

THE QUESTION OF TURKISH INTEGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMAN
CULTURAL IDENTITY CONCEPTIONS

Brittany Tallman

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green
State University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2011

Committee:

Geoffrey Howes, Advisor

Edgar Landgraf

© 2011

Brittany Tallman

All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

Geoffrey Howes, Advisor

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the current state of Turkish integration in Germany and to examine the reasons behind the apparent lack of Turkish integration in comparison with other immigrant groups such as, *Aussiedler*, or *Volksdeutsche*, and immigrants from other European Union countries.

I will first examine how the *Gastarbeiter* program and the effects of the policies of the German government concerning the Turkish workers and immigrants in general can still be seen today. The second part of the thesis examines the concept of German identity and how German's view themselves has impacted integration. The case of the *Aussiedler*, and how their treatment by the German government affected the Turkish community, will also be examined in this context. The final portion of the thesis discusses the controversial themes of the German *Leitkultur* and the theory of the *Kulturkreis*, which makes the claim that Turkish and German culture are too incompatible with each other to create an atmosphere conducive to successful integration.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents, Frank and Teresa Tallman, for offering me the support needed to complete this seemingly huge task.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Howes for his help and guidance as my advisor while I was writing this paper, and for being so patient with the process, and my sometimes scattered thoughts. Thank you for listening to my ideas, even when you did not agree with them, and for permitting me to change my topic to something I would truly enjoy working on. I truly enjoyed our discussions and always felt that when I left your office, my paper regained the focus and clarity that it may have lost. I want to also thank you for taking making the impossible possible by giving me access to the book, “*Deutschland schafft sich ab*,” which was remarkably hard to get my hands on!

I would also like to thank Dr. Landgraf for his insightful comments and feedback, and for leading our workshop in an effort to take our papers from good to great. I appreciate all the hours you put in to reading our papers, giving us feedback and keeping us on track. Sometimes we needed to hear things that we did not want to hear, but I know you were just trying to give us honest feedback in order to challenge us to make our papers the best they could be.

I would also like to thank Arton Kastrati for his support and patience through this long process. You have supported me like no one else. You cheered me on, on my good days, and cheered me up when I was discouraged! Thank you for reading my thesis, giving me feedback and pushing me to have more “German days.”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I. FROM GASTARBEITER TO AUSLÄNDER.....	3
A Stance of Denial and the Myth of Returning Home.....	3
Problematic Terminology.....	12
Laying the Foundation for Failure.....	16
CHAPTER II. GERMANY IDENTITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON INTEGRATION.....	19
The Question of What it Means to be a German.....	19
East German + West German + Foreigners = <i>Ein Volk</i> ?.....	23
Which Mold of German?.....	27
Integration versus Acculturation.....	30
The Test of “Germanhood”.....	33
CHAPTER III. LEITKULTUR AND THE THEORY OF THE KULTURKREIS	50
The Heidelberg Manifesto.....	50
In Search of the German <i>Leitkultur</i>	53
The Theory of the <i>Kulturkreis</i>	61
Is Turkey Just Too Culturally Different?.....	68
CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION.....	75
WORKS CITED.....	80

INTRODUCTION

In a 2010 article from *Spiegel Online* German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, taking part in the *Deutschlandtag der Jungen Union* in Postdam, stated the following: “Der Ansatz für Multikulti ist gescheitert, absolut gescheitert.” The article then paraphrases her explanation for why *Multikulti* has failed, which is, according to Merkel, a lack of demands placed on the immigrants to integrate: “Man müsse Migranten nicht nur fördern, sondern auch fordern. Dieses Fordern sei in der Vergangenheit zu kurz gekommen” (“Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert”). Perhaps Merkel has a point that Germany did not “require enough” of its immigrants in the beginning, and now, from her perspective, Germany has failed to realize a multicultural state, but on the other hand, she fails to mention that perhaps the reasons why *Multikulti* failed were the official policy of the German government that Germany was *kein Einwanderungsland* and the fact that Germany’s position in regards to its foreign community was one of denial of their immigrant status, and an upholding of a policy that hindered integration and pushed for repatriation for its Turkish community. At the same time, however, Germany was emphasizing through its policy regarding ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, *Volksdeutsche* or *Aussiedler*, that German identity is first and foremost based on genealogy and secondly based on German *Leitkultur*, a set of ideals and characteristics that are purported to make up the essence of German culture, including a commitment to Enlightenment ideals and Christian values.

Along with the notion of a certain German *Leitkultur* comes the theory expressed by some German politicians on the right such as Horst Seehofer, chairman of the CSU, that people who belong to cultures too far removed from the German *Leitkultur* are simply too different to successfully integrate into German society. According to this theory people with these certain

cultural backgrounds have inherent qualities that are too far removed from the German *Leitkultur* to successfully integrate into German life. Because of these perceived fundamental differences people from these cultures should be discouraged from immigrating to Germany.

Although these ideas of a German *Leitkultur*, and that some cultures are just too different to successfully be a part of German society, seem to be too reminiscent of the ideas surrounding National Socialism to ever be taken seriously by the German public, a recent book by Thilo Sarrazin entitled, *Deutschland schafft sich ab*, has become a national bestseller. In the book Sarrazin makes the argument that foreigners in Germany from countries with an Islamic tradition, mainly the Turks, are “unintegratable” and because of their inability to integrate, have a detrimental effect on Germany as a whole.

In order to better understand the perceived failure of multiculturalism one must start from the beginning of the *Gastarbeiter* program and examine what official stance Germany decided to take regarding its foreign workforce and what consequences this stance still carries with it today for the Turkish-German community. In addition to this, it is also necessary to examine the notion of a German identity and how Germans define what it means to be a German, and to also examine who is eligible, and what requirements must be filled, to achieve the status of being “German.”

CHAPTER I. FROM *GASTARBEITER* TO *AUSLÄNDER*

A Stance of Denial and the Myth of Returning Home

In the 1950s West Germany experienced a boom in its economy known as the *Wirtschaftswunder*. During the first few years of this economic miracle, Germany was able to sustain its growing economy due in part to the 1951 Act on the Legal Status of Homeless Foreigners, which guaranteed to those who had done forced labor and remained in Germany legal equality and the right to reside and work in the Federal Republic of Germany. According to Hammar, “the integration of the expelled persons and refugees, once initial mass unemployment was eliminated at the beginning of the 1950s, had the effect of severely reducing the need for foreign workers” (169). By 1955, however, it was clear that if Germany was to sustain its expanding economy it would have to supplement its workforce with foreign workers, and in the same year the first bilateral recruitment agreement was reached with Italy (170). Similar recruitment agreements were also signed with Spain and Greece in 1960. A recruitment agreement was signed with Turkey in 1961.

The year 1961 marked an historic landmark in Germany’s history when the GDR closed its borders to the western world and constructed the Berlin wall separating East and West Berlin, effectively cutting off the stream of refugees coming to the FRG, resulting in “the beginning of the ‘uncontrolled expansion’ of immigrant labor” (Hammar 170). In order to compensate for the loss of refugees from the east the FRG entered into recruitment agreements with Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965 and Morocco in 1963 and then again in 1966. It was during this period of high foreign-worker recruitment that the FRG passed one of the most influential immigration regulations, the Aliens Act, in April of 1965. The main agenda of the Aliens Act was to define the conditions under which foreigners may take up residence in the FRG. The act gave the

authorities of the FRG discretionary powers regarding work and residence permits and did not grant foreigners any legal right to residence. According to Hammar: “The act ... was intended to make immigrant labor in the FRG a maneuverable resource, easily controlled and regulated, for the solving of economic problems” (170).

At the time of the *Gastarbeiter* program, foreign workers had to possess both a residence and work permit, which were granted solely at the discretion of the immigration authorities. Work permits were granted only “as long as there [was] no German applicant for the same job,” a fact that may seem discriminatory, but is actually common in most Western states, including the United States. Placing such a strong connection between the residence and work permits and granting residence permits for very limited periods of time made “it possible to check regularly whether a permit holder’s residence [was] still in the interest of Germany” (Hammar 185).

Although the FRG intended for immigrant labor to be a temporary fix to its labor shortage, it became clear that instead of supplementing the labor shortage the *Gastarbeiter* were actually producing a substitution of immigrant workers for German workers. The *Gastarbeiter* were employed in the most physically demanding and least skilled jobs, resulting in several positive outcomes for the German population. Because the *Gastarbeiter* were employed in these low-level jobs, German students had the opportunity to receive a “longer and better education without causing shortages in the labor market” (Hammar 172) In addition to enabling German students to attend to their education longer, many experts credit immigrant labor with the smooth reconstruction of the German army. This substitution of labor “resulted in a ‘collective mobility’ of the German population, a phenomenon that, in the beginning, was not recognized by immigrants as being disadvantageous to them” (172).

During the years 1966 and 1967 Germany suffered a small economic crisis and the number of foreign workers dropped accordingly by 320,000. Once the economy recovered and jobs were no longer scarce the number of foreign workers once again rose. This rise and fall in the number of foreign workers according to the economic situation led German officials to believe that the *Gastarbeiter* regarded themselves as a temporary part of the German labor market and were ready to repatriate if the economic situation in Germany no longer afforded them employment. In 1973, however, this assumption proved to be somewhat false when, as a consequence of the oil embargo and economic crisis in 1973 the FRG decided to implement a full recruitment stop of foreign workers and the number of foreigners in Germany surprisingly increased instead of decreased due to reunification of family members (Hammar 173).

The German government fully expected the number of foreign workers to drop as it had during the 1966-67 economic downturn, which it did from 2.6 million in 1973 to 1.87 million in 1978; however, the recruitment stop had an unintended consequence that the FRG had not anticipated. As a result of the recruitment stop many foreign workers decided not to return to their countries of origin out of fear that if they left, they might not ever be able to return; instead, they brought their families to join them in Germany, creating a dramatic shift in the demographics of the foreign population from mostly individual male workers to whole family units. Formerly the foreign community in West Germany “had been seen merely from the economic point of view up to the beginning of the 1970s”; however, it became clear that the FRG would have to now have to tackle the social issues resulting from a more permanent foreign population (Hammar 173).

Central to German policy concerning foreign workers was the fact that FRG had never been, and in spite of the non-repatriation of a large segment of foreign workers, was still not,

officially an “immigration country.” This denial of Germany being an *Einwanderungsland* has been a consistent argument in the debate on which stance the German government should take when dealing with Germany’s foreign population. Many politicians, especially on the right end of the political spectrum but also a few on the left, have backed up this stance, including Foreign Secretary Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), who stated in 1984 before the *Bundestag*, “Wir sind kein Einwanderungsland. Wir können es nach unserer Größe und wir können es wegen unserer dichten Besiedlung nicht sein” (qtd. in Brehl). In 1996 Interior Minister Manfred Kanther (CDU) stated in an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, “Wir haben in der Vergangenheit nie eine aktive Politik der Aufnahme von Ausländern mit dem Ziel der Dauerniederlassung betrieben.” He goes on to say, “Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland, will und soll auch keines werden” (qtd. in Hell 82).

In today’s political world the denial of Germany’s status as an “immigration country” is still a valid position for many, including CSU leader Horst Seehofer. In a 2010 article for the magazine *Focus Online*, Seehofer plainly states, “Deutschland ist kein Zuwanderungsland” (Seehofer).

Several arguments have been used to justify Germany as a “non-immigration nation,” including the “country’s high population density; the fear that permanent residence for ethnic minorities may cause conflict ...; the country’s lack of preconditions for integration ...; and the belief that permanent immigration [was] not in the interest of the sending countries either” (Hammar 180). This refusal to accept that the FRG had indeed become a country with a sizeable immigrant population was further underlined by the outright avoidance of the word “immigrant” (*Immigrant* or *Einwanderer*); instead in the 1970s and through most of the 1980s the term *Gastarbeiter* was popular, while in the 1990s the term *Ausländer* became the favored term for

politicians and the German media. The terminology used to describe the foreign community in Germany will be examined more in depth later.

The FRG's way of dealing with the issue of a permanent non-German population was to try to encourage repatriation through the preservation of the Turkish language and culture, instead of implementing a plan for full integration of the foreign community into German society. In the 1970s the FRG decided to introduce a policy of *Integration auf Zeit* or temporary integration that worked to integrate not only the foreign workers but also the second generation, many of whom had been born in Germany, up to a certain point, so that they could be a functioning part of German society while at the same time leaving the door open for eventual repatriation. According to Hammar, "full integration was expressly rejected, but 'everything should be done to provide the immigrants with humane conditions during their stay'" (190).

Efforts to encourage repatriation of the *Gastarbeiter* included financial incentives for those workers who did choose to return to their home countries as well as "mortgages to construct homes in Turkey, cheap credits for businesses and the formation of workers' companies to set up firms in Turkey" (Thomas). Although the FRG offered these tangible incentives to encourage repatriation, not many foreign workers decided to return to their countries of origin. The FRG needed a new tactic, and it was decided that the best way to encourage repatriation was to strengthen cultural and linguistic ties with the home country. This is perhaps most visible in Germany's immigration policy concerning education. From the beginning of the *Gastarbeiter* program until 1964 children of guest workers were required to attend school in Germany, "but it was emphasized that retaining linguistic and cultural links with the countries of origin should have equal priority" (Hammar 193). During this period children of non-German parents would attend classes in their native language and then eventually make the

switch into classes taught in German. Although the intention of this program was for the non-German speaking children to eventually be able to attend classes in German, “the necessary guidelines, curricula, and teaching materials were lacking” (194).

Although the FRG was aware of the deficiencies of necessary equipment and teachers for these “bilingual” programs, the government did not consider the problem of education for foreign children as a serious issue worthy of addressing since the FRG had not yet taken into consideration that the *Gastarbeiter* and their children might become a permanent part of Germany’s population. “The special linguistic, religious, and social needs of ethnic children were simply ignored, based on the presumption that Turkish families would eventually ‘go home’” (Mushaben 24). It must be noted that the for many *Gastarbeiter* families the ultimate goal was to repatriate, as can be seen in the encouragement of the second-generation by their parents to choose vocational training instead of a university-track education, in order to acquire skills that would be useful in their former countries. This lackadaisical attitude of the federal government concerning the quality of education and the acquisition of the German language by the children of the *Gastarbeiter* naturally had consequences that the FRG had not foreseen.

Because the FRG had not deemed necessary the acquisition of German by the *Gastarbeiter* or their children, attempts or programs for *Gastarbeiter* to learn German and efforts to teach German to the children of foreign workers were only federally coordinated after 1972, when the Social Democrats, the SPD, for the first time in the history of the Bonn Republic became the party with the most seats in the *Bundestag* (Laux 507). The lack of concern for the acquisition of German for the *Gastarbeiter* and of the second-generation until this point created a community of people who, despite working and sometimes even growing up in Germany, still had difficulties communicating in German (Hammar 193).

In December of 1971 the issue of the deficient education system for foreign children was considered worthy of addressing. Two alternatives were discussed: The establishment of separate schools for foreign children or the full integration of these children into German classrooms. It was finally agreed upon by the new coalition government made up by the SPD and FDP that immigrant children should be fully integrated into German schools, but “it was recommended that the proportion of foreigners per class not exceed 20 percent” (Hammar 194). Although it was officially decided that the best course of action was to fully integrate foreign students into the German school system, the FRG implemented curious policies that seemed to counteract their goal of full integration. Students with little or no knowledge of German were sent to preparatory classes in which “foreign teachers were now used to teach immigrant children in their mother tongue” Another curious policy change was that “the sending countries were permitted to establish supplementary national schools (more or less supervised by the school authorities of the *Länder*)” (194). The inconsistencies between the federal government’s stated goal of full integration of immigrant children and the practice of offering these children an education based on their nationality was further highlighted in April of 1976 by a decision made by the *Länder* ministries of education in which the concept of “enabling foreign children to live in ‘two worlds’” was emphasized. According to Hammar this decision was “certainly an attempt to keep return migration a viable alternative” (194).

Another reason for the inconsistency in dealing with the issue of education of immigrant children was the fact that issues of education and culture fall under the jurisdiction of the different *Bundesländer* and that each of the different *Länder* approached the issue with a different goal in mind; for example, the city-states Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin, as well as *Länder* with Social-Democratic governments such as North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse tackled

the issue with the goal of and emphasis on integration, while on the other hand, the more conservative Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg “emphasize[d] separation and national instruction in order to strengthen the ability and willingness to return” (Hammar 195).

The ability and willingness to return to the country of origin was something that the FRG needed to foster in order to exercise more control over the immigrant workers. If the foreign workers were no longer beneficial to Germany, the German government wanted to have the option of repatriation to the sending country. At the same time it seemed to the German government as if the *Gastarbeiter* themselves also counted on returning to their countries of origin some day. The *Gastarbeiter* seemed to resist integration and “this hesitation to accept integration measures was misinterpreted as a fundamental orientation in favor of return migration” (Hammar 200). However, the resistance to integration was in part due to the unstable legal status of the *Gastarbeiter* evident in an article from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* which reported in 1980 that “[m]ehr als vierzig Prozent befürchten, wieder in ihre Heimat zurückgeschickt zu werden” (qtd. in Jung, Niehr & Böke 66). The German government failed to take into consideration that the uncertain legal status of the *Gastarbeiter*, and not primarily the desire to return home, was responsible for their resistance to integration.

Of course any measure that encourages immigrants to repatriate implicitly discourages any real integration. According to Hammar immigrant regulation that is placing restrictions on who can come and how long one is permitted to stay in Germany, and immigration policy that works to integrate immigrants and attend to their social needs are in direct contradiction with each other:

Most of the measures that encourage immigrants to use the social services run counter to economic interests and diminish the state’s ability to dispose of immigrant labor.

Therefore, any “coordination” of these two sides of immigration policy has been merely accidental. This relationship between immigrant policy and immigration regulation has a certain logic: immigration is stopped so as to facilitate integration. Yet it is incomprehensible that, *at the same time*, overall immigration policy still explicitly aims at ensuring the free manipulation of labor, which is reflected by the refusal to admit that the FRG has in fact become an “immigration country” as well as by the various recommendations for maintaining and strengthening the immigrants’ willingness to return to their countries of origin. (198-99)

It is clear that from the beginning of the *Gastarbeiter* period Germany was not anticipating a large foreign presence becoming a fixture of its population. This is clear because until the 1970s Germany did not require or offer German language classes for its immigrant workers and decided to acknowledge the issue of permanent residency and integration of the foreign workers and their children only after it became strikingly evident that many of these people would not be returning anytime soon to their countries of origin. Nevertheless the FRG decided to try to implement a policy of temporary integration while at the same time attempting to maintain a distinctly “non-German” cultural and ethnic identity that according to Hammar “in most cases [were] closely linked to the aim of strengthening the ability to return” (191). These inconsistencies in policy and practice set the stage for the current situation of minorities in Germany, especially the Turks, who now are, according to a 2005 study done by the *Berlin Institut* and reported in an article from *Spiegel Online*, at a disadvantage compared to their German counterparts in nearly every aspect of life, such as education, employment and income (Elger, Kneip & Theile 2009). It is clear that actions of the FRG and its stance of denying that the foreign workers are actual immigrants, and its insistence that Germany was not an

immigration country, formed the foundation of the failure of multiculturalism which Angela Merkel pointed out and not that Germany “had not required enough” of the foreign workers in the beginning.

Problematic Terminology

The terms that the German government used and still uses in reference to the foreign workers in Germany, and which terms are avoided, reveal much about the attitudes that the government and the German people hold towards this segment of the German population. The term *Gastarbeiter* is full of connotation when one breaks it down and examines it closely. It is interesting and important to note that the term *Fremdarbeiter*, literally “foreign workers,” was ineligible for use by the German government because it was used formerly to refer to those workers who were used in the forced labor programs during the period of National Socialism; however, in Switzerland, where the problematic history of National Socialism is not relevant, the term *Fremdarbeiter* is used instead of *Gastarbeiter* (Mandel 54).

When one separates the word into its two components, *Gast* and *Arbeiter*, the connotations are easier to examine. The word *Gast*, “guest,” has radically different connotations in German than in Turkish. For the Germans, the term *Gast* refers to people who are “temporary and expected to return home ... [and] are bound to the rules and regulations of the hosts” (Mandel 55). The main connotation of the term *Gast* is that a guest is a person who does not stay permanently in a place; when one stays longer than a guest is expected to one ceases being a guest and eventually becomes an inhabitant. The term “guest” also intuitively implies that there must be a host. In the German, and also in the English, context the host is to be respected by the guest and is the one who is “at home.” The guest on the other hand is coming into the host’s

home and therefore cannot be “at home” as long as he is still considered a guest. The connotations associated with the term “guest” can be easily seen in the advice often given to Americans when traveling to foreign countries: “Remember we are guests here and should behave as such,” meaning one should respect the culture and accommodate one’s behavior to fit the norms and customs of the host country.

The word “guest” in Turkish as well in many other Mediterranean cultures brings with it radically different connotations than in German or English. For the Turks, guests are people to be honored and respected, who are the ones who need to be made to feel at home and after which the hosts model their behavior. According to Mandel, “[t]he Turkish ‘guests’ feel that their treatment in Germany violates every tenet of this set of expectations; they in turn judge the Germans by these violated standards and are pained by what they see as an insulting appellation” (56).

The second part of the word, *Arbeiter*, literally “workers,” is especially important because it highlights the way the Germans think about the foreigners. They are people who are reduced to their function; they are workers, and nothing else. They are described by what they can offer Germany, their labor. The Swiss writer Max Frisch opens in his 1967 work *Überfremdung: Öffentlichkeit als Partner* with the words, “Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, es kamen Menschen” (We called for labor, but people came instead) (qtd. in Klaschka). This quotation points out how the Germans thought of the *Gastarbeiter*, not as people, but as labor and according to Mandel, “captures the sense of surprise of the West German nation as a whole, faced by the unprecedented scale of immigration over the last half-century” (51). The term *Gastarbeiter* “marginalizes and objectifies migrants, leaving limited conceptual, social, or linguistic space for meaningful incorporation into the society” (55). Even as late as 1993

“Chancellor Kohl stressed in an interview: ‘We need our foreign guests ... without guestworkers the present level of economic prosperity in Germany would be unimaginable’” (63). It is clear from Kohl’s speech that the foreign presence in Germany is valued mainly on the basis of their contributions as workers and their positive effects on the German economy. The Turkish workers, reduced to their role as workers, are something to be tolerated in exchange for greater economic prosperity.

Perhaps the most telling term, or rather the term that is systematically avoided by the German government when referring to the non-German population residing in Germany, is the word *Einwanderer* or “immigrant.” The avoidance of this term is necessary to uphold the notion that Germany is not an “immigration country.” The discrepancy between the German government’s stance that Germany is not an “immigration country” and the reality that Germany is now home to a large non-German community has raised the eyebrows of many critics, among them Jane Kramer, a writer for the *New Yorker*. She writes in an article from 1993 entitled “Neo-Nazis: A Chaos in the Head” from her column “Letter From Europe”: “Germany: the country with 6.5 million foreigners and no immigrants” (52). Kramer’s comment on this disparity shows just how far removed from reality the German government’s official stance regarding its immigrant population has been and continues to be.

The reasons behind Germany’s resistance and refusal to use the term *Einwanderer* when referring to these people lie, according to Mandel, in the fact that the term “immigrant” carries with it legal obligations and certain rights as well as doing away with any intention of the immigrant to repatriate. The most widely used term used when referring to these people is still *Ausländer* (“foreigners”; “aliens”), a term whose “widespread currency ... in Germany has served the agenda of the state: had the persons to whom the term refers been called ‘immigrant’

instead, a whole host of rights and obligations--political, social, and economic--would have adhered” (Mandel 80). The term *Ausländer* is problematic in two ways, even without being compared to the term “immigrant.” According to Mandel *Ausländer* “means much more than merely foreigner, it implies the unwanted foreigner who does not belong. It means unintegratable outsider, alien, rather than any neutral rendering of the English ‘foreigner’” (80). The negative connotations revolving around this term work to create even more distance between the *Ausländer* and the citizens and clearly divide the population into two categories, one more valuable than the other.

The other problematic aspect of the term *Ausländer* is that it lumps many different people into a one-fits-all category. For example the term is used to describe asylum seekers newly arrived in Germany as well as to describe people who may have been born in Germany or are even third-generation “Germans.” This usage of an umbrella term to refer to all non-Germans completely ignores the contributions some foreigners have made to Germany. The term is especially degrading to people who immigrated to Germany as *Gastarbeiter* and contributed for decades to the German economy through their labor and consuming habits, putting them on equal footing with immigrants who may have been in Germany seeking asylum for only a few days.

The term *Ausländer* is one that is quite difficult, even impossible, to shed for people who are not ethnically German. Despite being born in Germany or even having parents who were born in Germany, they are still referred to as *Ausländer*. In comparison, the United States, where “children of migrants are Americans of the second generation or define themselves as second-generation Americans,” this labeling of people as *Ausländer* despite their being able to call Germany their country of birth is especially striking. The term *Ausländer* is “transmitted from

one generation to the next, so that their children and grandchildren are foreigners.” (Kastoryano 25). The inescapable term *Ausländer* highlights the often-held Germans attitude of, “once a Turk, always a Turk” (Mandel 181). The inescapable term *Ausländer* is often the center of many comments posted on the Internet. One such comment found on the website *YouTube* expresses frustration at the inability to shed the *Ausländer* label. The post reads, “die meisten Deutsche sehen einen Ausländer immer als Ausländer egal ob Araber, Türke, Russeegal ob integriert oder nicht ...selbst wenn schon 3 Generationen seiner Familie hier lebt oder perfektes deutsch spricht ...das Aussehn bestimmt ,...ist einfach so” (syriengirl9).

Also especially striking in comparison with the United States, where the expressions Italian-American or African-American are the norm, is the compound often used for Turkish people living in Germany, German-Turks or *Deutschtürken*, instead of Turkish-Germans. Using “German-Turks” to describe the Turkish immigrants and their descendents means that these people are “rendered a variant of Turk, not a variant of German ... it could be argued that the grammatical ordering in this term still precludes full participation into Germanness.” (Mandel 181).

Laying the Foundation for Failure

Germany’s early policies regarding the *Gastarbeiter* laid the framework for the perceived failure of *Multikulti*. The workers who came to Germany were clearly expected to return home and because of this expectation, very little was done to encourage any kind of integration of the workers into German society. In fact, full integration was discouraged in favor of an “*Integration auf Zeit*” or temporary integration. Temporary integration was supposed to enable the *Gastarbeiter* to function in Germany while at the same time retaining cultural and linguistic

ties with the country of origin to maintain the possibility of return migration. In this way the German government was able to maintain control over the foreign workforce and viewed the *Gastarbeiter* as a maneuverable workforce that could easily be disposed of if the economy no longer demanded their presence.

Social problems facing the second-generation especially in terms of linguistic ability and education were often not taken seriously and ignored due to the assumption made by the German government that the *Gastarbeiter* and their families would eventually return home. The German government also misinterpreted the lack of enthusiasm for integration as a sign of a willingness to return to the country of origin, never considering the possibility that the immigrants were hesitant to integrate not due to a longing to return home, but rather because of their precarious legal status in Germany.

Central to the German government's stance on immigration is the denial that Germany is in fact an "immigration country." A stance that was upheld until the first of January 2005, when an immigration law came into effect that "erstmal's Regeln für einen geordneten Zuzug bennent" (Klaschka). In addition to there being no laws prior to 2005 that permitted one to immigrate to Germany unless one was ethnically German, the stance that Germany is not an immigration country has been repeated by countless politicians from the 1960s up through the present time and denies immigrant status to the almost 8 million non-Germans who call Germany home and have made decades' worth of contributions to the German economy. This stance has clearly hindered integration on the part of the Turks. Lacking legal status as immigrants, they have been resistant to integration and have had little encouragement or incentives to conform themselves to fit German society. The terminology used in reference to these people also reveals a denial of their immigrant and permanent status. The German government is careful in

choosing which terms to apply to these people and which terms to avoid. Examples include its avoidance of the terms *Fremdarbeiter* and *Einwanderer*, and its choice instead to use the terms *Gastarbeiter* and *Ausländer*. By denying these people an immigrant status, the Federal Republic can justify not bestowing on them certain rights that all other German citizens enjoy, and it can use the argument that Germany never was and is not an “immigration nation” to justify restrictions and regulations on future immigration.

CHAPTER II. GERMANY IDENTITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON INTEGRATION

The Question of what it means to be a German

The question of what it means to be a German is one that is highly relevant when talking about Turkish integration, because it is important to identify exactly what distinguishes, to German society, a German from a non-German. Which characteristics and beliefs are Turkish immigrants expected to adopt and on which variety of “German” are they supposed to model their behavior? These are questions that are difficult to answer for Germans and non-Germans alike. The definition of “Germanness” has experienced drastic changes through different historical periods and can even have completely different definitions among people of the same era. The question of what it means to be a German is further complicated by the different aspects of German identity, including legal, cultural and ethnic components. Because of the ever-evolving definition of what it means to be a German, immigrants often find it difficult to navigate the path to “Germanness,” while others feel as if the elusive goal is outside the realm of possibility and therefore are resistant to conforming to the German mold. Along with the questions of what it means to be a German comes the question of to what degree members of the Turkish community are expected to integrate themselves. Turkish immigrants often contend that not integration is the actual goal of the Federal Republic, but total assimilation, which leaves no room for a Turkish or even a dual identity. An additional obstacle to Turkish integration is the perceived preferential treatment by the German government of ethnic Germans or *Aussiedler* from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, who were welcomed back into Germany after perhaps hundreds of years with open arms and with the possibility of “re-activating” their citizenship upon entry. This of course had the result of sending a strong message to the Turkish community that blood and ethnicity were essential elements of German identity, a basis for

German citizenship that was first adopted in the constitution of 1871 and set the precedence for German citizenship based on *jus sanguinis*.

For the first time there was an attempt in the constitution produced by the revolutionary Frankfurt Parliament in 1849 to define German citizenship; however, “the first attempt to establish a comprehensive German citizenship failed” because the constitution was not adopted (Levy & Weiss 62). Ultimately the 1871 constitution of the German Empire adopted the “Prussian, descent-based model of citizenship (*ius sanguinis*) over the traditional, territorial one (*ius soli*), which was deeply rooted in feudal legal tradition.” From this principle of *jus sanguinis*:

the Germans have developed an “ethnocultural self-understanding ...[and] [a]s a result ‘Germans, like many other Europeans, more easily [than “English speakers”] conceive of a nation (*Nation*) or people (*Volk*) as an aggregate existing independent of state organization, unified by certain commonalities such as language, religion, culture, history, and descent.’” (Brubaker 15; Neuman 249-250; qtd. in Klopp 41-42)

The adoption of the Prussian model of citizenship “advanced the homogenization of citizenship; descent from a citizen became the guiding principle of citizenship throughout the German Reich.” One could become a naturalized citizen if two conditions were met: “minimum socioeconomic criteria of integration into the local community ... and proof of ‘respectability.’” The second requirement is purposefully vague and allowed for “the inclusion of political, moral and economic considerations” (Levy & Weiss 62). The vagueness of what “respectable” entailed was also used to encourage national homogeneity and to allow “desirable” applicants easier naturalization while making it more difficult for “undesirable” applicants to become naturalized. According to Levy and Weiss the criteria used to measure desirability shifted as “economic and

social indicators became less important and linguistic or cultural affinity more so.” The most “desirable” applicants were “those regarded as ‘nationally harmless’ meaning they were members of Western nations of ‘related blood’” (64). Other privileged applicants included “[f]ormer citizens seeking re-naturalization, especially if they were fit for military service and morally ‘respectable’.... Their privileged position was justified with reference to their knowledge of the German language and their proximity to the ‘German character.’”

Through the vagueness of citizenship laws certain groups of people could be excluded from citizenship. Among those excluded were “Slavs, particularly Czechs and Poles,” who were ranked “toward the bottom of the scale, being regarded as ‘unwanted elements’ for reasons of national homogeneity” (Levy & Weiss 64). The built-in ambiguity of laws governing citizenship made it possible for certain people to be excluded based on various factors and allowed for the state to refuse those who threatened the cultural homogeneity of the population. It is clear that from the very first definitions of German citizenship, cultural and linguistic elements were designed to play an essential role in determining who was eligible to label themselves “German.”

The process of defining citizenship along cultural, ethnic and linguistic lines “was accompanied by the development in political theory of the concept of the state as an ‘organism,’ which was equated with the family as the embodiment of the idea of a community of descent” (Levy and Weiss 62). Citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* was “[c]odified in the 1913 *Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*, [and] the idea of an organic national community (*das deutsche Volk*) was reinforced by the Preamble to the 1949 Basic Law and Article 116 GG” (Mushaben 4). The 1913 *Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* has long been regarded as the archetype of citizenship based on ethnicity, yet some argue that it is not the elements of *jus sanguinis* in the

law that set it apart from all others before it, but its “rigorously discarding any *ius soli* element” which was “driven by the desire to keep eastern Jews and Poles out of citizenry” (Gibney & Hansen 87). By rejecting any notion of *jus solis* the German nation has effectively been able to maintain control over who is permitted to become a citizen. Although maintaining control of who can become a naturalized citizen is not unique to Germany, what makes Germany different from other western nations is that it also denies citizenship to individuals born within German borders who are not ethnically German.

Article 116 of the “Basic Law” or *Grundgesetz* of 1949 sets out to define German citizenship with the following paragraphs:

(1) Deutscher im Sinne dieses Grundgesetzes ist vorbehaltlich anderweitiger gesetzlicher Regelung, wer die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt oder als Flüchtling oder Vertriebener deutscher Volkszugehörigkeit oder als dessen Ehegatte oder Abkömmling in dem Gebiete des Deutschen Reiches nach dem Stande vom 31. Dezember 1937 Aufnahme gefunden hat.

(2) Frühere deutsche Staatsangehörige, denen zwischen dem 30. Januar 1933 und dem 8. Mai 1945 die Staatsangehörigkeit aus politischen, rassischen oder religiösen Gründen entzogen worden ist, und ihre Abkömmlinge sind auf Antrag wieder einzubürgern. Sie gelten als nicht ausgebürgert, sofern sie nach dem 8. Mai 1945 ihren Wohnsitz in Deutschland genommen haben und nicht einen entgegengesetzten Willen zum Ausdruck gebracht haben.

Along with defining who “is a citizen of the Federal Republic, Article 116 spells out exactly who has the right--and who does not have the right--to be considered a German, expressed in the term *Volkszugehörigkeit*, literally, folk- or people- belongingness (often

inadequately glossed as ‘ethnicity’)” (Mandel 207). Until 2005, the year in which a new immigration law took effect that outlined the possibility of acquisition of German citizenship for immigrants, there were no laws in Germany that provided a way for foreign nationals to immigrate to Germany and become citizens, unless the person in question was of German descent (Klaschka). Article 116 of the *Grundgesetz* provides literally no possibility for a foreign national of non-German descent to become a citizen.

Although Article 116 may seem very inclusive by claiming that a German is any person holding German citizenship, one must realize that one is only born with German citizenship when at least one of the parents also has German citizenship, meaning ethnically German, not by being born within German territory. Another aspect of German citizenship outlined in Article 116 that deserves special attention is that special consideration is given to ethnic Germans who may have been driven out of Germany, or to the descendants of ethnic Germans who left Germany centuries ago. This special consideration for people of German descent further highlights the organic nature of German citizenship, which stems from the idea of the nation state as an organic being, naturally encompassing a specific geographical area and being home to an organically and naturally connected body of citizens, and how great a role the idea of *Volkszugehörigkeit* has played in forming notions of German citizenship and identity.

East German + West German + Foreigners = *Ein Volk*?

In addition to reinforcing the legitimacy of the idea of *das deutsche Volk* the FRG reaped additional benefits from the adherence to a policy of *jus sanguinis* especially during the period of German division. The notion of a people unified by cultural ties and descent “rendered the idea

of German division provisional, obliging lawmakers to work toward unification.” In addition it “assert[ed] that East and West Germans remained blood brothers and sisters” and thus “justified foreign policy mechanisms used to undermine the existential legitimacy of the other German state” such as the Hallstein Doctrine, which set forth the policy that the FRG would not continue or enter into diplomatic relations with any nation, with the exception of the Soviet Union, that recognized the GDR (Mushaben 4).

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of West and East Germany tested the legally defined foundation of what it meant to be a German. The two German states, separated for decades, were now proclaiming to be *ein Volk*. Although the slogan “*Wir sind ein Volk*” was the battle cry of reunification, the East and West Germans failed initially to take into consideration the profound impact on identity that decades of separation can have. Throughout the entire existence of a divided Germany the governments on both sides of the Wall made it their mission to create and enforce a political identity that was in direct contrast to the other German identity, all along highlighting the differences between their worldview and that on the other side of the Wall. After the fall of the Wall these two different identities and worldviews shaped by decades of indoctrination and isolation from each other had to be quickly set aside in order for Germany to be able to see itself as one cohesive nation and *ein Volk*.

In order to overcome these differences Germans turned to placing a large emphasis on a “national refocusing of a common culture, language, and history” (Mandel 31). They were out to define “Germanness” by seeking commonalities between the East and West Germans that justified the idea that these two groups of people, although separated, had always shared a natural common connection and identity that could not be overcome by politics. According to this new world view the organic connections (language, culture, history) between these two

groups of people were enough to justify the claim that East and West Germans were indeed *ein Volk*.

The emphasis placed on a shared language, culture and history when defining German identity also meant that certain members of the population residing in Germany were clearly not a part of this new unified *Volk*, “namely, the several-million-strong non-German resident Turks and other *Ausländer*” (Mandel 31). The Turkish immigrants were excluded from the discourse regarding identity after reunification and did not easily meet any of the new standards set forth when determining a post-Wall German identity. The Germans placed great emphasis on a shared history between East and West Germans, but it is important to note that this emphasis on a shared history was specifically pre-division and disregarded the decades of separation that were exactly the period of time in which the *Gastarbeiter* first arrived and worked in Germany. Their history in Germany was completely ignored, because the German history that mattered when it came to German identity was the shared history before separation.

Along with the emphasis on a shared pre-separation history, the new unified German identity placed a considerable amount of emphasis on a common culture and language. Along with the shared history, the shared culture being emphasized was specifically pre-separation, for the East and West German states had drastically different cultural characteristics due to their separation and differing political environments. These different cultural characteristics would soon find themselves being transformed into stereotypes. East Germans often found West Germans “self-confident to the point of being arrogant, patronizing, and overly concerned with their outward appearance” (Twark 121). On the other hand, East Germans are often stereotyped as being lazy, backwards and expecting free hand-outs from the West. Although these stereotypes point to a recognition on the part of the Germans that cultural differences do exist

within this unified German *Volk*, they do not undermine the arguments that emphasize a natural organic connection between East and West Germans because these cultural differences can all be attributed to the decades of separation. The shared historical and cultural ties that are pointed to as justification for a natural East- West-German belonging are purposefully sought in the period of pre-division by the newly unified Germans.

Although the Turks may have been excluded from the discourse surrounding a unified German identity, that does not mean that the Turkish population was somehow immune to any effects the fall of the Berlin Wall may have had. Although they had been “proscribed from the historical processes shaping postwar and post-Wall politics, eastern and western, the *Ausländer* nevertheless found themselves very much affected by the opening of the Wall” (Mandel 31). Among these effects were “increased competition in the labor market from unemployed eastern Germans, threats by growing neo-Nazi groups, [and] the generalized fallout from the unification taxes of increased *Ausländerfeindlichkeit*, xenophobia” (31).

A linguistic response to the fall of the Wall was the creation of a new saying in Turkish, “*duvar bizim üstüme düştü*- the Wall fell on us” (Mandel 31). The Turkish community has felt its exclusion from discourse surrounding the Berlin Wall and despite many of its members’ having lived through the days and fall of the Wall, many Germans still do not accept that member of the Turkish community could have any real investment or genuine interests in “German” subjects. They are not considered by many Germans to be genuine actors in German history. It is as if the Turkish community has been completely erased from the German memory and although many Germans and Turks shared the same history in the same country for close to forty years, it seems inconceivable to some Germans that a Turk could possibly be interested in

something that is “not part of his history” when in fact the Turks lived, experienced and contributed to the same history.

An example of the phenomenon of Turkish deletion in the minds of many Germans can be seen in an episode recounted by Joyce Mushaben. She recalls how a Turkish-German writer while being interviewed on television was clearly becoming increasingly frustrated by only being asked questions which pertained to the *Ausländerproblem* when in fact “he had published an essay on the dramatic 1989 Turn-Around.” The interviewer asked him several times: “But why are you interested in the Wall? That’s a German Topic!” The author, a long-time resident of Kreuzberg who happened to live most of his life in close proximity to the Wall, insisted: “[I]t was my Wall too!” (83)ⁱ. By claiming that the Wall was “his Wall too!” he is trying to get across to his German interviewer that he is just as much a part of German history as other Germans and just because he happened to be ethnically different does not mean that he was immune to the history taking place around him.

Which Mold of German?

An often confusing problem for Turkish immigrants and Germans themselves is to pinpoint exactly what type of German the Turkish immigrants and other *Ausländer* are supposed to model their behavior after. This problem is often confounded and made more complex by Germany’s history of National Socialism and the way in which Germans come to terms with their problematic past. Because of National Socialism it is often taboo for Germans to display pride in or attach any specific meaning to “being German.” This double standard of encouraging *Ausländer* to integrate into German society and become “German” while at the same time

ⁱ This anecdote was told to Mushaben. The Turkish-German author from this anecdote could not be positively identified.

making it a point not to display any pride or attach any meaning to being German does not make integration an appealing option to many immigrants. The immigrants are not unaware of this contradiction and often ask the question: “Why should we want to model ourselves after Germans, when they themselves are not happy to be Germans?”.

This point of view was also expressed in an interview with Cem Özdemir, the first person of Turkish descent to earn a seat in the *Bundestag*. Despite being born in Germany he “describes his own naturalization process as a ‘long march against the institutions.’” To celebrate his becoming a naturalized German citizen he threw a costume party, inviting several of his German friends, who according to him “just couldn’t comprehend it: Why should anyone be happy about the fact that he’s now a German? They found it just terrible: Everyone inside the enlightened left-liberal spectrum was ashamed of being German, and this guy was happy!” (Mushaben 57).

Because of Germany’s problematic history of National Socialism Germans are often hesitant to claim that any one thing is what defines them as Germans. According to a survey conducted in 1998 asking native-born Germans and immigrants the question: “What does it mean to you, personally, to be a German?” a striking 39.1% of native-born Germans responded that they “don’t connect anything special with it,” which was the most commonly chosen answer by a margin of more than 20%. The next most commonly chosen answers in the survey were: “Growing up in Germany” and “Holding German citizenship” both with 18.2% of the native-born vote (Dietz & Roll 162; qtd. in Mushaben 117).

Also because of Germany’s past many Germans often strive to define themselves by what they are not instead of what they are. Germans are often quick to point out that they are not “ultranationalistic, war-mongering, anti-Semitic, or subservient to an authoritarian state.” In addition to this “few citizens describe their emotional ties to the country in positive terms”

(Mushaben 19). The book, *Lieben Sie Deutschland?* by Marielousie Janssen-Jurreit is devoted entirely to this national phenomenon. While Germans continue to grapple with the problem of their negative feelings towards their identity, immigrants, on the other hand, “are supposed to recreate themselves in a national image few indigenous souls are especially ‘proud’ to embody.” The immigrants’ “inability to do so becomes the justification for their economic marginalization and social exclusion,” while the reasons why they do not see any benefit in becoming more “German” are often overlooked (19).

Adding to this problem is the simple fact that Germans are not all perfectly alike. One only has to take the views held by members of the CDU and compare them to the views held by members of the Green Party to see that the types of worldviews that Germans hold sometimes seem to completely contradict each other, and yet people holding these opposing views are Germans: *ein Volk*. Dieter Oberndörfer recognized the problem of the lack of a definitive model of “Germanness” towards which immigrants should strive by saying:

Whoever demands that foreigners integrate themselves into German culture first has to answer the question: *what is an integrated German?* Are Southern or Northern Germans, Catholics, Protestants, secular or non-denominational citizens Germans, those who have converted to Islam or Buddhism, academics or farmers, SPD members or CSU voters the right model for integration and integrated Germans? ... The culture of Germany is the culture of its citizens. And the culture of its citizens is nothing static, it changes and pluralizes itself.

(qtd. in Mushaben 120)

Integration versus Acculturation

Many Turkish immigrants express that their lack of efforts to integrate stems from a fear that what Germans demand from them will completely erase their cultural identity, a step that few immigrants are willing to embrace. They claim that fitting into German society and becoming integrated are not what Germany is demanding from them, but total acculturation and the giving up of their former cultural identities. Although the command is “Integrate!” “[b]y this they mean nothing short of absolute assimilation, the disappearance of Anatolian faces behind German masks” (Şenocak 2).

Kenen Kolat, the chairman of the Turkish Society in Germany (*Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland*), is also “against the term integration because in Germany it actually means ‘assimilation.’ According to him, it is better to use the term “participation”--the participation of people coming from different backgrounds in every aspect of social, political and economic life in Germany” (Karabat). He goes on to explain the difference between integration and assimilation or acculturation by saying “The term integration does not give any obligation to the culture of the majority; it is not asking some duties of them but only demanding the harmonization of foreigners with the culture of the majority. The countries of immigration have to be changed and have to adapt themselves, too, but Germany is not ready to do it” (Karabat).

Acculturation differs from integration because it “correlates directly with *jus sanguinis*, a standard implying ‘sameness’ in values, behaviors, and perhaps even appearance. Acculturation “poses a standard that Turkish, African or Asian migrants would find hard to meet, regardless of generational status” (Mushaben 19). Acculturation also differs from integration in that acculturation “implies a one-way process of adaptation that many German politicians mistakenly

identify as ‘integration’” (20). Integration, on the other hand, “refers to a process of mutual cultural adjustment, a kind of ‘change through drawing closer’ that finds both sides moving toward common ground on core values, e.g., supporting the free-democratic order, but allowing for reinterpretation of others, based on the contributions of new entrants” (20).

Many Turkish-Germans express frustration at the notion that they have not done enough to integrate themselves and claim that the demands Germany society is placing on them go too far and would lead to a total disappearance of Turkish cultural identity. They claim that they are willing to accept, and indeed in many communities, have already accepted fundamental democratic and modern ways of thinking which are central to modern Western societies; however, they feel they are unfairly demanded to also give up other cultural characteristics and to subscribe exclusively to ‘German’ traits and customs. According to Mushaben:

It’s one thing to expect persons living within German borders to accept constitutional principles like gender equality and religious freedom, or to abide by criminal statutes against “honor killings.” It is quite another to presume that one must embrace only “German” business practices, musical tastes, eating habits, modes of dress, and child-rearing patterns to ensure national order. (20)

The refusal on the part of Turkish-Germans to completely do away with all Turkish cultural traits and practices is especially troublesome, even intolerable, to many Germans. The “prospect of others in [their] midst steadfastly refusing to become [them], to look, eat, and act like [them], to be exclusively loyal to [them], simply is intolerable to many well meaning Germans.” They ask themselves “how can there be a ‘foreign German?’” (Mandel 317).

To these Germans “Germanness” is often interpreted as a single culture and single entity whose cultural and linguistic traits point to a single line of descent. “Germanness” symbolizes

strict adherence to all “German” characteristics and cultural traits, even if these traits can vary from German to German. However, when one introduces cultural elements that are ascribed to a non-German culture into German society these elements are immediately shunned and regarded as “foreign” and specifically “non-German.” The elements that are not considered inherent to German society can never, in the minds of some Germans, be reconciled with “inherent” or “natural” German cultural patterns and traits. They are unacceptable and should never be considered a part of German culture regardless of how long the communities to which these traits belong have inhabited Germany and contributed to German economic and social life.

German cultural traits are often considered as being static and having a traditional legacy that cannot and should not be altered by outside influence. Instead of integration--a process in which both cultures involved adapt and transform themselves in order for them to reach a common destination, both sides involved in a give-take exchange--Germans are often accused of using the term *integration* when what they ultimately strive for is *acculturation*. Instead of the simultaneous giving and taking involved in integration, acculturation is the total adaptation of one culture’s traits and characteristics while at the same time completely shedding all traits belonging to the former culture. The argument that the Turkish community in Germany should repatriate in order to be spared from acculturation or “Germanization” was central to the *Heidelberger Manifest*, a document published in support of Turkish repatriation.ⁱⁱ

Losing one’s cultural identity through acculturation is often an undesirable goal that few Turkish-Germans are willing to strive for, and often actively resist. The resistance to absolute acculturation is not unique to the Turkish community. Active resistance on the part of several minorities in Germany can be seen in blogs and posts on the Internet. Several examples of these posts can be found on sites such as *YouTube*. One user openly resists the pressure of total

ⁱⁱ The *Heidelberger Manifest* is discussed in chapter III.

acculturation by writing, “integriert bin ich aber assimilieren lass ich mich nicht ich bleib serbin bis zum tot!!” (SerbiaPrincess).

Although one would be hard-pressed to find a single person opposed to integration, it is clear that minorities in Germany have no intention of committing to absolute acculturation. By giving up all of their cultural traits and customs they would become, as Şenocak states, just “Anatolian faces behind German masks.” The fear of losing one’s cultural identity is both a considerable hindrance to integration and a step that Turkish-Germans consider unnecessary for successful integration. The Turkish-German community’s retaining certain cultural elements while at the same time accepting fundamental values of modern Western states and being fully integrated in Germany’s social and economic life should be regarded as successful integration.

According to Mandel, Germany’s insistence on absolute acculturation under the guise of integration is akin to earlier attempts to encourage repatriation. Both the push for repatriation and the push for total assimilation lead to a disappearance of the Turkish presence. Perhaps Merkel’s opinion that *Multikulti* has failed has more to do with Germany’s image of what may be considered German culture, a culture that can only be achieved through a total shedding of all “non-German” traits, and with the fact that “many German politicians mistakenly identify [acculturation] as ‘integration’” (Mushaben 20). The fact that a Turkish presence is still visible in Germany does not mean that integration has not been achieved by many Turkish-Germans; it simply points to a refusal to lose one’s cultural identity and disappear.

The Test of “Germanhood”

One of the most controversial and contested policies that the German government has had since World War II has been its stance in regard to communities of people living in Eastern

Europe who are believed and claim to be ethnically German. For Germans living in Germany these “Germans” living abroad in non-German territory were symbolized and were often seen as “idealized ur-German ancestor[s] temporarily transposed to modernity.” They symbolized and carried on an “authentic Germanness” which was “untainted, uncorrupted, and pure.” For many Germans they were regarded as artifacts that had come to life and were regarded as long-lost brothers and sisters (Mandel 212).

Labeled as *Aussiedler*, these ethnic Germans, also known as *Russlandsdeutsche*, “arrived in Russia in the mid-eighteenth century, recruited from southwest Germany by Catherine the Great.” During World War II they were driven by Stalin into central Asia and Siberia where they remained scattered. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, *Aussiedler* began to pour into Germany in large numbers. According to Mandel, “[t]hroughout the 1990s some 220,000 per annum immigrated to Germany, primarily from Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Poland,” where they were welcomed with open arms. Upon arrival they were met with “access to German naturalization, German language and citizenship classes, generous housing and living allowances, assistance in seeking employment and training, all from the government” (Mandel 68).

In a 1998 speech to a Russian-German fraternal organization, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl expresses the attitude that many Germans had regarding the *Aussiedler*. In the speech he expressly rejects the idea that these people are *Ausländer*, by stating: “Dear Compatriots ... for [you] the Russian-Germans the borders are open. A long desired dream has been fulfilled ... dear compatriots, in the name of the Federal Government, I proclaim to you: we are happy and

thankful that you were able to come to us! You are all a *profit* to our German fatherland” (qtd. in Mandel 68)ⁱⁱⁱ.

It is important to recognize here that the *Aussiedler* are also not labeled as *Einwanderer*, immigrants, because the Federal Republic is officially “*kein Einwanderungsland*.” The *Aussiedler* are instead addressed by Kohl as “compatriots,” further highlighting their non-*Ausländer* and automatic German status, and making it ultimately clear to the *Ausländer* community that German identity is based on the idea of an organic group of people who, no matter how far removed by geography and time, are forever tied together through shared culture and most importantly through ethnicity. Kohl’s speech was regarded by many Turkish-Germans and other minorities as a direct insult and denial of their contributions to Germany over the previous thirty years. Despite all of their efforts to contribute to the German economy, to learn the German language and despite many of them having been born and living their entire lives inside German borders, they were still not regarded by the German population as “compatriots.”

Although the *Aussiedler* were ethnically German, many did not possess a working knowledge of the German language. Kohl recognized this as a hindrance to integration and encouraged them to “speak German daily with one another, asserting that it is only a lack of fluency in German that stands in the way of their integration into German society” (Mandel 70). The *Aussiedler*, unlike the *Ausländer*, have the ability to become full-fledged Germans with the mastery of the German language. The irony of Kohl’s speech, proclaiming the “Germanness” of the *Aussiedler* is that “unlike many Turkish ‘co-citizens,’ many of the [*Aussiedler*] ‘co-citizens’ in the audience of the Russian German fraternal organization likely did not possess sufficient mastery of German to comprehend [Kohl’s] message” (71).

ⁱⁱⁱ Emphasis and translation by Mandel.

Although the Federal Republic was willing and eager to accept these co-Germans into German society and political life, there of course had to be a certain set of criteria one had to fulfill in order to prove one's "Germanness." In his speech Kohl gives considerable attention to the suffering of the *Aussiedler* outside of German borders at the hands of the USSR:

Still today many Russian-Germans and their children suffer from the consequences of exile, forced labour, misery imposed by communist dictatorship ... Stalinist terror [in] 1941 had the Russian-Germans banished overnight to the Asian part of the former USSR. They were oppressed, kept in closed cities, not released--a hard fate, while they were Germans and wished to remain so. The Russian-Germans through no fault of their own *did penance for a war unleashed by a criminal regime in Germany.* (qtd. in Mandel 70)^{iv}

In the early years of *Aussiedler* immigration to Germany it was considered sufficient to claim "Germanness" on the "basis of one's Soviet defined 'ethnicity' (*natsionalnost*) stamped in an internal passport;" however, with former Soviet citizens flocking to Germany and claiming "Germanness" it became "increasingly the display of German cultural norms, proven in an 'ethnicity' test administered by consular officials in the emigration countries, that [came] to define who ha[d] the right to claim Germanness" (Mandel 212). This system of proving one's "Germanness" through knowledge of German culture, language and tradition also proved insufficient as many ethnic Germans had lost much, if not all, of their German cultural markers and language skills. Curiously, the lack of these cultural markers and language skills, which once were thought of as evidence of one's "Germanness," came to be elements that proved one's "Germanness." The loss of cultural markers and language skills on the part of the *Aussiedler* pointed to the "linguistic and cultural repression practiced by the Soviets upon the Germans"

^{iv} Mandel's translation of Kohl's speech with emphasis added. A transcript of the Kohl's original speech could not be located.

(214). In other words, “a German’s inability to speak German, as a sign of repression, is in itself a sign of ‘German’ identity” (Senders 133). According to Levy and Weiss, the “inability to preserve the German language and culture--was interpreted as discrimination and reason enough to grant them citizenship” (203).

Eventually ultimate proof of one’s “Germanness” came to be defined as suffering as a result of being “German.” During the interview process, “[h]aving suffered for one’s ethnicity, for one’s German identity, became an essential part of the staged performance at the interview but also of one’s identity.” Ultimately what made repatriation to Germany possible was the “experience of having suffered at the hands of the Soviets, of having proved one’s mettle, having been tested and passed the exam of Germanness, having tenaciously held onto Germanness and not denying or relinquishing it in times of adversity” (Mandel 212).

The *Aussiedler* “were seen as the representation of the nation, having suffered for its sins.” Through their suffering the *Aussiedler* paid the price and bore the burden of Germany’s history of National Socialism, and because they suffered for their “Germanness” the vast support and aid they received upon entry into Germany could be legitimized.

Another method of proving one’s “Germanness” when cultural markers and linguistic skills were lacking was supplying proof that one’s ancestors had been members of the Nazi Party. One notable case is that of a Romanian Jew who in 1991 claimed to be of German descent and thus should be entitled to naturalization and the status of *Aussiedler*. Although the person in this case demonstrated knowledge of the German language and culture, he was denied *Aussiedler* status on the basis that his father had been subjected to *Zwangsarbeit* or forced labor by the Nazis from 1941 to 1944. Because of this “he was deemed to be a member of the Jewish ethnic group and therefore could not be considered of German ethnicity” (Mandel 215). It is notable

how great a role ethnicity played in determining this case, considering that “the claimant could present his ancestors as Germans in practically all aspects, language, culture and education, but a Jew can never prove membership in the ss, the most common proof to be recognized as an *Aussiedler*” (Scheidges 3; qtd. in Mandel 215). If the claimant had based his claim on suffering, instead of basing it on his knowledge of the German language and culture, his claim still would have been dismissed because “he had suffered as a Jew, not as a German” (216).

According to Mandel this case demonstrates clearly the problematic basis on which German identity is defined.

German identity is not assigned on the basis of common language but rather on the problematic idea of descent. The ability to speak German alone is not sufficient to establish proof of German ancestry. The same criteria that prove effective in including the *Aussiedler* ultimately exclude those who are deemed non-ethnic Germans. In other words, one does not become German by speaking the language; rather one is *born* a German. (215)

The problematic idea of German identity through descent is an issue that migrants have struggled with since the days of the *Gastarbeiter* program. For those *Ausländer* whose physical appearance points to non-German ethnicity the reality of this notion of belonging through descent is especially painful. The label of *Ausländer* is nearly impossible for them to escape, even if they speak German as their first language or are part of the third-generation born in Germany. Their physical appearance separates them, in the minds of many Germans, from an authentic German identity. By no power of their own can non-ethnic Germans alter their appearance to appear more “German.” They are extremely aware of this insurmountable obstacle and often express frustration at the lack of acceptance their outward appearance often

causes. Many non-ethnic Germans are confronted with this reality in their everyday lives, not just in the minds of academics or other abstract ways.

Examples of their frustration at their inability to be viewed as “real” Germans are apparent in numerous comments posted on public websites such as *YouTube*. Viewers offered their experiences, including the frustration that non-ethnic Germans who look physically different from ethnic-Germans experience when constantly being asked about their ethnic origins. One viewer writes, “Ich find's genau so dämlich, dass viele Deutsche glauben, dass man nur, wenn man Schmidt oder Müller mit Nachnamen heißt, wirklich Deutscher ist. Dann gibt es immer so tiefend rassistische Dialoge wie: ‘Wo kommen sie denn her?’ – ‘Aus Dortmund.’ – ‘Nein, ich meine Ursprünglich.’ – ‘Aus Iserlohn.’ usw” (syriengirl9).

In a May 2009 article from *Der Spiegel* entitled “Für immer fremd” which deals with and tries to explain why the Turkish community in Germany has failed to integrate as well as other immigrant groups, a scene is described in which a teacher is asked to point to each student and give the country of origin of each of the students’ parents. As the teacher is rattling off a country for each of her students, the author of the article writes, “ihr Zeigefinger wandert von einem dunkelhaarigen Kopf zum nächsten, 30 Kinder lächeln in die Kamera, und als Schöder mit dem Durchzählen fertig ist, hat sie nicht ein einziges Mal Deutschland gesagt” (Elger, Kneip & Theile 2005). Although at first glance the passage seems innocent, upon closer inspection the mention of the students’ hair color can be seen as problematic. Does the color of the students’ hair heighten their level of “non-Germanness?” Other comments posted on *YouTube* also state that one’s physical appearance still today largely determines whether that person will be accepted as a German or not. One *YouTube* user writes, “die meisten deutsche würden ein schwarzkopf nie nie niemals als deutschen ansehen” (RahmanDO420).

Although it seems like a minor issue, by pointing out the color of the students' hair the authors are, probably and hopefully unintentionally, making the point that "real" Germans do not have dark colored hair. By describing the students' physical characteristics the authors are implying a comparison between physical ethnic and non-ethnic German markers. Another problematic element of this passage is that the teacher is giving the country of origin for each of the children's parents, the fact that most if not all of these children were born within German borders receives no attention. However subtle, comments and statements like the one above not only reinforce the notion that physical appearance plays a role in how an individual will be categorized, but also gives a glimpse of how ethnicity still plays a significant role to many Germans in defining "Germanness."

How the Case of the *Aussiedler* Affected and Still Affects the Turkish Community

To Turkish-Germans the stance the German government has taken, beginning with Chancellor Kohl, concerning the *Aussiedler* has been received as both an insult and proof of Germany's commitment to an ethnicity-based form of citizenship and national identity. The *Aussiedler* received radically different treatment by the federal government than the Turkish community had, although one must also mention that the circumstances under which each group entered Germany were radically different. The *Aussiedler* were seen from the beginning of their migration into Germany as permanent settlers in contrast to the Turkish *Gastarbeiter*, who were seen as a temporary workforce. While the Federal Republic encouraged repatriation for the *Gastarbeiter* and the second generation, the *Aussiedler* were welcomed into Germany with open arms and with access to an array of governmental aid. This support included "the right of two years full state support ... [h]ousing, monthly stipends, language classes, free health care,

[and] employment assistance” all provided for by the state (Mandel 212). Perhaps the most important advantage the *Aussiedler* received upon proving their “Germanness” was the access to immediate naturalization which put them on equal legal standing with other Germans and provided them with a rock-solid legal status in Germany with no danger of deportation. Unlike the Turkish *Gastarbeiter* and their children, for the *Aussiedler* there was no threat that they would one day need to leave Germany and repatriate, and hence there was no need for them to cling to former cultural and linguistic elements for fear of forced repatriation, which enabled them to commit fully to the integration process.

When one compares how citizenship was bestowed upon or denied to each group of people, the emphasis placed on ethnicity is strikingly obvious. The *Aussiedler* “were naturalized de facto and on oath by simple proof of their affiliation and their belonging to the German ‘people,’ whereas other foreign people, who had been settled in Germany for more than 30 years and socialized within its social and national institutions, still remain[ed] excluded from the political community for reasons of ancestry” (Gülalp 19). This adherence to an ethnicity-based approach to citizenship by the German government can be attributed, according to Koopmans et al., to “the special conditions of post-World War II territory losses, actual persecution and expulsion of ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe until deep into the 1950s, as well as the division of the country into two competing states, which all stood in the way of a civic-territorial conception of the nation” (37).

Although the *Aussiedler* were ethnically German, they had been separated, both geographically and in terms of time, from the rest of Germany. The separation the *Aussiedler* experienced had a significant impact on their linguistic skills and German cultural knowledge; in fact, most had not been able to retain their linguistic ability and cultural markers. The loss of

these characteristics meant that the *Aussiedler* were expected, as was the Turkish minority, to go through a process of integration in order to become functioning full members of German society. However, the integration process for the *Aussiedler* took a drastically different form than the situation the Turkish minority faced.

The first difference in integration processes is the fact that for the *Aussiedler* naturalization was the starting point of their integration. This put them on equal footing with all other Germans and enabled them to fully commit to the integration process, for them there was no fear of having to someday repatriate. Along with citizenship came the opportunity to engage in the political process and to play a role in determining their fate through suffrage. On the other hand, naturalization was the end point for the Turkish process of integration, it was the goal at the end of the tunnel, and could only be reached by fulfilling a difficult set of criteria, including uninterrupted residence in Germany for up to ten years, no criminal record and formal renouncement of former citizenship. Only after contributing to the German economy for up to a decade could a Turkish immigrant begin to foster thoughts of citizenship.

It was not until the year 2000, under the ruling SPD/Green Party political coalition, that Germany made a significant change to its naturalization policy. Under this legislation, “children born with at least one parent living in Germany for a minimum of four years and with a permanent residence permit automatically receive German citizenship” (Stritzky). Although Germany has added *jus soli* elements to its naturalization policy, it also maintains *jus sanguinis* elements. For example, the children included in this scenario also receive the citizenship of their parents, resulting in the simultaneous application of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*, and must choose between the ages of 18 and 23 which nation’s citizenship to maintain, forcing them to make a choice between Germany and the country of their parents’ citizenship.

The debate in Germany concerning dual citizenship is one that often evokes strong feelings and opinions from both sides involved. Those for dual citizenship often claim that having to choose between Germany and the country of their parents is often a painful choice that “feels like having to give up part of their identity and cut ties with their ancestry” (Knight). Kenen Kolat, chairman of the Turkish society in Germany (*Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland*) also weighed in on the issue of dual citizenship, saying, “[w]enn es ein Recht auf doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft für die Türken in der zweiten Generation gäbe, würde das die Integration in jedem Fall fördern. So wären sie nicht gezwungen, eine Entscheidung für oder gegen Deutschland zu treffen” (Elger, Kneip & Theile 2005).

The supporters of dual citizenship also cite practical reasons for the need for dual citizenship, including Turkish laws regarding land ownership and inheritance. An example of one such law is the law that dictates that “[t]he total area of all lands a foreign national (real person) can own in Turkey cannot exceed 2.5 hectares (25,000 m²)” (“Buying Property in Turkey”). This would mean that Turkish citizens residing in Germany, but having property in Turkey, would lose the right to own their land in Turkey, if it exceeded 2.5 hectares, if they were to acquire German citizenship. Because of the restrictive nature of Turkish laws governing land ownership and inheritance many Turkish people living in Germany are not willing to sacrifice the property they own in Turkey or exclude themselves from inheritance in order to become naturalized German citizens.

Those opposed to dual citizenship, mainly members of the CDU and CSU, often contend that dual citizenship is “a threat to both the loyalty of immigrants to the German state and to the identity and integrity of German nationhood” (Kitschelt & Streeck 231). They contend that if Turkish Germans were permitted to have dual citizenship then it would not be clear where their

loyalties really lie. It is interesting that the question of loyalty was not considered relevant to the *Aussiedler*, “who do not have to give up their previous citizenship” when they become naturalized German citizens (Castles & Davidson 88). The *Aussiedlers*’ loyalty to Germany is something that is hardly ever regarded with suspicion. It is never questioned if the *Aussiedlers*’ loyalties lie with Germany or with the country they were emigrating from. Perhaps because of their status as ethnic Germans they are considered by the German government and people to be above the level of suspicion and are seen as naturally loyal to Germany due to their ethnic connection. The Turks, on the other hand, must make the choice between Germany or Turkey and pledge their allegiance formally by making the decision to terminate their Turkish citizenship in order to become naturalized Germans or to retain their Turkish citizenship, thereby foregoing the possibility of German citizenship.

According to an article published in 1997 in *The Economist*, entitled “Who is a German?,” the CSU offered another reason for opposing dual citizenship. Although the article deems the reason given as disingenuous, a member of the CSU claimed that “the ‘compulsory Germanising’ of foreigners born in Germany is authoritarian.”

Perhaps the best expression of how the preferential treatment the *Aussiedler* received in Germany affected the mentality of the Turkish community concerning integration can be found in Şenocak’s 2000 work entitled *Atlas of a Tropical Germany: Essays on Politics and Culture*:

[W]e see no serious desire for integrations as long as the de-bureaucratization and the liberalization of the German naturalization law in its implementation are excluded from discussion. The offer entailed in the statement ‘the foreigners could become citizens if they really wanted to’ remains a mockery in the face of many aspects of German citizenship that derive from genealogical criteria. According to these principles, someone

of German descent from an Eastern European country whose ancestors might have lived for as many as five hundred years outside German territory and who speaks only broken German or no German at all, is considered a German. But not a Turk of the second or third generation who speaks far better German than Turkish: he is and remains a foreigner. The fact that racialized thought (*Rassegedanke*) can continue to play such a central role in a country where such thinking led to unimaginable crimes is, to put it mildly, alienating. (7-8)

The argument that foreigners in Germany could easily be integrated if “they just wanted to” has been repeated by politicians, including Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), who stated, “[i]ntegration also requires people to take a decision. They have to want to integrate themselves. Turks born in Germany could become German if they so desire” (Elger, Kneip & Theile 2009). While the argument that immigrants must have the desire to integrate in order to do so successfully is a valid one, Schäuble’s argument ignores the discrepancy between the restrictive nature of German citizenship laws for Turkish citizens and the very liberal nature of the same law for the *Aussiedler*. These citizenship laws have resulted in hindered Turkish integration because of legal obstacles to naturalization and by sending a strong message to the Turkish community that German identity and citizenship is first and foremost based on ethnicity, something that lies outside the realm of possibility for non-ethnic Germans.

In the previously discussed 2005 article from *Der Spiegel* entitled “Für immer Fremd” a study released by the *Berlin Institut* measured the level of integration in German society of different immigrants groups and compared each group with the other immigrant groups and then ranked from the “most integrated” to the “least integrated.” The group which ranked as the “most integrated” were citizens of other European Union countries while the group considered to

be the “least integrated” were the Turks. The *Aussiedler* come in as the second “most integrated” in the study. The immigrants were assessed using a variety of categories, including being a German citizen, marriage with a German spouse, employment, the number of women who are housewives, education and the lack of dependence on social services.

The article then goes on to examine why and how Turks, despite being in Germany the longest, come in at the bottom of the integration scale. The article cites some reasons for the lack of Turkish integration including, “[s]ie [the Turks] richteten sich ein in Ghettos, sie knüpften keine Kontakte zu Deutschen, und all das erschwerte auch ihren Kindern den Weg in die neue Gesellschaft.” The article also mentions the question: “Was haben die Deutschen versäumt bei der Integration der Türken?” Although the question is raised, it is answered only vaguely. The authors of the article pose this question to Reiner Klingholz, the head of the *Berlin Institut*, who responds by acknowledging that Germany’s policy regarding the *Gastarbeiter* was problematic by saying: “Wir haben Gastarbeiter geholt und dachten, die sind bald wieder weg,” but concludes that education is the main reason why the Turks are so badly integrated in comparison with other immigrant groups (Elger, Kneip & Theile 2005).

The tendency in Germany is to conclude that the Turkish community is not integrated because they “vor Jahrzehnten nach Deutschland kamen, wollten gar nicht Teil werden” and instead “wollten hier [in Deutschland] Geld verdienen und dann, nach ein paar Jahren, zurück in die Heimat” (Elger, Kneip & Theile 2005). This argument is problematic because it ignores the political stance the Federal Republic had taken during and after the *Gastarbeiter* era. Although it is absolutely indisputable that the Turkish *Gastarbeiter* came to Germany for economic reasons, and gave the impression that they were uninterested in becoming a part of Germany through their reluctance to integrate, the German governments attitude concerning the *Gastarbeiter* and its

effects on their integration should not be ignored when considering the state of Turkish integration today. The German government received the false impression that their reluctance to integrate was based on a desire for repatriation, when in reality the *Gastarbeiter* were reluctant to integrate not because they did not want to stay in Germany, but because of their precarious legal status and the many difficult, seemingly impossible, conditions under which one could obtain German citizenship. In addition to the precarious legal status of the *Gastarbeiter* the Federal Republic was actively supporting the maintenance of the Turkish language and culture through separate Turkish schools and a policy of *Integration auf Zeit* while actively encouraging repatriation.

The article “Für immer fremd” also elicited an array of responses from other newspapers in Germany from both sides of the political spectrum. The article entitled “Turks Should Be Evaluated ‘the Same Way as other Immigrants’” briefly summarizes what major newspapers in Germany were printing about the study done by the *Berlin Institut*, which scored the Turkish community at the very bottom of the integration scale behind all other immigrant groups including *Aussiedler*, who were ranked second best behind the category of “citizens of other European Union countries.”

According to this article, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (center-left) is of the opinion that the study and its “reproaching view of Turkish immigrants suffers from forgetfulness. All the way into the 1970s, the so-called guest workers were intentionally brought to Germany to be a new underclass that performed the jobs that Germans found too dangerous or dirty Can people seriously expect that the children of these individuals will now populate German universities?” (Ward). The center-right *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* points out the progress the German government has made in terms of immigrant issues and highlights the lack of integration by the

Turks by comparing them with other immigrant groups when it writes, “A lot is being done in terms of integration policies, especially when it comes to increased support for language training. But while other groups of immigrants have been able to eke out a place for themselves in society despite adverse circumstances, the especially large Turkish population is conspicuous for its lack of integration” (Ward). A response by another German newspaper, *Die Tageszeitung*, blames German society and a lack of funding for the less than desirable level of Turkish integration by writing:

Integration has two sides. The behavior of the societal majority must also be examined. Just attributing all the failings to immigrants is not enough. That is what the Wolfgang Schäubles and the Maria Böhmers (Germany’s interior minister and commissioner for integration, respectively) do when they continue to demand that Turkish-Germans learn German, do more to help educate their children and not allow forced marriages. However correct these appeals might be, the state also needs to do something—and provide the necessary funding as well. (Ward)

As the different responses to the *Berlin Institut* and the *Spiegel* article show, the opinions on the issue of Turkish integration are varied, as are the opinions of what should be done to handle the problem. Although each immigrant group has a certain responsibility to integrate into the society they are entering into, it is important to keep in mind that federal policy and citizenship laws play a huge role in determining which groups of immigrants will be successful at integration and which groups will struggle. According to the theories of the German *Leitkultur* and the theory of the *Kulturkreis*, both of which will be examined in chapter 3, the further removed from Germany’s culture an immigrant group is, the more difficulties the group will have in integrating. According to these theories the *Aussiedler* were expected, due to their

German ethnicity and culture, to be easily capable of integrating themselves into German society, while the Turks, due to their non-German ethnicity and culture, were expected to struggle to integrate or not be able to integrate at all. The fact that the Turks in Germany are at the bottom of the integration scale, while the *Aussiedler* are towards the top, seems to support this theory, but one cannot forget that the policies concerning each group were drastically different. In a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy the *Aussiedler* were expected to integrate well into German society and due to generous government benefits, language classes and immediate access to German citizenship and dual citizenship they find themselves at the top of the integration scale. The Turks, on the other hand, predicted to have difficulties in integrating due to their culture being far outside of the German *Kulturkreis*, had little access to government benefits, extremely limited access to German citizenship and no access to dual citizenship; therefore, they have come in at the bottom of the integration scale. Add to this the message the German government was sending to the Turkish community with the immediate naturalization of the *Aussiedler*, that German identity is based on ethnicity, and it ceases to be surprising that the immigrant group who has been in Germany the longest, the Turks, could be the least well integrated.

When regarding the situation of the Turkish community in Germany today, it is important to keep in mind the policies that have led up to the current lack of integration on the part of the Turks, and to analyze arguments that explain the current situation by claiming that Turkish culture is too different from German culture to successfully integrate with a critical eye.

CHAPTER III. *LEITKULTUR* AND THE THEORY OF THE *KULTURKEIS*

The Heidelberg Manifesto

Resistance to pressure to reconsider the definition of German identity or modify German culture to accommodate and facilitate the integration of a non-German minority is not a recent phenomenon in Germany. One of the earliest and clearest forms of this resistance due to Turkish presence in Germany is the Heidelberg Manifesto (*Heidelberger Manifest*).

The Heidelberg Manifesto, written during the time of German division in 1982, was written by a group of professors and originally published in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. The paper they published advocates for the repatriation of the Turkish minority in Germany on the basis of the preservation of the German *Volk* and to spare the Turkish minority from the threat of “*Germanisierung*”: “The professors make sure to point out that they oppose any sort of ideological nationalism or racism, and that they condemn any form of right- or left-extremism: “Auf dem Boden des Grundgesetzes stehend wenden wir uns gegen ideologischen Nationalismus, gegen Rassismus und gegen jeden Rechts- und Linksextremismus.”

The writers of the Heidelberg Manifesto claim their reason for writing this paper is the fact that many Germans have felt the presence of the Turkish community and now feel as if they are “foreigners in their own country:” “jetzt sind viele Deutsche in ihren Wohnbezirken und an ihren Arbeitsstätten Fremdlinge in der eigenen Heimat.” Basing their claims on the *Grundgesetz*, the professors claim that the concept of the nation is based on the idea of a German *Volk*, and not on basis of people residing within a common border. According to this definition of “nation” based on the German *Volk*, ethnicity, any inclusion of citizens of non-German ethnicity would not only undermine the definition of “nation” laid out in the *Grundgesetz*, but

also the idea that East and West Germany are destined for reunification based on their common belongingness to the German *Volk*.

Das Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland geht nicht aus vom Begriff 'Nation' als der Summe aller Völker innerhalb eines Staates. Es geht vielmehr aus vom Begriff 'Volk' und zwar vom deutschen Volk. Der Bundespräsident und die Mitglieder der Bundesregierung leisten den Amtseid: 'Ich schwöre, daß ich meine Kraft dem Wohle des deutschen Volkes widmen, seinen Nutzen mehren, Schaden von ihm wenden werde'.

Somit verpflichtet das Grundgesetz zur Erhaltung des deutschen Volkes.

Die Präambel des Grundgesetzes verpflichtet auf das Ziel der Wiedervereinigung. Wie soll diese möglich bleiben, wenn sich die Teilgebiete ethnisch fremd werden? Die jetzt praktizierte Ausländerpolitik, welche die Entwicklung zu einer multirassischen Gesellschaft fördert, widerspricht dem Grundgesetz, das alle Deutschen der Bundesrepublik zur Bewahrung und Verteidigung der Lebensrechte unseres Volkes verpflichtet.

The article goes on to argue that every nation and culture has the right to protect its identity and unique culture from foreign influence. According to the professors, the German culture is based on an on occidental Christian tradition and should be protected by the creation of coalition, whose task it would be to protect the German *Volk* and its spiritual identity from outside influence: "Deshalb rufen wir zur Gründung eines parteipolitisch und ideologisch unabhängigen Bundes auf, dessen Aufgabe die Erhaltung des deutschen Volkes und seiner geistigen Identität auf der Grundlage unseres christlich-abendländischen Erbes ist." In addition to preserving the German culture and ethnic homogeneity of the German *Volk*, the paper argues that the Turks also have the right to maintain their cultural identity and purity, in Turkey, and be

spared from assimilation: “Jedes Volk, auch das deutsche Volk, hat ein Naturrecht auf Erhaltung seiner Identität und Eigenart in seinem Wohngebiet. Die Achtung vor anderen Völkern gebietet ihre Erhaltung, nicht aber ihre Verschmelzung ('Germanisierung').”

It is important to point out that although the professors claim that every cultural group has the right to preserve their culture and identity, the right to this preservation depends on the location of the cultural group, if they are in their own nation or not. Therefore, Turks only have the right to maintain their cultural identity in Turkey, and not in Germany, where the Germans are “naturally at home.”

Lastly, the Heidelberg Manifesto calls for the permanent repatriation of non-ethnic Germans by “attacking the problem at the root” and improving conditions in the immigrants’ home countries, not in Germany: “Das Übel an der Wurzel zu packen heißt, durch gezielte Entwicklungshilfe die Lebensbedingungen der Gastarbeiter in ihren Heimatländern zu verbessern - und nicht hier bei uns.” Instead of bringing people to Germany to work, Germany should seek to bring the work to the people, “nicht die Menschen zu den Maschinen zu bringen, sondern die Maschinen zu den Menschen.”

The Heidelberg Manifesto works to show the nature of German identity, an identity based on the idea of nation defined by its people, its *Volk*. With such a long history of defining German identity in this way, it is a logical outcome that the inclusion of a large minority population that is not ethnically German into German citizenry would be met with resistance. However, in a modern globalized world, a nation with a sizeable minority cannot exclude a large segment of its population based on ethnicity. The concept of German identity, from one based on ethnicity to one based on residence within German borders, is slowly progressing, but both Germans and Turks need to make concessions in order to facilitate more successful integration.

In Search of the German *Leitkultur*

In October of 2010 the debate concerning the controversial issue of integration was made even more heated by Angela Merkel, who remarked (as noted earlier) that “Multikulti ist absolute gescheitert,” and by Horst Seehofer, since 2008 head of the CSU party and Minister-President of Bavaria, who added fuel to the already hot integration debate by stating that integration does not just mean “nebeneinander, sondern miteinander leben auf dem gemeinsamen Fundament der Werteordnung unseres Grundgesetzes und unserer deutschen Leitkultur, die von den christlich-jüdischen Wurzeln und von Christentum, Humanismus und Aufklärung geprägt ist” (“Horst Seehofers 7-Punkte-Plan zur Integration”).

Seehofer’s demand that immigrants must conform their behavior and values to fit his definition of the German *Leitkultur* has been a source of contention and controversy in the recent integration debate. Although Seehofer makes it clear that he defines German *Leitkultur* as having Christian-Jewish roots and being marked by Christianity, humanism and Enlightenment, one must examine the history and meaning of the term to fully understand what it means for the current debate on integration.

Like many words in the German language, the term *Leitkultur* can be interpreted in many different ways. In 2004 Nicolas Kumanoff, a journalist for *Deutsche Welle*, wrote an article for the newspaper *The Atlantic Times* in which he attempted to define the word “*Leitkultur*.” He writes:

Leitkultur is a compound noun, of the kind that like *Weltanschauung* or *Zeitgeist*, helps the give German language its mystique--or its murkiness: vaguely philosophical, pregnant with meaning and requiring a whole sentence to properly translate. My attempt: “The leading or defining culture in any given society, but especially Germany’s.”

The term “*Leitkultur*” was first coined by Bassam Tibi, a German citizen of Syrian descent, in his 1998 book entitled *Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft*, in which he advocated for a European *Leitkultur* based on “the ideals of the European Enlightenment--of the precedence of reason over religious revelation and dogma, and on human rights including freedom of religion, resulting in pluralism and reciprocal tolerance” (qtd. in Kumanoff). For Tibi the purpose of defining the European *Leitkultur* was to make it possible “for Germans and immigrants to coexist.” He also argued that “[w]ithout this kind of social adhesive, increasing migration could result in ‘parallel societies’ within a country, even ‘Balkanization’” (qtd. in Kumanoff). For Tibi the term “*Leitkultur*” meant the separation of religion from politics into two separate spheres, private and public, but also the freedom for members of a society to practice whatever religion they wished and not have their belongingness to the society questioned. Members of the society could be from radically different religious backgrounds, but could still create a cohesive society through their common commitment to European Enlightenment ideals. Seehofer’s inclusion of Christian-Judeo roots in his definition of German *Leitkultur* stands in direct opposition to Tibi’s original meaning of the term, which emphasized a lack of emphasis on a specific religion.

According to Kumanoff, the term “*Leitkultur*” “entered the popular vocabulary in the fall of 2000, when a then-leading parliamentarian in the conservative CDU party, Friedrich Merz, called on non-Germans living in Germany to fully adopt the country’s ‘mature, liberal *Leitkultur*.’” Not only did Merz’s use of the term elicited criticism from his own party, but many outside of his party claimed that his use of the term was not to “integrate non-Germans, but to purposely alienate them while mobilizing conservative votes for the upcoming federal elections.” Whatever the motives were for Merz to use the term, it did focus the term specifically on

Germany and changed it from a term that was meant to describe European values and culture as a whole, and appropriated it specifically to Germany.

The use of the term “*Leitkultur*” reemerged four years later, called into the political ring again by the murder of Theo von Gogh. The Dutch filmmaker’s film *Submission* detailed, with the help of Somali-born writer Ayaan Hirsi Alithe, the life and treatment of women in Islam, and at the same time provoked outrage in the conservative Muslim community. On November 2, 2004, Theo von Gogh was assassinated by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim, stirring up fears and concerns about the Muslim population in Europe. The assassination of the Dutch filmmaker was seen by those on the right of the political spectrum as a reason and justification for establishing a German *Leitkultur*. In an article appearing in *Deutsche Welle* on November 16, 2004, shortly after the assassination of von Gogh, entitled “Holland Promotes Soul-Searching in Germany,” Markus Soeder, then head of the CSU, “said the events in the Netherlands showed the need for a *leitkultur* in Germany.” He is further quoted in the article as saying: “When we look at the recent events in the Netherlands, we see a clash of civilizations in full, and we must prevent anything similar from evolving here. We need a change in our integration policy which ought to be based strictly on the values and notion of a modern Christian Society” (“Holland Promotes Soul-Searching in Germany”).

The rhetoric Soeder uses when describing the events happening in Europe is especially problematic. Phrases such as “clash of civilizations” evoke the image of two cultures or societies that are in direct ideological opposition to each other, warring over Europe as if it were a modern day crusade. The phrase “clash of civilizations” also sets up a very clear “us-versus-them” mentality, with modern Europe trying to prevail over a Muslim enemy with a backward and ruled by irrational religious dogma. The problem with this kind of rhetoric is that it is highly

counterproductive to the ultimate goal of integration and the peaceful coexistence of people from different religious and cultural backgrounds, and it also ignores many Muslims living in Europe who do accept and believe in democratic values and ideals who would get lumped together with extremists solely on the basis of their common religious tradition.

Another important aspect of the term “*Leitkultur*” is that Tibi never intended for the term to be specifically based on one country’s culture and in fact warned of the dangers of such use of the term in a 2004 article from *Spiegel Online* entitled “Why Europe Needs a ‘Leading Culture.’” In the article Tibi was asked the question: “You spoke of a European *Leitkultur*. The (Conservative German opposition party) Christian Social Union is insisting on a German version. Is the difference meaningful?” to which Tibi replies:

There is a huge difference. I have always emphasized how dangerous it is to talk about a specifically German *Leitkultur*. There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, the problem we are talking about here is a European problem Thus, we also need a European value structure. Plus, any other approach would lead to a German “special path” and that is completely inadvisable. (Musharbash)

Although Tibi made it clear that the term “*Leitkultur*” should under no circumstances be tied to a specific nation or culture, that did not stop the conservative political parties in Germany, the CDU and the CSU, from adopting the term and making it their own. In the same year Tibi gave the interview for *Spiegel Online* concerning *Leitkultur*, Jörg Schönbohm (CDU), then state interior minister of Brandenburg, also gave an interview for *Der Spiegel* in which he insisted that “resident non-Germans accept Germany’s *Leitkultur*.” He went on to compare the non-Germans of the present with the Jews of the Middle Ages by saying:

In the Middle Ages, ghettos were founded to marginalize the Jews. Today, some of the foreigners who live with us here in Germany have founded their own ghettos because they scorn us Germans. Those who come here have to adopt the German *Leitkultur*. Our history has developed over a thousand years We can't allow that this basis of our commonality be destroyed by foreigners. (qtd. in Kumanoff)

Schönbohm's comparison between Jews of the Middle Ages and the non-German residents of Germany and the emphasis on the thousand years it took for the German *Leitkultur* to develop are both highly problematic. Schönbohm points out in his statement that although both Jews in the Middle Ages and foreigners today resided and reside in ghettos, the circumstances under which these groups of people find themselves in ghettos is the point of difference. While the Jews were forced into ghettos by the Germans in order to be marginalized, the foreigners of today chose to marginalize themselves out of their "scorn" for the Germans. Through this logic Schönbohm is justifying any marginalization of the foreigners because they have freely chosen the path into ghettos and have refused to accept the German *Leitkultur*, essentially pushing all of the responsibility for the marginalization of foreigners onto the foreigners themselves.

The fact that Schönbohm chooses only to mention the "Jews of the Middle Ages" is also an interesting aspect of his argument. By choosing a group of people so far removed by time to the present day he is attempting to draw attention away from the atrocities of the 1930s and 1940s in which Jews in Germany were also forced into ghettos. By specifically referring to "Jews in the Middle Ages" instead of Jews in general, Schönbohm is also trying to create ideological distance between the Germans of the Middle Ages, highly intolerant of religious and ethnic difference, and the Germans of the present day, ready to accept foreigners into society if

only the foreigners were ready to accept them. Although Germans have evolved dramatically since the Middle Ages, it is irresponsible to ignore Germany's long history of anti-Semitism over the very same thousand years in which the German *Leitkultur* that Schönbohm refers to has developed. According to Schönbohm's logic, foreigners in Germany deserve to be marginalized, due to their "scorn" for Germans and refusal to accept the German *Leitkultur*, which have led to their self-ghettoization.

Schönbohm also points out that "our [German] history has developed over a thousand years ...," justifying why foreigners in Germany should accept German *Leitkultur* and asserting that the German *Leitkultur*, through its long developmental history, is superior to the culture of the foreigners. What is problematic with this argument is that it ignores the fact that the foreigners' culture also has a thousand year history, or more, of development. A long historical development is something that is not unique to the German *Leitkultur* and the fact that Schönbohm points out that Germany's long history of cultural development is the reason why the German *Leitkultur* should be valued and protected only serves to support the argument that the foreigner culture, which also has a history of centuries of development, is something that should also be valued and protected and not simply discarded in order to conform completely to the German *Leitkultur*.

The inclusion of religion (Judeo-Christian roots) by Seehofer and Soeder in the definition of what makes up the German *Leitkultur* has been the subject of controversy, not only among non-Christian or non-Jewish immigrants, but also among Germans who find that identifying a specific religion with German culture only serves to alienate immigrant groups of other religions, mainly Islam, in order to gain popular support for political reasons. The act of tying a specific religion to a country's *Leitkultur* also stands in direct opposition to Tibi's original meaning of the

term he created, which called for the separation of central democratic values from the private sphere of religion.

Jürgen Habermas, professor emeritus of philosophy at Goethe University in Frankfurt, pinpoints exactly what he finds problematic about a definition of German *Leitkultur* that at least partially bases, its definition on a specific religion or religious tradition. He contends that by placing an emphasis on religion the political right is creating an “us-versus-them” mentality that only serves to alienate the immigrant population and highlight the differences between Germans and immigrants. He argues that “today leitkultur is defined not by ‘German culture’ but by religion. With an arrogant appropriation of Judaism--and an incredible disregard for the fate of Jews suffered in Germany--the apologists of the leitkultur now appeal to the ‘Judeo-Christian tradition,’ which distinguishes ‘us’ from the foreigners” (Habermas).

Although it cannot be denied that Germany has been traditionally a Christian nation, it was after all the birthplace of Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation and had before Luther a Catholic tradition stretching back several centuries, the inclusion of religion in the definition of the German *Leitkultur* as a standard that immigrants are supposed to conform to and the basis for German identity cannot be deemed reasonable in a democratic, secularized modern society. According to Habermas the political right in Germany suffers from the misconception that “the liberal state should demand more of its immigrants than learning the language of the country and accepting the principles of the Constitution. We [Germans] had, and apparently still have, to overcome the view that immigrants are supposed to assimilate the ‘values’ of the majority culture and to adopt its ‘customs.’”

Being told to accept German *Leitkultur* “seems like a reasonable request, but to many immigrants it smacks of arrogance” and leaves them little choice but “to choose between

practising their religion and adopting a German identity” (“The integration debate in Germany: Is multi-kulti dead?”). Emphasizing religion in the definition of German *Leitkultur* makes it extremely difficult for people of other religious backgrounds to integrate to the degree that those on the political right demand, and be accepted by German society as a whole, as having a German identity. Asking for a commitment to democratic values and ideals from immigrant communities in order to create a common cultural basis is reasonable and necessary for a cohesive society, but asking for a commitment to a culture based on Christian belief and values only serves to alienate the immigrant community and sets standards that would be impossible for them to achieve. The placement itself of religion into what defines German *Leitkultur* stands in opposition to the democratic value of freedom of religion, as does basing belonging to a society on membership in a specific religion instead of on a commitment to democratic values and ideals.

Although Germany is moving from an identity based on ethnicity and the principles of *jus sanguinis*, it is, perhaps unintentionally, excluding through the new definition of German *Leitkultur*, the mostly Muslim immigrant community. The basing of German identity on ethnicity and the attaching of Christianity to the definition of German *Leitkultur* ultimately have the same outcome, an exclusion of the immigrant community from German identity. German identity based on ethnicity was an obstacle to German identity that was impossible for immigrants who were not ethnically German to overcome; after all one cannot, no matter how hard one tries, will himself to become an ethnic German. Moving the definition of “Germanness” from an ethnic one to one based on culture is certainly a step towards greater inclusion, but the addition of Christian values to the definition of German *Leitkultur*, which is proclaimed by the political right as the basis for German identity and which immigrants are now

being pressured to adopt as their own, can be an obstacle to inclusion that is unacceptable to immigrants.

Another problematic aspect of the inclusion of Christian values in the definition of German *Leitkultur* is that it sets the stage for a ranking system of immigrants from those who could most easily identify with and accept the German *Leitkultur* and are therefore easier to integrate into German society, to those groups of immigrant who, based on the degree of difference between their culture and German *Leitkultur*, would have much more difficulties in integration or may not be capable of integration at all.

The Theory of the *Kulturkreis*

The concept of the German *Leitkultur*, which is based not only on Enlightenment values, but also on Christian tradition, as being the leading or defining culture of Germany is also the basis of another concept known as the *Kulturkreis*. The concept of the *Kulturkreis* is based on the idea that the German *Leitkultur* makes up the center of a series of concentric circles, with each circle encompassing the circles before it, and as one moves from the center, the rings get bigger and bigger. Immigrant cultures are placed in one of the circles, depending on how similar or different it is from the center ring, where the German *Leitkultur* resides. “The more distant and different from German society--in terms of social, cultural, and physical proxemics, and also in terms of cultural, economic, and symbolic capital”--an immigrant group finds itself, the further away they are placed from the center ring, the German *Leitkultur* (Mandel 91). Cultures that find themselves close to the center ring are seen as especially capable of integration, while those cultures that find themselves in the outermost rings are predicted to have difficulties integrating into German society. Instead of ranking foreigners based on factors such as race or

ethnicity, the theory of the *Kulturkreis* ranks foreigners on the basis of culture, a less taboo set of criteria than race or ethnicity.

This ranking system of cultures leads to a sort of hierarchy of immigrants based on their cultural similarity to German culture. According to the theory of the *Kulturkreis*, European immigrants “are seen as more integratable within German society, thought to share basic Christian heritage and values” (Mandel 91). According to Hammar, the idea that European immigrants are more capable of integration into German society can trace its roots back to the year 1965, when a decision was made by the standing conference of the *Länder* Ministers of the Interior “that prohibit[ed] (with certain exceptions) citizens of non-European and Eastern bloc countries from staying in the FRG. The justification for this so-called ‘European Principle’ was that non-Europeans would have difficulties adapting to German conditions” (181). Although justification for the exclusion of non-European immigrants was reported to be culturally motivated, “the exclusion of the Eastern bloc countries” and the “inclusion of Turkey among the recruitment countries” highlight the political motivation for this decision” (181). In the case of Turkey, countries belonging to NATO, Germany included, were trying to deter Turkey from joining the Warsaw Pact.

Despite the “European Principle” that claims that European immigrants are more capable of integration into German society than immigrants from non-European countries, there are perceived differences in the degree of the ability to integrate even among Europeans. According to Mandel, European immigrants are broken down into a hierarchy in which “Italians, then Greeks and Christian (former) Yugoslavs are ranked according to a more complex system of differentiation deriving from class, history, and religious affiliation” (91).

In this European hierarchy, Italians “dominate the top of the pecking order, sharing as they do Catholicism ... and a solidly European heritage, which includes opera, the Renaissance, the Pope, Vivaldi, Armani, classical antiquity, pizza and gelato, and other symbols with which Germans might express affinity” (Mandel 91). Italians are considered to be so close to the center of the *Kulturkreis* that, to many Germans, they have lost their foreignness altogether. An example of this phenomenon is recounted in an anecdote by Joyce Mushaben, who while attempting to compile a list of Italian organizations in Berlin in 2002, contacted Berlin Commissioner Barbara John’s office and was told by her secretary: “Ach, the Italians? They’re not foreigners! We hardly notice them!” (Mushaben 38). Another example for the way in which Italians are generally viewed in Germany can be found in an article published in *Die Zeit*. The article, which examines the history of Italians in Germany from the days of the *Gastarbeiter* to the year the article was written, 1995, describes Germans’ general opinion of Italians in Germany this way: “Die Italiener gelten in Deutschland als unproblematisch. Sie sind EU-Bürger, Christen - welche Schwierigkeiten sollte es geben? Viele Deutsche denken an den Wirt des Ristorante, bei dem sie gerne essen, der so gut Deutsch spricht und mit dem Lande vertraut ist” (Romeo).

This view of Italians in Germany is especially interesting because it highlights why, according to many Germans, Italians are considered to be “*unproblematisch*.” According to the article, reasons for the “unproblematical” status Italians enjoy include their religious affiliation, Christianity, specifically Catholicism (Catholic Germans make up a large segment of the German population), and their membership in the European Union. Both of these aspects are characteristics that Germans and Italians have in common, therefore affording Italian culture a place in the *Kulturkreis* that is very close to the German *Leitkultur*.

In the hierarchy of European immigrant communities in Germany with connections to the *Gastarbeiter* program, Greeks occupy the next rung on the *Kulturkreis* ladder after Italians. Although they come from a Christian tradition, they “are of the exotically inflected Eastern Orthodox persuasion and of a culture far less accessible to Germans” (Mandel 91). However, “Greeks stand in a superior position to Turks, in part due to Germans tracing their intellectual heritage to ancient Greece” (93). In addition to this, Greek culture and history were highly regarded and idealized in the German Romantic literary period, especially by Goethe, who, “much enamored with Greece, idealized it and [even] translated and promoted modern (nineteenth-century) Greek folk songs” (93). Because of Greece’s religious affiliation and history, Greek culture is ranked relatively close to the German *Leitkultur*, and therefore Greek immigrants are foreseen to have few difficulties integrating into German society.

Another important aspect regarding Italian and Greek immigrants in Germany is that both groups held membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) during and, in the case of Greece, shortly after the *Gastarbeiter* period (1981). According to Hammar, membership in the EEC “guarantee[d] citizens of EEC member status a relatively free choice of employment within the Community” (181). Citizens of EEC countries were permitted to reside in any other EEC country without a residence permit, as long as they could find employment. Thus, the FRG had little control over immigration from Italy and Greece; therefore, Italian and Greek citizens could work in Germany, retain their former citizenship and stay in Germany as long as they could maintain employment. The relatively open laws concerning EEC citizens and the lack of the threat of repatriation due to the non-renewal of a residence permits enabled these immigrants to commit more fully to integration into German society, unlike immigrants from Yugoslavia and Turkey, whose legal status in Germany depended on residence permits

Today, Italians and Greeks still enjoy a privileged position in Germany due to their European Union membership, which grants them the right to unlimited employment and residence in Germany, rights which Turks and ex-Yugoslavs, except Slovenes, did not enjoy during the *Gastarbeiter* period, and still do not enjoy in the year 2011 due to the lack of European Union membership of Turkey and ex-Yugoslav countries, except Slovenia. The degree to which the right to work and reside in Germany without a residence permit affects how well a group is integrated into German society can be seen in a study conducted in 2005 by the *Berlin Institut*. According to the study, the only group of immigrants studied who were ranked above the *Aussiedler* was the group of immigrants labeled “Weitere Länder der EU” (Elger, Kneip & Theile 2005).

Christian Yugoslavs find themselves ranked after Greeks, due to their non-membership in the EEC during the *Gastarbeiter* period, and the non-membership of ex-Yugoslav countries, with the exception of Slovenia, today in the European Union. Although there are ex-Yugoslavs who are not Christian, a large part of Yugoslavia did come from a Christian tradition (Catholic and Orthodox), which is enough to place ex-Yugoslavs closer to the German *Leitkultur* than Turks.

The group of immigrants with connections to the *Gastarbeiter* program which occupies the space furthest away from the German *Leitkultur* are the Turks, who are not traditionally Christian, and have never been citizens of a country that held full membership in the European Economic Community, or in the organization that replaced the EEC, the European Union. With Turkey’s 1987 application for membership in the European Union, several issues were brought up as to why Turkey should not be given full membership in the organization. Among these were two conflicts with other European Union member states. The first was the ongoing conflict with Greece concerning the island of Cyprus and the second was with Bulgaria, who pledged it

“will block Turkey's membership unless compensation is paid for the expulsion of Thracians by Ottoman forces in the early 20th century” (Cronin).

In addition to the political conflicts with Greece and Bulgaria that have proven to be hindrances on Turkey's path to European Union membership, Turkey's “Europeanness” has also been a point of contention, due not only to its geographical location, but also because of its religious tradition and culture.

To many Europeans, including Herman Van Rompuy, the Belgian Prime Minister and first full-time president of the European Union, European values are based, not unlike Seehofer's definition of German *Leitkultur*, on a distinctly Christian tradition. In a 2004 speech he gave in opposition to Turkish membership in the EU he states: “An expansion of the EU to include Turkey cannot be considered as just another expansion, as in the past. The universal values which are in force in Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey” (Barber). According to the same article, in *The Financial Times*, in which Van Rompuy is quoted, this opinion “puts him squarely on the side of Nicolas Sarkozy, France's president, and Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, both of whom are willing to offer Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ but want to keep the country out of the EU” (Barber).

The tying of religion, Christianity, together with European values and making Christianity an integral part of European identity is problematic on several levels. The basing of European identity on Christianity not only ignores the large Islamic segment of Europe's population, which would consider itself a part of Europe, but also ignores the fact that Islam has influenced continental Europe for centuries. Austria was the first nation in Europe to officially

recognize Islam as an official religion in 1912, on the basis of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire expanding its borders to include what is now Bosnia (Richter).

Another interesting aspect of the debate on Turkish “Europeanness” is the fact that, although Islam is not considered to be a part of Europe, according to European Union President Van Rompuy, German politicians often point out that Islam is indeed a part of Germany. In 2010, German Federal President Christian Wulff (CDU) made the statement, “Islam also belongs in Germany,” during a speech to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of German unification (qtd. in Dowling). The competing claims that Islam is not a part of Europe yet at the same “belongs in” Germany create a contradiction. How can it be that Islam is not a part of Europe, when many European countries, including Germany, have sizeable Muslim populations?

Although many leaders in the European Union, including Van Rompuy, claim that Turkey should not be granted membership in the EU based on its non-Christian heritage, many argue that this line of argumentation is merely a ploy to gain public support, while masking a political agenda. Because of Turkey’s large population, if it were granted membership in the EU, it would hold the second largest number of seats behind Germany, giving Turkey a large amount of influence concerning EU decision making. In addition to this, because of Turkey’s expected population growth, it would soon have a population larger than Germany’s, making it the nation with the largest number of seats, thus wielding the most decision-making power.

Wulff’s statement, that Islam is a part of Germany, produced a strong backlash from members of his own party. Wolfgang Bosbach (CDU) was reported as saying, “while Islam is a part of daily reality in Germany, ours is a Judeo-Christian tradition,” referring again to religion as a core component of the German *Leitkultur* (qtd. in Dowling). His statement is highly problematic because it seems to say: “Yes, we have Muslims in Germany, but they are not part

of our culture; they are present in Germany, and hence a part of it, but since they do not subscribe to our Judeo-Christian tradition, they are not to be considered Germans.” Bosbach’s statement also works to create an “us-versus-them” mentality, by using words such as, “our,” which implies that there must be a “their.”

Pitting one religious tradition against another and portraying them as “us-versus-them,” either in arguing for a German *Leitkultur*, or to gain support for denying Turkey membership in the EU, is a way to gain public support, but it ignores key Enlightenment principles, such as tolerance, that supporters of both the German and European *Leitkultur* claim to uphold. Placing Islam and Christianity in such opposing positions creates an atmosphere of separation and difference while ignoring the possibility of finding a common identity based on a commitment to core democratic values, instead of on religious tradition.

Is Turkey Just Too Culturally Different?

According to the theory of the *Kulturkreis*, Turkish culture is ranked as the “most different” from German culture of any culture that was involved in the *Gastarbeiter* program. Because of this ranking, the theory predicts that Turks will have more difficulties adjusting to and integrating into German society than immigrants from cultures that are considered more similar to the German *Leitkultur*. When one looks at the current statistics comparing integration among different immigrant groups, it seems as if this theory has proven itself to be true; however, the argument and conclusion that some groups of immigrants are more capable of integration than others is problematic because it does not take into consideration the individual circumstances that are unique to each group of immigrants. The theory is also

problematic because it creates an idea of cultural determinism, which means that immigrants, based on their culture, are pre-destined to be successful at integration or be “unintegratable.”

It is important to point out here that the idea that some groups of immigrants are more integratable than others is not unique to Germany. In fact, the United States adopted a similar policy in the early twentieth century. During this period of heavy immigration to the United States, “the dominant ethno-cultural groups in the USA ... felt that the US should recruit immigrants that were easy to assimilate” (Siapera 37). According to Siapera, “these were immigrants whose culture resembled the WASP culture of America, hence those originating from North-west Europe” were heavily recruited, while immigration from southeast Europe was restricted through quotas implemented by the Immigration Act of 1924 (37).

In an essay written in 1998 entitled “Warum Deutschland kein Einwanderungsland sein kann,” Jörg Schönbohm (CDU) attempts to explain why Turkish integration in Germany had yet to become a success. He describes that the recruitment stop of foreign workers and the high number of family reunifications among the *Gastarbeiter* was the starting point of the integration challenge that Germany would have to face. He writes, “[d]amit begann jedoch eine Integrationsherausforderung, der sich die Deutschen und ausländischen Mitbewohner nicht offen und entschieden genug, vor allem aber viel zu spät, gestellt haben.” In this quotation, Schönbohm does acknowledge that the position of the Germans, and the *Gastarbeiter* themselves, on the issue of permanent integration was not decisive enough and wavered between a stance of integration and repatriation, which ultimately proved to be a stumbling block for the second generation. However, he goes on to say that Turkish immigrants have more difficulties in integrating because of their culture than other immigrant groups. He states: “Dies gilt vor allem für die über zwei Millionen Türken, die von ihren Sitten, Gebräuchen und ihrer Religion

her nicht so leicht integrierbar sind wie Zuwanderer aus dem übrigen Europa. The comparison that Schönbohm makes between the Turkish immigrants and other immigrant groups from the rest of Europe serves to highlight the argument that the further a culture is considered to be from the German *Leitkultur*, the more difficulties they will have integrating into German society. However, what he fails to consider in his argument is the fact that Turkish immigrants had a different set of legal rights than other immigrant groups who through their membership in the EEC, and later in the EU, had the right to residence and employment in Germany, without the restrictions of residence and work permits. Without the fear of deportation, they were able to commit themselves more fully to integration. They were also not encouraged, as the Turkish immigrants were, to repatriate. For citizens of EEC, and later EU, countries, there was always the possibility of returning to Germany after the recruitment stop, meaning there was no point for Germany to try to encourage repatriation for these immigrants, because they could return whenever they found work in Germany again. For the Turks, the recruitment stop meant a last chance for them to bring their families to Germany before the opportunity of legal status in Germany was closed to them.

Comparing different immigrant groups in terms of integration based solely on cultural characteristics, without taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding their legal status in Germany, is problematic and sets the stage for arguments supporting only allowing immigrants into Germany who are of culturally similar backgrounds. It also leads to an argument of cultural determinism which creates the misconception that there is something inherent in Turkish culture that prevents integration and ignores other factors that may be affecting their integration in more meaningful ways.

Schönbohm is not the only politician who has argued that one of the main reasons for a lack of integration on the part of the Turks is due to the difference between German and Turkish culture. In an interview with *Focus*, Host Seehofer, chairman of the CSU, voiced his opinion that the success of integration depends on the cultural background of the immigrant: “Es ist doch klar, dass sich Zuwanderer aus anderen Kulturkreisen wie aus der Türkei und arabischen Ländern insgesamt schwerer tun. Daraus ziehe ich auf jeden Fall den Schluss, dass wir keine zusätzliche Zuwanderung aus anderen Kulturkreisen brauchen” (Seehofer 2011).

What is problematic about his argument is that he groups all immigrants from Turkey and Arab countries together, and makes the assertion that any immigrant emigrating from these cultures will have such difficulties integrating into German society that immigration from these countries should be stopped. The other problematic element of Seehofer’s theory is that it asserts that culture is something that cannot be overcome. The culture, and not the immigrant himself, determines whether integration will be successful or not. The logic that culture determines whether an immigrant is integratable leads to the highly problematic concept of cultural determinism, which moves the focus from developing strategies for integration and tolerance, and instead focuses on developing strategies to exclude those who are perceived as being so culturally different that integration is predetermined to fail, and therefore any efforts to encourage integration would be futile. Another outcome of the idea of cultural determinism is that it relieves the host culture of much of the responsibility for the lack of integration by the minority culture and instead pushes a large part of the responsibility onto the immigrant group, who are not free to choose which “inescapable” culture they come from.

Another reason Seehofer gives for stopping further immigration from other *Kulturkreisen* is that further immigration would hinder efforts to integrate the people that are already in

Germany. What is interesting about this logic however is that Seehofer admits that a large segment of the Turkish population is already well integrated: “Wir müssen uns mit den Menschen beschäftigen, die bereits hier leben. 80 bis 90 Prozent sind ja gut integriert” (Seehofer 2011). The fact that even Seehofer, who is against further immigration from other *Kulturkreisen*, points out that the vast majority of Turks in Germany are already integrated undermines his argument in two ways. First, it shows that immigrants from Turkey are capable of integration, and that they are not culturally predetermined to integration failure. Secondly, it weakens his claim that further immigration from Turkey should be stopped in order to focus on the immigrants that are already in Germany, since most of the immigrants are, according to him, already well integrated.

It is also important to point out that it is not just politicians who subscribe to the idea that culture determines the level of integration success, but also a large segment of the German population. In a poll carried out by the polling firm TNS Emnid on behalf of *Focus*, 1000 Germans were polled on whether they supported Seehofer’s statements regarding integration. According to the poll, fifty-four percent of those asked agreed with Seehofer’s statement: “Zuwanderer aus der Türkei und arabischen Ländern haben mit der Integration größere Schwierigkeiten als Zuwanderer aus anderen Ländern.” In addition forty-seven percent of those who participated in the poll agreed with Seehofer that Germany did not need additional immigrants “aus der Türkei und den arabischen Ländern” (“Seehofer legt Sieben-Punkte Plan nach”).

It can be interpreted from these poll results that the German general public attributes the lack of integration among Turkish immigrants to an incompatibility of Turkish and German culture, instead of to the different circumstances, including legal rights to residence and

employment and the motives for immigration, which surround each individual immigrant group. The argument that certain groups of immigrants, from cultures that are similar to that of Germany, are easier to integrate into German society than immigrants from cultures that are less similar seems like a valid argument to many Germans for an array of reasons. When one considers studies on integration, such as the one done in 2005 by the *Berlin Institut* and published in the *Spiegel* article “Für immer Fremd,” which show that immigrants with many cultural similarities to Germany, such as immigrants from other European Union countries and *Aussiedler*, are highly integrated, while the Turkish community lags behind, it seems logical to conclude that culture must play a role. When this conclusion is also backed by public figures such as politicians, it legitimizes the perceived role culture plays in integration.

Although the conclusion that culture plays a large role in determining the level of integration success does seem like a logical conclusion, one must also bear in mind that the ranking of immigrant groups from the most to least integrated also corresponds to the level of legal rights each group has had access to. In the study done by the *Berlin Institut*, immigrants from other European Union countries and *Aussiedler* are ranked as the two “most integrated” groups. They are also the two groups which had the most access to legal rights in Germany. Citizens of European Union countries are and were (under the former organization, the EEC), permitted to work and reside in Germany without residence or work permits. *Aussiedler* arrived in Germany with access to citizenship and all the rights that came with it. On the other hand, Turkish immigrants, ranked as the “least integrated,” had no legal right to live or work in Germany without residence or work permits. They also had many restrictions to naturalization, including residence and employment requirements that had to be fulfilled in order to be considered for naturalization. In addition to these requirements, the lack of the possibility of

dual citizenship often served as a stumbling block to naturalization. The implications of the varying degree of legal rights each group enjoys, has also played a role in integration and should be taken into account when examining the current level of integration of the different immigrant groups.

Another aspect of the argument that immigrants from culturally similar backgrounds are more capable of integration is the fact that the integration of these immigrants demands less of the majority, German, culture. The more similar a minority culture is to the majority culture, the fewer concessions the majority culture must make to accommodate the minority and facilitate successful integration. Therefore, accepting only immigrants with similar cultural backgrounds would make the preservation of German culture and identity, as it stands, more likely and would not force Germans to reconsider or reconstruct German identity.

CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION

My goal in writing this paper was to examine the current integration debate going on in Germany concerning the Turkish community, and to examine the current argumentation and reasoning about why the Turkish community continues to lag behind other immigrant groups in areas such as education and employment. Angela Merkel's strong statement that *Multikulti* has failed and the current rhetoric regarding citizenship laws and the German *Leitkultur* only heightened my interest and desire to try to find answers regarding the highly controversial issues of citizenship, integration, immigration and identity.

The section on the *Gastarbeiter* program shows how great a role governmental policy has played in, and continues to play in, the level of Turkish integration. Germany's stance of not being an "immigration nation" and the push for repatriation through policies that were meant to help the Turks maintain their cultural and linguistic ties to Turkey did little to foster a desire on the part of the Turks to learn German or to integrate any further than was necessary to function in Germany. In addition to this, the Turks' lack of legal security regarding residence and work permits also proved to be a stumbling block to integration, something that other immigrant groups, such as *Gastarbeiter* who were citizens of EEC countries, did not have to worry about. For these immigrants, there were few legal restrictions in terms of residence or employment in Germany.

The motivation for integration was also lacking on the part of the Turks, who came to Germany, not with the intention of becoming permanent immigrants, but to earn money and then, eventually return to their families. However, despite the intentions of both the Germans and the Turks, the number of Turkish nationals in Germany after the *Anwerbestopp* did not decrease as was expected, but increased due to rising levels of family reunification.

German citizenship laws and the definition of German identity that is created from these laws also played a large role in the integration of the Turkish immigrants. According to the German *Grundgesetz*, German citizenship was created in an effort to unify the loosely connected German states. In order to create a unified nation it was decided that the *Prussian* model of citizenship would be used, a model based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. The adherence to this model of determining citizenship proved to be an important element in the period of German separation, and justified the notion that ethnic Germans should not be divided into two nations, but belonged to the same *Volk*, and therefore the division of this *Volk* into two separate nations was inappropriate. German citizenship based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* also provided for the acceptance and naturalization of *Volksdeutsche* or *Aussiedler*, who, although they were ethnically German, had lived outside of German borders for centuries. After the reunification of Germany and the opening of the Iron Curtain, many *Aussiedler* immigrated to Germany to “reactivate” their German citizenship on the basis of their ethnicity.

It was also during the time of *Aussiedler* immigration that a new concept of German identity emerged, the concept of proving one’s “Germanness” through suffering. In order to reactive their German citizenship, the *Aussiedler* had to prove their ethnicity and often did so by demonstrating that their families had suffered at the hands of the Soviets in forced labor camps, or by having a lack of knowledge of the German language and culture, which would have demonstrated persecution on the basis of their German cultural and linguistic heritage.

While the German citizenship laws proved to be an inclusive force for the *Aussiedler*, it proved to be a great exclusionary factor to the Turkish community, who despite living for close to thirty years or even being born in Germany, still had little access to citizenship and the legal rights that accompany it. The immediate acquisition of German citizenship on the part of the

Aussiedler was received especially hard in the Turkish community, who viewed it, according to Şenocak, as “alienating.”

In addition to the alienating impact of the naturalization of the *Aussiedler*, the Turkish community was further excluded by the right to dual citizenship that the *Aussiedler* enjoyed. For the Turks dual citizenship was, and still is, not permitted. As of 2000, children born in Germany to parents who meet certain requirements, such as minimum uninterrupted residency in Germany, are required to choose between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three between German or Turkish citizenship, a choice that supporters of dual citizenship deem to be an unnecessary requirement, that forces those affected to choose between an exclusively German or Turkish identity. Another important aspect of the dual citizenship debate is the fact that the access to dual citizenship depends on one’s ethnicity. When one is ethnically German, dual citizenship is permitted, such as in the case of the *Aussiedler*. On the other hand, when one is not ethnically German there is little possibility, and in the case of the Turks, no possibility, of access to dual citizenship.

The concept of culture has also come to the forefront of the integration debate. The Turkish community often makes the claim that when the German government insists on “integration,” “acculturation” is actually meant. Instead of integration, the adaption and coming together of both the majority and minority cultures, the Turkish community claims to feel pressure to totally conform to German culture, which would ultimately destroy their Turkish identity and they would become in the words of Şenocak, “Anatolian faces behind German masks” (2).

Culture also plays a critical role in the integration debate in other ways as well. Since Tibi’s term “*Leitkultur*” which was meant to describe European culture as a whole, was modified

to mean a specifically German *Leitkultur*, religion has come to the forefront of the debate. The integration debate has recently come to include questions of European and German identity, and whether Islam has become a part of Europe, or more specifically Germany. Many on the political right, including Angela Merkel, support the notion that although Muslims do live in Germany, Islam is not a part of the German *Leitkultur*. Of course the inclusion of any religion into the definition of *Leitkultur* stands in opposition to the other components of German *Leitkultur*, which include Enlightenment values such as tolerance, democracy and the freedom to practice different religions without the fear of persecution or exclusion. Although the inclusion of both a specific religion and Enlightenment values in the definition of German *Leitkultur* seems to be an obvious contradiction, politicians on the political right make no effort to rectify this glaring contradiction. Instead, they proclaim that Christianity and Enlightenment values both play central roles in defining German *Leitkultur*.

In addition to a definition of German *Leitkultur* that is based, at least partially, on religions, there is the theory of the *Kulturkreis*. This theory asserts that the more dissimilar a culture is from Germany's, the more difficulties immigrants from that culture will face while integrating into German society. According to this Theory, Turks and immigrants from Arab countries should face the most difficulty when integrating, while immigrants from other European Union countries such as Italy or *Aussiedler* should have the least amount of difficulty. This has led some politicians, such as Horst Seehofer, to call for an absolute stop of immigration from *Kulturkreisen* that are too different from the German *Leitkultur*. It has also led to the misconception that the current state of integration can be explained simply by considering the minority cultures and their similarity or dissimilarity to the German *Leitkultur*. However, it is my opinion that the intentions under which immigrants enter Germany, either permanent

residence or eventual repatriation, and the legal rights each minority group enjoys, such as access to naturalization or dual citizenship, play a much larger role than culture in determining how successful each immigrant group will be at integrating into German society. When considering the current state of integration among the different immigrant groups today, it is important to look beyond the political rhetoric and consider how each group's historical and legal history in Germany has played a role, before jumping to the conclusion that some cultures are just not "integratable."

The traditional German concept of the national state with the foundation of belonging based on ethnicity is a concept that Germans have been reluctant to abandon. The professors who drafted the Heidelberg Manifesto defended this concept on the basis of the German *Grundgesetz*, which defines citizenship based on belonging to the German *Volk*. However, through immigration Germany's population has shifted and Germany has become a multi-ethnic state. The adherence to citizenship laws based on ethnicity do not reflect the reality of Germany's population, leading to the creation of a group of people, who despite living in, and in most cases today, being born in Germany do not have legal access to citizenship and the privileges it carries with it. The lack of access to legal citizenship has been a considerable barrier to successful integration and has also challenged Germans to rethink their identity as Germans and their identity as a secularized, modern and democratic nation that is committed to Enlightenment values.

Works Cited

- Barber, Tony. "Van Rompuy Against Turkey Membership." The Financial Times. 19 Nov. 2009. Web. 20 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/11c93616-d4fb-11de-8ec4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1EeNltRFt>>.
- Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992. Print.
- "Buying Property in Turkey." Turkish Embassy Office of the First Economic Counsellor, London. Web. 02 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.turkisheconomy.org.uk/buyingproperty/property.html>>.
- Castles, Stephen, and Alastair Davidson. Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging. New York: Routledge, 2000. Print.
- Cronin, David. "Keeping Turkey out of Europe." Guardian.co.uk. 06 Jan. 2010. Web. 01 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/06/turkey-european-union-membership>>.
- Dietz, Barbara, and Heike Roll. Jugendliche Aussiedler: Porträt einer Zuwanderergeneration. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag GmbH, 1998. Print.
- Dowling, Siobhán. "Should Muslims Be Treated on an Equal Footing?" Spiegel Online. 08 Oct. 2010. Web. 21 Feb. 2011. <<http://http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,722065,00.html>>.
- Elger, Katrin, Ansbert Kneip, and Merlind Theile. "Für immer fremd." Der Spiegel. May 2005: 32-36. Print.
- Elger, Katrin, Ansbert Kneip, and Merlind Theile. "Survey Shows Alarming Lack of Integration in Germany." Spiegel Online. 26 Jan. 2009. Web. 4 Feb. 2011.

<<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-603588,00.html>>.

Gibney, Matthew J., and Randall Hansen, eds. Immigration and Asylum: from 1900 to the Present. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005. Print.

Gülalp, Haldun, ed. Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict: Challenging the Nation-State. London: Routledge, 2006. Print.

Habermas, Jürgen. "Leadership and Leitkultur." Trans. Ciaran Cronin. The New York Times. 28 Oct. 2010. Web. 12 Feb. 2011.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/opinion/29Habermas.html?_r=1>.

Hammar, Tomas, ed. European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study. New York: Cambridge UP, 1985. Print.

Hell, Mattias. Einwanderungsland Deutschland?: Die Zuwanderungsdiskussion 1998-2002. Wiesbaden: Der VS Verlag Für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005. Print.

"Heidelberger Manifest." Frankfurter Rundschau. 04 Mar. 1982. Print.

"Holland Prompts Soul-Searching in Germany." Deutsche Welle. 16 Nov. 2004. Web. 1 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1397707,00.html>>.

"Is Multi-kulti Dead?" The Economist Online. 22 Oct. 2010. Web. 12 Feb. 2011.

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/10/integration_debate_germany>.

Janssen-Jurreit, Marielouise. Lieben Sie Deutschland?: Gefühle zur Lage der Nation. Munich: Piper, 1985. Print

Jung, Matthias, Thomas Niehr, and Karin Böke. Ausländer Und Migranten Im Spiegel Der Presse. Weisbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, 2000. Print.

Karabat, Ayse. "Germany Never Applied Multicultural Policies, Says Kenen Kolat." Today's Zaman. 31 Oct. 2010. Web. 05 Feb. 2011.

<http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=225887>.

Kastoryano, Riva. *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany*.

Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002. Print.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds. *Germany: Beyond the Stable State*. Southgate: Frank Cass, 2004. Print.

Klaschka, Norbert. "Wir Riefen Arbeitskräfte, Es Kamen Menschen." *Stern.de*. 01 Jan. 2005.

Web. 7 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/zuwanderungsgesetz-wir-riefen-arbeitskraefte-es-kamen-menschen-534427.html>>.

Klopp, Brett. *German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Print.

Knight, Ben. "German Upper House Says 'no' to Dual Citizenship." *Deutsche Welle*.

26 Mar. 2010. Web. 12 Feb. 2011.

<<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5401847,00.html>>.

Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005. Print.

Kramer, Jane. "Letter from Europe: Neo-Nazis" a Chaos in the Head." *The New Yorker*. 14 June 1993: 52. Print.

Kumanoff, Nicolas. "What Is Leitkultur? In a Raging Debate, Leitkultur Is the Operative Term."

The Atlantic Times. Dec. 2004. Web. 07 Jan. 2011. <http://www.atlantic-times.com/archive_detail.php?recordID=69>.

Laux, William E. "West German Political Parties and the 1972 Bundestag Election."

- The Western Political Quarterly 26.3 (1973): 507-28. *JSTOR*. Web. 7 Feb. 2011.
<<http://www.jsot.org/stable/446436>>.
- Levy, Daniel, and Yfaat Weiss, eds. Challenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration. New York: Berghahn, 2002. Print.
- Mandel, Ruth. Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2008. Print.
- “Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert.” Spiegel Online. 16 Oct. 2010. Web. 22 Nov. 2010. <<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,723532,00.html>>.
- Mushaben, Joyce Marie. The Changing Faces of Citizenship: Social Integration and Political Mobilization among Ethnic Minorities in Germany. New York: Berghahn, 2008. Print.
- Musharbash, Yassin. “Why Europe Needs a ‘Leading Culture’” Spiegel Online. 26 Nov. 2004. Web. 15 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,329784,00.html>>.
- Neuman, Gerald L. "Nationality Law in the United States and Germany." Paths to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany. Ed. Peter Schuck and Rainer Münz. Providence: Berghahn, 1998. Print.
- Oberndörfer, Dieter. “Was ist eigentlich ein integrierter Deutsche?” Frankfurter Rundschau. 24 Oct. 2000. Print.
- RahmanDO420. "Re: Du bist Araber wenn." Web log comment. YouTube. 13 Jan. 2011. Web. 13 Mar. 2011. <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CdonMAUi9zc>>.
- Richter, Hannes. “Islam and Dialogue in Austria.” Austrian Press and Information Service. 27 June 2006. Web. 06 Feb. 2011. <<http://www.austrianinformation.org/march-april-2006/2006/6/27/islam-and-dialogue-in-austria.html>>.

Romeo, Antonella. "Von Alberobello Nach Gifhorn." Die Zeit. 15 Dec. 1995.

Zeit Online. Web. 06 Jan. 2011.

<http://www.zeit.de/1995/51/Von_Alberobello_nach_Gifhorn>.

Schönbohm, Jörg. "Jörg Schönbohm: Warum Deutschland kein Einwanderungsland sein kann."

Welt Online. 28 Aug. 1998. Web. 17 Feb. 2011. <[http://www.welt.de/print-](http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article625580/Joerg_Schoenbohm_Warum_Deutschland_kein_Einwanderungsland_sein_kann.html)

[welt/article625580/Joerg_Schoenbohm_Warum_Deutschland_kein_Einwanderungsland_sein_kann.html](http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article625580/Joerg_Schoenbohm_Warum_Deutschland_kein_Einwanderungsland_sein_kann.html)>.

Seehofer, Horst. "Morgenland? Abendland! Seehofers 7-Punkte Plan zur Integration." Focus

Online. 18 Oct. 2010. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

<http://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/morgenland-abendland-seehofers-7-punkte-plan-zur-integration_aid_563048.html>.

Seehofer, Horst. "Kampfansage an Schmarotzer Und Zuwanderer." Focus Online. 09 Oct. 2010.

Web. 05 Jan. 2011. <[http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/horst-seehofer-](http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/horst-seehofer-kampfansage-an-schmarotzer-und-zuwanderer_aid_560515.html)

[kampfansage-an-schmarotzer-und-zuwanderer_aid_560515.html](http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/horst-seehofer-kampfansage-an-schmarotzer-und-zuwanderer_aid_560515.html)>.

"Seehofer legt Sieben-Punkte Plan nach." Focus Online. 16 Oct. 2010. Web. 05 Jan. 2011.

<http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/integration-seehofer-legt-sieben-punkte-plan-nach_aid_562723.html>.

Senders, Stefan. "Jus Sanguinis or Jus Mimesis? Rethinking Repatriation." Coming Home to

Germany? The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the

Federal Republic. Ed. David Rock and Stefan Wolff. New York: Berghahn, 2002.

87-101. Print.

Şenocak, Zafer. Atlas of a Tropical Germany: Essays on Politics and Culture, 1990-1998. Trans.

Leslie A. Adelson. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2000. Print.

SerbiaPrincess. "Re: Du bist Serbe oder Albaner (Deutsch, German)." Web log comment.

YouTube. 01 Feb. 2011. Web. 15 Feb. 2011.

<http://www.youtube.com/comment_servlet?all_comments=1&v=NRqBjPbEvco>.

Siapera, Eugenia. Cultural Diversity and Global Media: The Mediation of Difference. West

Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Print.

Stritzky, Johannes von. "Germany's Immigration Policy: From Refusal to Reluctance (ARI)."

Real Instituto Elcano. 03 June 2009. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

<http://129.35.96.158/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/demography+population/ari93-2009>.

syriengirl9. "Re: Du bist Araber wenn." Web log comment. YouTube. 01 Feb. 2011. Web. 15

Feb. 2011.

<http://www.youtube.com/comment_servlet?all_comments=1&v=CdonMAUi9zc>.

Thomas, Bryan R. "Necessary but Unloved: Turkish Immigrants in Germany." Green Left.

10 Feb. 1993. Web. 11 Nov. 2010. <<http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/4706>>.

Twark, Jill E. Humor, Satire, and Identity: Eastern German Literature in the 1990s. Berlin:

Walter De Gruyter, 2007. Print.

Ward, Josh. "Turks Should Be Evaluated 'the Same Way as Other Immigrants'" Spiegel Online.

27 Jan. 2009. Web. 4 Feb. 2011.

<<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-603787,00.html>>.

"Who Is a German?" The Economist 03 Apr. 1997. Web. 17 Feb. 2011.

<<http://www.economist.com/node/146449>>.