Auction Design Without Quasilinear Preferences

@article{Baisa2013AuctionDW,
  title={Auction Design Without Quasilinear Preferences},
  author={Brian Baisa},
  journal={Microeconomics: Welfare Economics \& Collective Decision-Making eJournal},
  year={2013},
  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:184874}
}
  • Brian Baisa
  • Published 6 August 2013
  • Economics
  • Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal
I study the canonical private value auction model for a single good without the quasilinearity restriction. I assume only that bidders are risk averse and the indivisible good for sale is a normal good. I show removing quasilinearity leads to qualitatively different solutions to the auction design problem. Expected revenue is no longer maximized using standard auctions that allocate the good to the highest bidder. Instead, the auctioneer better exploits bidder preferences by using a mechanism… 
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42 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
9
Background Citations
28
Methods Citations
1
Results Citations
4

42 Citations

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54 References

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