The study of domains and domain walls has a long tradition in magnetism, and these experiments open this field to the study of chiral superconductors. Volovik and Gor’kov (8) were the first to study the theory of these kinds of superconducting domain walls. They found that the domains should contain counterflowing supercurrents along the wall that generate a perpendicular magnetic dipole (see the figure). All this remains to be verified experimentally, as does another effect predicted by Sigrist et al. (9): A novel magnetic vortex should accompany a singularity on a domain wall analogous to a Bloch line in magnetism. The observation of such a vortex with a fractional magnetic flux is a challenge to this emerging field, but it will not be easy in view of the short characteristic length scales that Kidwingira et al. deduce from their experiments. Confirmation of these exotic predictions will be a clear test of our understanding of these intriguing superconductors.

References

The Brain’s Dark Energy

Marcus E. Raichle

Since the 19th century, and possibly longer, two perspectives on brain functions have existed (1). One view posits that the brain is primarily reflexive, driven by the momentary demands of the environment; the other, that the brain’s operations are mainly intrinsic, involving the maintenance of information for interpreting, responding to, and even predicting environmental demands. While neither view is dominant, the former has motivated most neuroscience research. But technological advances, particularly in neuroimaging, have provoked a reassessment of these two perspectives.

Human functional neuroimaging, first with positron emission tomography (PET) and now largely with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), allows the brain’s responses to controlled stimuli to be studied by measuring changes in brain circulation and metabolism (energy consumption). Surprisingly, these studies have revealed that the additional energy required for such brain responses is extremely small compared to the ongoing amount of energy that the brain normally and continuously expends (2). The brain apparently uses only a small fraction of total brain activity. The adult human brain represents about 2% of the body weight, yet accounts for about 20% of the body’s total energy consumption, 10 times that predicted by its weight alone. What fraction of this energy is directly related to brain function? Depending on the approach used, it is estimated that 60 to 80% of the energy budget of the brain supports communication among neurons and their supporting cells (2). The additional energy burden associated with momentary demands of the environment may be as little as 0.5 to 1.0% of the total energy budget (2). This cost-based analysis implies that intrinsic activity may be far more significant than evoked activity in terms of overall brain function.

Consideration of brain energy may thus provide new insights into questions that have long puzzled neuroscientists. For example, researchers have sought to explain the relative disproportion of connections (i.e., synapses) among neurons that appear to perform functions intrinsically within the cerebral cortex. Take the visual cortex, whose primary function is to respond to external input to the retina. Less than 10% of all synapses carry incoming information from the external world (3)—a surprisingly small number. From a brain energy perspective, however, the cortex may simply be more involved in intrinsic activities.

What is this intrinsic activity? One possibility is that it simply represents unconstrained, spontaneous cognition—our daydreams or, more technically, stimulus-independent thoughts. But it is highly unlikely to account for more than that elicited by responding to controlled stimuli, which accounts for a very small fraction of total brain activity.

At rest, but active. fMRI images of a normal human brain at rest. The images reveal the highly organized nature of intrinsic brain activity, represented by correlated spontaneous fluctuations in the fMRI signal. Correlations are depicted by an arbitrary color scale. Positive correlations reside in areas known to increase activity during responses to controlled stimuli; negative correlations reside in areas that decrease activity under the same conditions. (Left) Lateral and medial views of the left hemisphere; (center) dorsal view; (right) lateral and medial views of the right hemisphere. [Reprinted from (12)]
Another possibility is that the brain’s enormous intrinsic functional activity facilitates responses to stimuli. Neurons continuously receive both excitatory and inhibitory inputs. The “balance” of these stimuli determines the responsiveness (or gain) of neurons to correlated inputs and, in so doing, potentially sculpts communication pathways in the brain (4). Balance also manifests at a large systems level. For example, neurologists know that strokes that damage cortical centers that control eye movements lead to deviation of the eyes toward the side of the lesion, implying the preexisting presence of “balance.” It may be that in the normal brain, a balance of opposing forces enhances the precision of a wide range of processes. Thus, “balance” might be viewed as a necessary enabling, but costly, element of brain function.

A more expanded view is that intrinsic activity instantiates the maintenance of information for interpreting, responding to, and even predicting environmental demands. In this regard, a useful conceptual framework from theoretical neuroscience posits that the brain operates as a Bayesian inference engine, designed to generate predictions about the future (5). Beginning with a set of “advance” predictions at birth (genes), the brain is then sculpted by worldly experience to represent intrinsically a “best guess” (“priors” in Bayesian parlance) about the environment and, in the case of humans at least, to make predictions about the future (6). It has long been thought that the ability to reflect on the past or contemplate the future has facilitated the development of unique human attributes such as imagination and creativity (7, 8).

fMRI provides one important experimental approach to understanding the nature of the brain’s intrinsic functional activity without direct recourse to controlled stimuli and observable behaviors. A prominent feature of fMRI is that the unaveraged signal is quite noisy, prompting researchers to average their data to reduce this “noise” and increase the signals they seek. In doing this, it turns out that a considerable fraction of the variance in the blood oxygen level–dependent (BOLD) signal of fMRI in the frequency range below 0.1 Hz, which reflects fluctuating neural activity, is lost. This activity exhibits striking patterns of coherence within known networks of specific neurons in the human brain in the absence of observable behaviors (see the figure).

Future research should address the cellular events underlying spontaneous fMRI BOLD signal fluctuations. Studies likely will cover a broad range of approaches to the study of spontaneous activity of neurons (9, 10). In this regard, descriptions of slow fluctuations (nominally <0.1 Hz) in neuronal membrane polarization—so-called up and down states—are intriguing (4, 10). Not only does their temporal frequency correspond to that of the spontaneous fluctuations in the fMRI BOLD signal, but their functional consequences may be relevant to an understanding of the variability in task-evoked brain activity as well as behavioral variability in human performance.

William James presciently suggested in 1890 (11) that “Enough has now been said to prove the general law of perception, which is this, that whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses from the object before us, another part (and it may be the larger part) always comes (in Lazarus’s phrase) out of our own head.” The brain’s energy consumption tells us that the brain is never at rest. The challenge of neuroscience is to understand the functions associated with this energy consumption.

## References
CORRECTIONS & CLARIFICATIONS

ERRATUM
Post date 12 January 2007

Perspectives: “The brain’s dark energy” by M. E. Raichle (24 Nov. 2006, p. 1249). The author’s affiliation was incorrect. It should be Department of Radiology, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO 63110, USA. E-mail: marc@npg.wustl.edu.
PTSD and Vietnam Veterans

IN HIS PERSPECTIVE “PSYCHIATRIC CASUALTIES OF WAR” (18 AUG., P. 923), R. J. MCNALLY NOTES THAT a new study by B. P. Dohrenwend et al. (“The psychological risks of Vietnam for U.S. veterans: a revisit with new data and methods,” Reports, 18 Aug., p. 979) revised downward from 15.2 to 9.1% the rates of chronic posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from the Vietnam War estimated by the National Vietnam Veterans’ Readjustment Study (NVVRS). He notes that this “confirmed the suspicions of the skeptics” but fails to observe that the new study confirmed that the 2.2% prevalence rate reported by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) (1) was a serious underestimate.

In numbers, this new rate means that 236,000 veterans currently have PTSD from the Vietnam War, an enormous long-term emotional and human cost of war. Recently, the director of the National Center for PTSD warned about the “psychiatric cost” of deployment in war zones, noting that we “underestimate the eventual magnitude of this clinical problem” (2). The Ex-Services Mental Welfare Society “Combat Stress” group in the United Kingdom saw 944 new referrals last year, an increase of 40% in recent years (3). The average period between discharge from the military and first contact was 12.7 years.

McNally cited a study (4) of 100 treatment-seeking veterans, claiming that only 41% of them had documented “combat exposure.” Another 52% had clearly served in Vietnam, but “combat exposure status (was) unclear (20)” or there was “no evidence of combat exposure (32)” [(4), table 1, p. 469]. Given the general unreliability of military records in a war zone, the old statistical rule that “absence of proof is not proof of absence” applies. We want to stress that the nature of modern warfare, evident in the current news, is such that danger and destruction do not occur only in places designated as “combat zones.”

Lastly, in addition to Dohrenwend et al.’s valuable service, we think it is time that scientists design studies to increase the accuracy of our prevalence estimates by applying the knowledge of over two decades of research that includes measures of biomarkers. Studies like Dohrenwend et al.’s in combination with new knowledge about neurobiological correlates of PTSD will contribute to science and help us to plan effectively to treat the true costs of war.

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References

I WISH TO CORRECT A MISCHARACTERIZATION OF my position that R. J. McNally made in his Perspective, “Psychiatric casualties of war” (18 Aug., p. 923). McNally stated that, in a column I wrote (1) as president of the International Society of Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS), I “urged critics to muffle their dissent, lest the intensity of scientific controversy distract us from attending to the needs of trauma victims.” I did not say that we should stifle critics or scientific dissent. I specifically stated that “research and treatment ideas benefit from being subjected to the crucible of criticism via the scientific method” (1). As someone who has been conducting traumatic stress research for almost 30 years, I have consistently argued that good research is the best way to resolve controversial policy issues and that researchers also have a duty to report research results responsibly and accurately (2).

McNally’s Perspective did not provide a balanced assessment of B. P. Dohrenwend et al.’s findings (“The psychological risks of Vietnam for U.S. veterans: a revisit with new data and methods,” Reports, 18 Aug., p. 979), which refuted most of the prior criticisms of the National Vietnam Veterans’ Readjustment Study (NVVRS). Instead, McNally focused on a misleading comparison of PTSD prevalence estimates for the entire NVVRS sample with those obtained from a clinically assessed subsample of the NVVRS that used extremely conservative criteria to determine PTSD status. Dohrenwend et al.’s findings show that NVVRS critics [e.g., (3–5)] were wrong when they argued that only veterans in combat roles could experience war zone stressors sufficient to produce PTSD and that veterans’ reports of exposure to war zone stressors could not be independently verified.

McNally states that Frueh et al. (6) consulted “the same archival sources” as Dohrenwend et al. However, Dohrenwend et al.’s verification procedures were much more rigorous than Frueh et al.’s. McNally also stated that Frueh et al. were only able to verify combat exposure in 41% of veterans. This is true but misleading in that 93% of veterans had documented service in Vietnam. Dohrenwend et al.’s findings suggest that exposure to war zone stressors, not

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just combat stressors, increases risk of PTSD, so the latter percentage is more applicable than the former.

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References
Finally, Kilpatrick says that I mischaracterized his views as expressed in his essay entitled “Our Common Bonds” (10). Likening our field to a “family” that often quarrels, Kilpatrick surmises that trauma victims, whose welfare constitutes our common bond, “would rather see us work together than to squabble and bicker.” And despite his mentioning the importance of critique in science, he contradicts himself in his take-home message: “In my view, our field would do well to focus more on our common bonds and less on our differences.” But if we downplay our differences, muffle our dissent, or curb our critique, studies like Dohrenwend et al.’s might never get launched.

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References

Response
In his perspective on our report, McNally nominated as our “most news-worthy” finding the discrepancy between our somewhat lower rates of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the original National Vietnam Veterans’ Readjustment Study (NVVRS) rates (1). Buckley commends us for findings that he suggests indicate that the NVVRS estimates “are unreasonably high and uncorroborated by other scientific evidence.” This choice of emphasis is highly selective and ignores considerations that are more important than our differences with the original NVVRS rates.

First, the discrepancies are attributable to differences in the definitions of disorder rather than to inflationary measurement error in the original NVVRS rates. To estimate rates of first onset of war-related PTSD and rates of these onsets that were current at follow-up 10 to 12 years after the war, we used diagnostic histories obtained by experienced NVVRS clinicians from a subsample of the veterans. By contrast, self-report symptom scales were used in the full-sample NVVRS measure to provide a less time-consuming and expensive approximation of current PTSD. This approach did not specify whether or not PTSD was war-related. However, if you take the NVVRS rate of 2.5% current PTSD for veterans who did not serve in Vietnam as an estimate of non–combat-related current PTSD, double it as per the 2:1 ratio of lifetime to current PTSD (see our Table 2 and the original NVVRS rates showing this ratio), and subtract the resulting rates from the original NVVRS 30.9% lifetime and 15.2% current PTSD rates, the result is 25.9% lifetime and 12.7% current war-related PTSD. These rates are very close to our war-related PTSD rates before adjustments for impairment and documentation of exposure (see our Table 2). This correspondence is what you would expect if, as was its aim, the NVVRS symptom scales were successfully calibrated against the subsample diagnoses.

Second, skepticism about the NVVRS rates has been stimulated by a number of factors: the discrepancy with much lower rates reported in a CDC study (2), a belief that only 15% of Vietnam veterans saw combat (e.g., (3)), and the related assumption that many veterans were either fabricating their combat experiences or that the dose-response relation between self-reports of exposure and PTSD risk was due to recall bias (e.g., (4–6)). We pointed out that the CDC measure grossly underreports diagnosable PTSD [(7), Appendix E]. We demonstrated that the prevalence of combat exposure was much higher than 15% in this “war without fronts” (8). We found little evidence of fabrication. We showed that our record-based measure of severity of exposure to war-zone stressors, which is independent of veterans’ reports of their combat experiences, is positively associated with self-reported exposure and with clinical diagnoses of PTSD. The dose-response relationship with this record-based measure of exposure is strong evidence of the validity of war-related PTSD and, we think, our most important finding.

When the NVVRS was conducted, a PTSD diagnosis did not require, as it does now, the presence of impaired functioning. Skeptics speculated that the PTSD symptoms measured in the NVVRS might indicate relatively mild psychological distress rather than true disorder (e.g., (9)). The subsample diagnoses included ratings of severity and impairment useful for addressing this question. Frueh interprets our findings on functioning as indicating “surprisingly little current
improvement among veterans with war-related PTSD. However, our results in Table 1 are for impairment at time of diagnosis, 10 to 12 years after the war. As we show, the large majority of war-related PTSD involved substantial impairment when the disorder was at its worst, even for veterans whose onsets had remitted (our Report and SOM text). We concluded that the Vietnam War took a severe psychological toll on U.S. veterans.

An epidemiological study like ours cannot speak to the treatment and compensation issues raised by Buckley and Frueh. Follow-up of the NVVRS sample could, however, provide longitudinal information on the nature of war-related PTSD and the factors that reduce its psychological costs.

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In THEIR POLICY FORUM "PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE of evolution" (11 Aug., p. 765), J. Miller, E. Scott, and S. Okamoto show that Americans are less likely to accept evolution than citizens of other industrial nations, and that U.S. attitudes are strongly tied to fundamentalist religious beliefs. This replicates earlier results (7). They hint that American views on evolution may be related to political liberalism and conservatism.

The validity of their conjecture can be seen in earlier surveys. In 1993, 1994, and 2000, the General Social Surveys asked how true is the statement, “Human beings evolved from earlier species of animals.” Of 3673 American respondents offering an opinion, a majority (53%) called the statement definitely or probably not true (2). Respondents also reported their political views, ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Political liberals were significantly more likely than conservatives to believe that humans evolved.

In Fig. S1 (3), the percentage of respondents believing in human evolution is plotted simultaneously against political view (conservative, moderate, liberal), education (high school or less, some college, graduate school), and respondent’s religious denomination (fundamentalist or not) (2). Belief in evolution rises along with political liberalism, independently of control variables.

References

COMMENT ON “A Common Genetic Variant Is Associated with Adult and Childhood Obesity”

Christian Dina, David Meyre, Chantal Samson, Jean Tichet, Michel Marre, Beatrice Jouret, Marie Aline Charles, Beverley Balkau, Philippe Fouguel

Herbert et al. (Reports, 14 April 2006, p. 279) reported an association between the INSIG2 gene variant rs7566605 and obesity in four sample populations, under a recessive model. We attempted to replicate this result in 10,265 Caucasian individuals, combining family-based, case-control, and general population studies, but found no support for a major role of this variant in obesity.

Full text at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/315/5809/187b

COMMENT ON “A Common Genetic Variant Is Associated with Adult and Childhood Obesity”

Ruth J. F. Loos, Inês Barroso, Stephen O’Rahilly, Nicholas J. Wareham

Herbert et al. (Reports, 14 April 2006, p. 279) found that the rs7566605 variant, located upstream of the INSIG2 gene, was consistently associated with increased body mass index. However, we found no evidence of association between rs7566605 and body mass index in two large ethnically homogeneous population-based cohorts. On the contrary, an opposite tendency was observed.

Full text at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/315/5809/187b

COMMENT ON “A Common Genetic Variant Is Associated with Adult and Childhood Obesity”


Contrary to the findings of Herbert et al. (Reports, 14 April 2006, p. 279), homozygous carriers of the C allele of the rs7566605 variant near the INSIG2 gene did not exhibit a significantly increased risk for obesity in a large population-based cross-sectional German study. A subgroup analysis, however, revealed that this allele significantly increased the risk for obesity in already overweight individuals.

Full text at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/315/5809/187d

RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ON “A Common Genetic Variant Is Associated with Adult and Childhood Obesity”

Alan Herbert, Norman P. Gerry, Matthew B. McQueen, Iris M. Heid, Arne Pfeuffer, Thomas Illig, H.-Erich Wichmann, Thomas Meitinger, David Hunter, Frank B. Hu, Graham Colditz, Anke Hinney, Johannes Hebebrand, Kerstin Koberwitz, Xiaofeng Zhu, Richard Cooper, Kristin Ardlie, Helen Lyon, Joel N. Hirschhorn, Nan M. Laird, Marc E. Lenburg, Christoph Lange, Michael F. Christman

Identification of genetic variants affecting complex traits such as obesity is confounded by many types of bias, especially when effect sizes are small. Given our findings of a positive association between rs7566605 and body mass index in four out of five separate samples, a false positive finding cannot be ruled out with certainty but seems unlikely. Meta-analyses of multiple large studies will help refine the estimate of the effects of rs7566605 on body mass index.

Full text at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/315/5809/187e

CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS

Reports: “Relating three-dimensional structures to protein networks provides evolutionary insights” by P. M. Kim et al. (22 Dec. 2006, p. 1938). In note 32, the funding acknowledgment should read, “This work was supported by NIH grants T32-HV-28186 and RR19895.” Additionally, on page 1939, a maximum degree of 14 was reported for the SIN v1; this number refers to an earlier version of the SIN (v0.9). The SIN v1 as reported in the paper has one node with a degree of higher than 14. All versions of the SIN and current statistics on them are available at http://SIN.gersteinlab.org.

Special Section: Breakthrough of the Year: “Minute manipulations” (22 Dec. 2006, p. 1855). This item incorrectly described Piwi-interacting RNAs (piRNAs) as binding to Piwi proteins, when in fact piRNAs bind to Piwi proteins.

Perspectives: “The brain’s dark energy” by M. E. Raichle (24 Nov. 2006, p. 1249). The author’s affiliation was incorrect. It should be Department of Radiology, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO 63110, USA. E-mail: marc@wustl.edu.