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# Crime-Proofing Conflict Prevention, Management, and Peacebuilding: A Review of Emerging Good Practice

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## Executive Summary

Today, peacemakers, peacekeepers, and peacebuilders operate in highly complex and fluid strategic environments where groups with clear criminal agendas have a major impact on conflict dynamics, peace processes, and post-war transitions. In recent years, there has been an increasing international recognition of the close connections between organized crime and conflict. This has often included a call to integrate awareness of organized crime into conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, mission assessment, and planning. The objective of this paper, commissioned by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), is to help identify good practices from across several organizations outside the UN system, on what it means to incorporate sensitivity to organized crime into conflict prevention and peacemaking activities.

### ***Why should peacemakers pay attention to organized crime?***

While traditional perceptions have tended to treat criminal and political actors as entirely separate, emerging research and evidence from a variety of settings suggest that this hard and fast distinction is overstated. Contemporary conflicts, from Colombia to Mali, Libya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), attest to the porous boundaries between state, non-state armed groups, and criminal groups, and between political and criminal motivations and strategies. Shifting alliances over the control of criminal rents have contributed to the fragmentation of conflicts and conflict parties, potentially making conflicts longer, deadlier, and harder to resolve. This complicates both conflict resolution efforts and post-conflict recovery efforts, which are vulnerable to the emergence of large-scale corruption networks, and to political and regulatory capture.

Recognizing that organized crime is not always separated from but sometimes intertwined with politics has serious implications for the work of actors such as DPA. This paper argues that where criminal agendas are present, conflict-related work requires a focus not just on formal politics but also on informal and illicit political economy.

### ***How can DPA “crime-proof” its activities?***

Through an in-depth survey of the literature and a review of practices from relevant organizations, this paper identifies a range of good practices for UN peacemakers, peacekeepers, and peacebuilders, and identifies three main “crime-proofing measures” relevant to the work of the United Nations, especially DPA:


- **Boost Analytical Capacities and Develop Inducement Strategies:** DPA should consider increasing its analytical capacities for mapping criminal networks and illicit economies, including through the development of risk indicators at both local and transnational levels that can effectively feed into mission planning and design. Specific attention is also needed to develop inducement strategies that prevent criminal actors from potentially spoiling peace processes. This would involve considering a broad set of socio-economic incentives and mechanisms that DPA may be able to marshal and activate.
- **Recognize the Political Power of Criminal Groups:** To limit the influence of organized crime in transitional political arrangements, DPA should consider crime-proofing its electoral assistance practices and strengthening its anti-corruption programming, particularly at the local level. Strengthening UN and local actors’ strategic communications capacity, and introducing gender-smart interventions, may also help to undermine criminal practices.
- **Do No Crime:** Finally, at minimum DPA should act to prevent the unintended facilitation of organized crime as a consequence of UN interventions. DPA has a role to play in promoting the development of guidance on how to identify and understand what drives criminal actors; in encouraging sensitivity in UN procurement practices to impacts on informal and illicit economies; in limiting opportunities for the criminal infiltration of UN police reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs; and especially in the design, implementation, and review of sanctions regimes.

**Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

Within the United Nations and the global community, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has a vital leadership role to play in: 1) conflict analysis and early warning; 2) preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and crisis management; and 3) peacebuilding. Today, these activities occur in complex and fluid strategic environments, including many impacted by organized crime.<sup>2</sup> In some cases, groups with clear criminal agendas – aiming to use force, corruption, and other means and methods to maximize control of and profits from criminal activity – have a major impact on conflict dynamics, peace processes, and post-conflict recovery.<sup>3</sup> How can UN DPA “crime-proof” its work in these environments?

The need for answers to this question is increasingly urgent. The Security Council is placing growing emphasis on the international peace and security implications of organized crime, as Figure 1 shows,<sup>4</sup> and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in organized crime-affected contexts also requires careful thought.<sup>5</sup> UN peace operations are now mandated in various ways to address criminal activity ranging from trafficking in drugs, humans, arms, minerals, wildlife, charcoal, oil, and antiquities.<sup>6</sup> There is increasing attention in the Security Council to the close connections between organized crime and terrorism,<sup>7</sup> and the Council has since 2009 held numerous thematic debates on drug trafficking and organized crime generally.<sup>8</sup>

**Figure 1: Number of UNSC resolutions and presidential statements with references to “organized crime,” 2004-2014**



Source: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (February 2015)

In several Presidential Statements, the Security Council has invited the Secretary-General to integrate organized crime into “conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions assessment and planning”.<sup>9</sup> Yet guidance on how to factor crime into the DPA’s work has been lacking for some time,<sup>10</sup> just as it has been absent from other actors’ conflict assessment work.<sup>11</sup> In March 2013, the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee (in Decision 2013/3) requested that the UN System Task Force on Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, co-chaired by DPA and the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) share experiences on thematic issues “such as crime-sensitive [...] peacebuilding, and conflict prevention policies” and “Produce a guidance note on how to include issues related to drug trafficking and organized crime in conflict analysis and integrated assessment processes”.<sup>12</sup>

This Occasional Paper was commissioned from UN University (UNU) by the Department of Political Affairs to help it develop its own thinking on this topic, by identifying lessons from scholarship and good practices from other organizations. It will form the basis for DPA to produce an internal Policy Brief and consider what next steps the Department could take to improve its sensitivity to organized crime throughout its work. The first section of the paper considers how organized crime is impacting: 1) conflict analysis and early warning; 2) preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and crisis management; and 3) peacebuilding. This section is based on extensive review of the scholarly, public policy, and think-tank literatures. One central take-away is that where criminal agendas are present, conflict-related work requires a focus not just on formal politics but on informal (and illicit) political economy. Consequently, negotiations over constitutions and political institutions may need to be nested within consultations over broader socio-economic questions – sometimes involving engagement with actors with known or hidden criminal agendas, and often involving the development of access to economic leverage and dividends.

The second section of the paper draws on the practice of six intergovernmental organizations (the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)), two highly active governmental agencies (the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UK Stabilisation Unit), and four non-governmental organizations (Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime, International Alert, International Peace Institute, Safeworld). UNU was not tasked to review past UN practice, whether of DPA or other UN entities, as this was considered beyond the scope of work feasible given available time and resources. This paper identifies five recurring themes in what is considered “good practice”: 1) mapping illicit political economies; 2) thinking beyond law enforcement; 3) addressing corruption; 4) strategic communication; and 5) harm minimization.

The third section of the paper offers recommendations to strengthen UN DPA’s capabilities in a variety of areas, from electoral assistance and sanctions-related work to its approach to gender mainstreaming and to procurement. These involve three cross-cutting themes: 1) boosting analytical capacities and developing inducement strategies; 2) recognizing the political power of criminal groups; and 3) adopting a *Do No Crime* approach.

## 1. The impact of organized crime on war and peace<sup>13</sup>

### **Conflict analysis and early warning**

Traditional conflict analysis (and much political science and international relations theory) distinguishes between a military-political realm (the “upperworld”), in which armed conflict occurs as a competition over political power, and a separate criminal realm (the “underworld”) in which criminal competition occurs between actors seeking to maximize illicit profits. This traditional view suggests that criminal actors are not “conflict actors” because they seek to maximize profits – not power.

Many theorists now suggest this hard and fast distinction is overstated, as a matter of both theory and practice.<sup>14</sup> Some criminal groups have political goals and strategies – and some political actors engage in organized crime. Both state and non-state armed actors frequently use “underworld” criminal activity to develop social and political power that has a major impact on “upperworld” political and conflict dynamics. Recent experiences in Mali, the Sahel, and North Africa all bear witness to the impact of shifting alliances between different state forces, rebel groups, and criminal networks.<sup>15</sup> As a recent review of the failures of conflict management and recovery efforts in Colombia and Afghanistan noted, organized criminal activity has not proven exogenous to local power politics, as external actors assumed, but rather endogenous to it.<sup>16</sup>

In many cases, states, non-state armed groups and criminal groups are not only intertwined, they compete in a single market for protection or government,<sup>17</sup> even if criminal actors choose, strategically, to keep their power hidden.<sup>18</sup> The UK Stabilisation Unit recently commissioned work that concluded that there is an “emerging consensus” that organized crime is not separate from, but intertwined with, politics.<sup>19</sup> As we recognize that these different actors operate in a shared strategic space, the potential for hidden criminal agendas to influence conflict dynamics, spoil peace processes, and skew post-conflict recovery, comes into focus.

There is even a growing body of evidence suggesting that today’s armed conflicts *generate* organized crime. War lowers the costs of developing alternative, non-state sources of protection and builds people’s allegiance to non-state armed groups.<sup>20</sup> War creates gaps in the market for government by weakening the governmental capabilities of the state, loosening the ties of allegiance that bind citizens to the state (and to each other), and fostering the organization of alternative social orders and norms. Armed conflict is no longer a military competition between symmetric entities to shape the conditions within which political negotiation and settlement separately takes place; it is, rather, direct, armed politics,<sup>21</sup> within which hidden criminal agendas may be embedded and pursued.<sup>22</sup>

This is partly the result of structural factors. Access to cheaper transport and telecommunications technologies facilitates local groups tapping into revenue flows from illicit goods and services. This also significantly reduces the cost and risk of access to foreign financing.<sup>23</sup> At the same time, excessive dependence on illicit revenue can also erode internal discipline and encourage group splintering.<sup>24</sup> The result appears to be both a fragmentation of armed groups,<sup>25</sup> and the increasing adoption of “hybrid” approaches that combine politico-military, criminal, and terrorist identities and strategies.<sup>26</sup>

As armed actors shift strategy, re-organize, and adapt, real-time analysis becomes more essential to effective early warning, conflict analysis, crisis management, and diplomacy. Yet those involved in criminal agendas work hard to keep them hidden, so relevant data may be hard to obtain, especially in environments where the UN itself is a target for attack. DPA and other relevant actors will increasingly need to analyze shifting patterns and track risk indicators on a continuous basis. Research commissioned by the UK Stabilisation Unit suggests that by mapping local political economies, we may be able to identify certain “causal vulnerabilities” generating organized criminal influence.<sup>27</sup> Research published by the UNODC-backed *Forum on Crime & Society* likewise points to patterns of coincidence between organized crime and certain structural factors such as one-party rule, rentier economies, commodity subsidies, and large informal labour sectors.<sup>28</sup>

Organized crime will manifest differently in each context. In some cases its presence and impact on politics and governance will be hidden and difficult to uncover. In others, armed actors with criminal agendas will play a more overt role in governance of markets, communities, and territory. This demands an analytical approach that enables DPA to understand how criminal agendas can work within and even shape the political economies of conflict and post-conflict societies.

### **Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and crisis management**

“Spotting the spoilers” through crime-proofed conflict analysis is essential, as analysts such as Mark Shaw and Walter Kemp have argued;<sup>29</sup> yet it is also hard to do. The “spoiler” concept was originally elaborated by Stephen Stedman to describe actors who use violence to oppose, undermine, or manipulate peace processes and post-conflict transitions.<sup>30</sup> There is increasing recognition that some criminal groups have done just that in contexts as varied as Guatemala,<sup>31</sup> Colombia,<sup>32</sup> Kosovo,<sup>33</sup> Libya,<sup>34</sup> Sierra Leone, Haiti, Nigeria, Myanmar,<sup>35</sup> and even post-War Sicily.<sup>36</sup> Yet, rather than openly attack or block the peace process, these criminal spoilers tend to *subvert* it, embedding their own hidden criminal power and agendas within peace settlements. In some cases, criminal actors even actively *facilitate* peacemaking, where they see it delivering a peace dividend, as in parts of Bosnia in the 1990s,<sup>37</sup> or Myanmar in the late 1980s.<sup>38</sup>

When will organized crime shun peace, and when will it embrace and manipulate it? The question for peacemakers is how to develop what Stedman calls a strategy of “inducement” – or, alternatively, what de Waal calls the “buy-in scenario” in a political marketplace.<sup>39</sup> While rebel groups may be prepared to lay down arms in return for recognition as a legitimate political party, this may not be a sufficiently attractive inducement to those groups with hidden – or even overt – criminal agendas, as the recent gang truce process in El Salvador suggests.<sup>40</sup> Where a negotiated settlement is reached, the state will have to resolve difficult questions about amnesty for past crimes and transitional justice – as the current Colombian peace process is showing.<sup>41</sup> As recent UNODC research shows, absent such arrangements, high levels of impunity, the wide availability of weapons, and criminal markets can lead to widespread criminal violence.<sup>42</sup>

Inducement strategies for criminal groups may have less to do with traditional topics of DPA peacemaking activity, such as political voice and institutions, than they do with socio-economic considerations. Recent experiments with “gang truces” and outreach to organized criminal groups in Belize, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico,<sup>43</sup> Brazil,<sup>44</sup> and Haiti<sup>45</sup> all point to a need for mediators to have access not only to one-off development projects that offer inducements to criminals for “going straight”, but also to policymakers who can shape market access and regulation for the long-term, to keep criminals on the straight and narrow. Fashioning an effective inducement strategy should not be seen as a question of identifying a criminal group’s “price” for peace; such an approach risks generating moral hazard, and may backfire, as some NATO countries’ attempts to buy-off opium poppy farmers in Afghanistan over the last decade and a half did. Instead, it involves restructuring socio-economic arrangements to provide those involved in organized crime access to an *ongoing peace dividend* adequate to limit their involvement in criminal activity and induce – and maintain – their allegiance to the state, and to legality.

Peacemaking and crisis management in these contexts requires moving beyond questions of “political settlement”, to negotiate a broader set of socio-economic ground rules about the social legitimacy and legality of certain activities, and the use of violence in political competition. It involves enlarging access to sustainable development and licit livelihoods – and will be a question not only of political institutions, but also economic opportunity. In some places such as Colombia, this may require the extension of state regulatory authority into areas it has not previously reached. In many places it will also require the close engagement of development and business actors, such as the World Bank, regional development banks, the private sector, and even a country’s trading partners. We tend not to think of questions of regional labour market regulation, access to export markets, and tariff rates as central issues in peacemaking and preventive diplomacy; yet it may be precisely the non-viability of domestic and export industries that make criminal livelihoods attractive. Only if peacemak-

ers find the economic leverage that will transform criminal actors’ calculus and offer them the necessary, ongoing peace dividend will these actors become – and remain – loyal to the state and avoid relapse into conflict or high-level violence.

### **Peacebuilding and sustaining peace**

Research also points to several important ways that the UN’s peacebuilding work, and DPA’s in particular, may be affected by organized crime. Researchers suggest that constitutional and post-war transition processes are frequently vulnerable to criminalization.<sup>46</sup> Black market networks born or entrenched during conflict often become the source of economic power in post-conflict processes, using their access to capital to expand their influence into licit economic sectors. Economic power quickly translates into political influence, through financing of election campaigns, purchasing of state assets privatized during transition, large-scale corruption of public procurement processes, and regulatory capture.<sup>47</sup>

Confronted by such criminal influence in politics, international actors must contend with a dilemma: any effort to tackle criminal influence risks creating instability; but the failure to confront such influence risks its entrenchment, and the subversion not only of the recovery process, but of democratic development.<sup>48</sup> This is not a new dilemma: it was directly confronted by the Allied Military Government (AMG) during its occupation of Sicily in the early 1940s. The AMG’s solution was to ignore the problem; the result was the criminalization of Italian politics for several decades.<sup>49</sup> A similar wilful blindness seems prevalent in many contemporary interventions, with similar results.<sup>50</sup> Post-conflict actors with hidden criminal agendas have emerged as major political forces in Kosovo,<sup>51</sup> Guatemala,<sup>52</sup> Afghanistan,<sup>53</sup> and Myanmar.<sup>54</sup> As Eric Scheye argues, “stability is a political calculation”, which requires considering the costs and benefits of taking action against powerful actors connected to organized crime.<sup>55</sup>

Several areas of particular vulnerability stand out.

First, transitional economies are often distorted by massive, off-budget aid influxes. Afghanistan offers a salutary example.<sup>56</sup> In 2013, aid and military spending equalled some 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s official GDP;<sup>57</sup> with as much as 88 per cent of development assistance bypassing the state and being funnelled directly to implementing organizations (many non-governmental). As a result, the Government of Afghanistan struggled to develop the capacity for effective public financial management and oversight. This has not only created short-term opportunities for mismanagement and corruption but over the medium term created a large, unregulated foreign exchange market that facilitated transnational organized crime.<sup>58</sup>

Second, smuggling and violence are often the leading economic sectors in the immediate post-conflict period. Post-conflict economies are typically characterized by reduced

capital stock (including reduced human capital). Domestic and export infrastructure may be weakened, and the workforce has often become deskilled – except in the production of violence, and in smuggling. The illicit economy thus risks being the only viable outlet for entrepreneurialism, absent injections of capital.

Third, criminal actors exploit transitional governments' weakened capacity to provide effective market regulation. State institutions in these situations are fragile and formal avenues for financing, contract enforcement, and property ownership are weak – creating a space in the market for government by alternative providers, such as organized criminal groups.<sup>59</sup> Research on organized crime in the post-Soviet states, for example, suggests that organized crime has often substituted for the state by providing property rights, contract enforcement, and even public services.<sup>60</sup>

Fourth, post-conflict governments often feel compelled to subsidize basic commodities to protect their populations. This creates significant arbitrage and smuggling risks, fueling the emergence of cliques and mafias that control cross-border smuggling.<sup>61</sup>

Fifth, a rush to elections risks pushing politicians into the arms of actors with hidden criminal strategies, since they are often the ones with ready access to resources and may also offer the organizational capabilities (including street muscle) needed for effective political campaigning. In turn, elections offer those groups a chance to entrench themselves as post-transition mafias,<sup>62</sup> or even to run their own candidates for office.<sup>63</sup> In states where national solidarity is weak, political elites at the centre may acquiesce in the criminalization of the periphery, not just to improve their access to criminal rents, but as a deliberate strategy of rule through criminal disorder.<sup>64</sup>

## 2. How is the impact of organized crime on conflict being managed?

In this section we explore how twelve different organizations are factoring the impact of organized crime into conflict-related analysis and practice. The organizations are varied: the intergovernmental AU, EU, International IDEA, OAS, OECD, and OSCE; at the national level, the USAID and the UK Stabilisation Unit; and four non-governmental organizations and influential think tanks (International Alert, Saferworld, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, and International Peace Institute).<sup>65</sup> Five recurring “good practice” themes emerge: 1) mapping illicit political economies; 2) thinking beyond law enforcement; 3) addressing corruption; 4) strategic communication; and 5) harm minimization.

### Mapping illicit political economies

Several of the organizations reviewed stressed that effective conflict analysis and response requires mapping illicit political economies.<sup>66</sup> A recent USAID review of its programming

in conflict-affected and fragile states argued for increased attention to “the political dimensions of organized crime”.<sup>67</sup> Adopting a similar analysis, research commissioned by the UK Stabilisation Unit concluded that “[m]apping the actors and their political, social and economic relationships should ... be the first step to designing effective response to organised crime”.<sup>68</sup> It suggests mapping not only the flow of money but also “power” through informal networks.<sup>69</sup>

Reitano and Shaw of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) argue that mapping “protection economies” will provide valuable insights, and that they often follow a geographic pattern.<sup>70</sup> The related GITOC “Assessment and Programming Tool for Organized Crime and Development”, published in April 2016, builds on this perspective, calling for an analytic approach that combines political economy analysis of the strategic environment with a dedicated mapping of markets and “power”, identified through variables such as “price; ease of market entry; levels of violence; the extent of protection” and legitimacy.<sup>71</sup> James Cockayne argues that by mapping the rents available at different points in illicit value-chains and the costs of capturing them, we can determine which one of six distinct criminal strategies an actor is pursuing: intermediation (mafia) strategy, autonomy (warlord) strategy, merger (joint venture) strategy, alliances, terrorism as a criminal strategy, and blue ocean strategy.<sup>72</sup> (See Annex.) He points to research suggesting that the onset and dynamics of violence, including against civilians, in DRC,<sup>73</sup> Syria,<sup>74</sup> Afghanistan,<sup>75</sup> and Mexico<sup>76</sup> can all be partially explained by understanding groups' criminal strategies.

Taken together, these variations all point to a common theme: the need to adopt an analytical approach that understands criminal groups and agendas in a broader politico-economic context. Organized crime threat assessments may offer one way to conduct such mapping exercises. Organizations as diverse as UNODC,<sup>77</sup> the AU,<sup>78</sup> and USAID<sup>79</sup> are all now using such an approach. In 2012, the International Peace Institute even published a guide to conducting an organized crime threat assessment in mission contexts.<sup>80</sup> However, in order to be useful to *political* analysis and action, there is a need for such assessments to map not only illicit markets or flows, but also to understand the sources of political power derived from such criminal activity. The EU has perhaps come closest to this approach, with Europol's Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessments (SOCTAs) shaping spending under the EU Instrument for Stability, and guiding political dialogue in EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.<sup>81</sup>

### Thinking beyond law enforcement

Practitioners increasingly argue that while policing and law enforcement responses are a *necessary* component of effective international response to organized crime, particularly in transitional situations where policing and law enforcement institutions are weakened, they will not prove a *sufficient*

response. As one UK-government commissioned piece concluded, while “law enforcement activity” can disrupt organized crime, “it will be unlikely” in these contexts “to address the key political and social enablers and breeding grounds”.<sup>82</sup> Other forms of leverage – including political and economic tools – also need to be found and deployed. These are likely to include tools that tackle marginalization and disenfranchisement, regulatory and accountability measures, press freedom and civil society capacity, and even direct mediation with gangs.<sup>83</sup>

### **Corruption and electoral systems integrity**

Practitioners increasingly point to the complicity and corruption of government officials as a major impediment to tackling organized crime in conflict-affected settings.<sup>84</sup> “Programming that does not explicitly take this dynamic into account”, concluded one recent government-initiated review, does not accord to best practices and “runs the grave risk of being ineffective”.<sup>85</sup>

It is not easy for intergovernmental organizations like the UN to discuss the involvement of state officials in criminal activity, as the OSCE discovered when it recently attempted to integrate organized crime into its “conflict cycle toolbox”.<sup>86</sup> Yet the growing understanding of how corruption and illicit financial flows weaken state capacity is encouraging some organizations to take on this difficult task. The OECD has developed insights and guidance for donors seeking to address corruption and economic crime.<sup>87</sup> The AU is discussing the connections between organized crime, terrorism, and governance failings as aggravating factors in conflict.<sup>88</sup> And the OAS has, in the past decade, developed a “multidimensional” approach to countering organized crime that treats it not just as a question of criminal infraction but as a broader “social phenomenon” underpinned by governmental corruption.<sup>89</sup> On the strength of that analysis, the OAS has become directly involved in efforts to mitigate criminal violence through engagement and limited sponsorship of “gang truce” efforts in El Salvador and Honduras.<sup>90</sup>

Another issue raised by some organizations is the need to address the links between electoral finance and organized crime. The pioneering actor in this area has to date been International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that supports democracy around the world.<sup>91</sup> IDEA’s *Illicit Networks and Politics in Latin America*<sup>92</sup> highlights opportunities for the strategic manipulation and corruption of electoral and party financing arrangements by organized crime groups, and suggests a range of potential responses such as electoral finance reform, lustration, and political party capacity-building.<sup>93</sup>

### **Strategic communication**

In conflict-affected situations, the state and organized crime groups compete for popular allegiance.<sup>94</sup> Scholars and practitioners are paying increasing attention to criminal actors’ use

of strategic communications to cultivate legitimacy and support, whether through interfering with the free press, promoting their own media content and popular cultural forms (think Mexican *narcocultura*), or hiring public relations firms.<sup>95</sup> The recent GITOC Assessment and Programming Tool for Organized Crime and Development identifies “legitimacy” as one of five main areas of effective analysis.<sup>96</sup> Yet states and international organizations usually lack a clear communications strategy in these situations.

In Central America, the OAS has admitted that “the absence of a communication strategy” explaining the OAS’ involvement in the gang truce process in El Salvador “was a mistake”.<sup>97</sup> It allowed the process to become deeply politicized and undermined the space for a negotiated settlement.<sup>98</sup> The politicization of this process has recently reached new levels with the arrests of interlocutors and mediators involved in these negotiations.<sup>99</sup> An OAS workshop concluded that: “The media’s support is vital as they then have the power to influence public opinion and educate the public.”<sup>100</sup> All of this suggests that any peacemaking effort involving direct engagement with criminal groups – or, *a fortiori*, efforts to directly confront criminal groups – should have a communications strategy in place from the outset.

Practice also suggests that support for freedom of expression, free media, and robust investigative journalism is itself a way to bolster the state’s social legitimacy in the face of organized crime.<sup>101</sup> Criminal groups rely on keeping their use of corruption and intimidation masked, and thus on social complicity and public – and media – silence. This is why Mexican cartels routinely target journalists and citizen bloggers.<sup>102</sup> Efforts to protect journalists and defend the free media not only weaken these groups, but also bolster the state’s credentials in the eyes of a skeptical public.

### **Harm minimization**

As we saw earlier, going after organized crime in conflict-affected settings will often involve a trade-off between protecting short-term stability and promoting the long-term integrity of democratic development. This has led to growing calls for such efforts to be guided by a harm minimization framework.<sup>103</sup> Adapting the concept of “do no harm”, one commentator suggests a need for a “Do No Crime” approach.<sup>104</sup> A similar idea is echoed in the recent work of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.<sup>105</sup>

DPA may wish to reflect on specific ways in which UN mediation, preventive diplomacy, peace operations, and other interventions risk playing into the hands of organized crime – for example, as we explain further in the next section, through procurement from organized criminal groups, or, as discussed earlier, through criminal groups’ using elections to gain traction in the political system. Guidance may be needed to help DPA actors work through the potential harms entailed and options for minimizing them.

### 3. Three crime-proofing measures

In the final section of this paper we offer recommendations to strengthen the UN system's response in contexts where crime and conflict intersect, with a specific focus on implications for the work of the UN Department of Political Affairs. We identify three main "crime-proofing measures", which stretch across DPA's different functional activities: 1) boosting analytical capacities and developing inducement strategies; 2) recognizing the political power of criminal groups; and 3) adopting a Do No Crime approach. We note again at this juncture that this study was not tasked to review the past practice of UN DPA, or any other UN entity: it is thus possible that some of these measures are already being undertaken by UN personnel.

#### ***Boosting Analytical Capacities and Developing Inducement Strategies***

How can the UN system address illicit political economies and what does this mean concretely for DPA? We believe there are five elements that DPA could consider integrating into its activities to help the UN system understand illicit political economies, and respond to them: 1) mapping; 2) transnational perspectives; 3) inducement strategies and economic leverage; 4) risk indicators; and 5) planning political missions' strategy.

Organized crime is frequently embedded in society. As a USAID analysis puts it, tackling organized crime is less about decapitating snakes, and more about eradicating plants with complex, hidden root systems.<sup>106</sup> To avoid unintended consequences and broader social harms, before any effort is made to tackle these groups, the first step must be a careful mapping of the network, through the kinds of organized crime threat assessment, value-chain analysis, and "spotting the spoilers" processes discussed in section 2. DPA may wish to integrate such analysis into ongoing conflict analysis and mission planning exercises, as the Security Council has already proposed in prior presidential statements.

A central consideration for DPA will be how to access relevant data. As our review, above, suggests, there are techniques now available for accessing such data, but DPA would need to study what data is already available from relevant UN and multilateral system partners (sanctions expert groups, peace and development advisors, mission personnel including civil affairs officers and human rights advisors, development actors, UNODC, the World Bank). Some recent analyses have begun to point to the kinds of questions that actors in the field can ask to gather useful data.<sup>107</sup> But DPA may also need to consider where new modalities may need to be developed for developing or accessing data through interaction with external actors (for example through the cluster system that coordinates the action of a wide range of UN and non-UN humanitarian partners in the field<sup>108</sup>) and member state agencies.<sup>109</sup>

Where possible, such analysis and response should be both

local and transnational.<sup>110</sup> Armed groups derive value and power from regionalized illicit economies and transnational illicit flows. Effective analysis and response – i.e. early warning, preventive diplomacy, crisis management, and post-conflict recovery – should all be organized and, where possible, mandated to engage along these transnational value-chains, wherever the UN can develop effective leverage. DPA already has considerable expertise in addressing the intersection between organized crime and conflict on a regional basis (e.g. through its three regional offices, the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS); the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), and the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)).

Specific attention is also needed to the development of inducement strategies for criminal spoilers, including guidance for DPA staff on how preventive diplomacy and mediation may need to expand their scope from questions of political voice and institutions to broader questions of socio-economic development. Inclusive political settlements will help reduce allegiance to alternative governance providers such as organized crime groups.<sup>111</sup> DPA could initiate in-depth research into the conditions and mechanisms that make such efforts successful, and engage with ongoing work and relevant international actors in this area.<sup>112</sup> Without the ability to deliver not only one-time economic pay-offs from short-term, small-scale development project, but also the deeper economic transformations that restructure criminal actors' incentive structures, peacemakers cannot ensure ongoing peace dividends and the resulting popular allegiance to the state. This may require a discussion of how DPA can engage other UN actors (such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), International Labour Organization (ILO), World Trade Organization (WTO), or even the World Customs Organisation) more closely in its preventive diplomacy, structural prevention, crisis management, and peacemaking work. It may also require DPA to find ways to bring outside actors with economic leverage – the World Bank, regional development banks, private sector actors, a country's trading partners – into these efforts.<sup>113</sup> Since over-reliance on commodity subsidies can foster the emergence of criminal cliques and rentier economies, even actors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may need to be engaged.<sup>114</sup>

Meanwhile, there may be significant short-term gains from developing risk indicators that can help to highlight the risk of organized crime developing political influence or generating violence. Recent work suggests it may be possible to identify quite localized, leading indicators of criminal violence, particularly related to criminal and electoral market dynamics.<sup>115</sup> There may be particular utility in developing leading indicators for criminal violence against civilians, which may be possible through mapping and tracking criminal rent fluctuations.

Analysis of such indicators could be useful both as an early warning device, and in planning mission strategy. Especially relevant for DPA is the integration of such indicators when planning Special Political Missions (SPMs). Different criminal



agendas pose different risks to these missions, and thus demand different mission capabilities and responses. Where an SPM is confronted by a group looking to reap rents from serving as an intermediary between the state and difficult to reach populations – i.e. a mafia – the most effective responses may be an intense focus on anti-corruption, governance reforms, and even, to a certain extent, market regulation. Where, however, a group seeks to control pockets of rural or urban territory, the best response may involve efforts to extend state authority and public services. Where a group seeks to merge state and criminal business operations, for example by incorporating military assets into trafficking activities (as in Guinea-Bissau), security sector reform and inter-state accountability (including international criminal cooperation) may be the necessary response. (See the Annex for further elaboration.)

It is important to recognize that DPA faces at least four significant challenges in moving to integrate mapping of illicit political economies into its conflict analysis and planning work. The first, already touched upon, is access to relevant data. As we suggest above, existing practice suggests a need to supplement official (state and intergovernmental) law enforcement data with expert, practitioner, local civil society and private sector data.

Second, DPA will need access to human resources capable of analysing such data. The modalities for legitimate and timely access to reliable analysis require careful reflection. In some cases, actors *outside* formal UN structures may be better positioned to provide these analytical services, whether at the field or HQ level. Once identified, where should such analysis be conducted? The practice reviewed for this study suggests that such analysis is most effective if it informs strategic decision-making – both at headquarters (i.e. in mission planning and engagement with the Security Council) and in the field.<sup>116</sup> At UNHQ, it may be useful to consider whether such capabilities should be located within DPA, or could also be incorporated in the future into the activities of the new analytical cell within the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. In the field, such analysis may need to occur within established analytical cells, but should also be available to guide decision-making by senior mission leadership.

Third, this analysis needs to span local, national, and transnational contexts.<sup>117</sup> Perhaps the best example to date is the work of Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano on Libya, which shows how the dynamics of violence and power in that country since the UN's engagement on the ground closely relate to developments in the transnational smuggling economy running through Libya.<sup>118</sup>

Finally, it is crucial to note that whoever conducts the data gathering feeding into DPA analysis may face security risks. These threats should be assessed carefully before deciding when and how DPA staff can engage with such issues, especially on the ground.

### **Recognize the political power of criminal groups**

Just as “crime-proofing” requires taking the economic aspects of organized crime seriously, so it requires developing a more sophisticated appreciation of these actors’ political power. We suggest four specific areas that DPA may want to explore: 1) electoral assistance; 2) anti-corruption; 3) freedom of expression; and 4) gender.

As we saw in section 2, post-conflict elections risk becoming mechanisms by which organized crime groups – flush with cash and street muscle – can entrench influence in post-conflict political arrangements. This has implications for DPA’s electoral assistance work. As the scope of such assistance is generally negotiated between the state in question and the UN Focal Point for Electoral Assistance (the USG for Political Affairs), there are constraints on DPA’s ability to tackle these issues head on.

Existing UN system-wide guidance encourages analysis of a wide range of areas related to the functioning of a state’s electoral system prior to assistance, yet gives limited attention to corruption and crime.<sup>119</sup> Furthermore, criminal actors’ influence over electoral systems appears to be viewed as a “symptom” of a deeper problem of organized crime, rather than a central part of some actors’ political strategy.<sup>120</sup> The implications of recognizing that organized crime may deliberately target and manipulate political processes are hard to overstate. There is a danger that “rushing” to elections rewards actors with ties to organized crime, helping them to exercise and grow their influence in contexts lacking effect electoral oversight capacity. While any discussion about the timing of elections needs take into account numerous factors, it may be useful for DPA to reflect on how the calling of elections may help serve the interests of actors with criminal agendas, potentially undermining the process of democratic transition that elections are intended to promote.<sup>121</sup>

More could arguably be done to consider and address these concerns, even within existing frameworks. For example electoral assistance personnel could be further sensitized to the manner in which some criminal groups deliberately exploit electoral systems to enlarge their own power and influence; more emphasis could be placed on supporting effective electoral management bodies to detect and avoid infiltration;<sup>122</sup> further guidance related to political and campaign financing could be provided, as well as on transparency (including financial disclosure rules).<sup>123</sup> Other strategies could include the development of advice and guidance on lustration and vetting to reduce the potential for organized criminal influence on politics, while respecting human rights;<sup>124</sup> and support for neutral and impartial efforts to build political party capacities.<sup>125</sup>

Systematic guidance on anti-corruption measures may also be useful, especially in contexts where anti-corruption meas-

ures are addressed in peace agreements or where DPA is advising host governments and/or the UN and other partners on such measures and therefore may have some influence. Anti-corruption efforts are also likely to play an important role in the implementation of Goal 16 of Agenda 2030. Anti-corruption monitoring can serve both as an effective preventive measure against the emergence of organized crime, and as a means to expose actual corruption, which, once uncovered, can then be targeted for investigation, prosecution, or broader social delegitimization.

Such efforts should not be limited to the capital. A raft of evidence suggests that organized crime emerges where decisions over public coercion and public spending take place. When such decisions are devolved to local governments, there is an increased risk of corruption, primarily because anti-corruption and capacity building efforts are often poorly resourced outside the capital – if they extend there at all.<sup>126</sup> One solution may be to combine centralized anti-corruption measures with randomized auditing and enforcement procedures at the local and provincial levels.<sup>127</sup> There may also be lessons to learn from more judicial approaches to anti-corruption, such as DPA's support to the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).<sup>128</sup>

Guidance on support for freedom of expression, a free media and investigative journalism may also be useful. While this usually falls under the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, there is room for further cooperation between different UN entities, including DPA, on these issues. Indeed, the preceding analysis suggests robust protection of freedom of expression is essential to ensure social resistance to criminal power.<sup>129</sup>

The promotion of gender equality is mainstreamed throughout the work of the UN system, including DPA. Yet little attention has been given to the intersection of the anti-organized crime agenda and UN responses to Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security.<sup>130</sup> This goes beyond the question of women's participation in negotiations with criminal groups and extends to assessing the gendered impact of organized crime. The reality is that many criminal organizations promote norms that discriminate heavily against women. This is often expressed in the form of sexual violence and the use of marriage as an organizational alliance mechanism.<sup>131</sup> Criminal groups also frequently reproduce and reinforce gender stereotyped roles and norms, treating women as passive bystanders and embodiments of constraining familial norms. Some efforts to counter organized crime have played on this by using women as messengers to influence the views of male criminals and promote more non-violent trajectories and processes, as better for the family.<sup>132</sup> An interesting example is the use of the voices of mothers of FARC members by the Colombian government in its Christmas broadcast over the radio, attempt-

ing to weaken morale amongst the FARC and induce defections.<sup>133</sup>

In fact, women also play an active role in some criminal organizations. When it comes to developing programs that offer inducements to pull men and women out of organized crime, careful reflection is needed to understand the economic, social, and political incentives that both men and women gain by participating in violence and crime, and how to influence those incentives.<sup>134</sup> Reinsertion, reintegration, and recovery programmes must accept the realities of criminal behaviour and organization in a given context, while ensuring that gender inequalities are addressed and women are given equitable economic and social opportunities. As such, DPA could consider commissioning further research on the impact of gendered identities in the dynamics of violence and crime. Guidance based on successful interventions from relevant organizations, including civil society entities, could also be developed to understand how and when gender-smart interventions can best be leveraged by DPA.

### **Do No Crime**

Finally, our review also points to the importance of mitigating the negative impacts of UN interventions, for example through unwitting or unintentional promotion of opportunities for organized crime. As foreshadowed in section 2, we describe this as a "Do No Crime" approach. Specifically for DPA, four areas stand out: 1) engagement and strategic communication; 2) procurement; 3) police reform and DDR; and 4) sanctions.

First, DPA may wish to identify the conditions in which mere engagement between peacemakers and actors with criminal agendas may play to the benefit of those actors. While peacemakers have long wrestled with the question of whether bringing rebel groups to the negotiating table legitimizes them in any way, the permissibility of UN peacemakers' engagement with such groups is now rarely contested. Engagement with "terrorist" groups is, however, more often contested – and engagement with ostensibly criminal groups may face similar skepticism in some quarters, especially when such groups are involved in gross human rights violations or international crimes. However, as the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime argues, "it is rare that resolutions to entrenched criminal markets can be found without some form of negotiation with the dominant actors".<sup>135</sup> Additional guidance on when and how engagement with serious criminals is permissible, going beyond the existing guidance on dealing with those charged with international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide), may be useful.

Closely related, UN actors, including DPA staff, may benefit from clearer strategic guidance on communication practices in contexts where criminal groups or those with criminal agen-

das are party to peace negotiations. For example, it is important for DPA staff to clearly understand the UN's posture with respect to the question of "neutrality" and "impartiality" in disputes involving criminal groups or agendas.<sup>136</sup> Existing UN Guidance for Effective Mediation makes clear that UN mediators are required to be neutral in disputes, and to run a fair and impartial process. Does this constrain mediators' ability to exclude some actors from mediation based on their refusal to renounce criminal violence? Does it affect the incentives – such as livelihood, reintegration, or employment assistance – that can be offered to different parties to the negotiation? Absent such guidance, the UN's approach to engaging with conflict parties with criminal agendas risks being ineffective at best, or more likely incoherent and counter-productive at worst. As DPA is called upon to act in environments where these questions are posed, a new, more proactive approach to policy and practical guidance is required. Lessons from gang outreach, "focused deterrence," and violence disruption in North America, some of which draw on epidemiological models, suggest that strategic communication with such groups – if intended to influence their behaviour – may be most effectively delivered through agents who have legitimacy in the eyes of the target audience.<sup>137</sup> Such models will need to be adapted to the kinds of contexts in which DPA works. This requires careful contextual and actor analysis in order to determine which actors are likely to make credible interlocutors in specific contexts, whether they are former militants and criminal leaders, local tribal leaders, religious authorities or civil society organizations. Such tailoring will also need to take into account DPA's limited access to public information and strategic communications capabilities.

This takes us to a deeper question of the extent to which criminal agendas are entrenched in political institutions. As we prepared this study, some DPA staff with whom we spoke cautioned that making too much of the criminal ties of some political actors (including non-state armed groups) in reporting to the Security Council risked delegitimizing UN engagement with those actors. Other staff felt that the risks of engagement would depend significantly on the type of criminal conduct with which any given individual or group was suspected of being involved, since some forms of organized crime are more frowned upon than others. Our view is that, as the Brahimi Report stressed, the Council should be told what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.<sup>138</sup> If, as the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations stressed, politics is central to the outcomes of peace operations,<sup>139</sup> then the Security Council should be made aware of the criminal sources of governmental and political power of actors involved in situations on its agenda.

Second, DPA could work more closely with relevant UN actors (including the Department of Management and the Department of Field Support) to review when and how UN procurement risks promoting criminal interests. There is evidence

that peace operations have a major impact on local labour, services, and housing markets, and that capturing the associated revenues – including revenues from illicit activity such as prostitution – can become an important source of financial and social power in these environments.<sup>140</sup> To avoid this, UN procurement practices may need to be "crime-proofed". This requires adopting a context-specific analytical lens that understands the political economy of illicit actors/markets and adapting UN procurement practices and policies to avoid fuelling criminal markets.

Third, DPA may wish to promote analysis of how organized crime impacts police reform and DDR, in close collaboration with DPKO and specifically its Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI). Indeed there is evidence that, if not designed and monitored properly, such processes can provoke violent competition over the control and distribution of rents, and lead to the re-organization and fragmentation of armed groups into criminal structures.<sup>141</sup> As provisions relating to police reform and DDR are often at the core of peace negotiations, DPA has a strong role to play in ensuring that this risk is acknowledged early on in the negotiation process. In addition, while DPA does not have the exclusive responsibility for implementing such reforms, it has *de facto* engaged in monitoring demobilization processes in contexts such as Guatemala (MINUGUA), Nepal (UNMIN), Somalia (UNPOS), and is likely to be doing so in Colombia once a peace agreement is finalized. As such DPA might wish to reflect upon past experiences, perhaps through a lessons learned study.

There is evidence of organized criminal infiltration and manipulation of such processes.<sup>142</sup> In Mali, there are some signs that the attitudes of non-state armed groups to cantonment and DDR are linked to drug trafficking through northern Mali.<sup>143</sup> Housing new police recruits and ex-combatants in common barracks may also facilitate criminal recruitment.<sup>144</sup> Rushed efforts to build local law enforcement capacity can also unwittingly strengthen local criminal actors by either passing materiel or skills to them or by knocking out or weakening their rivals, thereby generating a violent chain reaction of criminal rivals seeking to exploit each other's vulnerability.<sup>145</sup> Ill-timed interventions may even drive actors willing to cooperate with the state back into the arms of opposing forces, as appears to have happened in Afghanistan.<sup>146</sup> Conversely, however, recent DDR experiences – for example in Colombia – may reveal useful insights relating to how to merge traditional reintegration strategies with transitional justice approaches, for example through the use of suspended sentences to incentivize non-recidivism.<sup>147</sup>

Finally, it may be useful to reflect on whether or how DPA's sanctions work needs "crime-proofing". There are four clear possibilities for such reflection, which might be variously applied to DPA's experiences with sanctions monitoring in DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, and Syria, amongst others.

First, when DPA is requested to conduct an analysis of a situation *prior* to the imposition of a sanctions regime, it may be useful for specific consideration to be given to how existing criminal networks may impact the effectiveness of sanctions, for example by enabling sanctions-busting and avoidance. Sanctions can have a number of unintended consequences, including possibly encouraging targets to draw closer to smugglers who have sanctions-avoidance expertise. Over time, this can criminalize the state.<sup>148</sup> Sensitivity to organized crime when considering and designing sanctions regimes will therefore help to strengthen their impact, and might even lead in time to the identification of leading indicators of sanctions (in)effectiveness.

Second, there may be scope for the use of UN sanctions instruments to induce criminal spoilers in peace processes to “go straight”.<sup>149</sup> Well-targeted sanctions can raise the costs and risks of crime. Learning from experience about how sanctions influence and disrupt the behaviour of actors with criminal agendas will help strengthen both existing and future sanctions regimes.

Third, once a sanctions regime is in place, reporting on the impact of criminal networks on sanctions regime dynamics and performance could be useful. Here, panels and groups of experts provide a unique informational and analytical resource, not only for understanding sanctions dynamics, but also for helping other peacemaking actors understand what is going on in the illicit political economies they engage. Sanctions can sometimes create unintended displacement effects within illicit markets, pushing criminal actors into adjacent or alternative markets, leading to violence. This appears to be the pattern in DRC, for example, where efforts to cut armed groups’ ability to export coltan and other minerals produced violent competition in the gold market. Greater analytical attention to criminal networks involved in sanctions avoidance might also help with identification of specific actors and enablers of multiple sanctions regimes.

Finally, once a sanctions regime has been lifted, it may be useful to review how it was impacted by, or itself impacted, organized crime. Such studies in the past have revealed a number of unexpected inter-relationships, such as the risk of

the use of sanctions crowding out efforts to develop more comprehensive conflict resolution strategies, and the use of sanctions unwittingly delegitimizing targets as partners in political dialogue, and restricting scope for political engagement.<sup>150</sup>

## Conclusion

This paper has highlighted the impact of organized crime for conflict prevention, management, and peacebuilding activities. Through a review of good practice on conflict analysis, prevention, management, and peacebuilding from outside the UN system, this study identifies a variety of “crime-proofing” measures available to the UN, with a specific focus on those most relevant to DPA. While DPA cannot tackle all of these complex challenges on its own, the Department has a vital leadership role to play in conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding within the UN and the global community. As such, this study suggests different ways in which DPA could strengthen its own work in this field: from mainstreaming organized crime into ongoing conflict analysis, to developing inducement and engagement strategies for criminal groups, crime-proofing its electoral assistance, and limiting the potential criminalizing impact of UN political missions and sanctions in conflict and post-conflict settings.

While our review of the literature and practice has uncovered increasing understanding, outside the UN system of “crime-proofing” measures, several important knowledge gaps remain. These include: how to develop inducement strategies that are effective in dissuading criminal actors from spoiling peace processes; how to prevent criminal agendas infiltrating and corrupting major institutional reform processes (including police reform, security sector reform, and demobilization programs); and how to identify and prevent the unintended impact of sanctions and procurement on criminal markets. Finally, as this study focuses on practices and knowledge outside the UN, it is important to reflect on the opportunity for learning available to DPA from conducting a review of its own past (and current) practice. Such an effort would enable DPA to further refine its policy guidance to deal with the increasingly important threat posed by criminal actors to peace and sustainable development.

**Annex 1**

**Three Criminal Accommodation Strategies**

Taken from James Cockayne, *Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime* (London/New York: Hurst, 2016).

	<b>Intermediation</b>	<b>Autonomy</b>	<b>Merger</b>
<b>Manifestation</b>	Mafias	Warlords and gang rule	Joint Ventures
<b>Segmentation of the "market for government"</b>	Jurisdictional sharing	Territorial segmentation	Vertical integration of governance
<b>Criminal rents available exceed internal costs plus...</b>	Cost of corrupting governmental capabilities	Cost of excluding state and developing alternative governmental capabilities	Cost of integration of capabilities
<b>Conditions for emergence</b>	Rapid structural or normative change creates unmet demand for government  Low costs of corruption	State enforcement capabilities ineffective  Low cost of organizing alternative governmental capabilities (e.g. fragmenting military structures; or local protection groups)	Elite political or military group controls state assets with weak public oversight  Poor rent extraction opportunities in local licit economy
<b>Geography</b>	Mafias locate at sites of formal legislative, spending and policing power	Communities where state capabilities are consistently weak – for warlords, peripheries; for gangs, slums	State-run security and economic operations – e.g. military airports and installations, development banks, financial regulators
<b>Governmentality</b>	Protection of traditional community values within formal political system	Protection of local identity and interests without secession	Court politics
<b>Effective state responses</b>	Remove unmet demand for government through market reforms (e.g. ending prohibition)  Raise costs of corruption, inc. through higher-level enforcement (e.g. federal)	Physical extension of state authority and public services  Localization of governance, subject to centralized corruption monitoring	Promotion of democratic control of state institutions (armed forces, development banks, financial regulators, campaign finance reform)  Inter-state accountability

**Annex 2**

**Three Criminal Confrontation Strategies**

Taken from James Cockayne, *Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime* (London/New York: Hurst, 2016).

	<b>Strategic Alliance</b>	<b>Terrorism</b>	<b>Blue Ocean</b>
<b>Role of third party</b>	Common adversary of both state and criminal group	Public – source of pressure on the state	Potential new state host
<b>Underlying strategic approach</b>	Balance of power	Indirect strategy	Structural transformation
<b>Criminal vulnerability</b>	Defection and betrayal	Alienation and popular resistance	Lack of local knowledge
<b>Effective state responses</b>	Defection/wedge strategies	Strategic communication to delegitimize criminal violence	Inter-state responsibility and elite accountability

**Endnotes**

- 1 The authors wish to thank Menaal Munshey and Franziska Seethaler for their research assistance.
- 2 See generally Sebastian von Einsiedel, et al., *Major Recent Trends in Violent Conflict*, Occasional Paper, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, December 2014 available at: <http://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/post/468/MajorRecentTrendsInViolentConflict-Dec2014.pdf>
- 3 James Cockayne, ‘Strengthening mediation to deal with criminal agendas’, *Oslo Forum Papers*, No. 002, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, November 2013.
- 4 See also, generally, James Cockayne, ‘Confronting Organized Crime and Piracy’, in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, eds., *The UN Security Council in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015), pp. 299-322.
- 5 See SDG 16.4 in particular. And see GITOC, *Organized Crime: A Cross-Cutting Threat to Sustainable Development*, Geneva, 2015.
- 6 See especially Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw, and Arthur Boutellis, *The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime?*, International Peace Institute, June 2013, who identified 13 of 28 UN peace operations in mid-2013 as having organized-crime related mandates; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, *Reinforcing Multilateral Approaches to Transnational Organized Crime by Strengthening Local Ownership and Accountability: Input to the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, Geneva, February 2015.
- 7 S/RES/2195 (2014), 19 December 2014.
- 8 For an overview see Cockayne, ‘Confronting’, op. cit.
- 9 See e.g. S/PRST/2010/4 (24 February 2010).
- 10 See e.g. James Cockayne and Camino Kavanagh, ‘Flying Blind? Political Mission Responses to Transnational Threats’, in *Annual Review of Political Missions* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2011).
- 11 Anna Ahmed et al., ‘The Crime–Conflict Nexus: Integrating Organized Crime into Conflict Analysis’ (New York: Columbia University, 2014).
- 12 Decisions of the Secretary-General, 12 February 2013 Meeting of the Policy Committee, points i(a) and i.(b) respectively (updating 2 March 2011 Decisions).
- 13 This section draws on the literature reviews in John de Boer and Louise Bosetti, ‘The Crime-Conflict “Nexus”: State of the Evidence’, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Occasional Paper No. 5, Tokyo, July 2015, available at [http://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/1665/OC\\_05-The-Crime-Conflict-Nexus.pdf](http://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/1665/OC_05-The-Crime-Conflict-Nexus.pdf); and James Cockayne, *Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime* (London: Hurst, 2016).

- 14 See especially Cockayne, *Hidden Power*; Klaus Von Lampe, *Organised Crime: Analyzing Illegal Activities, Criminal Structures and Extra-Legal Governance* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2016); David Kilcullen's 'theory of competitive control' in *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford: OUP, 2003), pp. 116-168; Enrique Desmond Arias, 'The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio de Janeiro,' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 38, no. 2 (May 1, 2006), pp. 293-325; Enrique Desmond Arias, 'Violence, Citizenship, and Religious Faith in a Rio de Janeiro Favela', *Lat. Am. Research Rev.*, vol. 49 (2014), pp. 149-167; and see Enrique Desmond Arias, *Criminal Politics: Illicit Activities and Governance in Latin American and the Caribbean*, forthcoming; Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, *Fixing a fractured state? Breaking the cycles of crime, conflict and corruption in Mali and Sahel*, Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime, Geneva, April 2015; Paula Miraglia, Rolando Ochoa and Ivan Briscoe, *Transnational organised crime and fragile states*, OECD Development Cooperation Working Paper No. 5, Paris, October 2012; and see the series on Non-Conventional Armed Violence Briscoe curated for the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, available at <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Themes/Global-trends/Publications/Report-series-Non-conventional-armed-violence>; and Camino Kavanagh, ed., *Getting Smart and Scaling Up: Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Governance in Developing Countries* (New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2013).
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- 22 Cockayne, *Hidden Power*, forthcoming.
- 23 See Von Einsiedel et al., *Major Recent Trends*, op. cit.; Michael Ross, 'How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases', *International Organization*, vol. 58 (2004), pp. 35-67; Richard Snyder, 'Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework', Working Paper No. 312, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN, 2004; and Richard Snyder and Angelica Duran-Martinez, 'Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets', *Crime Law & Social Change*, vol. 52 (2009), pp. 253-273.
- 24 See Williams, 'Insurgencies and Organized Crime', pp. 44-46, 58-60; Samuel P. Huntington, 'Civil violence and the process of development', *The Adelphi Papers*, vol. 11, issue 83 (1972), p. 15; Cockayne, *Hidden Power*.
- 25 See Francois-Bernard Huyghe, 'The impurity of war,' *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 873, March 31, 2009, available at <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-huyghe.pdf>; and see Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham and Lee J. M. Seymour. 'A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars', *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 10, no. 02 (June 2012), pp. 265-83.
- 26 See Cockayne, *Hidden Power*; de Boer and Bosetti, 'The Crime-Conflict "Nexus"'; and see Svante E. Cornell, 'Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 30 (2007), pp. 207-227.
- 27 Scheye, pp. 4-5, 7-8 and Annex II.
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