

Vulnerability Discovery with Attack Injection

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
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Introduction (1/2)

❖ Vulnerability

- Faults caused by wrong design, implementation mistakes, which is easy to being exploited by an attack
 - Attack means that malicious input performs some unintended and usually illegal activity



Introduction (2/2)

❖ Motivation

- Software dependability is getting more importance over the years especially in networked computer systems
- Network-connected servers should consider about new threats and forms of attacks
 - Sustain long periods of uninterrupted operation
 - Corruption on the server may threaten client's privacy


❖ Goal of this paper

- Suggest an attack injection tool(AJECT) for the automatic discovery of vulnerabilities in software

Attack injection tool (1/8)

❖ Overview of tool AJECT

Attack generation:
Automatically
generate attacks in
4 ways



Input : Protocol specification

Injection phase:
Execute previously
generated test
cases(attacks)

Monitoring:
Monitor target
system's state
while executing
attacks in **3** ways

Attack injection tool (2/8)


❖ Protocol as an input

- Even though the source code of server system is not available, protocols tend to be well defined
- AJECT offers a graphical user interface tool to input specification of protocol
- The tool attacks servers by transmitting erroneous packets with the protocol


Attack injection tool (3/8)

❖ Network server protocols

- 2 email protocols
 - Fully developed and commonly used
- POP protocol (POP3)
 - Post Office Protocol
 - Three states
 - Interaction through text strings
- IMAP protocol (IMAP4Rev1)
 - Internet Message Access Protocol
 - Much more complicated than POP
 - Wider functionality(ex. Create mailbox)
 - Interaction through text strings



State machine of POP protocol



State machine of IMAP protocol

Attack injection tool (4/8)

❖ Attack generation phase


■ Delimiter test

- Put illegal or missing delimiters
 - Double quotes as illegal delimiters
 - Omitting delimiter like 'space' character



■ Syntax test


- Violate syntax
 - Addition, elimination, reordering of each field



Attack injection tool (5/8)

❖ Attack generation phase(cont'd)

- Value test
 - Replace message specification fields with malicious tokens



Example

- AUTHENTICATE <A x 1296>
- < %s x 10 >;

Attack injection tool (6/8)

❖ Attack generation phase(cont'd)

- Privileged access violation test
 - Determine if the server allows unauthorized accesses
 - Specialization of the value test
 - If server allows these attacks, revealing private information or granting access to some files could be possible


Example

- CREATE / <A x 10>
- SELECT ../../other-user/inbox
- SELECT "{localhost/user=\\}."

Attack injection tool (7/8)

❖ Injection campaign phase

- Attack injector and three kind of monitors



Attack injection tool (8/8)

❖ Injection campaign phase(cont'd)

- Monitor

Monitor	Property	Execute in	Access Target Server's OS
Deep Monitor	Trace server's main <u>process</u> and children in great detail	Target server machine	O
Shallow Monitor	Monitor server's <u>termination code</u>	Target server machine	O
Remote Monitor	Infer server state by <u>network connection</u>	Injector machine	X

Case study (1/2)

❖ Experimental results

■ Target network servers

- Total up-to-date 16 servers
- Every servers support POP and IMAP both
- 8 Window servers
- 3 Unix servers
- 5 U/W servers
- 12 commercial servers
- 4 open source servers
- 3 D/S/R monitors
- 13 Remote monitors

E-mail Servers (POP3/IMAP4)	OS	Version	Build Date	Monitor
602LAN Suite (<i>602 Software</i>)	W	5.0.08.0403	4/8/2008	R
Citadel*	U	7.32	2/17/2008	R
dovecot*	U	1.1.rc3	3/9/2008	D/S/R
Hexamail Server Corporate	U/W	3.1.0.002	-	R
hMailServer	W	4.4.1	3/9/2008	R
IMail Server (<i>Ipswitch</i>)	W	2006,23	12/5/2007	R
Kerio MailServer (<i>Kerio Tech.</i>)	U/W	6.5.1	5/12/2008	R
Mailtraq (<i>Fastraq</i>)	W	2.12.1.2364	5/8/2008	R
Mdaemon (<i>Alt-N Technologies</i>)	W	9.6.5	6/19/2007	R
Merak Mail Server (<i>IceWarp</i>)	U/W	9.1.0	9/17/2007	R
NoticeWare Email Server NG	W	4.6.2	4/3/2008	R
Softalk Mail Server Corp.	W	8.5.1.431	10/30/2007	R
SurgeMail Mail Server (<i>NetWin</i>)	U/W	3.9e	4/10/2008	R
uw-imap* (<i>Univ. of Washington</i>)	U	2007b	6/4/2008	D/S/R
WinGate Email Server (<i>Qbik</i>)	W	6.2.2	7/12/2008	R
xmail*	U/W	1.25	1/3/2008	D/S/R

* - Open source; U - Unix/Linux; W - Windows
D - Deep monitor; S - Shallow Monitor; R - Remote Monitor

Case study (2/2)

❖ Experimental results(cont'd)

■ Results

- AJECT found vulnerabilities in **five** servers out of 16 servers
 - AJECT can be very useful in discovering vulnerabilities
- Characteristic of vulnerable servers
 - All vulnerabilities are found with **IMAP protocol**
 - » Indicate more complex protocols lead to more error-prone
 - All of vulnerable servers are **closed source** commercial servers
 - » Larger and active community could make fewer flaws

Vulnerable Server	Attack	Observable Behavior
hMailServer(IMAP)	>20k CREATE and RENAME messages	Server becomes unresponsive until it crashes
NoticeWare(IMAP)	>40 A01 LOGIN Ax5000 password	Server crashes
Softtalk(IMAP)	>3k A01 APPEND messages	Server crashes after low memory
SurgeMail(IMAP)	A01 APPEND Ax5000	Server crashes
WinGate(IMAP)	A01 LIST Ax1000 *	Server deny all connections

Related works

❖ Fault injection

- Inject faults to study behavior in the presence of faults
 - Because of simplicity of faults, it is difficult to apply complex faults, like vulnerabilities of network servers

❖ Fuzzers

- Inject random sample inputs to discover vulnerability
 - Since it uses random samples, test cases are either too simplistic or specialized
 - Lack of monitoring mechanisms

❖ Vulnerability scanners

- Inject faults from database of known vulnerabilities
 - Unable to uncover unknown vulnerabilities

Conclusion

❖ Contribution

- Suggest automated methodology to discover vulnerabilities in software
- Suggest attack injection mechanism which can be applied without target's source code

❖ Future work

- Experiment with other protocols

Discussion

❖ Pros

- The tool uses only well-defined part(protocols) of the program which could be poorly documented
- Well-organized experiments and excellent results

❖ Cons

- Simple idea, similar with existing test case generation and authors just added automatic monitoring
- In attack generation phase, it also needs pre-defined or collected malicious tokens

Thank You

Q & A

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