Latinos are by far the most numerous minority group, percent Latino is highly related ($|r| = .6$ or greater) to numerous SES and demographic variables, among them the city poverty rate and unemployment rate, the proportion of the population composed of children, and the percentage of the workforce engaged in executive occupations and farming/fishing jobs. In general, most measures of community status are highly correlated. In attempting to avoid collinearity in the model, I have included three variables that each have theoretical importance but are not highly correlated with each other. (Indeed, throughout the regression model, none of the independent variables are correlated above .56.):

(8) *Percent Hispanic*. Given the correlations noted above, this variable may proxy for various measures of deprivation;

(9) Median household *income*, which may be taken as a proxy for high status, generally. Income is highly correlated with percent college graduates (.78), percent executives (.83), percent not in poverty (.66), and percent owner-occupied housing (.65). (Income and percent Hispanic are only moderately related (-.40).);

(10) Percent of population *aged 65 or over*.

Housing Affordability

In addition to the age of housing in the community, discussed above, other housing-market characteristics might be expected to affect local government receptivity to development—particularly residential development. Housing affordability is a significant issue in many communities—especially in California—but is distinct from socioeconomic status, as affordability involves the cost of housing relative to ability-to-pay. Poor affordability may introduce pressures for local officials to approve additional housing to satisfy local demand. Unaffordable housing may, however, make city policymakers less receptive to job-producing development, since increased employment in the area will likely only put further pressure on the inflated housing market. Therefore

I measure:

(11) *Housing unaffordability*, defined as the ratio of median house value to median household income⁶;

Political Characteristics

Distinct from socioeconomic conditions and housing affordability, local political conditions can be expected to shape municipal decisionmaking. Although all local elections in California are officially nonpartisan, party strength nevertheless affects candidate recruitment and voter mobilization and reflects residents' ideological inclinations. One might anticipate that local Democratic strength is related to receptivity to development, but the affiliation of "liberalism" with progrowth labor unions, neighborhood populism, and environmentalism alike makes this relationship multidimensional and somewhat unpredictable (cf. DeLeon, 1992). My variables also include a measure of potential group strength of progrowth unions—one element of the local "growth machine"—and a measure of redevelopment policy intensity, which may be relevant for city receptivity to proposals in redevelopment zones:

(12) *Percent Democratic registration* of total two-party registration, 1998 (source: Office of the California Secretary of State);

(13) Percent of local resident workers engaged in *skilled trades* (i.e., precision production, craft, and repair occupations). This is a measure of the relative presence of construction and contractor workers, and thus the potential strength of trades unions.;

(14) For the redevelopment regressions only, a dummy variable for observations where survey respondents indicated their city government is "*very actively engaged in redevelopment*" (The reference category is "not very active." Cities that were not engaged in redevelopment at all were instructed to skip the redevelopment questions and thus are not included in the regression.)

Effects of Past Growth

Past growth may affect residents' and officials' receptivity to additional growth. Externalities, such as traffic congestion, may affect perceptions of the "carrying capacity" of local infrastructure. Pendall (1999), in a study of citizen opposition to housing proposals, finds that citizens most frequently mentioned infrastructure-related concerns in their communications, whether protests were of a "not in my backyard" character or a more general antigrowth nature. He also finds, however, that "projects in fast-growing communities generated less NIMBY controversy," and that "antigrowth sentiment was stronger in slowly growing communities . . ." (pp. 130-31). While various explanations may be suggested, Pendall's findings suggest that contrary to what one might expect, rapid population growth itself may be inversely related to antigrowth sentiment.

Some of the externalities or congestion costs of urban growth may possibly be captured

⁶ A substitute measure, the ratio of median rent to median household income, has similar effects when included in the model, but the home value measure produces a better fit.

by the density variable, discussed earlier. But the following variables more directly measure residents' experiences with growth:

(15) *Percent change in population, 1991-1998*, a measure of the rapidity of recent growth (California Department of Finance estimates);

(16) *Average travel time to work*, in minutes, a measure of local congestion (and perhaps indirectly a measure of jobs/housing mismatch);

(17) *Percent of housing units not connected to a public sewer system*. Like the previous variable, this is a potential measure of problems with the "carrying capacity" of local infrastructure. This variable includes those housing units using septic tanks, cesspools, or "other means" besides a modern sewer system.

Estimation Results

Using these independent variables, I estimated OLS regression models of city responses to the survey questions about the various land use categories. Responses relating to new development and redevelopment are reported separately.⁷ Bear in mind that the dependent variable represents only the city's expressed desire for a particular type of land use—not the advantage of that land-use category over other categories of development.

Industrial and Commercial Development

Regressions for light and heavy industry were first estimated separately, but effects were very similar, and I thus elected to combine these categories. The initial dependent variable, then, is the combined score given by each city for the desirability of light and heavy industry in new development areas. Results for this regression appear as column A in Table 4. Column B reports a model of the desirability of light and heavy industry in redevelopment areas.

[Table 4 here]

The parameter estimates are illuminating in a variety of ways. First, there is considerable evidence that locational and developmental characteristics of the cities strongly shape policymakers' attitudes toward industrial development. Cities with large populations are considerably more receptive to industry, while those with higher densities are less receptive—probably because land availability and land costs in dense areas may render industrial development infeasible, given its typically large land requirements. The negative effect of density may also reflect city officials' concerns about externality effects of industry—traffic, pollution, etc.—within crowded environments. This accords with the negative and significant effects of unsewered housing units and commute times on receptivity to new industry (though only the sewerage variable is significant in the case of redevelopment), suggesting that cities experiencing growth strains are unfavorably disposed to industry. Suburbs are also somewhat less inclined to accept industry in new development areas, even controlling for other characteristics, while cities

⁷ Redevelopment is a qualitatively different activity than new development. Moreover, a different subset of cities responded to the new development questions and the redevelopment questions, given the "screen" questions that excluded cities without vacant land or those without redevelopment activity.

in the Central Valley, a region with high unemployment levels and a lower-skilled work force, are more receptive to industry than other parts of the state.

The presence of skilled trades workers, posited as part of the progrowth coalition, is positively related to cities' desire for industry. This may also reflect city officials' perception of employment needs, given that skilled trades workers might well find job opportunities in industrial firms. Cities with less affordable housing are considerably disinclined to support industrial development, probably fearing that employment gains will further inflate the costs of housing. And in the case of new development, cities' percent Hispanic is positively associated with receptivity to industry. The two regressions account for 50 percent and 38 percent of the variation in the survey responses regarding industry.

Next we turn to office development, with results presented analogously in columns C and D. These regressions are considerably less well fit than the industry models. Nevertheless, several results stand out. For both new development and redevelopment areas, cities with high populations are significantly more receptive to office construction. Location in the San Francisco Bay Area, with its high-tech and professional job growth, also improves local receptivity to office development on vacant land sites, while respondents whose cities are "very active" in redevelopment policy are more welcoming of office buildings in redevelopment areas. In the case of new development, higher income cities are less receptive to office construction, as are those with less affordable housing, longer commute times, more unsewered homes, and more rapid recent population growth. The percentage of the labor force engaged in skilled trades is again positively related to receptivity to this type of growth, though the effect is significant only in redevelopment areas.

Retail, the most desired form of development among these cities, proves difficult to estimate, perhaps because covetousness of retail is so ubiquitous among California municipalities (Lewis & Barbour, 1999). Column E shows results for new development only, since the redevelopment model was so poorly fit as to be unreliable (adjusted R-squared of .02). Five variables have significant effects on receptivity to retail: Median income, age of housing, and unaffordable housing are negatively related, while suburbs are more receptive, as are more densely populated communities. Perhaps denser cities perceive more opportunities to tap the spending power of their concentrated populations.

Housing and Mixed-Use Development

The single-family housing regressions were very poorly fit, regardless of alternate specifications attempted. It seems that single-family housing is inoffensive enough, or indistinctive enough, that cities are not clearly divided on its attractiveness. I thus show results only for multifamily housing (columns F and G), and these do provide several interesting findings.

Some of the results reported above regarding the nonresidential categories are echoed here. First, cities whose residents have long commute times are disinclined to accept multifamily housing. Officials likely conclude that constructing additional housing will

probably only worsen local traffic congestion. Second, municipalities with higher populations are more receptive to apartments in new development areas, while cities with “very active” redevelopment policies are more receptive to such housing in redevelopment areas. Suburban governments are less inclined to welcome apartments in either case. In the case of the housing affordability variable, however, the effects are opposite to the effects on commercial/industrial development. Cities with less affordable housing, perhaps not surprisingly, are significantly *more* likely to desire multifamily housing. This supports the notion that city officials respond to local housing needs, rather than simply pursuing local fiscal advantage.

Other results may seem more anomalous. First, higher population growth rates are *positively* related to receptivity to multifamily housing, supporting Pendall’s (1999) findings on housing protest. Perhaps the positive effect of growth rates on housing receptivity (though significant only for new development areas) reflects an initial progrowth sentiment typical of many newer urbanizing communities, in accordance with the predictions of Zikmund (1975). By contrast, older, more settled communities with well-defined self-images may react against such rapid growth, as is indicated here by the negative effect of housing age on receptivity to apartments in redevelopment areas.

Second, if we assume that the ethnic and SES variables are potentially important measures of need for multifamily housing, the signs of the coefficients are all in the “wrong” direction. However, only the income variable (in regression G) attains statistical significance at the .10 level. An interesting potential explanation is one congruent with a “trusteeship” perspective on local policymaking. Simply put, officials of cities with high levels of poverty and with many residents needing local services (represented here by income, Hispanic origin, and senior citizen status) may wish to change the community’s direction and avoid becoming “overloaded” with lower SES groups. Since multifamily housing is typically cheaper than single-family dwellings, local policymakers in low-SES communities may fear that the large-scale construction of apartments will further hinder their capacity to meet local needs with fiscal resources. Such fiscal strains are often a key catalyst for shifts in city development strategies (Pagano & Bowman, 1997). The seemingly aberrant positive effect of income in regression G is particularly interesting in light of the State of California’s requirement that 20% of all tax increment revenues in redevelopment projects be spent on low- and moderate-income housing, a rule that critics charge is frequently evaded by municipalities (Dardia, 1998, pp. 79-86).

Finally, it is interesting to examine the factors related to support for mixed-use developments. Mixed-use projects, perhaps the most “urbane” type of development analyzed here, force cities to wrestle explicitly with issues of land-use mixing and complementarity of uses. Although the regressions for new development and redevelopment (columns H and I) are not very consistent with each other, together they tell a story that is by now mostly familiar. Communities suffering from effects of past growth (in this case, high commute times in the new development regression) are less receptive to mixed use. So are cities with less affordable housing (redevelopment only) and older housing (new development). High population size has a positive effect on receptivity to mixed use in both regressions, perhaps reflecting the greater capacity of big

city redevelopment agencies to carry out complex projects, as well as the general progrowth orientation of larger cities. Municipalities very actively engaged in redevelopment also pursue mixed-use more, probably for analogous reasons. Cities with higher population densities, as well as those in the Los Angeles region and San Francisco Bay Area, are more interested in mixed-use projects in new areas, probably reflecting greater familiarity with this sophisticated type of development project. Interestingly, respondents from cities with higher shares of seniors in the population rate mixed-use redevelopment projects as more desirable. Perhaps they view the elderly as potential beneficiaries, given that such projects often include housing aimed at empty nesters, and a pedestrian orientation.

Summary Findings and Implications

This study of a large and representative set of California municipalities and their receptivity to various land-use types reveals more complex and varied approaches to development than is suggested by some leading theories of urban politics. The city officials surveyed here certainly do not follow any simple maximization strategy, whether that strategy is assumed to be maximizing local revenues or advancing capital accumulation of local private elites.

Several conclusions may be drawn from the multivariate analysis. Perhaps most notably, cities that have had a hard time accommodating past growth (measured with travel time and sewerage variables) show significantly less receptivity to growth of all types except retail. This appears to contrast with some findings in the growth control literature, in which scholars concluded that rapid growth was unrelated to growth limitation policies (Glickfeld et al., 1999; Logan & Zhou, 1990). A likely explanation is that previous researchers measured only population growth, rather than directly measuring negative externalities such as traffic congestion.⁸

Moreover, it is notable that I do find a *positive* relationship between population growth rates themselves and the city's receptivity to multifamily housing. The results regarding housing are consistent with Pendall's (1999) argument that communities experiencing rapid demographic change may be less able to mobilize against proposed residential developments. It also hints at a degree of municipal specialization, in which towns experiencing rapid population growth wish to continue adding more housing. However, other data do not bear out the specialization hypothesis. Cities with "extreme" jobs/population mismatches appear to seek balance in their future development, but overall, the current jobs/housing ratio is simply not a major factor in land-use orientations.

Housing unaffordability likewise depresses receptivity to industrial and commercial development, but increases the attractiveness of multifamily housing. This finding is contrary to the expectations of the fiscal maximization perspective, in which local officials would seem to have little or no reason to ever promote apartment construction. It also casts some doubt on the argument that local governments in areas with high home

⁸ Brueckner (1998) does include a measure of freeway conditions, but it is measured at the county level and is insignificant.

prices act as cartels that restrict new construction in order to inflate the property values of local homeowners (Brueckner, 1995, 1998).

Overall, however, the ethnic and socioeconomic “need” variables mostly show insignificant effects on land-use orientations, or even effects the opposite of what might be expected. Most notably, communities with lower-income residents are *less* inclined to seek multifamily housing in redevelopment areas. In contrast to a pluralist paradise of politicians serving local group needs, this result suggests that local governments may seek to change their development trajectory and avoid becoming overloaded with dependent populations. Upper-income cities do look askance at office and retail development (and industrial redevelopment), however, and cities with high shares of Hispanics do seek to accommodate new industry.

More supportive of a pluralist perspective is the influence of the local skilled trades workforce in boosting local government receptivity to industrial and office development—though this finding is also consistent with the growth machine perspective, since construction unions and contractors are generally considered part of the progrowth coalition in local politics. Redevelopment policy intensity also seems to boost the perceived attractiveness of some types of redevelopment uses, namely apartments, office buildings, and mixed use. It is not surprising that cities heavily invested in redevelopment policies welcome such growth more readily.

Baseline development conditions—size, density, suburban status—also shape local government perspectives to some forms of growth. Cities with larger populations are significantly more welcoming to almost all types of development, while suburbs are pro-retail but generally opposed to industry and apartments. There seem to be some significant regional differences as well in this sample from one large state. Finally, the impact of the age-of-housing variable lends some tentative support to the “community life cycle” thesis, as “older” communities seem less disposed to favor certain development types—retail, apartments, offices, mixed use—that may have substantial congestion externalities.

Broader conclusions from a survey of local officials in one state at one point in time must be tentative. Perhaps we might best view these results as showing that city governments are in some sense market-driven, but not in a simple maximization framework such as that suggested by Peterson (1981), or for that matter Logan & Molotch (1987). Rather, local policymakers appear to make authentic choices to position their cities for present and future advantages within the complex local political economy of regions. They seek to avoid being overwhelmed by the costs and burdens of growth (traffic, poor people), while seeking types of development that seem to make sense to them, given the particular locational, developmental, and demographic context they find their communities in. This perspective, although it needs to be further developed, is generally consistent with a trusteeship approach to local land-use policy. As Eulau & Prewitt (1973, p. 571) concluded from their interviews, “As they are called on to take policy positions prior to actual decision-making, policy-makers balance what the problematic situation calls for against what their images of the future suggest as desirable.”

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Table 1**Dependent Variables: Respondents' Scores**

<i>Variable (Scored on 1 to 7 Scale):</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>No. of Responses</i>
<u>Desirability for New Development^a:</u>			
Retail	6.2	1.3	220
Office	5.6	1.4	221
Light industry	5.6	1.7	220
Mixed-use development	5.5	1.3	219
Single-family residential	4.9	1.5	220
Multifamily residential	3.6	1.6	221
Heavy industry	3.5	2.1	215
<u>Desirability for Redevelopment Areas^b:</u>			
Retail	6.4	1.0	234
Office	5.6	1.3	235
Mixed-use development	5.6	1.4	236
Light industry	5.0	2.0	235
Single-family residential	3.8	1.9	234
Multifamily residential	3.8	1.9	235
Heavy industry	3.3	2.1	230

^a “Given your city’s *overall* strategies and plans for land use and future development, *how desirable* to your city administration would each of these types of new development be? In other words, how sought-after are these types of development in your city, in general? Please rank each of the following.”

^b “Given your city’s *overall* strategies and plans for redevelopment, *how desirable* to your city administration would each of these types of projects be in your *redevelopment areas*? In other words, how sought-after are these types of projects in your city’s redevelopment areas?”

Table 2
Correlation Matrices for Survey Responses

Correlations between Desirability Scores: New Development

	<u>Light</u> <u>industry</u>	<u>Heavy</u> <u>industry</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Retail</u>	<u>Single-</u> <u>family</u>	<u>Multi-</u> <u>family</u>	<u>Mixed-</u> <u>use</u>
Light industry	1.00						
Heavy industry	0.56	1.00					
Office	0.52	0.29	1.00				
Retail	0.39	0.19	0.59	1.00			
Single-family housing	0.12	0.00	0.28	0.26	1.00		
Multifamily housing	0.13	0.07	0.24	0.13	0.26	1.00	
Mixed-use	0.36	0.16	0.62	0.51	0.24	0.37	1.00

Correlations between Desirability Scores: Redevelopment Projects

	<u>Light</u> <u>industry</u>	<u>Heavy</u> <u>industry</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Retail</u>	<u>Single-</u> <u>family</u>	<u>Multi-</u> <u>family</u>	<u>Mixed-</u> <u>use</u>
Light industry	1.00						
Heavy industry	0.55	1.00					
Office	0.25	0.16	1.00				
Retail	0.20	0.04	0.42	1.00			
Single-family housing	0.14	0.05	0.11	0.08	1.00		
Multifamily housing	-0.13	-0.17	0.15	-0.04	0.39	1.00	
Mixed-use	0.12	-0.04	0.45	0.31	0.15	0.27	1.00

Table 3**Relationship Between Cities' Job/Population Ratios and Ratings of Land Use Categories**

	<i>Mean Score for Cities with:</i>		<i>Overall Correlation^b</i>
	<i>Fewer Than 0.3 Jobs per Resident^f</i>	<i>More Than 0.61 Jobs per Resident^f</i>	
<u>Desirability for New Development</u>			
Light industry	5.8	5.3	-.13*
Heavy industry	3.5	3.1	-.10
Office	5.9	5.5	-.10
Retail	6.7	6.1	-.13*
Single-family residential	5.0	4.9	-.02
Multifamily residential	3.3	4.3	.00
Mixed-Use	5.7	5.8	-.03
<u>Desirability for Redevelopment Areas</u>			
Light industry	5.3	4.5	-.14**
Heavy industry	3.5	2.8	-.05
Office	5.7	5.4	-.08
Retail	6.7	6.0	-.32***
Single-family residential	3.8	4.0	.02
Multifamily residential	3.3	4.7	.05
Mixed-Use	5.5	5.5	-.13*

^aColumns represent lowest and highest quartiles of job/population ratios among respondent cities.

^bPearson's *r* between the job/population ratio and the survey question response. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Table 4

Regression Models of Desirability Scores for Land-Use Categories

	A. Industry--New Dev.	B. Industry--Redev.	C. Offices--New Dev.	D. Offices--Redev.	E. Retail--New Dev.
<u>Locational/Developmental:</u>					
1. Population, 1998 (log)	.36 (4.97)***	.19 (2.69)***	.18 (1.94)*	.23 (2.60)**	-.01 (0.11)
2. Population density (log)	-.18 (2.59)**	-.27 (3.36)***	.02 (0.27)	-.07 (0.74)	.17 (1.77)*
3. Suburb (dummy)	-.14 (1.94)*	-.10 (1.29)	.05 (0.51)	.02 (0.18)	.29 (2.91)***
4. Age of median housing unit	.02 (0.27)	-.02 (0.20)	-.27 (3.14)***	-.11 (1.20)	-.18 (1.95)*
5. Los Angeles region (dummy)	.02 (0.19)	.09 (0.99)	.14 (1.38)	-.07 (0.60)	-.03 (0.27)
6. San Francisco Bay area (dummy)	.05 (0.63)	-.00 (0.04)	.39 (3.56)***	.08 (0.65)	.11 (0.95)
7. Central Valley (dummy)	.14 (1.97)*	.12 (1.52)	.09 (1.03)	.09 (0.92)	-.06 (0.68)
<u>SES/Ethnicity:</u>					
8. Percent Hispanic	.17 (2.33)**	.02 (0.23)	.04 (0.39)	.02 (0.20)	-.03 (0.27)
9. Median household income	-.10 (0.90)	-.21 (1.81)*	-.33 (2.38)**	-.02 (0.18)	-.36 (2.46)**
10. Percent age 65+	.05 (0.64)	-.09 (1.30)	-.01 (0.16)	.09 (1.05)	-.12 (1.26)
<u>Housing Market:</u>					
11. Ratio: median house value/income	-.37 (5.34)***	-.27 (3.60)***	-.16 (1.82)*	-.10 (1.07)	-.17 (1.83)*
<u>Political:</u>					
12. Percent Democratic registration	-.01 (0.12)	.14 (1.35)	-.20 (1.73)*	-.01 (0.05)	-.11 (0.88)
13. Percent skilled trades workers	.19 (2.99)***	.16 (2.15)**	.08 (0.93)	.16 (1.77)*	-.02 (0.25)
14. "Very active" redevelopment policy	---	.03 (0.50)	---	.13 (1.89)*	---
<u>Past Growth Effects:</u>					
15. Percent pop. change, 1991-98	-.08 (1.41)	.04 (0.62)	-.17 (2.37)**	-.07 (1.01)	-.06 (0.74)
16. Mean travel time, journey-to-work	-.18 (2.17)**	.01 (0.10)	-.20 (1.91)*	-.08 (0.77)	-.12 (1.13)
17. Percent unsewered housing units	-.19 (3.32)***	-.24 (3.89)***	-.13 (1.74)*	-.03 (0.44)	-.04 (0.54)
N	202	224	208	228	207
Prob.>F	.000	.000	.000	.017	.006
Adj. R-squared	.50	.38	.18	.07	.09

(table continues on next page)

Table 4 (continued)

	<i>F. Multifamily housing--new</i>	<i>G. Multifamily housing--redev.</i>	<i>H. Mixed use—new dev.</i>	<i>I. Mixed use--redev.</i>
<u>Locational/Developmental:</u>				
1. Population, 1998 (log)	.25 (2.76)***	.06 (0.75)	.17 (1.80)*	.27 (3.14)***
2. Population density (log)	-.16 (1.81)*	.02 (0.19)	.17 (1.86)*	-.01 (0.13)
3. Suburb (dummy)	-.15 (1.65)*	-.16 (1.91)*	.13 (1.39)	-.02 (0.26)
4. Age of median housing unit	-.05 (0.60)	-.15 (1.68)*	-.20 (2.29)**	-.02 (0.24)
5. Los Angeles region (dummy)	-.05 (0.49)	-.09 (0.91)	.21 (2.01)**	-.06 (0.52)
6. San Francisco Bay area (dummy)	.21 (1.97)*	.13 (1.20)	.37 (3.24)***	.11 (0.90)
7. Central Valley (dummy)	.04 (0.44)	.01 (0.06)	-.01 (0.10)	-.02 (0.17)
<u>SES/Ethnicity:</u>				
8. Percent Hispanic	-.14 (1.55)	-.15 (1.61)	-.08 (0.86)	-.12 (1.22)
9. Median household income	.12 (0.87)	.23 (1.76)*	-.22 (1.53)	-.06 (0.41)
10. Percent age 65+	-.11 (1.29)	-.01 (0.11)	.06 (0.71)	.16 (1.91)*
<u>Housing Market:</u>				
11. Ratio: median house value/income	.19 (2.20)**	.16 (1.83)*	-.09 (0.99)	-.20 (2.26)**
<u>Political:</u>				
12. Percent Democratic registration	.15 (1.30)	.09 (0.76)	.02 (0.19)	.08 (0.64)
13. Percent skilled trades workers	.12 (1.51)	.00 (0.05)	.05 (0.59)	-.03 (0.29)
14. "Very active" redevelopment policy	---	.15 (2.36)**	---	.15 (2.33)**
<u>Past Growth Effects:</u>				
15. Percent pop. change, 1991-98	.12 (1.72)*	.03 (0.40)	-.02 (0.33)	-.12 (1.61)
16. Mean travel time, journey-to-work	-.40 (3.85)***	-.28 (2.98)***	-.36 (3.36)***	-.04 (0.36)
17. Percent unsewered housing units	-.06 (0.78)	.01 (0.18)	-.05 (0.69)	.02 (0.26)
N	208	228	206	229
Prob.>F	.000	.000	.000	.001
Adj. R-squared	.19	.18	.14	.10

Notes: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Cell entries are standardized (beta) coefficients, with the absolute value of T-values in parentheses.