Immigration and Welfare Support in Germany

Alexander Schmidt-Catran

GESIS Lecture Series

Mannheim – June 7th, 2016

Agenda

1. Introduction
2. Theory
3. Data and Methods
4. Results
5. Conclusion

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Introduction

- What will the future (European) welfare states look like?
- Public opinion as one determinant of welfare state generosity (Brooks & Manza 2006a, 2006b; Soroka & Wlezien 2010)

The US-American Case

- Ethnic heterogeneity as a cause of the compartively low level of welfare state generosity in the USA (Gilens 1999; Alesina et.al. 2001; Luttmer 2001; Alesina & Glaeser 2004)

… and in Europe?

- „American Exceptionalism“? … or…
- Will increasing migration in Europe undermine support for welfare states and ultimately „push the continent toward more American levels of spending“? (Alesina & Glaeser 2004: 175)

Migration and Public Support for the Welfare State



- Empirical evidence rather ambigous
  - No substantial relationship (Mau & Burkhardt 2009)
  - Negative relationship (Eger 2010)
  - Positive relationship (Brady & Finnigan 2013)
- Methodological issues?
  - Cross-sectional (unobserved heterogeneity)
  - Countries as higher-level clusters (small-N problem)

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Macro-Micro-Macro Link



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

- Contact hypothesis (-) (Allport 1954)
- Conflict hypothesis (+) (Forbes 1997)

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

- Contact hypothesis (-)
- Conflict hypothesis (+) (Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2006)

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

- Cultural threat (-) (Finseraas 2009; Schmidt & Spies 2014)
- Economic threat (+) (Finseraas 2009; Schmidt & Spies 2014)

Migration and Welfare Support

- Economic conditions as moderators: Tensions on job market lead to more critical attitudes towards immigrants (Mau & Burkhardt 2009; Soroka et.al. 2003; Taylor-Gooby 2005)

Hypotheses

- H1: The higher the number of foreign-born, the lower natives' welfare support (conflict hypothesis)
- H2: The higher the number of foreign-born, the higher natives' welfare support (protection hypothesis)
- H3: The higher the unemployment rate, the stronger is the effect of the number of foreign-born on natives' welfare support

- Furthermore, we expect a non-linear effect of the share of migrants

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Analysis Strategy

- Use many regional instead of few national context units
  - Theoretically: Perception of migrants should depend on daily experience
  - Methodologically: Less measurement error, no unobserved between country heterogeneity, and more statistical power
- Get longitudinal estimators
  - Address omitted variable bias / unobserved heterogeneity
  - Problem: All available surveys are cross-sectional – how to get a longitudinal estimator?

Data

- Individual-level data from the German General Social Survey (Allbus, 1994, 2000, 2006, 2010, cross-sectional)
- Share of foreigners (and unemployment rates) at regional level (RORs, n=96)
- Access to data only at secure work space (GESIS SDC)

Regional Distribution of Migrants in Germany

Proportion of the population with migration-background



Source: Federal Statistical Office (2011)

Variables

- Dependent variable: “Some people say that the level of welfare benefits is too high in Germany and that it should be retrenched; other people say that welfare benefits should be increased. What is your opinion on this?”
  - [1] decrease benefit level
  - [2] keep benefit level
  - [3] increase benefit level
- Independent variables:
  - Share of foreign-born (proxy for migrants, Corr=.92 in 2011)
  - Unemployment rate

Control Variables

- Controls
  - Equivalized household income (square-root-scale)
  - Employment status (working, unemployed, not in lab force)
  - Education (lower secondary, upper secondary, tertiary)
  - Gender
  - Age
  - Married
  - Left-right self-placement
  - Community size (<1,999, 2,000-4,999, ... , > 500,000)
  - East/West
  - Regional GDP/C
  - Time trend (dummy variables)

Population and Data

- Population: Natives = having German citizenship *and* being born in Germany
- Final data set:
  - 4 waves (1994, 2000, 2006, 2010)
  - 7,816 individuals
  - 94 RORs
- How to model this data?

Excursus: How to Model Pooled Cross-sectional Survey Data?

- Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016):
- Three kinds of random effects
  - RE for geographical clusters (e.g., countries, regions)
  - RE for survey waves/time (e.g., years)
  - RE for combinations of geographical clusters and time-points (country-years)

Level	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F
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Year			✓		✓	✓
Country-Year	✓		✓	✓		✓



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

Fixed Effects			Random Effects			RE Structure	Paper
C	C-Y	Y	C	C-Y	Y		
✓	✓			✓		A	Gerlitz *et al.* 2012
✓	✓			✓		A	van der Lippe *et al.* 2011
✓	✓			✓		A	Huijts *et al.* 2010
✓			✓			B	Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013
✓			✓			B	Dinesen 2013
✓			✓			B	Stegmueller *et al.* 2012
✓	✓		✓			B	Meulemann 2012
✓			✓			B	Engelhardt 2012
✓			✓			B	Kalmijn 2010
	✓		✓			B	Eger 2010
✓			✓			B	Biedinger *et al.* 2008
	✓		✓			B	Fekjær and Birkelund 2007
	✓		✓			B	Kogan and Kalter 2006
✓	✓	✓	✓			B	Meulemann 2004
	✓	✓		✓	✓	C	Schlueter and Davidov 2013
	✓			✓	✓	C	Andersen *et al.* 2006
✓	✓		✓	✓		D	Fairbrother 2013
	✓	✓	✓		✓	E	Lubbers and Scheepers 2001

Summary of Excursus

- More than half of the papers we reviewed use RE-structures that do not adequately reflect the clustering in the data
- This leads to downward biased standard errors and thereby increases the risk to make Type I errors (simulation results)
- Recommendation: Use



first is appropriate if variables are measured only at country and country-year level. Using year dummies within the first approach then controls for variation at this level.

Method

- Hierarchical mixed effects model with three levels (Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother, 2016)



ROR

ROR-Year

Individuals

Method

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

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

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

$\bar{z}_j$ ROR
("between effects")

$(z_{jt} - \bar{z}_j)$ ROR-Year
("within effects")

x_{jti} Individuals
("between effects")

Method

- Here: three-level ordinal probit mixed effects regression because hybrid approach can be econometrically proven to provide consistent estimates in the probit but not in the logit case (Wooldridge 2010: 615-17, 620)
- Decomposing context-level effects into within- and between-component (Fairbrother 2014):

$$\Pr(\mathrm{Y} \leq \mathrm{k} \mid \mathrm{X}, \mathrm{Z}) = \Phi(\beta \mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{jti}} + \gamma^{WE}(Z_{jt} - \overline{Z}_j) + \gamma^{BE}\overline{Z}_j + u_{jt} + u_j)$$

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Results

	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Year						
1994		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
2000		-0.3384 ***	-0.3300 ***	-0.3113 ***	-0.3710 ***	-0.3667 ***
2004		-0.4278 ***	-0.4670 ***	-0.4371 ***	-0.4481 ***	-0.4421 ***
2010		-0.0190	0.1015	0.1091	0.0737	0.0450
Male		-0.1714 ***	-0.1685 ***	-0.1669 ***	-0.1677 ***	-0.1665 ***
Age		-0.0073 ***	-0.0072 ***	-0.0073 ***	-0.0073 ***	-0.0073 ***
Married		0.0023	0.0029	0.0000	0.0015	-0.0018
Education						
Primary		0.0981 **	0.0977 **	0.0981 **	0.0975 **	0.0978 **
Lower Secondary		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Higher Secondary		-0.2039 ***	-0.2001 ***	-0.2015 ***	-0.2004 ***	-0.2016 ***
Employment Status						
Employed		-0.1206 ***	-0.1203 ***	-0.1227 ***	-0.1223 ***	-0.1236 ***
Unemployed		0.2612 ***	0.2571 ***	0.2549 ***	0.2539 ***	0.2529 ***
Not in labor force		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Left-Right		-0.0948 ***	-0.0949 ***	-0.0948 ***	-0.0948 ***	-0.0946 ***
Equiv. HH-Income (in 1,000€)		-0.1102 ***	-0.1106 ***	-0.1089 ***	-0.1103 ***	-0.1087 ***
Community Size	Not shown					
West Germany		-0.5701 ***	-0.4745 ***	-0.5255 ***	-0.4677 ***	-0.5235 ***

Share foreigners (between)			-0.0160	0.0116	-0.0108	0.0475
Share foreigners (within)			-0.1638 ***	-0.5213 ***	-0.0315	-0.0044
Unemployment rate (between)			0.0040	0.0055	0.0070	0.0176
Unemployment rate (within)			0.0466 ***	0.0499 ***	0.0700 ***	0.1104 ***
Share foreigners^2 (between)				-0.0016		-0.0026
Share foreigners^2 (within)				0.0186 ***		-0.0048
Foreigners*Unemployment rate (between)					-0.0005	-0.0014
Foreigners*Unemploy.rate (within)					-0.0089 **	-0.0302 **
Foreigners^2*Unempl. rate(between)						0.0000
Foreigners^2*Unempl. rate(within)						0.0016 *
GDP/C (in 1,000€) (between)			0.0037	0.0057	0.0034	0.0063
GDP/C (in 1,000€) (within)			-0.0018	0.0124	-0.0064	0.0053
Cut1	-1.2054 ***	-2.9142 ***	-2.7944 ***	-2.6677 ***	-2.7719 ***	-2.4691 ***
Cut2	0.6711 ***	-0.9592 ***	-0.8402 ***	-0.7145 **	-0.8179 ***	-0.5160
Variance Components						
Var(ROR)	0.0625 ***	0.0055	0.0070	0.0088	0.0082	0.0097
Var(Year)	0.0892 ***	0.0351 ***	0.0222 **	0.0156 *	0.0188 *	0.0115
Statistics						
N (RORs)	94	94	94	94	94	94
N (ROR-years)	267	267	267	267	267	267
N (Individuals)	7816	7816	7816	7816	7816	7816
AIC	13863.118	13246.724	13229.215	13219.422	13224.482	13214.159
BIC	13890.974	13406.894	13431.169	13435.303	13440.364	13457.897
Log Likelihood	-6927.559	-6600.362	-6585.608	-6578.7109	-6581.2412	-6572.0796

Notes: * p=.05, ** p=.01, *** p.001 (two-sided tests).
Source: GGSS (1994, 2000, 2004, 2010); Federal Statistical Office Germany (2013).

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Non-linear Effect of Share of Foreigners



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Interaction Between Share of Foreigners and Unemployment Rate



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Foreigners^2*Unempl. rate(within)						0.0016 *
GDP/C (in 1,000€) (between)			0.0037	0.0057	0.0034	0.0063
GDP/C (in 1,000€) (within)			-0.0018	0.0124	-0.0064	0.0053
Cut1	-1.2054 ***	-2.9142 ***	-2.7944 ***	-2.6677 ***	-2.7719 ***	-2.4691 ***
Cut2	0.6711 ***	-0.9592 ***	-0.8402 ***	-0.7145 **	-0.8179 ***	-0.5160
Variance Components						
Var(ROR)	0.0625 ***	0.0055	0.0070	0.0088	0.0082	0.0097
Var(Year)	0.0892 ***	0.0351 ***	0.0222 **	0.0156 *	0.0188 *	0.0115
Statistics						
N (RORs)	94	94	94	94	94	94
N (ROR-years)	267	267	267	267	267	267
N (Individuals)	7816	7816	7816	7816	7816	7816
AIC	13863.118	13246.724	13229.215	13219.422	13224.482	13214.159
BIC	13890.974	13406.894	13431.169	13435.303	13440.364	13457.897
Log Likelihood	-6927.559	-6600.362	-6585.608	-6578.7109	-6581.2412	-6572.0796

Notes: * p=.05, ** p=.01, *** p.001 (two-sided tests).
Source: GGSS (1994, 2000, 2004, 2010); Federal Statistical Office Germany (2013).

Interaction Share of Foreigners (non-linear) and Unemployment Rate







Agenda

1. Introduction
2. Theory
3. Data and Methods
4. Results
5. Conclusion

Conclusion and Discussion

- Robust evidence for a negative relationship between migration and natives‘ support for welfare in Germany
  - Effect particularly strong in initial phase of migration
  - Effect more negative if unemployment rate high
- Does this relationship hold in other countries?
  - Germany as a least likely case scenario – so maybe yes (?)
  - Currently working on an encompassing data set for Europe
- Net effect dependent on strength of economic and cultural threats?!
- Does this translate to real policies? Welfare chauvinism vs. general welfare preferences and party preferences!?

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Thank you!

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Appendix

Some More Results



The Informative Case of Switzerland



Published in *European Journal of Social Policy* (2016, with Dennis Spies)

The Informative Case of Switzerland



Micro Level Model



RMSEA=.047
CFI=.947
TLI=.926
CD=.804

Political Discourse



Published in *Comparative Political Studies* (2014, with Dennis Spies)

Playing the Race Card

- Positive effect of economic threat on demand for redistribution (not shown).
- Negative effect of cultural threat and perceived welfare abuse, both effects moderated by the salience of anti-immigrant issues in the political discourse.