Most efforts to combat fraud and abuse have relied on a punitive-deterrent approach, assuming that higher penalties and stricter enforcement will both punish present offenders and deter potential ones. Social science perspectives, particularly that of systems theory, suggest that a more effective approach is prevention grounded in an understanding of the constituencies involved.

Abstract
Constituency analysis can identify the constellations of social and political power that sustain existing opportunities for fraud and abuse, and those that will support countermeasures. Illustrations are drawn from the author's experience with New York State's attempt at reform in nursing homes and with efforts by the General Accounting Office and the Office of Management and Budget to combat fraud and abuse in federal programs.

This is the true story of an attempt to introduce into three government agencies—including the White House—a social science perspective to abet the valiant but so far quite futile drive to combat fraud and abuse. The story is modest enough. I was quite unsuccessful in gaining acceptance for the perspective I advocated. Therein lies a lesson, actually several lessons. At issue is why fraud and abuse have both yielded so little ground to so many drives against them. What are the underlying causes of fraud and abuse?
If they are systematically overlooked, as I claim is the rule, what are the reasons? And how might these reasons be overcome?

I was minding my own business at Columbia University in 1975 when Gus Tyler, a labor union intellectual and friend, called to say that he had recommended that I use my social science training to help a new commission about to be announced. In the preceding weeks, the New York Times had run a series of exposés of serious and pervasive abuses in nursing homes. Even before these appeared, a book on these problems, entitled Tender Loving Greed, had stirred public interest. Local TV and radio stations played the story for all it was worth. When a flamboyant but persistent assemblyman, Andrew Stein, drew on this wave of interest to challenge New York's Governor Hugh Carey, the governor found it wise to look into the charges against the nursing homes. He appointed a special prosecutor to study the allegations and launched a special state commission to investigate the underlying causes and suggest generic cures. (The commission was to turn over to the special prosecutor, conveniently located nearby, any specific instances of "wrong-doing" it came across, so it could concentrate on the underlying forces and correctives.)

To head the commission, the governor appointed Morris B. Abram, a trial lawyer who had served as a U.S. representative to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and had once run unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate. Other commissioners included another lawyer and close associate of the chairman, a black woman activist, a WASP Republican woman from Rochester, and a Jewish physician from New York City. As is customary, the commissioners were to meet occasionally, a few hours a month; but under my direction the staff was going to do much of the work.

It soon became quite evident that there were two conflicting major strategies, one favored by the commission's lawyers, the other by a lone sociologist, me. These strategies deserve attention, because similar differences of approach are often encountered, implicitly or explicitly, in drives of the sort that the commission was to undertake.

The strategy favored by the lawyers was to conduct hearings and some staff research to form recommendations as to how the laws and regulations concerning nursing homes might be changed. One problem, for instance, was with overbilling by nursing home owners. When owners were caught by the government, in the act of overbilling, restitution was expected, but it was by no means commonly achieved. Nursing home owners could tie up the state in courts for years, and they could charge their legal expenses to taxpayers by adding them to the costs of their services, to be reimbursed by the government. If convicted, nursing home owners could sometimes avoid restitution by closing in New York only to reopen in New Jersey. The commission's lawyers suggested that the appropriate law should be changed so that the state agencies...
involved could levy interest charges on these funds until restitution was made.

The conception underlying this approach seemed so self-evident to the lawyers that it was not often explicitly discussed: Better law enforcement would be achieved if penalties for violations were higher. Greater penalties would serve both to rehabilitate abusers and to deter other potential abusers. Most of the recommendations the commission finally made were in line with this punitive-deterrent approach.

Even less often articulated and discussed—at least at first—was how to achieve the desired changes in laws, regulations, and enforcement procedures. Some heated late-night debates elicited from the commission’s lawyers the theory as to where the forces of change are, and how they can be tapped. The main torchbearer was to be the public at large, whose irate drumfire was going to be kept at high pitch during a series of dramatic hearings the commission planned, hearings during which abused patients were to be rolled out in wheelchairs, and notorious nursing home owners were to be exposed. As a result, it was expected that the public was going to “demand action” and the governor “could not but respond,” “as he has repeatedly promised,” by supporting the legislative reforms that the commission was to unveil at the end of its appointed nine months of labor. (At one point the commission’s chairman announced publicly that “his hearing on political interference in the nursing home scandals will be so revealing that lawmakers will have to pass his ethics proposals.”)

From the depth of my utterly theoretical background, I could not have agreed less. I had never held public office before, never run an investigation before. I was armed with a social science perspective evolved over a decade and a half studying American society, and a theory spelled out best in my book *The Active Society.*

My brief was as follows. The public is a fickle ally. About the only thing you can be sure of is that it will soon turn elsewhere. Once deserted by the public, the commission (and the governor) would be alone in facing the well-heeled nursing home lobby. The commission had to use its term to fashion not merely the reforms but also the power base to support them.

One possibility was to take a leaf from the book of the National Association for Retarded Children, which in those days was raising hell about the warehousing of retarded children in state institutions. The association was not only demanding the passage of reform bills; it was monitoring their implementation, a little matter many reformers overlook. Its persistence led ultimately to the deinstitutionalization of thousands of children to homes and community centers. The commission, I suggested, could help form an association of people whose parents were in nursing homes to fill a similar role.

On consultation with people who had long worked in the field, however, I eventually concluded that this strategy was impractical. Most people who leave their elders in nursing homes, experi-
ence suggests, seem to be insufficiently motivated to act on their behalf. A secondary consideration was that the National Association for Retarded Children was widely considered a nuisance, if not a "menace," because of its often confrontational attitude; the state bureaucrats did not exactly look forward to dealing with another association of the same ilk. After all, the commission had to have the governor's support for its conclusions.

Accordingly, my main recommendation was to rely on existing power groups with an interest or commitment on the side of nursing home reform, such as the Grey Panthers, associations of social workers, and the major ethnic religious groups. Draw them to participate in formulating the commission's recommendations, so that they would consider the recommendations theirs as well as ours. Help create a pro-reform coalition of these groups by establishing a nursing home reform advisory board composed of their representatives. Recommend the formation of a permanent commission composed of these representatives.

Although these groups are often called interest groups, this term does not characterize them well. It brings to mind groups dedicated only to the well being of their members and preoccupied with their pocketbooks. The groups listed here, however, are often quite dedicated to a view of the public interest that is above and beyond the interest of their members. For instance, though such groups had very few black members, they were often quite active on behalf of minority rights. And they were concerned with a multiplicity of needs and values, not merely pecuniary ones. Most important from the viewpoint of the issue at hand, these groups had organized memberships, political representation in Albany (in effect their own lobbyists), and a lasting ability to support public policies they believed in.

The suggested permanent commission would be expected to issue an annual statement on the condition of nursing homes in the state. Its members and staff would have the right of unlimited visits to nursing homes, typically denied to outsiders. It would also be the guardian of last resort for incompetent patients with no next of kin, both in order to protect them from the abuses that are common when nursing home owners are made guardians and to increase the occasions for nursing home visits by representatives of the commission. Finally, long after our temporary commission had been dissolved, the permanent commission could recommend additional reforms as needed and marshal support for them among its constituent groups.

I visited informally with some representatives of these groups and found interest in the general approach, broad knowledge about the problems of the nursing homes, and many specific ideas for reforms.

After lengthy debates with the commission's lawyers about these two approaches, and after a vain attempt to follow both simultaneously, the lawyers' strategy was adopted. Feeling that the commission might do little good and probably some inadvertent harm (by dissipating the steam that had been built up in the
reform drive), I resigned. The commission held to its course and after a series of dramatic hearings (including a midnight visit, with TV cameras, to a nursing home) it reported eleven recommendations. Ten of these involved fairly innocuous changes in the law. Some were marginally useful, some irrelevant. One, for example, allowed class actions by nursing home patients against owners. Class actions are a useful tool for consumers but not for nursing home residents, who are under the owners’ control, often unable to move to another home, and dependent on the home for nursing care and even food. (Though the law was passed, no suit has ever been brought under its provisions.)

The eleventh suggestion was a bombshell. It would have prohibited the members of the New York legislature from being on the payroll or receiving “retainers” from the nursing home industry. Specifically, it would have barred legislators from representing clients before state agencies. State legislators serve part-time in most states and they usually do have outside work. The nursing home lobby was believed to have many New York state legislators on retainer.

By the time the commission’s recommendations reached the governor—and through him, the legislature—the nursing home scandal had moved from an almost daily appearance on page one to an occasional mention in fillers on the back pages. The investigative reporter who started it all had left the New York Times. The media and the public were deeply immersed in a new issue that was even more breathtaking, the New York city financial crisis. The New York state legislature passed ten of the eleven proposed reforms; predictably, number eleven was left out. Morris Abram, the commission’s head, observed that he expected another nursing home scandal would erupt within five or ten years. The New York Times, reporting his observations, added, “Indeed, the structure of the industry remains what it was, and the cast of characters is only slightly different.” The reporter who had helped to start it all, returning to survey the industry, summarized his findings with the statement, “Literally, it is business as usual in the nursing homes.”

Why call this and other such developments the theater of reform? Because much of the drama is staged for the benefit of an audience, the public, and much thought and effort go into keeping it engrossing (“newsworthy”), but it results in few if any real changes in the world behind the stage sets.

THE DEAF IN DIALOGUE In the years that followed the nursing home drama, I had another opportunity to try to gain support for real change, based on social science considerations, in the approach to fraud and abuse, first at the General Accounting Office (GAO), an arm of Congress, and then at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), part of the White House. With variations on the theme, I took the same fundamental position I had taken in the nursing homes case. The outcomes too proved similar.
At GAO When people from two different academic or intellectual disciplines attempt to engage in dialogue, they must reconcile themselves to the fact that each discipline makes its own distinctive assumptions about the nature of the universe it deals with and how it functions. These assumptions are so "basic" to the members of the discipline, so firmly built into their concepts, that they are either unaware of them in daily intercourse or unwilling to deal with them explicitly. Economists, for instance, tend to assume that people are basically rational in their behavior, which is not what psychoanalysts assume.

When I tried to suggest to the senior members of the GAO, an agency set up by Congress to investigate "all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds," that they use systems analysis to ferret out the root causes of fraud and abuse and to build preventive systems, I ran into just such a difference in perspective, rooted in what Veblen termed "trained incapacity." The accountants and investigators who dominate GAO, as well as the efficiency experts and economists who back them up, are expertly trained to look at the world through their particular lenses, which makes it more difficult for them than for a lay person to see it the way a political scientist or sociologist or social psychologist would see it.

The first reaction to my suggestion to use system analysis was an open puzzle. That, I was told, had already been done. One of the GAO's main achievements over the last years, according to the agency's heads, had been to shift from transaction-by-transaction auditing to a systems analysis of the subject agencies' control and verification procedures, and beyond that to program evaluation and analysis. This was the reason investigators were supplemented with auditors, and auditors with economists and efficiency experts—indeed the reason a whole division, Program Analysis, was created. Moreover, it was made clear to me that I did not appreciate how difficult it was for systems analysis to gain acceptance in a world of investigators and transaction-by-transaction auditors; indeed, the shift was still far from fully legitimated or embraced.

After considerable discussion, it gradually became clear that while we were all talking about systems analysis, we had rather different kinds of systems analysis in mind. The most progressive thinkers in GAO were thinking in terms of administrative systems, composed of management procedures, control mechanisms, and verification overlays. I was thinking about constituency systems (or power constellations) and their dynamics. Thus, a GAO person proudly pointed to their idea of using social security information to locate runaway fathers, a step that promises to reduce the cost of welfare, inasmuch as the largest item of the welfare budget was aid to families with dependent children. I had no trouble with the technical validity of the idea, but I wondered if it took into account the very strong commitment of most Americans against such use of data banks. One of the few themes shared by liberals and conservatives is a commitment to the privacy of information that a citizen
The GAO did not appear particularly keen to take on a second line of systems analysis before it had completed adopting the first. Nobody denied my arguments about the need to back up the first line of analysis with the second, but neither did anybody seem eager to add to their existing load. The newly appointed Inspectors General (IGs) seemed a more promising audience. In each of the twelve federal agencies, an IG was charged, under legislation passed by Congress in 1978, with conducting and supervising audits and investigations in order to "promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" and, specifically, "to prevent and detect fraud and abuse."

The IGs were to report to two higher authorities: the Department of Justice and OMB. I assumed Justice would be the more deeply attuned to the punish-and-deter view, so I turned to OMB. There I had several amicable discussions with the assistant director charged with management improvement and evaluation, as well as with members of his staff. The meetings were followed by memos explicating the concept of constituency analysis, which elicited responses that would flatter the uninitiated. The ideas, it seemed, were "worthwhile," "interesting," and "valuable," but there were reasons why OMB would not, could not, act on the matter. There was a rivalry between OMB and Justice, especially the FBI, over who would control how much of the drive against fraud and abuse. And OMB's leaders were not sure the president was really very keen to do much in this area. Constituency analysis, as seen through the eyes of the professional bureaucrat, appeared "too political," more than a career civil servant could be expected to handle.

A perusal of the IG's semiannual reports provided no evidence of any concern with constituency analysis. Apart from organizational matters, the reports were dedicated largely to accounts of punish-and-deter drives; these usually had yielded relatively little. For instance, the much touted Project Integrity, a computerized search for dishonest Medicaid doctors and druggists, "yielded 25 indictments, 8 convictions, and nearly $3 million in claims for restitution of government funds, plus other savings." The sum of $3 million could hardly be noticed in the multibillion dollar program, and the possibility that a considerable part of even that sum would actually be collected appeared slight. Two observers concluded simply: "Recent Justice Department figures indicate that referrals for fraud prosecution have not increased, despite the existence of the 12 new Inspectors General." The next port of call was the Inspectors General themselves. Three of the twelve were reputed to be particularly able. One of them, with powers of inspection over the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), had at his command 1024 positions, most filled with accountants and investigators trained—like voluntarily provides the government; to use social security information against a citizen in a welfare program might amount to self-incrimination. In the case at hand, I wondered if it was practical to ignore these feelings.
The position profile does not do full justice to the issue, though. Some of those not assigned to systems analysis might actually do it. Indeed, as one accountant put it, “accountants are expected, by the tenets of their profession, to do systems analysis.” Asked “But do they do it?” his response—“well . . .”—was far from reassuring. Moreover, whatever systems analysis they do tends to be of the administrative, not the constituency, type. And their organizational culture, as my accountant agreed, tends to promote “head hunting and dollar hunting.”

An Inspector General further explained to me that the IGs were aware of the constituency problem but did not see it as their responsibility. He cited the IG statute as saying they should act “without regard to political affiliation,” and he capped it all by observing: “We are not Common Cause.”

The IG assigned to the Labor Department was quick to grasp the significance of constituency analysis and hoped to use it in the future. It was at Labor that I came upon yet another affirmation of the need for that approach, in an exploration of the forces behind the continued fraud and abuse in the program on pneumoconiosis (black lung disease). The Department of Labor determines what benefits are due to coal miners afflicted by black lung disease. Benefits are due to coal miners who are found to be totally disabled by the illness as a result of employment in the coal mines. Prior to 1977, few claims were approved and paid, because of strict requirements for the evidence needed to establish “total disability,” “pneumoconiosis,” and the status of “coal miner.” During the period 1973–1978, only 7% of the claims were approved and a total of $78 million was paid in benefits.

In 1977, Congress amended the law to relax the standard. In doing so it was prodded by members of Congress who represented states where coal mining is a big and growing business. Under the amendments, the status of “coal miner” was extended to include people who did not actually work in a coal mine but “around” one, such as truck drivers and construction workers. Most telling, physicians specially trained to interpret x rays for the presence of black lung were prohibited from performing that function, except to determine acceptable film quality.

Following these amendments the approval rate jumped to 40%, and $718 million was paid out in one year alone, fiscal year 1980. (The figure reflects both new claims and the reprocessing of some previously denied ones.) This led to outcries in Congress and the media about abuses of the program and eventually to some tightening of the standards.

The underlying force in the relaxation of standards was the
The Fight Against Fraud and Abuse

pressure by the miners' union, many of whose members had come to claim black lung benefits as a part of their retirement rights, whether they had black lung or not. The root of the problem was clearly not poor enforcement of the law by Labor, or even congressionally "mandated waste," but the pressure of the coal miner constituency.

Obviously, there were ways to approach the black lung problem other than simply increasing the efforts to root out fraud, an approach that constituent groups were almost certain to block. One possibility was to consider increasing retirement benefits for all miners, based on the risks of working underground. But that possibility, though reasonable on its face, has not been fully explored.

We did not do much better at Agriculture in exploring with its Inspector General what to do about school lunches. The school lunch program, which dished out more than $3 billion a year before the Reagan administration cut it, provides meals to some 27 million pupils a year, in 94,000 schools and institutions. Lunches are either free, or are available at reduced prices, depending on the income of the parents. To establish children's eligibility, they or their parents must fill out forms indicating family income. There tends to be a great deal of fudging and inaccuracy in the income reports. Government audits estimate that more than 25% of the applications misrepresented families' incomes enough to result in their receiving more benefits than they were entitled to. Another 8.2% of those declared eligible for free meals or meals at reduced prices had no applications on file or provided information on their applications that was manifestly contradictory or that disqualified the applicant.

Schools are reluctant to verify the applications, preferring instead to serve free lunches to "ineligible" children. "School principals," notes a representative of the American Association of School Administrators, "are not suited to make welfare determinations by either training or temperament. The nature of their professional inclinations causes them to err on the side of leniency." In addition, schools found it attractive to divert some of the lunch funds for other purposes. Audits found that nearly half (45.5%) of the schools reported inaccurate meal counts. Some schools claimed the maximum number of free lunches served every day, despite any absences, so that they were paid federal funds for meals that students not in the program had already paid for. Other sources of inflated meal counts include meals prepared but not served, meals served to teachers, and a la carte meals, none of which qualify for federal reimbursement. There followed wave upon wave of local audits and investigations, finding high "error rates" and abuses, leading the media and Congress to cry for greater school scrutiny.

Various administrative fixes have been suggested. In October 1979, the Assessment, Improvement and Monitoring System (AIMS) was proposed, which would require state agencies to monitor food programs more closely, through regular periodic
reviews. This proposal met with widespread opposition from state agencies, the "Child Nutrition Coalition," food service firms, and others. Leading the many complaints was the suggestion that AIMS would create much more paperwork.

Working with the IG at Agriculture, I tried to chart the major constituencies involved. They turned out to include a surprisingly large and complicated array of groups, but four stood out.

First and foremost was the food industry, especially the food processors and the manufacturers of frozen foods, the "producers" of the lunches.

Second, the farm lobby was obviously keenly interested. The school lunch program was enacted in 1946 as a way of helping to dispose of surplus agricultural production. It is estimated that in one year alone, 1975, over $2 billion worth of food was used by the program. The farm lobby was concerned mainly with maintaining the flow of products—much less with who exactly used them. But that did not stop the members of Congress representing farming districts from beating on the Department of Agriculture bureaucrats for their failure to prevent fraud and abuse in the program.

Equally predictable was the position of liberal, urban, and minority groups, which favored the program as a way to channel food to their constituents and fought attempts at extensive policing ("so what if some near-poor get a free lunch?").

Much less in the public eye, but not far behind the others in power, was the American School Food Service Association, whose members for a quarter of a century had run the school-lunch program and protected the regime of laxity surrounding it. They were one of those narrow-focus interest groups with good contacts in the state capitols, and among governors and congressional delegations. They were not seeking to line their own pockets but to use school lunch monies for other school expenditures, such as buying uniforms and balls for the schools’ basketball teams. They also saw in the imposition of a stronger accounting scheme high administrative costs for them, invasion of the privacy of pupils and their families, and a demand to label some kids as poor.

Some obvious alternatives to the tightening of the regulations commended themselves, alternatives that were much more sensitive to the constituency problem. For example, using Census data on the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in which schools were located, and whatever other data were available, schools could be scored according to the composite economic status of their pupils rather than "scoring" the pupils individually. Each school could then be given a lump sum for school lunches based on the proportion of students deemed entitled to free and reduced-price lunches. The rest—how much they wished to collect from whom—would be up to each school, including their use of funds they saved. There would be no opportunity to falsify the data in order to enhance the school’s allotments, as the data to be used would not be under the control or influence of the school. And the federal government would save the costs of compliance, auditing,
and investigation, as there would no longer be individual applications or even school expenditure audits. The school administrators could be expected to support such a reform strongly, because it would give them greater flexibility in the use of the funds and reduce the paperwork involved. The farm lobby could live with it, because it would require no cut in the use of commodities. The urban groups would probably be least sanguine about it, because it would leave local authorities much freedom to determine the allocation of the funds, while they felt national determinations would be better for their followers.

Before the details of the proposal were worked out, let alone formally recommended and tried, the elections brought a new President who, despite the previous notion that the Inspectors General were nonpolitical appointees, fired them all in one day. I left the White House to return to academe. In the months that followed, fighting fraud and abuse was not given a high priority.

A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE

Among the most valuable contributions of the social sciences are ways of thinking and acting in the social and personal realms that are more realistic and more effective than those provided by religion, secular ideologies, or natural science, let alone "common sense."

Systems Theory as a Perspective

With New York's investigative commission on nursing homes and with GAO and OMB, the idea that I urged on the government, elementary to social scientists, has at its root the insight provided by systems theory. The essence of systems theory is that changes introduced in one factor, the "independent" variable, cannot "predict" the consequences, the effects on another factor (the "dependent" variable), at least not in the way that cause and effect appear to be related by common sense, or by historians who belong to the school of challenge and response, or by the psychologists of stimulus and response. The social and personal worlds are governed by multiple factors that all relate to each other, making up the system. Hence, to understand what effect changes in one factor will have on another requires understanding the "place" of the two factors in the system, their relationships to the other factors that also are members of the system. What to the uninitiated are "unanticipated consequences" of initiatives are typically the work of other factors that have been overlooked by tunnel vision but that have a chance of being seen by the systems analyst.

After the nursing home drama in New York, I had not thought much about the use of systems theory to combat fraud and abuse, until I read about the legislation (Public Law 95-452) that set up the Offices of Inspector General. The bill contains not a hint of why fraud and abuse exist in the first place, or why they persist in the face of numerous attempts to go after them. Its implied foundation, confirmed by interviews with the congressional staff members who helped draft the bill, was the assumption that sending more auditors and investigators after the malefactors would reduce the problem.
The enforcer approach relies on two closely linked conceptions: punishment and deterrence. It seeks to ferret out and punish those who engage in fraud and abuse, on the somewhat simple notion that if there are more crooks in jail, there will be fewer loose. The catch is that the government’s work involves billions of transactions each month. Criminals and other abusers obviously have a high incentive to conceal their acts, which further swells the work of the enforcers. Moreover, the transgressors are entitled to due process in court or in administrative hearings.

Hence to catch them one by one and dispose of each case is a monumental and thankless task. It is safe to assume that even with a beefed-up force of auditors and investigators the net number of transgressions may be reduced very little. This is a lesson implied in the fact that for a long period, as more people were sent to jail, crime rates refused to fall.

Enter deterrence, the other half of the catch-and-punish-them approach. It assumes that for every one caught and punished, there will be scores of others who will take heed. There is a well-known reason this approach often does not work: the smallness of the penalty and the low probability of having to face it. In many fields of law enforcement—nursing homes, drug traffic, white collar crime—the abuser is unlikely to be caught; if caught he is often not convicted, and if convicted, he often does not serve the sentence imposed or pay the fine. FBI statistics on violent crimes in 1977, for instance, show that in the 1847 cities studied, 39.4% of the reported offenses resulted in an arrest, 37.6% in a criminal charge. Conviction rates are lower: of the total number of offenses reported, 11.5% resulted in convictions on the original charge; another 2.9% in convictions on lesser charges; 6.3% in referrals to juvenile court. In other words, the effect of “deterrence” is often the opposite of what was intended: it does not deter but encourages.

Those who fashioned the bill setting up Inspectors General did not ask what level of penalties would deter, what degree of enforcement would generate a deterrent rather than an inducement effect, or under what conditions the needed penalties and enforcers would be available. It was implicitly assumed that “more” enforcement was better, but there was no concept of a threshold below which insufficient punishment ceases to deter crime.

The punishment-deterrence approach may make sense in the abstract when sufficient resources are available and other conditions, such as community acceptance, are met. The catch, to reiterate, is that typically it is applied in practice without anywhere near the needed resources or public support. Moreover, even when it is well supported, extensive reliance on it (as distinct from using it as a second line of defense) is inferior to preventive methods, because it is costly in human and economic terms.

In the attack on fraud and abuse, social science perspectives favor prevention over post hoc penalties, the basis of the punitive-deterrent approach, on grounds of efficiency and motivation. Reducing opportunities for fraud and abuse before the fact...
The Fight Against Fraud and Abuse

will tend to be much more cost efficient than dealing with the malefactors only after the fact (although prevention can be stretched to the point that it becomes overly costly and unproductive). Furthermore, as various studies show, it is much less alienating because, if successful, it often removes the motivation to engage in fraud and abuse, rather than frustrating the perpetrators. And the first step in fashioning a program of prevention is to understand the constituencies involved.

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NOTES
5. Ibid.
8. For reports on this transition, see Rourke, John T., ibid., and Mosher, Frederick C., The GAO (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), especially Chap. 7.
12. Communication from Peterson, cited earlier.
15. Private communication from a representative of the American Association of School Administrators.
16. AIMS Briefing, op. cit., p. 3.