

# Automation in Aviation

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## 1. Introduction

An aircraft landed safely is the result of a huge organizational effort required to cope with a complex system made up of humans, technology and the environment. The aviation safety record has improved dramatically over the years to reach an unprecedented low in terms of accidents per million take-offs, without ever achieving the “zero accident” target. The introduction of automation on board airplanes must be acknowledged as one of the driving forces behind the decline in the accident rate down to the current level.

Nevertheless, automation has solved old problems but ultimately caused new and different types of accidents. This stems from the way in which we view safety, systems, human contribution to accidents and, consequently, corrective actions. When it comes to aviation, technology is not an aim in itself, but should adapt to a pre-existing environment shared by a professional community.

The aim of this paper is to show why, when and how automation has been introduced, what problems arise from different ways of operating, and the possible countermeasures to limit faulty interaction between humans and machines.

This chapter is divided into four main parts:

1. Definition of automation, its advantages in ensuring safety in complex systems such as aviation;
2. Reasons for the introduction of onboard automation, with a quick glance at the history of accidents in aviation and the related safety paradigms;
3. Ergonomics: displays, tools, human-machine interaction emphasizing the cognitive demands in fast-paced and complex flight situations;
4. Illustration of some case studies linked to faulty human-machine interaction.

## 2. What is automation

According to a shared definition of automation, the latter may be defined in the following way: “Automation is the use of control systems and information technologies to reduce the need for human work in the production of goods and services”. Another plausible definition, well-suited the aviation domain, could be: “The technique of controlling an apparatus, a process or a system by means of electronic and/or mechanical devices that

replaces the human organism in the sensing, decision-making and deliberate output" (Webster, 1981).

The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines automation as:

1. Automatic control of the manufacture of a product through a number of successive stages;
2. The application of automatic control to any branch of industry or science;
3. By extension, the use of electronic or mechanical devices to replace human labour.

According to Parasumaran and Sheridan, "automation can be applied to four classes of functions:

1. Information acquisition;
2. Information analysis;
3. Decision and action selection;
4. Action implementation."

Information acquisition is related to the sensing and registration of input data. These operations are equivalent to the first human information processing stage, supporting human sensory processes. If we adopt a decision-making model based on perception, identification, mental process, decision, action, follow-up and feedback, information acquisition could be likened to the first step: perception. Let's imagine a video camera and the aid it offers in monitoring activity. It helps to replace continuous, boring, monotonous human observation with reliable, objective and detailed data on the environment.

Automation may handle these functions, as it is more efficient in detecting compared to humans, while – at the same time – it offers the possibility of positioning and orienting the sensory receptors, sensory processing, initial data pre-processing prior to full perception, and selective attention (e.g.: the focus function in a camera).

Information analysis is related to cognitive functions such as working memory and inferential processes. It involves conscious perception and manipulation of processed items. It allows for quick retrieval of information in the working memory. In aviation, this kind of system is broadly used to provide pilots with predictive information, such as how much fuel will be available at destination, where the top of climb or top of descent will be in order to optimize the flight path, and so forth.

With regard to decision and action selection, automation is useful because it involves varying levels of augmentation or replacement of human decision-making with machine decision-making. It is generally acknowledged that human decision-making processes are subject to several flaws, among them a tendency to avoid algorithmic thought, a biased development of pros and cons based on the laws of logic, a partial view of the overall system and, often, the heavy influence of emotions.

The fourth stage involves the implementation of a response or action consistent with the decision taken. Generally, it this stage automation replaces the human hands or voice. Certain features in the cockpit allow automation to act as a substitute for pilots. For instance, this occurs when – following an alert and warning for windshear conditions – the automation system detects an imminent danger from a power setting beyond a pre-set

threshold. In this case, the autopilot automatically performs a go-around procedure, which avoids a further decline in the aircraft's performance.

Besides being applicable to these functions, automation has different levels corresponding to different uses and interactions with technology, enabling the operator to choose the optimum level to be implemented based on the operational context (Parasumaran, Sheridan, 2000). These levels are:

1. The computer offers no assistance; the human operator must perform all the tasks;
2. The computer suggests alternative ways of performing the task;
3. The computer selects one way to perform the task and
4. Executes that suggestion if the human operator approves, or
5. Allows the human operator a limited time to veto before automatic execution, or
6. Executes the suggestion automatically then necessarily informs the human operator, or
7. Executes the suggestion automatically then informs the human operator only if asked.
8. The computer selects the method, executes the task and ignores the human operator.

### 3. History of accidents

Automation in the aviation world plays a pivotal role nowadays. Its presence on board airplanes is pervasive and highly useful in improving the pilots' performance and enhancing safety. Nevertheless, certain issues have emerged in the recent past that evidence automation misuse by pilots. This could depend on a series of factors, among them human performance, capabilities and limitations on one side, and poor ergonomics on the other.

We should first investigate the reasons leading to the introduction of onboard automation.


During the Fifties and Sixties, the main causes of aviation accidents were believed to be related to the human factor. The immediate cause of an accident was often to be found in "active failures", e.g. loss of control of the aircraft in which pilots failed to keep the aircraft under control, reaching over-speed limits, stalling, excessive bank angles, etc.

In these cases the root cause was a flawed performance that eventually caused the loss of control (the effect). Factors related to human performance, e.g. the impact of fatigue, attention, high workload sustainability, stress mismanagement, etc. were consequently addressed. Technological solutions were sought to help pilots manage these factors. Innovation at that time eventually led to the introduction of the auto-pilot, auto-throttle, flight director, etc. After the mid-Fifties, as a result of these innovations, the accident curve dropped sharply.

Looking at the graph below, we can clearly notice the impact of such innovations on flight safety. The vertical axis corresponds to the number of accidents per million take-offs, while the horizontal axis corresponds to the relative decades.

As we can observe, after a dramatic improvement the accident curve rose again during the mid-Seventies. Aviation safety experts were faced with accidents involving a perfectly functioning aircraft, with no evidence whatsoever of malfunctions. In these cases (known as "Controlled Flight Into Terrain" - CFIT), the aircrafts were hitting obstacles with the pilots in full control. The accidents were caused by loss of situational awareness, either on the

horizontal or on the vertical path. The evidence showed that an improper interaction between pilots was the main cause behind the accident, so this time the solution came from psychology. Human factor experts developed techniques and procedures to enhance cooperation between pilots, and specific non-technical training aspects became mandatory for pilots. For instance, a Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) course is nowadays mandatory in a pilot's curriculum: its topics may include leadership, cross-checking and criticizing fellow colleagues, assertiveness, resolution of conflicts, communication skills, etc.



Source: ICAO doc. 9683/950. Accident rate over the years

In the last decade, the pendulum has swung back to loss of control as a major cause of aviation accidents, however, compared to the accidents occurring during the Fifties, the factors leading to loss of control appear to be different. Whereas in the beginnings of aviation, human performance was impaired by “under-redundancy”, that is, insufficient aids available to pilots for avoiding the effects of factors like fatigue, distraction, workload and stress which reduced the pilots’ performance, nowadays many domain experts are pointing at possible cases of “over-redundancy”. This means that increasing automation might be putting the pilot out-of-the-loop, thus causing reduced situational awareness, automation complacency or over-confidence and loss of skills, due to lack of practice in manually flying the aircraft. As a result, pilots may not be able to regain control once automation has failed, or may be incapable of effectively monitoring the performance of automated systems (and questioning it when required).

The safety philosophy behind the adoption of increasing onboard automation is based on the assumption that human error is the main cause of accidents. Therefore, since the human (*live-ware*) component of the system is the flawed link in the accident chain, we ought to look for a substitute capable of handling the tasks once performed by pilots. This is partially true, as we’ll see later on. It is first necessary to understand what are the pros and cons of human contribution to safety, at what levels of operation does automation offer undoubted advantages and where the latter should end to leave room for pilots’ decisions. Pilots and machines are not alternatives, but complementary factors in ensuring flight safety. Achieving the correct balance between these components of the aviation domain

benefits safety, since the role of technology appears to have reached a standstill. Until the mid-1990s, it appears that pilots tried to adjust their behaviour to a given challenge (new automation), which was conceived regardless of their actual need and deeply rooted habits. In fact, one of the main drivers of the recent cockpit design philosophy was the reduction of costs related to better performances, lower fuel consumption, cheaper maintenance and flexible pilot training. Concern for the adaptability of pilots to these new solutions only came at a later stage and following some severe mishaps. To achieve this balance, we'll briefly analyse what levels of operation are involved in flight and where automation – primarily conceived to replace certain human operator tasks – should give way to the pilot's intervention.

#### 4. Skill, rules and knowledge

According to a paradigm proposed by Rasmussen and also developed by James Reason, human activity can be grouped into three main fields: skill-based action, rule-based action and knowledge-based action.

The first field is based on the human capability to accomplish physical tasks, such as providing correct input to flight control (so-called “stick and rudder training”), responding to external stimuli in a quick and consistent way, and coordinating the body in order to obtain a desired result. It is mainly an area in which the psycho-physiological aspect is paramount. Moreover, we could also include monitoring tasks in this field, such as detection, identification and response to external signals stemming from habits (body automatism or conditional reaction). Automation has played an important role at this level by replacing human performance rather well. As a result, autopilots, auto-throttle (and later on, auto-thrust computers) have come to gradually replace pilots in “hand-flying”. Generally speaking, an autopilot can tolerate workloads that are hardly sustainable by a pilot. Let's imagine an oceanic flight during the night; an autopilot is able to maintain (with no effort at all) altitude, speed, track and so forth, whereas pilots are subject to tiredness, attention lapses, distraction, etc. On the other hand, the systematic replacement of basic flying skills has led to the erosion of competence, because, as Germans put it: *“Die Übung macht den Meister”* (“Use makes master”). In the U.S. the FAA (Federal Aviation Authority) has suggested adopting “back to basics training”, in which pilots are taught how to fly without the help of automatisms and how to retrieve the elementary notions of aerodynamics, in order to avoid grossly misreading altitude, speed and power.

The second level – the rule base action – is the conceptual layer. It indicates compliance with the rules, norms, laws, and everything laid down in the official documentation. It is unproblematic to apply a given rule whenever conditions warrant it. This is the case of a limit set for a device, e.g. the maximum temperature for operating an engine (EGT). When the upper limit is exceeded, something happens: red indications on instruments, alarms, flashing light on to attract the pilot's attention, automatic exclusion of the failed system and so forth. A machine can easily detect whether the operating conditions are normal or abnormal, by matching the real values with an operating envelope. Since the pilot may forget some rules, apply them incorrectly, or fail to apply valid norms, certain functions (especially those relating to the monitoring activity that induces boredom and complacency) are assigned to automation. It is a consequence of automation, therefore, that the flight engineer is no longer required in the cockpit. Some problems were initially detected in the

normal flying activity of newly designed cockpits, since two pilots were required to manage a three-pilot cockpit, with automation playing the role of a “silent crew-member”.

The third level – the knowledge-base – includes the sound judgement of pilots in deciding if and when the given rules are applicable. This implies the notion of a complex system. Complexity is evident at every level of reality, from physics to biology, from thermodynamics to meteorology (Morin, 2001). Different conceptions of complexity emerge in the current scientific debate, but generally speaking, we may highlight some commonalities between the different theories: refusal of reductionism, different level of system description (be it physical or biological or even man-made) according to the level of observation, emergent proprieties, etc.

Since aviation is a complex system made up of complex subsystems such as humans, technology and the environment, it is almost impossible to govern everything in advance through rules and norms. There will always be a mismatch between the required task and the final outcome (Hollnagel, 2006). The resilience engineering approach to safety is aware of this complexity and focuses on the ambivalent role – in such a system – of man, who simultaneously constitutes a threat and resource in coping with unexpected events, unforeseeable situations and flawed procedures. Much of this activity, which continuously and strategically adapts the means to the goal, is undetected either by the top management, or by the front-line operators themselves (pilots). These micro-corrections are so pervasive that the person involved in accomplishing a task fails to even realize how much he/she deviates from a given rule. The front-end operator should always seek to compromise between efficiency and thoroughness. Hollnagel calls this compromise the ETTO (Efficiency, Thoroughness Trade Off) principle. The paradox emerging from the blind application of rules – the so-called “white strike” or “working by the rule” – is that it leads to a paralysis of the entire production activity (Hollnagel, 2009). The effects of such shortcuts during normal operations are another area of concern affecting flight safety, due to the systems’ opacity, the operator’s superficial knowledge, uncertainties and ambiguities of the operational scenario. If we turn to the initial introduction of onboard automation, we may detect some commonalities regarding the way pilots have coped with the innovations.

## 5. Evolution of automation

Automation seems to follow an evolutionary path rather than a revolutionary approach. Its adoption on board aircrafts does not respond to the planned purpose of enhancing safety “from scratch” in a consistent way, but rather resembles a biological organism trying to continuously adapt to the challenges posed by its environment (fly-fix-fly).

This trial-and-response approach can be observed regardless of the fact that innovation introduced on board generally lags a step behind the overall level achieved by the industry. In fact, one of the requirements for a certain technology to be implementable in the aviation domain is its reliability; it is preferable to have a slower yet reliable system rather than a high-speed one that is not completely tested or tried in an operational environment.

We may identify three main generations of onboard automation systems: mechanical, electrical and electronic.

In the beginnings of commercial flight there were no instrumental aids to help pilots to fly. A piece of string was attached to the wing to indicate whether the airflow over it was sufficient to sustain flight. Later on, the first anemometers and altimeters were introduced to indicate pilots the airspeed and altitude, respectively. These were the first steps toward the “virtualization of the environment” (Ralli, 1993). The invention of the pneumatic gyroscope (replaced, shortly after, by the electric gyroscope), used to stabilize an artificial horizon, helped pilots to understand their situation even in meteorological conditions characterised by extremely poor visibility, while at the same time preventing dangerous vestibular illusion (a false sense of equilibrium stemming from the inner ear). These simple instruments were merely capable of providing basic indications. Early signs of automation were introduced on board aircrafts during the decade from 1920 to 1930, in the form of an autopilot based on a mechanical engineering concept that was designed to keep the aircraft flying straight: a very basic input to control the flight at a “skill” level. Moreover, as airplanes became bigger and bigger, it became necessary to apply some form of amplification of the pilots’ physical force, because of the airflow over large aerodynamic surfaces. Servo-mechanisms were introduced on board, alongside certain devices aimed at facilitating perception of the force acting on such surfaces (artificial feel load, mach trim compensator) and absorbing the effects of the so-called Dutch-roll, an abnormal behaviour whereby the airplane yaws and oscillates in an uncoordinated manner (yaw damper). This (mechanical) innovation was the first of multiple steps that began widening the gap between the pilot’s input (action on the yoke) and the final outcome (aerodynamic movement). Instead of direct control, with the yoke mechanically attached to the ailerons, airplanes began to be constructed with a series of mechanisms intervening between the pilot’s input and the expected output. In this case, the virtualization of flight controls accompanied the parallel virtualization of flight instruments introduced by the artificial horizon (Attitude Display Indicator). At this stage, automation aided pilots mainly in their skill-based activity.

The second generation of automation included electric devices replacing the old mechanisms. Electric gyroscopes instead of pneumatic ones, new instruments such as the VOR (Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range) to follow a track based on ground aids, the ILS (Instrumental Landing System) to follow a horizontal and a vertical path till the runway threshold, and so forth. The 1960s saw plenty of innovations introduced on board aircrafts that enhanced safety: electric autopilots, auto-throttle (to manage the power setting in order to maintain a selected speed, or a vertical speed), flight directors (used to show pilots how to manoeuvre to achieve a pre-selected target such as speed, path-tracking and so forth), airborne weather radars, navigation instruments, inertial platforms, but also improved alarming and warning systems capable of detecting several parameters of engines and other equipment. Whereas the first generation of automation (mechanical) managed the pilot’s skill-based level, the second generation managed the skill-based and rule-based levels previously assigned to pilots. The airplane systems were monitored through a growing number of parameters and this gave rise to a new concern: the inflation of information with hundreds of additional gauges and indicators inside the cockpit, reaching almost 600 pieces (Boy, 2011). At this stage, pilots used the technology in a tactical manner. In other words, their inputs to automation were immediately accessible, controllable and monitored in the space of a few seconds. For example, if the pilot wanted to follow a new heading, he would use a function provided by the autopilot. The desired heading value was selected in the glare-shield placed in front of the pilot’s eye and the intended outcome

would be visible within a few seconds: the airplane banked to the left or right to follow the new heading. End of the task. At this stage, automation helped pilots also at a rule-based level, since monitoring of thousands of parameters required efficient alarming and warning systems, as well as recovery tools.

The third generation of innovation involved electronics, and was mainly driven by the availability of cheap, accessible, reliable and usable technology that invaded the market, bringing the personal computer into almost every home. The electronic revolution occurring from the mid-80s also helped to shape the new generation of pilots, who were accustomed to dealing with the pervasive presence of technology since the early years of their life. Electronics significantly helped to diminish the clutter of instruments on board and allowed for replacing old indicators - gauges in the form of round-dial, black and white mechanical indicators for every monitored parameter - with integrated coloured displays (e.g. CRT: Cathode Ray Tube, LCD: Liquid Crystal Display) capable of providing a synthetic and analytic view of multiple parameters in a limited area of the cockpit.

It is worthy mentioning that the type of operations implied by the Flight Management System shifted from tactical to strategic. In fact, whilst in the previous electrical automation stage, pilots were accustomed to receiving immediate feedback visible shortly after the entered input, in the new version, a series of data entered by the operator would show their effects at a distance of hours. The data was no longer immediately accessible and visible, therefore this new way of operating placed greater emphasis on crew co-ordination, mutual cross-checking, operational discipline, not only in the flying tasks but also in the monitoring activity. The Flight Management System database contains an impressive amount of data, from navigational routes, to performance capabilities and plenty of useful information that can be retrieved from pilots. Further on we analyze the traps hidden behind this kind of automation.

However, it is important to point out that the actual discontinuity introduced by this generation of automation: was the notion of electronic echo-system. Compared to the past, when pilots were acquainted with the inner logic of the systems they used, their basic components, and normal or abnormal procedures for coping with operational events, in the new cockpit pilots are sometimes "out of the loop". This occurrence forces them to change their attitude towards the job. On an airplane such as the A-320 there are almost 190 computers located in almost every area of the fuselage. They interact with each other without the pilot being aware of this interaction. Every time the pilot enters an input to obtain a desired goal (e.g. activating the hydraulic system), he/she starts a sequence in which not only the selected system is activated, but also a number (unknown to the pilot) of interactions between systems depending on the flight phase, operational demands, the airplane's conditions, etc.

The unmanageable complexity of the "electronic echo-system" is a genuine epistemological barrier for the pilot. Whereas before, the pilot had thorough knowledge of the entire airplane and could strategically operate in a new and creative manner whenever circumstances required, the evolution of the cockpit design and architecture has brought about a new approach to flight management that is procedural and sequential. Only actions performed in accordance with computer logic and with the given sequence are accepted by the system. In acting as a programmer who cannot perform tasks that are not pre-planned



by the computer configuration, the pilot has lost most of his expertise concerning the hardware part of the system (the aircraft). He too is constrained by the inner logic which dictates the timing of operations, even in high-tempo situations. Consequently, in the international debate on automation and the role of pilots, the latter are often referred to as "system operators". This holds true up to a certain point but, generally speaking, it is an incorrect assessment. Recalling what has been said about the levels of operation, we may say that at the skill-based level, pilots have become system operators because flying skills are now oriented to flight management system programming. As a flight instructor once said: "we now fly with our fingers, rather than with a hands-on method". What he meant was that the pilot now appears to "push-the-button" rather than govern the yoke and throttle.

At the skill-based level, automatisms may be in charge for the entire flight, relegating the pilot to a monitoring role. However, at a rule-based level, computers manage several tasks once accomplished by pilots, including monitoring the pressurization system, air conditioning system, pneumatic system and so forth. This statement is no longer valid when referred to the knowledge-based level. Here, the pilot cannot be replaced by any computer, no matter how sophisticated the latter is. Sound judgment of an expert pilot is the result of a series of experiences in which he/she fills the gap between procedures and reality. Since this paper discusses automation rather than the human factor in aviation, anyone wanting to investigate concepts such as flexibility, dealing with the unexpected, robustness, etc. may refer to authors adopting a Resilience Engineering approach (Hollnagel, 2008) (Woods, Dekker, 2010).

The fact that pilots are no longer so acquainted with the airplane as in the past, has led them to only adopt the procedural way to interact with the airplane. This is time-consuming, cognitively demanding, and above all, in some cases it may lead to miss the "big picture", or situation awareness. This new situation introduces two major consequences: automation intimidation (ICAO, 1998) and a restriction of the available tools for coping with unexpected events. In this sense, we can compare the natural echo-system - made up of a complex network of interactions, integrations, retro-actions that make it mostly unforeseeable and unpredictable - with the electronic system. On a modern aircraft, the electronic echo-system is mostly not known by its user. Pilots only know which button they have to press, what the probable outcome is, and ignore what lies in between. It is a new way of operating that has pros and cons. To assess the real impact on safety, we ought to analyze the relationship between man and technology, by shifting from HMI (Human Machine Interaction) to HCI (Human Computer Interaction). A further step will lead to Human Machine Engineering and/or Human Machine Design (Boy, 2011). The core of this approach is that the focus of the research should be on human-centred design; in other words, the final user - with his/her mental patterns activated in real scenarios - should be regarded as the core of the entire project for a new form of automation.

From an engineering perspective, it is very strange that concepts routinely used to describe the role of onboard automation miss a basic focal point: the final user. In fact, when we talk about technology, we refer to bolt-on versus built-in systems. These expressions indicate the different pattern of integration of onboard technology. Bolt-on indicates the introduction of a new technology on board an airplane conceived without automation. It is a reactive mode that strives to combine the old engineering philosophy with new devices. It is a kind of "patchwork" which requires several local adjustments to combine new requirements with

old capabilities. The expression “built-in” indicates the development of a new technology incorporated in the original project. Every function is integrated with the airplane’s systems, making every action consistent with the original philosophy of use. The paradox is that the final user is left out of the original project. Nowadays, after several avoidable accidents, pilots are involved in the early stage of design in order to produce a user-friendly airplane.

## 6. Why automation?

Two main reasons led to the decision to adopt onboard automation: the elimination of human error and economic aspects. The first element stems from the general view whereby human performance is regarded as a threat to safety. As such a topic would require a paper in itself, it is more appropriate to briefly mention some references for students eager to investigate the topic thoroughly. The second element is easier to tackle since we can even quantify the real savings related to, say, lower fuel consumption. According to IATA estimates, “a one percent reduction in fuel consumption translates into annual savings amounting to 100,000,000 dollars a year for IATA carriers of a particular State”. (ICAO, 1998). Aside from fuel, the evolution of onboard technology over the years has led to a dramatic improvement in safety, operational costs, workload reduction, job satisfaction, and so forth. The introduction of the glass cockpit concept allows airlines to reduce maintenance and overhauling costs, improve operational capabilities and ensure higher flexibility in pilot training.

### a. Fuel consumption

A crucial item in an airline’s balance sheet is the fuel cost. Saving on fuel is vital to remain competitive on the market. The introduction of the “fly-by-wire” concept helps to reduce fuel consumption in at least three areas: weight, balance and data predictions.

1. The fly-by-wire concept has brought a tangible innovation. Inputs coming from the pilots’ control stick are no longer conveyed via cables and rods directly to the aerodynamic surfaces. In fact, the side-stick (or other devices designed to meet pilots’ demands regarding a conventional yoke) provides input to a computer which – via optic fibres – sends a message to another computer placed near the ailerons or stabilizer. This computer provides input to a servo-mechanism to move the surfaces. Therefore, there is no longer any need for steel cables running through the fuselage and other weighty devices such as rods, wheels, etc. This also significantly reduces the aircraft’s weight and improves fuel consumption, since less power is required to generate the required lift.
2. The second area that contributes to saving fuel is aircraft balance. The aircraft must be balanced to maintain longitudinal stability (pitch axis in equilibrium). This equilibrium may be stable, unstable or neutral. In a stable aircraft, the weight is concentrated in front of the mean aerodynamic chord. Basically, this means that the stabilizer (the tail) should “push-down” (or, technically, induce de-lifting) to compensate for the wing movements. In an unstable equilibrium, the balance of weight is shifted sensibly backwards compared to a stable aircraft. In other words, the stabilizer should generate lift to compensate for the wing movements. Where does the problem lie with unstable aircrafts? A stable aircraft tends to return to its original state of equilibrium after it deviates from the latter, but is less

manoeuvrable since the excursion of the stabilizer is narrower. On the contrary, unstable equilibrium causes an increasingly greater magnitude of oscillations as it deviates from the initial point. It makes the aircraft more manoeuvrable but unstable. In practical terms, in these kinds of airplanes pilots are required to make continuous corrections in order to keep the aircraft steady. This is why the computer was introduced to stabilize the airplane with continuous micro-corrections. This significantly reduces the pilots' workload for flying smoothly. Moreover, due to the distribution of weight concentrated on the mean aerodynamic chord, an unstable aircraft consumes less fuel.

3. The third factor helping pilots is a database capable of computing in real time any variation to the flight plan either on the horizontal path (alternative routes, short-cut, mileage calculations, etc.) or on the vertical profile (optimum altitude, top of descent to manage a low drag approach, best consumption speed, and so forth). This enhances the crew's decision-making task in choosing the best option in order to save fuel.

#### b. Maintenance costs

The glass cockpit concept enables airlines to reduce maintenance and overhauling costs. In conventional airplanes, every instrument had its box and spare part in the hangar. Whenever a malfunction was reported by the crew, maintenance personnel on the ground fixed it by replacing the apparatus or swapping the devices. All these actions required a new component for every instrument. If we consider that an airliner has roughly one million spare parts, we can easily understand the economic breakthrough offered by the glass cockpit concept.

In these airplanes, a single computer gives inputs to several displays or instruments. The maintenance approach is to change a single computer rather than every component or actuator. Based to this operating method, few spare parts are required in the hangar: no more altimeters, no more speed indicators, no more navigation displays (often supplied different manufacturers). Moreover, training of maintenance personnel is simplified as it focuses on a few items only which, in turn, allows for increased personnel specialisation.

#### c. Selection and Training costs

The fast growth pace of the airline industry over the last decades has generated concern about the replacement of older pilots, since training centres cannot provide the necessary output for airline requirements. Hiring pilots from a limited base of skilled workers creates a bottleneck in the industrial supply of such an essential organizational factor as are pilots for an airline. Automation has facilitated the hiring of new pilots, since the basic skills are no longer a crucial item to be verified in the initial phase of a pilot's career. If, barely thirty years ago, it would not have been sufficient "to have walked on the moon to be hired by a major airline", as an expert pilot ironically put it, nowadays the number of would-be pilots has increased exponentially. In the current industrial philosophy, almost everyone would be able to fly a large airliner safely with a short amount of training. This phenomenon gives rise to new and urgent problems, as we'll now see.

Besides the selection advantages, broadening the potential pilot base enables airlines to save money for the recurrent training of pilots or to reduce transition costs. Indeed, once the manufacturer sets up a standardized cockpit display, the latter is then applied to a series of

aircraft. If we look at the Airbus series comprising A-319, A-320, A-321, A-330, A-340, etc., we realize how easy is to switch from one airplane to another. In this case, the transition course costs are significantly lower since pilots require fewer lessons; indeed, aside from certain specific details, the only difference involves the performance (take-off weight, cruise speed, landing distances, etc.).

Since pilot training costs make up a considerable portion of an airline's budget, it is financially convenient to purchase a uniform fleet made up of same "family" of airplanes. Often, the regulations enable airlines to use a pilot on more than one airplane belonging to a "family". Consequently, this leads to shorter transition courses, operational flexibility as pilots get to fly several aircrafts at a time, and in the long-run, better standardization among pilots.

Some authors have pointed out how automation has redefined the need for different training processes and crew interaction (Dekker, 2000).

#### d. Operational flexibility

A pilot flying with no aids at all, be they mechanical, electrical or electronic, is limited in many ways.

He/she must fly at low altitude, because of his/her physiological limits (hypoxia), he/she cannot fly too fast since the effort on the yoke exceeds his/her physical power, he/she cannot even fly in bad weather (clouds or poor visibility) since he/she must maintain visual contact with the ground. Automation allows for overcoming such limitations. Higher flight levels also mean lower fuel consumption and the possibility of flying out of clouds. Faster speeds allow for reaching the destination earlier and completing multiple flights a day. Onboard instruments enable pilots to achieve better performance. Let's imagine an approach in low visibility conditions. In the beginnings, pilots would rely on a Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) as an aid to find the final track to land on the runway. Safety measures were implemented such as the operating minima. These implied that during a final landing approach, the pilot had to identify the runway before reaching a certain altitude (landing minima). Obviously, as instruments became more reliable, the landing minima were lowered. Subsequently, the introduction of the VOR (Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range), which provided a more accurate signal, allowed for performing an approach closer to the runway and at a lower "decision altitude", as the safety margins were assured. When the ILS (Instrumental Landing System) was introduced on board, pilots could also rely on vertical profile indications. This implied higher safety margins that led the regulatory bodies to once again lower the landing minima. As the ILS became increasingly precise and accurate, the landing minima were lowered till they reached the value of zero. This means that an airplane can touch down with such low visibility that pilots must rely on autopilot to perform such an approach. This is due to human limitations such as visual and vestibular illusions (white-out, wall of fog, duck under, etc.) that may impair the pilot's performance. Let's imagine an approach during the '50s: with a visibility of 1,000 metres at the destination airport, the airplane should have diverted to another airport because the pilots would not have been able to attain the airport visual reference at the decision altitude (landing minima). Nowadays, the same airport could operate with 100 metres visibility due to improved transmitting apparatus on the ground and flight automation that enhances pilot performance.

A problem evidenced by several authors concerns the shift in responsibility of the people managing the automation system. With the performances brought about by automation that exceed human capabilities, a failure in the automatic system places pilots in a situation in which they have no resources available for coping with an unexpected event. In one case, where the pilots were performing a low visibility approach, the automatic system went out of control at very low altitude, causing the airplane to pitch down and hit hard on the runway. Experts acknowledge that the pilots' recovery in that case was beyond reasonable intervention, that is to say "impossible" (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2008). Indeed, the time available for detecting, understanding and intervening was so short that it was virtually impossible to solve the airplane's faulty behaviour. Who is responsible in such a case? Is it correct to refer to the pilots' mismanagement, poor skill, or untimely reaction when they are operating outside their safety boundaries? If the operations are conducted beyond human capabilities we should also review the concept of responsibility when coping with automation. As Boy and Grote put it: "*Human control over technical systems, including transparency, predictability, and sufficient means of influencing the systems, is considered to be the main prerequisite for responsibility and accountability*" (Boy, 2011).



Classic T-model

## 7. Different cockpit presentation

In recent years, cockpit design has undergone somewhat of a revolution. Old aircraft were designed to satisfy pilots' needs and relied upon slight modifications in the previous onboard scanning pattern. A common standardized cockpit display emerged in the early '50s: the T-model. It included the basic instruments such as artificial horizon (in the top-centre), anemometer (speed indicator) on the left, the altimeter on the right and compass (indicating the heading and track) in the bottom-centre position. Two further instruments, the side-slip indicator and vertical speed indicator were added later on. The adjacent picture shows the classic T-model.



Primary flight Display

With the introduction of the glass cockpit, the traditional flight instrument display was replaced by a different presentation encompassing more information, greater flexibility, colour coding and marking, but at the same time, it could lead to information overload, as several parameters are displayed in a compact area. In a single display, known as the PFD (Primary Flight Display), multiple information is included not only for basic parameters, but also for navigation functions, approach facilities, automatic flight feedback, flight mode awareness, and so forth.

Since the pilot needs to cross-check a great number of instruments at a glance, the design of traditional instruments was developed according to a pattern of attention, from the more important information to the more marginal information. Each instrument had its own case and its functional dynamics was perfectly known by the pilot; it was easy to detect, easy to use during normal operations and easy to handle in case of failure. The switch positions and shapes were positioned on board according to a pattern of use and were instantly recognisable at the touch. It was common for pilots to perform the checklist according to the “touch and feel” principle, by detecting whether a switch was in the required configuration by confirming its on/off position. Almost every switch had a peculiar shape: i.e., rough and big for operative ones, smooth and small for less important switches. A form of training implemented in most flying schools was the “blind panel” exercise, which consisted in covering the trainee’s eye with a bandage and asking him/her to activate the switch prompted by the instructor. Being familiar with the physical ergonomics of the cockpit proved very helpful. The pilot knew how much strength was required to activate a command, how much the arm had to be stretched to reach a knob and so forth. This exercise enhanced the pilot’s skill, or the skill level of operation (according to Rasmussen’s Skill-

Rule-Knowledge paradigms). Regarding the input to the flight controls, it was assured via flight control wheels and sticks, cables and rods, in order to enable the pilot to intervene directly on the aerodynamic surfaces such as the ailerons, rudder and stabilizer.

With regard to displays, the traditional instrument configuration – made up of drum pointers, single instrument boxes and “touch and feel” overhead panel – was replaced by a new approach towards onboard information available to the pilot. The “touch and feel” philosophy was replaced by the “dark cockpit” approach. A dark, flat, overhead panel was adopted to show the pilot that everything was OK. Failures or anomalies were detected by an illuminated button, recalled by a master caution/warning light just in front of the pilots’ eyes. In the unlikely (but not impossible) situation of smoke in the cockpit severely impairing the pilots’ sight, (due to the concentration of a thick layer of dense, white fog), pilots of conventional airplanes could retrieve the intended system’s configuration “by heart”, by detecting the switch position with a fingertip.

Vice-versa, let’s imagine a dark panel with smoke on board. It is truly challenging to spot where to place your hand and, above all, what the system’s feedback is, since the system configuration is not given by the switch position but by an ON/OFF light, which is often undetectable.

## 8. Ergonomics

The problem with innovation, especially in a critical context for safety as is aviation, lies in the interaction between a community of practice and a new concept, conceived and implemented by engineers. This implies a relationship between automation and ergonomics. Ergonomics is a word deriving from the Greek words *ergon* (work) and *nomos* (law), and it is a field of study aimed at improving work conditions so as to guarantee optimal adaptation of the worker to his/her environment. We may identify three main types of ergonomics: physical, cognitive and social (or organizational).

Initially, with the onset of the first generation of automation (mechanical), ergonomists studied physical ergonomics, namely: how to reach a control, how much force is required to operate a lever, visibility of displayed information, seat position design, and so forth. For example, several accidents occurred due to misuse of the flap lever and landing gear lever. Indeed, these were positioned near one another and had similar shapes, leading the pilots to mistake them (Koonce, 2002). The ergonomists found a straightforward and brilliant solution: they attached a little round-shaped rubber wheel to the lever tip to indicate the landing gear, and a wing-shaped plastic cover indicating the flaps. Moreover, the two levers were separated in order to avoid any misuse.

In the next generation of automation, namely electrical automation, the ergonomists aimed to improve the cockpit design standardization. A pilot flying on an airplane had difficulty in forming a mental image of the various levers, knobs and displays, as every manufacturer arranged the cockpit according to different criteria. Dekker has clearly illustrated a case of airplane standardization: the position of the propeller, engine thrust and carburettor in a cockpit (Dekker, 2006). Pilots transitioning to other aircrafts struggled to remember the position of every lever since they were adjacent to each other, and the possibility of mistaking them was very high. Moreover, during the training process there was a risk of

the so-called “negative transfer”, that is, the incorrect application of a procedure no longer suited to the new context. For example, the switches on Boeing aircrafts have top-down activation, while Airbus has chosen the swept-on system (bottom-up). A pilot transitioning from a Boeing 737 to an Airbus A-320 may quickly learn how to switch on the systems, but in conditions of stress, fast-paced rhythm and high workload, he/she may return to old habits and implement them incorrectly. Social ergonomics tries to eliminate such difficulties.

Cognitive ergonomics studies the adaptability of the technology to the mental patterns of the operator. The third generation of automation introduced on board aircrafts gave rise to many concerns about whether the instrument logic was suitable for being correctly used by pilots. From a cognitive perspective, the new system should be designed according to the user’s need, while bearing in mind that pilot-friendly is not equivalent to user-friendly (Chialastri, 2010). A generic user is not supposed to fly, as some engineers erroneously tend to believe. Pilots belong to a professional community that share a mental pattern when coping with critical operational situations. The *modus operandi* is the result of a life-long in-flight experience. A professional community such as the pilot community is target-oriented, and aims at the final goal rather than observing all the required procedural tasks step-by-step. This is why we talk about “shortcuts”, “heuristics”, and so forth.

For example purposes, let’s discuss the introduction of a new airplane with variable wings: the F-111. It was conceived by the designers with a lever in the cockpit to modulate the wings from straight (useful at low speed) to swept (to fly at high speed). In the mind of the designer (who is not a pilot), it seemed perfectly sensible to associate the forward movement of the lever in the cockpit with the forward movement of the wings: lever forward – straight wings, lever back – swept wings. When the airplane was introduced in flight operations, something “strange” occurred. Pilots associated the forward movement with the concept of speed. So, when they wanted high speed, they pushed the thrust levers forward, the yoke down to dive and, consequently, the wing-lever forward (incorrectly so). For a thorough analysis of this case, see Dekker (2006).

All this occurred due to the confusion between generic users and specialized users, as are pilots. As Parasumaran puts it: “Automation does not simply supplant human activity but rather changes it, often in ways unintended and unanticipated by the designers of automation and, as a result, poses new coordination demands on the human operator” (Parasumaran, Sheridan, 2000).

## 9. Automation surprise

The interaction between pilots and technologies on board the aircraft raises some concerns regarding an acknowledged problem: the automation surprise. This occurs when pilots no longer know what the system is doing, why it is doing what it does and what it will do next. It is an awful sensation for a pilot to feel to be lagging behind the airplane, as – ever since the early stages of flight school – every pilot is taught that he/she should be “five minutes ahead of the airplane” in order to manage the rapid changes occurring during the final part of the flight. When approaching the runway, the airplane’s configuration demands a higher workload, the communication flow with air traffic controllers increases and the proximity to the ground absorbs much of the pilot’s attention.



Once all the fast-pace activities are handled with the aid of automation, the pilot may shed some of the workload. When automation fails or behaves in a “strange” manner, the workload increases exponentially. This is only a matter of the effort required to cope with automation, and could be solved with additional training. A more complicated issue – arising from investigations on some accidents – is the difference between two concepts, namely: “situational surprise” and “fundamental surprise” (Wears, 2011). To summarise our explanation, we may refer to the example mentioned by Wears regarding an everyday situation: a wife returns home unexpectedly and finds her husband in bed with the waitress. She is shocked and the only thing she can say is: “Darling, I am surprised”. Her husband calmly replies, “no, darling, I am surprised; you are astonished”. In this example, the husband knows he is doing something regrettable, but accepts the risk even if he doesn’t expect his wife to return home. He is surprised, but has calculated even the worst case (wife back home sooner than expected). The wife comes home and finds a situation she is not prepared for. She is surprised and doesn’t know what to do at first, because she lacks a plan. No doubt she will find one...

Therefore, situation surprise arises when something occurs in a pre-defined context, in which the pilots know how to manage the situation. Such a situation is unexpected, being an abnormal condition, but nonetheless remains within the realm of the pilot’s knowledge. Moreover, it returns to being a manageable condition once the pilot acknowledges the difference between a normal and an abnormal condition, by applying the relevant abnormal procedure. After the initial surprise due to the unexpected event, the pilot returns to a familiar pattern of operation acquired with training.

A so-called fundamental surprise is a very different circumstance: it implies a thorough re-evaluation of the situation starting from the basic assumptions. It is an entirely new situation for which there is no quick-fix “recipe” and is difficult to assess, since it is unexampled. The pilots literally do not know what to do because they lack any cognitive map of the given situation. This concept can be well summarised by the findings following an accident involving a new generation airplane. When analysing the black box after an accident, it is not rare to hear comments such as: “I don’t know what’s happening” – this is a something of a pilot’s nightmare.

It should be noted that some failures occurring on board highly automated aircrafts are transient and are very difficult to reproduce or even diagnose on the ground. Even the manufacturer’s statements regarding electrical failures are self-explaining, as a failure may produce different effects in each case or appear in different configurations depending on the flight phase, airplane configuration, speed and so forth. Sometimes, an electrical transient (also influenced by Portable Electrical Devices activated by unaware passengers) could trigger certain airplane reactions that leave no memory of the root cause.

## **10. Automation issues**

Although automation has improved the overall safety level in aviation, some problems tend to emerge from a new way of operating. A special commission was set up in 1985 by the Society of Automotive Engineers to determine the pros and cons arising from flight deck automation. Nine categories were identified: situation awareness, automation complacency, automation intimidation, captain’s command authority, crew interface design, pilot

selection, training and procedures, the role of pilots in automated aircrafts (ICAO, 1998). Sometimes, pilots lose situation awareness because they lag behind the automation logic. A pilot should always know what the automation system is going to do in the next five minutes, to either detect any anomalies or take control of the airplane. In fast-paced situations – such as crowded skies, proximity with the terrain and instrumental procedures carried out in poor visibility – a high number of parameters must be monitored. As the workload increases, the pilot tends to delegate to the automation system a series of functions in order to minimise the workload. It is important to specify that the physical workload (the number of actions performed within a given time frame) differs from the cognitive workload in that the latter implies a thorough monitoring, understanding and evaluation of the data coming from the automation system. The paradox involving airplane automation is that it works as an amplifier: with low workloads, it could lead to complacency (“let the automation system do it”) that reduces alertness and awareness, while the latter increases with high workloads, due to the high number of interactions and data involved in fast-paced situations. Plainly said: “When good, better; when bad, worse”.

Poor user interface design is another issue. Norman, Billings et al. have studied the way humans interact with automation and have developed cognitive ergonomics. There are several studies concerning the optimal presentation (displays, alarms, indicators, etc.) for pilot use. For example, old displays were designed in such a way that each single instrument provided data for a specific domain only: the anemometer for speed, the altimeter for altitude and flight levels, and so forth. With the integrated instruments, all the required data is available at a glance in a single instrument, which not only provides colour-coded information but also on-demand information by means of pop-up features, so that it can be concealed during normal operations and recalled when needed.



Several issues are related to displays, but only two are addressed here: cognitive mapping of instruments and human limitations in applying the colour-code to perception.

We have to consider that the replacement of round-dial black and white instruments, such as the old anemometer, with coloured multi-function CRT (Cathodic Ray Tube) instruments, has determined a new approach by pilots in mentally analysing speed data. Indeed, with round-dial indicators, pilots knew at a glance in which speed area they were flying: danger area, safe operations or limit speed. Although it is not important to know the exact speed, according to a Gestalt theory concept we need to see the forest rather than every single tree.

Furthermore, from a cognitive perspective, we tend to perceive the configuration as a multiple instrument: for example, during the approach phase, the anemometer needle will point to 6 o'clock, the vertical speed indicator to 8 o'clock and so forth.

In the new speed indicator, the values appear on a vertical speed tape rolling up and down, with the actual speed magnified for greater clarity. Moreover, additional indicators are displayed on the speed tape, such as minimum speed, flap retraction speed and maximum speed for every configuration. In many ways, this system facilitates the pilot's task. Problems arise whenever failures occur (electrical failure, unreliable indication etc.), as the markings disappear.




The situation worsens compared to the old indicators, as pilots need to create a mental image of the speed field in which they are flying. For example, it is unimportant for us to know whether we are flying at 245 or 247 knots, but it becomes important to know that we are flying at 145 knots rather than 245 knots. This means that the mental mapping of the speed indication involves a higher workload, is time-consuming and also energy-consuming. Let's take a look at these two different speed indicators to grasp the concept.

The second issue is related to human performance and limitations. The human eye may detect colours, shape, light and movement with foveal vision. There are two kinds of receptors in the fovea: the cones and the rods.

The cones are responsible for detecting shapes and colours, in a roughly 1 cent large area, and account for focused vision. Instead, rods are responsible for peripheral vision and are able to detect movement and light. This means that colour-coded information should appear in an area just in front of the pilot's head, as only the cones may such information. In fact, since an input appearing to the side can be detected by the rods, which are insensitive to colour and shape, the pilot will not notice it unless he stares at it directly.

Other relevant indicators for pilots are symmetry and context. The needle in a round-dial instrument satisfies both these requirements, since we may easily detect which field of operation we are currently in (near the upper limit, in the middle, in the lower margin), in addition to the trend (fast-moving, erratic, gradual) and symmetry with nearby parameters. A digital indicator shows this information in an alternative way, by arranging numbers on a digital display, as can be clearly seen in the above picture. The configuration on the left can be grasped at first glance, while the second set of information requires a considerable effort to detect differences.

**Disrupted symmetry****Digital information**

Another area worthy of attention is the greater magnitude of the errors made by pilots when flying highly automated airplanes. Pilots flying older aircrafts normally relied on their ability to obtain the required data using a heuristic and rule-of-thumb approach. This method was not extremely accurate but roughly precise. Nowadays, with the all-round presence of computers on board, flight data can be processed very precisely but with the risk of gross errors due to inaccurate entries made by pilots. An example taken from everyday life may help to explain the situation: when setting older-version alarm clocks, the user's error might have been limited to within the range of a few minutes, whereas the new digital alarm clocks are very accurate but subject to gross errors – for example 8 PM could be mistaken for 8AM.

Lower situation awareness means that pilots no longer have the big picture of the available data. The aviation truism, “trash in-trash out”, is applicable to this new technology as well. Having lost the habit of looking for the “frame”, namely the context in which the automation system's computed data should appear, pilots risk losing the big picture and, eventually, situation awareness. Unsurprisingly, there have been cases of accidents caused by inconsistent data provided by the computer and uncritically accepted by pilots. This is neither a strange nor uncommon occurrence. Fatigue, distractions, and heavy workload may cause pilots to lower their attention threshold. In one case, a pilot on a long haul flight entered the available parameters into the computer to obtain the take-off performance (maximum weight allowed by the runway tables, speed and flap setting). He mistook the take-off weight with other data and entered the parameters into the computer. The end result was a wrong take-off weight, wrong speed and wrong flap setting. The aircraft eventually overrun the runway and crashed a few hundred meters beyond the airport fences.

Another issue linked the introduction of onboard automation is a weakening of the hierarchy implied by the different way of using the automation system. The captain is indeed the person with the greatest responsibility for the flight and this implies a hierarchical order to establish who has the final word on board. This hierarchical order is also accompanied by functional task sharing, whereby on every flight there is a pilot flying and a pilot not flying (or monitoring pilot). Airplanes with a high level of automation require task sharing, in which the pilot flying has a great degree of autonomy in programming the Flight Management System, in deciding the intended flight path and type

of approach. Above all, the pilot flying also determines the timing of the collaboration offered by the pilot not flying, even in an emergency situation. In fact, since the crew must act in a procedural way in fulfilling the demands of the automation system, both pilots must cooperate in a more horizontal way compared to the past. The hierarchical relationship between captain and co-pilot is known as the “trans-authority gradient” (Hawkins, 1987) and, from a human factor perspective, should not be too flat nor too steep.

## 11. Case studies

Currently, several case studies could be cited to illustrate the relationship between pilots and automation. In the recent past, accidents have occurred due to lack of mode awareness (A-320 on Mount St. Odile), automation misuse (Delhi, 1999), loss of braking leading to loss of control (S. Paulo Garulhos, 2006), loss of control during approach (B-737 in Amsterdam, 2008), and several other cases.

From these accidents, we chose a couple of peculiar cases. The first case occurred in 1991 and involved an Airbus flying at cruise altitude. While the captain was in the passenger’s cabin, the co-pilot tried to “play” with the FMS in order to learn hands-on. He deselected some radio-aids (VOR: Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range) from the planned route. After the tenth VOR was deselected, the airplane de-pressurized, forcing the pilot to perform an emergency descent. From an engineering perspective there was a bug in the system but, moreover, it was inconceivable for the pilot to link the VOR deselection (a navigation function) to the pressurization system.

The second case is related to a B-727 performing a low-visibility approach to Denver. The flight was uneventful till the final phase. The sky was clear but the city was covered by a layer of fog that reduced the horizontal visibility to 350 ft. and the vertical visibility to 500 ft. The captain was the pilot flying, in accordance with the company regulations, and used the autopilot as specified in the operating manual. The chosen type of approach was an ILS Cat II. The ILS is a ground based navigation aid that emits a horizontal signal to guide the airplane to the centre of the runway together with a vertical signal to guide the aircraft along a certain slope (usually 3°) in order to cross the runway threshold at a height of 50 ft. The regulations state that once the aircraft is at 100 ft., the crew must acquire the visual references to positively identify the runway lights (or markings). If not, a go-around is mandatory. Once the captain has identified the runway lights he must proceed to land manually, by switching off the autopilot at very low altitude. There are certain risks associated with this manoeuvre, since – with impaired visibility – the pilot loses the horizon, depth perception and the vertical speed sensation, and could be subject to spatial disorientation due to the consequences of the so-called “white-out” effect. In this case, however, nothing similar occurred. The autopilot duly followed the ILS signals, but due to a random signal emitted in the last 200 ft., the aircraft pitched down abruptly. The captain tried to take over the controls, though unsuccessfully. He later reported – during the investigation – that the window was suddenly “full of lights”, meaning that the aircraft assumed a very nose-down pitch attitude. The high rate of descent, coupled with the surprise factor and low visibility, did not allow the captain to recover such a degraded situation: the airplane touched down so hard that it veered off the runway, irreversibly damaging the fuselage.

This case emphasizes the relationship between pilots and liability. Operating beyond human capabilities, the pilot finds himself/herself in a no-man's land where he/she is held responsible even when he/she cannot sensibly regain control of the airplane. As stated by Dismukes and Berman, it is hardly possible to recover from such a situation.

## 12. Conclusion

This brief paper highlights certain aspects concerning the introduction of automation on board aircrafts. Automation has undeniably led to an improvement in flight safety. Nevertheless, to enhance its ability to assure due and consistent help to pilots, automation itself should be investigated more thoroughly to determine whether it is suitable in terms of human capabilities and limitations, ergonomics, cognitive suitability and instrument standardization, in order to gradually improve performance.

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