

On Building Secure SCADA Systems using Security Patterns

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Outline

- SCADA Systems
- Security Issues
- Model of a General SCADA System
- Some potential attacks
- Patterns
- Security Patterns
- Securing a SCADA system by adding security using patterns
- Examine how security measures guard against attacks
- Conclusions and Future Work

SCADA



- To continuously monitor and control the different sections of a plant in order to ensure its appropriate operation we use SCADA systems

Supervisory
Control
And
Data
Acquisition

- SCADA systems are applied for electric power generation, water treatment, oil refining, etc.

Security issues

- SCADA systems were first designed to meet the basic requirements of process control systems where security issues were hardly a concern
- However, the growing demands for increased connectivity between a SCADA system and other network components, such as the corporate network and the Internet, expose the critical parts of a SCADA system to the public
- Therefore, security issues can no longer be ignored.



Attacks against SCADA Systems

- We systematically enumerate the threats against a system by considering its use cases and activities and possible ways of subverting them.
- A simplified approach looks at possible attacks against each unit of a system if its structure is predefined.

Attacks against SCADA Systems considering attacks against/thru each unit

- **Central controller**, include
 - T1: physical attacks
 - T2: malicious settings of the field units
 - T3: wrong commands to the field units
 - T4: malicious alteration of the runtime parameters of the central controller
 - T5: denial of service attacks
- **Field Units**, include
 - T6: physical attacks
 - T7: malicious alteration of the runtime parameters of the field unit
 - T8: wrong commands to the field units
 - T9: malicious alarms to the central controller
 - T10: denial of service attacks
- **Communication Networks**, include
 - T11: sniffing
 - T12: spoofing
 - T13: denial of service attacks

Patterns

- Many problems occur in similar ways in different contexts or environments. Generic solutions to these problems can be expressed as patterns.
- A *pattern* is an encapsulated solution to a problem in a given context and can be used to guide the design or evaluation of systems
- Analysis, design, and architectural patterns are well established and have proved their value in helping to produce good quality software


Security patterns



- *Security patterns* have joined analysis, design and architectural patterns and they are becoming accepted by industry
- Security patterns are useful to guide the security design of systems by providing generic solutions that can stop a variety of attacks.
- We have produced a book on security patterns and many patterns that cover all architectural levels




Securing systems

- We add instances of security patterns to the functional models
- Possible patterns include
 - authorization (Access matrix),
 - Role-Based AccessControl (RBAC),
 - Multilevel access,
 - Logger,
 - Authentication,
 - Firewalls,
 - Intrusion Detection Systems







Related Work

SCADA Systems

- A. Miller. Trends in process control systems security. *IEEE Security and Privacy*, 3(5):57–60, 2005.
- V. M. Ijure, S. A. Laughter, and R. D. Williams. Security issues in SCADA net-works. *Computers & Security*, 25(7):498– 506, 2006.
- D. Goeke and H. Nguyen. SCADA system security, 2005
- U.S. Department Of Energy. 21 steps to improve cyber security of SCADA networks.
- S. Cheung, B. Dutertre, M. Fong, U. Lindqvist, K. Skinner, and A. Valdes. Using model-based intrusion detection for SCADA networks. In *Proc. of the SCADA Security Scientific Symposium*, Miami Beach, FL, USA, January 2007

Related Work

Security Patterns

- J. Yoder and J. Barcalow. Architectural patterns for enabling application security. In *Proc. of PLoP*, 1997. Also Chapter 15 in *Pattern Languages of Program Design*, vol. 4 (N. Harrison, B. Foote, and H. Rohnert, Eds.), Addison-Wesley, 2000.
- M. Schumacher, E. B. Fernandez, D. Hybertson, F. Buschmann, and P. Sommerlad. *Security Patterns: Integrating Security and Systems Engineering*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006.
- E. B. Fernandez. Security patterns. In *Proc. of International Symposium on System and Information Security*, 2006.
- E. B. Fernandez and R. Pan. A pattern language for security models. In *Proc. of the 8th Annual Conference on the Pattern Languages of Programs (PLoP 2001)*, Urbana, Illinois, USA, 11-15 September 2001.

Conclusions

- We considered the use of security patterns to analyze, build and evaluate a secure SCADA system
- In particular, we study the architecture of a general SCADA system and analyze the potential attacks against it
- We use security patterns as a tool to design secure SCADA systems that can control these attacks
- We believe our research work defines a new direction for future research on secure SCADA systems by indicating where security should be applied in the software lifecycle
- We will complete our methodology by applying more security patterns to different layers and types of SCADA systems
- Physical access control can also be integrated by using appropriate patterns

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Questions



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