Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation

@article{Taylor2011SubjectivePA,
  title={Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation},
  author={Curtis R. Taylor and Huseyin Yildirim},
  journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
  year={2011},
  volume={78},
  pages={762-794},
  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:15996734}
}
The incentive and project selection effects of agent anonymity are investigated in a setting where an evaluator observes a subjective signal of project quality. Although the evaluator cannot commit ex ante to an acceptance criterion, she decides up front between informed review, where the agent's ability is directly observable, or blind review, where it is not. An ideal acceptance criterion balances the goals of incentive provision and project selection. Relative to this, informed review… 
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58 References

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