

Lateral Movement Detection Using Distributed Data Fusion

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Slide Credits: some slides are taken from the presentation made at SRDS 2016 by Ahmed Fawaz



Introduction

Intrusion resilience

- Monitor the operation of system
- Detect intrusions
- Take response actions

Volume of information that is required to construct a system-wide state can grow rapidly

Long-lasting targeted attacks pose more scalability challenges



Contributions

- A **distributed data fusion framework** for system resiliency.
- An agent-based monitoring and fusion mechanisms to **detect lateral movement behavior** in an enterprise system.
- A host-level monitor to infer **connection causation relations**.




Distributed Data Fusion Framework

We propose a fusion framework, $\mathcal{F} = (G, f, g, \mathbb{T})$, where:

$G = (V, E)$	A graph of agents
$f(\cdot)$	Local transformation function
$g(\cdot)$	Fusion transformation function
\mathbb{T}	A set of temporal propositions


Fusion Graph

A graph where the edges between the **agents** represent communication **channels**



Local Transformation


A function f to estimate local state



$$\hat{x}_1 = f_1(x_1)$$

$$\hat{x}_3 = f_3(x_3)$$


$$\hat{x}_7 = f_7(x_7)$$



State in node 1 is x_1


Fusion Transformation

A function g that fuses and abstracts local data and received data



Temporal Propositions


A temporal proposition defines **trigger events**



Lateral Movement Detection


A Case Study

Stages of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Attacks



Lateral Movement Explained

- Starting from the entry point attacker moves to target host
- Uses system services or custom tools





In the News

Persistence, stealthiness, and lateral movement

STUXNET BOTNET ATT

OPM HACK

World's First

Power Outage Caused by Hackers



Important Notice: unauthorized access to payment card data in U.S. stores



December 19, 2013

Dear Guest,

We wanted to make you aware of unauthorized access to Target payment card data. The unauthorized access may impact guests who made credit or debit card purchases in our U.S. stores from Nov. 27 to Dec. 15, 2013. Your trust is a top priority for Target, and we deeply regret




Motivation

Lateral movement detection is challenging

- Need to estimate system-wide state
- Information overhead
- Attacker uses legitimate network services
- Requires a global clock


Lateral movement detection enables proactive prevention and response before the actual damage (e.g., data exfiltration)

Lateral Movement Detection Overview






System Model



Lateral Movement

A critical step during APT to move from the entry point to target host





Inside Host 1

Local agent infers connection causation using the **Process Communication Graph**

Collect timestamped events of:


- Processes running
- Process communication (pipes, messages,...)
- Network connections
- File access

The agent creates a timed directed graph of communication between processes

Causation is inferred via a path between incoming and outgoing connections


Inside Host 1

Local agent infers connection causation using the **Process Communication Graph**




Inside Host 1

Local agent infers connection causation using the **Process Communication Graph**



Lateral Movement

A critical step during APT to move from the entry point to target host



Inside Cluster Leader 1

Cluster head maintains Host Communication Graph

Incoming Causation Events:

$C1 \triangleright C2$

$C2 \triangleright C3$

$C3 \triangleright C4$

Host 4

Host 3

Host 1


Agents do not need to synchronize clocks

$C1 \triangleright C2 \triangleright C3 \triangleright C4$

$\Rightarrow t(C1) < t(C2) < t(C3) < t(C4)$

Lateral Movement

A critical step during APT to move from the entry point to target host






Discussion

A critical step during APT to move from the entry point to target host

The load of system-wide lateral movement chain collection is distributed over all agents

The method can fuse all process level information without overloading a single monitoring server





Results

- Simulation-based evaluation
- Evaluated storage and processing overhead, fairness of resource consumption, and quality of local state
 - Clustering improves the scalability
 - Better fairness and quality can be achieved through topology-aware clustering of hosts
- Implemented a prototype of host-level process monitor
 - Using DTrace on OS X
 - Overhead is manageable



Conclusion

The data fusion framework is a generalized method for fusing monitoring information

Hierarchical fusion framework distributes the fusion loads across the network

Process communication at the host-level infers connection relations

Detection of malicious chains is not investigated

- Work provides a needed step towards the goal

BACKUP SLIDES

Image Sources

- Ukrain: <http://thehackernews.com/2016/01/Ukraine-power-system-hacked.html>
- Target: <https://securityledger.com/2015/12/target-agrees-to-pay-39m-to-banks-for-data-breach-reuters/>
- OPM: <http://thehackernews.com/2015/09/opm-hack-fingerprint.html>
- Stuxnet: <http://www.mapsofworld.com/around-the-world/recent-hacking-incidents.html>