An Improved Conference-Key Agreement Protocol with Forward Secrecy *

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Abstract. Recently, Tzeng proposed a provably secure and fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol. It requires only a constant number of rounds to establish a conference key among all honest participants. This article will show that Tzeng’s protocol does not offer forward secrecy. We say that a conference-key agreement protocol offers forward secrecy if the long-term secret key of any participant is compromised and will not result in the compromise of the previously established conference keys. This property is important and has been included in most key agreement protocols and standards. In this paper, an improvement based on Tzeng’s protocol is proposed and it achieves forward secrecy. Under the Diffie–Hellman decision problem assumption and the random oracle model, we show that the proposed protocol can withstand passive attacks and is secure against impersonator’s attacks. The improved protocol requires a constant number of rounds to compute a conference key. The improved protocol provides fault-tolerance.

Key words: forward secrecy, fault tolerant, key agreement.

1. Introduction

With the growth of network technologies, many group communication services have become the focus of future developments, such as tele-conferencing, collaborative works, and secure group communications. Efficient and secure conference-key establishment protocol design is a critical issue in providing security services for group communications over insecure channels. There are two well-known kinds of conference-key establishment protocols: conference-key distribution and conference-key agreement. In conference-key distribution protocols (Anzai et al., 2001; Hwang and Yang, 1995; Tseng and Jan, 1999), there is a chairman who is responsible for generating and securely distributing a conference key to other participants involved in a conference. A conference-key agreement protocol (Bresson et al., 2002; Burmester and Desmedt, 1994; Horng, 2001; Steiner et al., 2000; Tzeng, 2002a) involves all participants cooperatively establishing a common key without a chairman. One advantage of a key agreement protocol over a key distribution protocol is that no participant can predetermine the common key. In the past,

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many conference-key agreement protocols have been proposed. These protocols are classified into two kinds: authenticated (Bresson et al., 2002; Burmester and Desmedt, 1994; Tzeng, 2002a) and non-authenticated (Horng, 2001; Steiner et al., 2000). Since a non-authenticated conference-key agreement protocol does not provide participant authentication, it is only suitable for an authenticated network channel. Generally, an authenticated conference-key agreement protocol is more flexible for various system models and requirements.

Conference-key agreement protocols are designed for various types of network connection, such as the broadcast connection, the ring connection or the tree connection, etc. One notable result was presented by Burmester and Desmedt (1994). They proposed several key agreement protocols based on various types of network connections. Fundamentally, their non-authenticated key agreement protocol under the broadcast channel is quite efficient requiring only two rounds. However, their improved key agreement protocol with participant authentication (protocol 7) uses a sequential proof for authenticating participants. Thus, the number of rounds required in the authenticated protocol is proportional to the number of participants.

Recently, Tzeng (2002a) proposed a provably secure and fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol based on the broadcast channel. Fault tolerance means that even if there are many malicious participants attempting to disrupt the conference-key establishment, all other honest participants can compute the common conference key. It uses two rounds to compute a conference key. The number of rounds is independent of the number of participants. It is provably secure against passive attacks and impersonator’s attacks under the variant Diffie–Hellman decision problem assumption (Boneh, 1998) and the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993), respectively. However, Tzeng’s protocol has a weakness that it does not offer forward secrecy.

Forward secrecy means that the compromise of a long-term key(s) cannot result in the compromise of previously established conference keys. In the following, an attack scenario is described to explain the practical significance of forward secrecy. Although the probability that a malicious attacker obtains a legal participant’s secret key is small, the malicious attacker could obtain any legal participant’s secret key with higher probability as the time passes in the future. When the conference is significant and the conference contents must be kept secret until a special time, if the conference key is compromised and the encrypted messages will be revealed before the time is ripe, it could cause serious damage or do harm to others. Since a network or Internet is an open communication channel, eavesdroppers can intercept the transmitted messages over the open communication channel. Suppose that a malicious eavesdropper records all transmitted messages in conference-key establishment phase, while he also records all broadcast encrypted messages among participants in conference-session phase. If a conference-key establishment protocol does not provide forward secrecy, a malicious attacker could reveal the encrypted messages of a secure conference in the future. For security robustness, this property is very important and has been included in most key-agreement protocols (Bresson et al., 2002; Burmester and Desmedt, 1994; Horng, 2001; Steiner et al., 2000; Tzeng, 2002) or standards (ANSI X9.63, 2001; IEEE Std 1363, 2000).
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In this paper, we will present how Tzeng’s protocol is unable to provide forward secrecy. To remedy this weakness, based on Tzeng’s protocol, we propose an improvement with forward secrecy, while it remains the merits of the original protocol. The improved protocol requires a constant number of rounds to compute a conference key. The improved protocol also provides fault-tolerance.

2. Brief Review and Security Analysis of Tzeng’s Protocol

In this section, we briefly review Tzeng’s fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol (Tzeng, 2002a). Afterwards, we present that this protocol does not offer forward secrecy.

The system has the following public parameters:

- $q$ – a large prime;
- $p$ – a large prime such that $p = 2q + 1$;
- $G_q$ – a subgroup of quadratic residues in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, that is $G_q = \{i^2 | i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\}$;
- $g$ – a generator for the subgroup $G_q$;
- $H$ – a one-way function from $\mathbb{Z}_q$ to $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

Meanwhile, each user in the system has the following:

- $x_i$ – $U_i$’s secret key and a random value in $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$;
- $y_i$ – $U_i$’s public key such that $y_i = g^{x_i} \mod p$.

In this protocol, assume that there is an initiator calling for a secure conference with $n$ participants. Without loss of generality, let $U = \{U_1, U_2, ..., U_n\}$ be the initial set of participants that want to generate a conference key. Each $U_i$, $1 \leq i \leq n$, knows the set $U$. Each $U_i$ holds and agrees a message $M$ to deter the replay attack (Tzeng, 2002b).

Step 1. Secret distribution and commitment. Initially, each participant $U_i$ randomly selects $R_i$ and $K_i$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, and $S_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. Then, $U_i$ constructs a polynomial $h_i(x)$ (over $\mathbb{Z}_q$) with degree $n$ that passes points $(j, (y_i^{R_i} \mod p) \mod q), (1 \leq j \leq n)$, and $(0, K_i)$. $U_i$ computes and broadcasts the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\omega_{ij} &= h_i(n + j) \mod q, \quad 1 \leq j \leq n, \\
\alpha_i &= g^{R_i} \mod p, \\
\gamma_i &= g^{S_i} \mod p, \\
\delta_i &= S_i^{-1} (H(K_i, M) - \gamma_i x_i) \mod q.
\end{align*}
\]

Step 2. Subkey computation and verification. Upon receiving $\omega_{ij}$, $1 \leq l \leq n$, and $\alpha_j$, each participant $U_i$ uses his secret key $x_i$ to reconstruct the polynomial $h'_j(x)$ (over $\mathbb{Z}_q$) with degree $n$ that passes points $(n + l, \omega_{jl}), 1 \leq l \leq n$, and $(i, (\alpha_j^{x_i} \mod p) \mod q)$. Let $K'_j = h'_j(0) \mod q$. Then, $U_i$ checks whether $g^{H(K'_j, M)} = y_j^{\gamma_j} \delta_j \mod p$ holds or not. If it holds, $U_i$ broadcasts “$V_{ij} = success$”. Otherwose, $U_i$ broadcasts “$V_{ij} = failure$”.

Step 3. Fault detection. We omit the detail description here. If any fault is detected, all honest participants must restart the protocol by deleting malicious participants from the set \( U = \{ U_1, U_2, \ldots, U_n \} \).

Step 4. Conference-key computation. We denote that the final valid participant set \( U' \) is \( U' = \{ U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, \ldots, U_{i_m} \} \), where \( m \leq n \) and the equality denotes that no fault is detected. Each participant \( U_i \) may compute the conference key

\[
K = (K'_{i_1} + K'_{i_2} + \cdots + K'_{i_m}) \mod q.
\]

In the following, we present that the above protocol cannot offers forward secrecy. If a malicious user knows the secret key \( x_i \) of any participant \( U_i \), the malicious user may compute all established conference-keys participated by \( U_i \). Suppose that a malicious user intends to record all broadcast messages in the open network. Assume that in the past a participant \( U_i \) has ever participated in a conference. Since the malicious user knows the secret key \( x_i \) of the participant \( U_i \), the malicious user uses the recorded messages \( \omega_{jl}, 1 \leq l \leq n, \) and \( \alpha_j \) to reconstruct the polynomial \( h'_j(x) \) (over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \)) with degree \( n \) that passes points \( (n + l, \omega_{jl}), 1 \leq l \leq n, \) and \( (i, (\alpha^j_x) \mod p) \mod q \), then compute \( K'_j = h'_j(0) \mod q \). Thus, he may obtain all subkeys \( K'_j, 1 \leq j \leq n, \) and \( K = (K'_{i_1} + K'_{i_2} + \cdots + K'_{i_m}) \mod q \). This is because each participant in a conference uses “ephemeral” public keys of other participants to distribute the subkey. Therefore, all previously established conference-keys participated by \( U_i \) will be disclosed if a malicious user knows the secret key \( x_i \) of participant \( U_i \).

3. The Improved Protocol with Forward Secrecy

Here, we present an improved protocol based on Tzeng’s protocol. The improved protocol with forward secrecy uses a temporary public key to distribute sub-keys, thus even the disclosure of the participant’s secret key will not result in the compromise of previously established conference keys. In the improved protocol, the system model and security assumptions are the same as ones of Tzeng’s protocol. Only Steps 1 and 2 in Tzeng’s protocol need to be modified, and Steps 3 and 4 remain unchanged. The detailed modifications are presented as follows.

Step 1.1. Temporary public-key distribution. Initially, each participant randomly selects a short-term secret keys \( t_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \) and an integer \( v_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \), and then computes and broadcasts the following:

\[
T_i = g^{t_i} \mod p, \quad A_i = g^{v_i} \mod p, \quad B_i = v_i^{-1} (H(T_i, M) - A_i x_i) \mod q.
\]

In fact, \((A_i, B_i, M)\) can be called as a certificate for the temporary public key \( T_i \).
Step 1.2. Secret distribution and commitment. Upon receiving all \((T_j, A_j, B_j) (1 \leq j \leq n, j \neq i)\), each participant \(U_i\) checks that each \(T_j\) is really issued by \(U_j\), i.e., checks whether \(g^{H(T_j, M)} = y_j^A A_j^{B_j} \mod p\) holds. \(U_i\) also validates whether \(T_j\) is a generator of subgroup \(G_q\) by checking \(2 \leq w_j \leq p - 1\) and \(w_j^q \mod p = 1\) (Menezes et al., 1997). If two checks do not hold, \(U_i\) claims and broadcasts the message “\(U_j\) is faulty”. If there is any participant \(U_j\) tries to send wrong \(T_j\), the participant \(U_j\) is setted as a malicious participant and is deleted from the initial participant set \(U\). If two checks hold, each participant \(U_i\) randomly selects \(R_i\) and \(K_i\) in \(Z_q\), and \(S_i \in Z_q^*\). Then, \(U_i\) constructs a polynomial \(h_i(x)\) (over \(Z_q\)) with degree \(n\) that passes points \((j, (T_j^R, \mod p) \mod q), (1 \leq j \leq n), (0, K_i)\). \(U_i\) computes and broadcasts the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\omega_{ij} &= h_i(n + j) \mod q, \quad 1 \leq j \leq n, \\
\alpha_i &= g^{R_i} \mod p, \\
\gamma_i &= g^{S_i} \mod p, \\
\delta_i &= S_i^{-1}(H(K_i, M) - \gamma_i x_i) \mod q.
\end{align*}
\]

Step 2. Subkey computation and verification. Upon receiving \(\omega_{jl}, 1 \leq l \leq n, \) and \(\alpha_j\), each participant \(U_i\) uses his short-term secret key \(t_i\) to reconstruct the polynomial \(h'_i(x)\) (over \(Z_q\)) with degree \(n\) that passes points \((n + l, \omega_{jl}), 1 \leq l \leq n, \) and \((i, (\alpha_j^l \mod p) \mod q).\) Let \(K'_j = h'_i(0) \mod q\). Then, \(U_i\) checks whether \(g^{H(K'_j, M)} = y_j^\omega_i g^{\delta_j} \mod p\) holds or not. If it holds, \(U_i\) broadcasts “\(V_{ij} = success\)”. Otherwise, \(U_i\) broadcasts “\(V_{ij} = failure\)”. 

4. Discussions

In this section, we show that the improved protocol is secure against passive attacks and impersonator attacks. Note that in the improved protocol each participant \(U_i\) increases the broadcast messages \((T_i, A_i, B_i)\) in the Step 1.1 than Tzeng’s protocol. Thus, we discuss only that the increased broadcast messages will not affect the security of Tzeng’s protocol.

A. Security Against Passive Attacks

If a passive attacker is unable to obtain the established common key by eavesdropping messages transmitted over the broadcast channel, the conference-key agreement protocol is secure against passive attacks. Since an eavesdropper does not know secrets \(x_i\) and \(K_i\) of any participant \(U_i\), the attacker’s view of the messages broadcast by \(U_i\) on the broadcast channel can be simulated without knowing secrets \(x_i\) and \(K_i\). To prove this, Tzeng’s protocol adopts a variant Diffie–Hellman decision problem (Tzeng, 2002a) to show that the simulator of the attacker’s view is computationally indistinguishable from the real one.
In the improved protocol, each participant increases the broadcast messages \((T_i, A_i, B_i)\) in the Step 1.1. Therefore, we show that, the real view \((T_i, A_i, B_i, \omega_{i1}, \omega_{i2}, \ldots, \omega_{im}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i)\) and the attacker’s view \((T_i', A_i', B_i', \omega_{i1}', \omega_{i2}', \ldots, \omega_{im}', \alpha_i', \gamma_i', \delta_i')\) on random variables \(t'_i \in Z_q^*, v'_i \in Z_q^*, B'_i \in Z_q, \omega_{ij}' \in Z_q (1 \leq j \leq m), R'_i \in Z_q, S'_i \in Z_q, \delta'_i \in Z_q\), are computationally indistinguishable, where \(T'_i = g^{t_i} \mod p, A'_i = g^{\alpha_i} \mod p, \alpha_i' = g^{\alpha_i' \mod p} \mod p\) and \(\gamma_i' = g^{\gamma_i' \mod p}\). By probability argument, since for any \(A_{i0} \in G_q = \{1\}\) and \(B_{i0} \in Z_q\), we have \(\Pr[A_i = A_{i0}, B_i = B_{i0}] = \Pr[A_i' = A_{i0}, B_i' = B_{i0}] = \frac{1}{q(q-1)}\). For any fixed \(A_{i0}\) and \(B_{i0}\), \(T_i\) is fixed, say \(T_{i0}\). Thus, we need to consider two probability distributions

\[
\Pr \left[ (\omega_{i1}, \omega_{i2}, \ldots, \omega_{im}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i) | A_i = A_{i0}, B_i = B_{i0} \right] = \Pr \left[ (\omega_{i1}, \omega_{i2}, \ldots, \omega_{im}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i) | T_i = T_{i0} \right]
\]

and

\[
\Pr \left[ (\omega_{i1}', \omega_{i2}', \ldots, \omega_{im}', \alpha_i', \gamma_i', \delta_i') | A_i' = A_{i0}, B_i' = B_{i0} \right] = \Pr \left[ (\omega_{i1}', \omega_{i2}', \ldots, \omega_{im}', \alpha_i', \gamma_i', \delta_i') \right].
\]

From the above discussions, therefore we only have to consider the real view \((\omega_{i1}, \omega_{i2}, \ldots, \omega_{im}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i)\) and the attacker’s view \((\omega_{i1}', \omega_{i2}', \ldots, \omega_{im}', \alpha_i', \gamma_i', \delta_i')\) are computationally indistinguishable. In fact, the above problem is the same as one in Tzeng’s protocol, refer to (Tzeng, 2002a) for the details of the proof.

### B. Security Against Impersonator’s Attacks

For impersonator’s adaptively chosen message attacks, it means that a malicious adversary wants to impersonate the legal participant \(U_i\) even if the broadcast channel is not authenticated. In provable security, the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) is usually adopted to demonstrate the security of key establishment protocols or signature schemes. Thus, we will show the improved protocol is secure against impersonator’s adaptively chosen message attacks under the random oracle model. In the improved protocol, each participant \(U_i\) broadcasts two sets of messages \((T_i, A_i, B_i)\) in the Step 1.1 and \((\omega_{i1}, \omega_{i2}, \ldots, \omega_{im}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i)\) in the Step 1.2. In Tzeng’s protocol, messages broadcast by \(U_i\) are \((\omega_{i1}, \omega_{i2}, \ldots, \omega_{im}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i)\), which are proved “existentially un-forgeable” against the adaptively chosen message attack. Thus in the improved protocol each participant uses the short-term public key \(T_i\) to distribute the sub-key, it is needed to show that no malicious adversary is able to forge the valid \(T_i\).

**Theorem 1.** Any malicious adversary \(E\), who can not compute the valid \(T_i\) of any legal user \(U_i\) in the random oracle model assuming that the discrete logarithm problem is intractable.

**Proof.** The proof follows from that in (Pointcheval and Stern, 1996) directly. Suppose that a malicious adversary \(E\) can impersonate \(U_i\) to sign \((T_i, M)\) with a non-negligible
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probability $\varepsilon$. Under the random oracle model, the one-way function $H$ is a true random function, that is, $H(T_i, M)$ is an independent random variable from $(T_i, M)$. Thus, by a probability argument, the malicious adversary $E$ can sign the messages $(T_i, M)$ to generate two valid signatures $(A_i, B_i, h)$ and $(A_i, B'_i, h')$ with a nonnegligible probability, where $A_i = g^{v_i} \mod p$, $B_i = v_i^{-1}(h - A_ix_i) \mod q$, $B'_i = v_i^{-1}(h' - A_ix_i) \mod q$, and $h$ and $h'$ are two hash values of $H(T_i, M)$ under the random oracle model. It is easy to see that since random number $v_i$ is used twice, the malicious adversary can compute the secret key $x_i$ using two equations $B_i = v_i^{-1}(h - A_ix_i) \mod q$ and $B'_i = v_i^{-1}(h' - A_ix_i) \mod q$, which is a contradiction.

C. Forward Secrecy

In the following theorem, we show that the improved protocol provides forward secrecy under the assumption that computing the discrete logarithm problem is difficulty (Menezes et al., 1997).

**Theorem 2.** Under the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm problem, the improved protocol provides forward secrecy.

**Proof.** Without loss of generality, let $U = \{U_1, U_2, \ldots, U_n\}$ be the set of participants and they have established a conference key $K$ at some past time $\tau$. The conference key $K$ is composed of all participants’ sub-keys $K_i$ ($1 \leq i \leq n$), as $K = (K_1 + K_2 + \cdots + K_n) \mod q$. And each $K_i$ is distributed to other participants $U_j$, $(1 \leq j \leq n)$ using their short-term public keys $T_j = g^v \mod p$. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain the short-term secret $t_j$. But in the following, we will show that even if an adversary with knowing $x_j$ is unable to obtain $t_j$. First, the adversary tries to get $t_j$ from $T_j = g^v \mod p$ directly, it is clear that the adversary must face the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm problem. Suppose that some participant $U_j$’s secret key $x_j$ is compromised at time $\tau + 1$, and an adversary knowing $x_j$ tries to learn the established conference key $K$ at time $\tau$. Since $T_j = g^v \mod p$, $A_j = g^{v_j} \mod p$, and $B_j = v_j^{-1}(H(T_j, M) - A_jx_j) \mod q$, the adversary may use $x_j$ to learn $v_j$ but not $t_j$, because $t_j$ does not involved in $B_j = v_j^{-1}(H(T_j, M) - A_jx_j) \mod q$.

On the other way, the adversary with knowing $x_j$ tries to obtain $K_j$ from $(\gamma_j, \delta_j)$, where $\gamma_j = g^{S_j} \mod p$ and $\delta_j = S_j^{-1}(H(K_j, M) - \gamma_jx_j) \mod q$. It is easy to see that $\delta_j$ has two other unknown variables $S_j$ and $K_j$. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain the random value $S_j$. But the adversary tries to get $S_j$ from $\gamma_j = g^{S_j} \mod p$ directly, he/she also faces the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm problem.

5. Performance Analysis

A new round is initiated each time when any number of participants needs to provide additional pieces of information to aid other participants for their key computation. Thus,
a round can be a participant forwarding a piece of information to another participant or many participants simultaneously broadcasting a piece of information to others. In this sense, Tzeng’s original protocol (Tzeng, 2002a) requires only one simultaneously broadcasting round for each participant. In the improved protocol, an extra broadcasting round is required. Nevertheless, the improved protocol requires only constant rounds.

Let us consider the size of messages sent by each participant in the improved protocol. Each participant $U_i$ broadcasts two sets of messages $(T_i, A_i, B_i)$ in the Step 1.1 and $(\omega_{i1}, \omega_{i2}, \ldots, \omega_{in}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i)$ in the Step 1.2, respectively. In Tzeng’s protocol, messages broadcasted by $U_i$ are $(\omega_{i1}, \omega_{i2}, \ldots, \omega_{in}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i)$. Therefore, the size of extra broadcast message is $2|p| + |q|$. Note that in both protocols, the size of messages that each participant sends is still proportional to the number of participants.

6. Conclusions

The improved protocol remains the merits of the original protocol with round efficiency and fault-tolerance. Under the same assumption of the variant Diffie–Hellman decision problem, we have shown that the improved protocol is secure against passive attacks. It is provably secure against impersonator attacks under the random oracle model. Furthermore, we have shown that the improved protocol offers forward secrecy, while Tzeng’s protocol does not provide this property.

References


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Modifikuotas konferencijos rakto generavimo protokolas, tenkinantis išankstinio saugumo sąlygą

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Tseng’as pasiūlė konferencijos rakto generavimo protokola. Straipsnyje parodyta, kad šis protokolas neužtikrina išankstinio saugumo (forward secrecy). Sakoma, kad konferencijos rakto generavimo protokolas tenkina išankstinio saugumo reikalavimą, kai bet kurio konferencijos dalyvio privatų raktų sukompromitavimas neturi įtakos konferencijos rakto saugumui. Straipsnyje pasiūlytas modifikuotas Tseng’o protokolas, tenkinantis išankstinio saugumo sąlygą. Atlikta modifikuoto protoko atsparumo įvairiu atakų atžvilgiu analizė.