Insecure “Provably Secure Network Coding” and Homomorphic Authentication Schemes for Network Coding

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November 23, 2010

Abstract

Network coding allows the routers to mix the received information before forwarding them to the next nodes. Though this information mixing has been proven to maximize network throughput, it also introduces security challenges such as pollution attacks. A malicious node could insert a malicious packet into the system and this corrupted packet will propagate more quickly than in traditional copy-and-forward networks. Several authors have studied secure network coding from both information theoretic and probabilistic viewpoints. In this paper, we show that there are serious flaws in several of these schemes (the security “proofs” for these schemes were presented in these publications). Furthermore, we will propose a secure homomorphic authentication scheme for network coding.

1 Introduction

Maximum flow minimum cut (MFMC) theory [14] has been one of the most important principles for network traffic routing. However, MFMC theorem works only for the case that there is one sender and one receiver. When there are multiple receivers (multicast scenario), the maximum flow problems become NP-hard and there is no efficient way to multicast the same message to all receivers with maximum network capacity. Network coding [2] has been designed to overcome these problems and it has been shown that network coding can maximize network throughput [2, 22, 27], while traditional copy-and-forward networking technology cannot. In particular, it has been shown [19, 22, 27, 30] that random linear code can be used to broadcast a message to multiple recipients with maximum network capacity and probabilistic reliability. Deterministic polynomial time network coding schemes have also been designed to achieve maximum network capacity [22, 27, 30]. Since these seminal works, network coding techniques have been extensively used in other applications such as wireless networks [12, 24, 25, 32], content distribution [16], and distributed storage [23].

Though network coding techniques have been extensively studied and mature techniques are now available for practical network coding, secure network coding techniques have relatively been less addressed. Without efficient techniques for reliable and private network coding, it is infeasible to widely deploy network coding techniques.

A malicious node in a network coding environment may inject/forward corrupted packets into the information flow. Since network coding makes the intermediate node mix received packets, a
single corrupted packet can corrupt the entire information reaching the destination. This kind of attack is commonly known as the pollution attack. Several researchers have tried to address this problem in a series of papers with important contributions. However, our analysis below shows that several of them are not suitable and several others could be easily broken.

Cai and Yeung [5, 39, 7] have proposed a general framework and obtained theoretical bounds for network error correction. Based on these theoretical bounds, Cai and Yeung [8] have designed algorithms for achieving network coding based information theoretic secure communication against passive adversaries (wire tappers). Several other papers [7, 3, 18, 20, 21, 39] studied network coding based information theoretic secure communication techniques against Byzantine/active adversaries. It should be noted that in these papers, the adversary model is based on the threshold number of communication links that could be controlled by the adversary. This is very different from the more powerful model based on the number of nodes that could be controlled by the adversary. The link based adversary model may be realistic in some wire based networks, it is unrealistic in wireless networks [12] or overlay networks such as peer-to-peer networks where the participants are open to the public. Thus the scope of these results could be limited.

It should be noted that non-network-coding based perfectly secure (information theoretic) message transmission techniques have been extensively studied in a series of papers. For example, Wang and Desmedt [36, 37] have designed information theoretic secure message transmission techniques against Byzantine adversaries in the non network coding based environment.

Cryptographic (or probabilistic) techniques have also been designed by researchers to protect network coding security against pollution attacks. It should be noted that traditional digital signature approaches are not suitable for network coding process since each intermediate node needs to mix the incoming packets and then forward it to the next node. This process destroys the sender’s original signature. In order to address this challenge, several homomorphic cryptographic schemes have been proposed for network coding. The examples are: homomorphic hashing [15, 17, 28], homomorphic digital signatures [4, 9, 15, 40, 42], homomorphic MAC [1, 29, 31, 33], and other schemes [12, 26].

In this paper, we will show that several of the existing cryptographic protocols for secure network coding could be easily broken and several others are impractical for network coding. This paper will also propose a secure and efficient homomorphic authentication scheme for network coding.

2 Random Linear Network Coding

In this section, we briefly discuss the concept and notations of network coding. The network is modeled by a directed graph. There is a source node and several sink nodes. In network coding, the source node generates the data packets that she wishes to deliver to the sink nodes over the network. To do so, the source node encodes her data and transmits the encoded data via its outgoing edges, according to some encoding algorithm that we will discuss later. Each intermediate node receives data packets from its incoming edges, combines them by some encoding algorithms, and transmits the encoded data via its outgoing edges. Note that the node may transmits different data packets on different outgoing edges. The advantage of network coding is showed in the Figure 1 from [2]. In this Figure, we assume that the source node has two data packets \(A\) and \(B\) and wants to deliver them to the two sink nodes at the bottom. Assuming that all links have a capacity of one packet per unit of time, for traditional copy-and-forward network communication, there is no
possibility for the source node to deliver these two packets to the two sink nodes in one unit time. However, if the upper intermediate node XORs the received packets and forward \( A \oplus B \) to the middle link, both sink nodes obtain two distinct packets in every unit of time.

![Network coding](image)

Network coding has been extensively studied by researchers in the past few years. The works in [19, 22, 27, 30] show that simple random linear coding is sufficient for achieving maximum capacity bounds in multicast traffic. In the following, we introduce notations for the random linear coding.

Without loss of generality, we assume that the source node generates the messages \( w_1, \ldots, w_t \in F_p^{n-t} \), where \( F_p \) is the finite field. In another word, each \( w_i \) consists of \( n - t \) elements from \( F_p \).

First, the source node pads the messages with the \( t \times t \) identity matrix \( I \) as follows:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  M_1 \\
  M_2 \\
  \vdots \\
  M_t
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
  w_1 \\
  w_2 \\
  \vdots \\
  w_t
\end{pmatrix}I
\]

Thus we can consider the messages as \( M_1, \ldots, M_t \in F_p^n \).

For one message transmission session, each node with \( k \) incoming edges receives \( v_1, \ldots, v_k \in F_p^n \) from its \( k \) incoming edges respectively. For each outgoing edge, the node chooses random \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k \in F_p \) and transmits \( \alpha_1 v_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k v_k \) on this outgoing edge.

Without loss of generality, we also assume that there are \( t \) virtual nodes which transmit the values \( M_1, \ldots, M_t \) to the source node. So the source node transmits random linear combinations of these messages on its outgoing edges instead of the original messages.

Note that if one sink node receives \( v_i = (u_{i,1}, \ldots, u_{i,n-t}, \beta_{i,1}, \ldots, \beta_{i,t}) \), then we have the following property

\[
v_i = (\beta_{i,1}, \ldots, \beta_{i,t}) \begin{pmatrix}
  M_1 \\
  M_2 \\
  \vdots \\
  M_t
\end{pmatrix}
\]

Thus if the receiver node could collect \( t \) packets \( v_1, \ldots, v_t \), then with high probability she could
recover the original message as

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
M_1 \\
M_2 \\
\vdots \\
M_t
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
\beta_{1,1} & \cdots & \beta_{1,t} \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\beta_{t,1} & \cdots & \beta_{t,t}
\end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix}
v_1 \\
v_2 \\
\vdots \\
v_t
\end{pmatrix}
\]

### 3 Information Theoretic Approach to Network Coding

Cai and Yeung [5, 39, 7] have proposed a general framework and obtained theoretical bounds for network error correction. Based on these theoretical bounds, Cai and Yeung [8] designed algorithms for achieving network coding based secure communication against passive adversaries (wire tappers).

Several other papers [7, 3, 18, 20, 21, 39] studied network coding based information theoretic secure communication techniques against Byzantine/active adversaries. It should be noted that in these papers, the adversary model is based on the threshold number of communication links that could be controlled by the adversary. This is very different from the more powerful model based on the number of nodes that could be controlled by the adversary. The link based adversary model may be realistic in some wire based networks, it is unrealistic in wireless networks [12] or overlay networks such as peer-to-peer networks where the participants are open to the public.

For example, in Figure 2 (from Cai and Yeung [8]), the sender \( s \) generates a random key \( k_1 \) and sends the encrypted versions of the message \( m_1 + k_1 \) and \( m_1 - k_1 \) on the two outgoing links respectively. It is clear that any single link will not be able to recover the message \( m_1 \) nor the key \( k_1 \). Thus this message transmission protocol is secure against any single corrupted link. However, the node \( a_0 \) could easily recover the message by summing up the two received packets: \( (m_1 - k_1) + (m_1 + k_1) = 2m_1 \). In another word, the protocol proposed by Cai and Yeung [8] is not private against one single eavesdropping node.

![Figure 2: Cai and Yeung’s private network coding](image)

The same model is used by other researchers (see, e.g., [7, 3, 18, 20, 21, 39]) to design secure message transmission protocols in network coding against active (Byzantine style) adversaries. Since the adversary model is based on the maximum number of links controlled by the adversary, these network coding message transmission protocols are NOT secure against an adversary who...
controls one single node and generates \( k \)-outgoing corrupted messages where \( k \) is the threshold bounds in these protocols. Thus the scope of these network coding transmission protocols could be limited. Note that the authors in [38] propose to reduce the adversary’s capability by only allowing nodes to broadcast at most once. This model requires trusted nodes and are impractical for open systems such as practical wireless networks [13] or peer-to-peer networks.

Though the link based adversary models may be sufficient in some applications where it is hard for the adversary to control one single node with several output channels, these models are not valid in many applications where the adversary could control several nodes. For example, in peer-to-peer networks (indeed, one of the major applications of network coding is peer-to-peer networks) or wireless networks [12]. Thus it is preferred to study information theoretic message transmission network coding protocols in the node based adversary models.

4 Probabilistic approach to secure network coding

In addition to the information theoretic approaches for secure network coding that we have discussed in the previous section. Several efforts have been made to design cryptographic protocols (essentially all of them are based on homomorphic message authentication schemes) for secure network coding. In this section, we describe these efforts and show that these efforts are far from suitable solutions.

4.1 Homomorphic MACs and Security Models

In this section, we will briefly describe the definitions for homomorphic message authentication codes and security models. A \((p, n, t)\) homomorphic MAC consists of three components:

- MAC generation: for the input \((k, \text{id}, M_i)\) where \(k\) is the secret key, \(\text{id}\) is the session identifier, and \(M_i \in F_p^n\) is a message, it generates an MAC tag \(\text{MAC}(M_i)\) for \(M_i\).
- Combine: assume the received message and MAC pairs for the session id are \((\text{id}, v_1, \text{MAC}_1), \ldots, (\text{id}, v_k, \text{MAC}_k)\). For each outgoing edge, the node chooses random \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k \in F_p\) and computes the MAC tag \(\text{MAC}_v\) on the combined message \(v = \alpha_1 v_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k v_k\).
- Verification: for a received message and MAC pair \((\text{id}, v, \text{MAC})\) of session id, it outputs 0 as reject and 1 as accept.

The protocol should satisfy the following correctness property: Let \((M_1, \text{MAC}_1), \ldots, (M_t, \text{MAC}_t)\) be the base messages and corresponding MAC tags generated by the source node. For any \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k \in F_p\) and \(v = \alpha_1 M_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k M_k\), the verification output on \((\text{id}, v, \text{MAC})\) is “accept” if and only if MAC is the same as the Combine process output tag for the message \(v\).

Next, we discuss the security model for homomorphic MACs. There are two kinds of security models that we will consider. In the first model, we allow the attacker to observe the MAC tags (signatures) on several message spaces but it is not allowed to choose its own session id and message space to obtain MAC tags for the base messages from that message space. The homomorphic MAC scheme is observation secure if, after observing MAC tags on message spaces at most polynomial in \(|p| + n + t\), the attacker has negligible advantage in producing a valid triple \((\text{id}, v, \text{MAC})\) where either \(\text{id}\) is new or \(\text{id}\) is the identifier for a previous session but \(v\) is not in the message space of that session.
The second model is similar but different to Agrawal and Boneh’s model [1]. In this model, in addition to allowing the attacker to observe message authentication tags on polynomial many message spaces, we allow the attacker to obtain the MAC tags (signatures) on arbitrary message spaces (at most polynomial in $|p| + n + t$) of its choice which is similar to chosen message attacks. The restriction on the queries is that the attacker is not allowed to submit a query with same identifiers that she has already submitted or observed (in the model from [1], there is no such restriction). Each message space submitted by the attack should contain a session id. The homomorphic MAC scheme is chosen message secure if, after polynomial many observations and queries, the attacker has negligible advantage in producing a valid triple $(id, v, MAC)$ where either id is new or id is the identifier for a previous session but $v$ is not in the message space of that session.

In the next sections, we will show that several of the previous message authentication schemes for network coding are not even observation secure. In section 5, we will propose a chosen message secure message authentication scheme for network coding.

4.2 Digital signature on orthogonal vectors from ISIT 07

Zhao, Kalker, Medard, and Han [42] introduce a different scheme to authenticate messages in network coding. Roughly speaking, in order to authenticate $M_1, \cdots, M_t$, the source node finds a vector $u$ which is orthogonal to all these messages and digitally signs $x = u \cdot \alpha'$ where $\alpha'$ is derived from a session private key. The intermediate and receiver nodes will accept a received message $M$ if and only if $M \cdot u = 0$.

The intuition for this scheme is that a received message $M$ should be accepted if and only if it belongs to the linear space spanned by the vectors $M_1, \cdots, M_t$. The authors [42] think that this is “equivalent” to the fact that $M \cdot u = 0$. Unfortunately, this argument is not valid. There are many vectors $M'$ with the property $M' \cdot u = 0$ but $M'$ does not belong to the linear space spanned by the vectors $M_1, \cdots, M_t$. In the following, we describe the signature scheme and simple observation attacks on the scheme.

The parameters for the system consist of a generator $g$ for the group $G$ of order $p$. The private key for the source node is $n$ random elements $\{\alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_n\}$ from $F_p$. The public key for the source node is $\{g^{\alpha_1}, \cdots, g^{\alpha_n}\}$. We assume that all nodes in the network have an authentic copy of the system parameters $(g, G, p)$ and the public key of the source node.

For the source node to sign the messages $M_i = (m_{i,1}, \cdots, m_{i,n})$ (1 ≤ $i$ ≤ $t$), the source node finds a nonzero vector $u \in F_p^n$ with the property that $u \cdot M_i = 0$ for $i = 1, \cdots, t$. The digital signature for the message space is $x = (u_1\alpha_1^{-1}, \cdots, u_n\alpha_n^{-1})$ together with a standard digital signature on $x$. [42] does not mention how this $u$ is found.

To verify whether $x$ is a valid signature on a message $M = (m_1, \cdots, m_n)$, one needs to check whether

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} (g^{\alpha_i})^{x_im_i} = 1$$

The authors in [42] have provided a security proof for the above signature scheme. In the following, we show a few observation attacks on this signature scheme (thus the scheme is not observation secure).
4.2.1 Attack 1 described in [42]

This attack was noticed by the authors in their original paper [42]. Assume that $x$ is the digital signature for session one (of file $F$) and $x'$ is the digital signature for session two (of file $F'$). Furthermore, assume that the message $M = (m_1, \ldots, m_n)$ is from session one. Then one can construct a message $M' = (m'_1, \ldots, m'_n)$ for session two, where $m'_i = x_i m_i / x'_i$. This is true since

$$ \prod_{i=1}^{n} (g^{\alpha_i})^{x'_i m'_i} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} (g^{\alpha_i})^{x_i m_i} = 1. $$

Obviously, $M'$ is not a valid message for session two. This attack shows that each session needs the secure deployment of a different public/private keys, which could use too much of the network coding capacity.

4.2.2 Attack 2

It is straightforward that if the adversary can collect $t$ messages (which can be easily done by the adversary), then she will be able to recover the original message. At the same time, the adversary will also be able to compute the original orthogonal vector $u$. Here we assume that the implementation for computing $u$ from the messages is public so $u$ can be uniquely recovered. By the fact that $x = (u_1 \alpha_1^{-1}, \ldots, u_n \alpha_n^{-1})$, the adversary will be able to recover the private key of the source node. Thus she will be able to create any signature on any coined message.

4.2.3 Attack 3

Let $M_1, \ldots, M_t$ be the message vectors where $M_i = (m_{i,1}, \ldots, m_{i,n-t}, 0, \ldots, 0, 1, 0, \ldots, 0)$. Assume the source node chooses the following $u$ as the orthogonal vector ([42] does not give a method for the choice of $u$),

$$ (1, \ldots, 1_{n-t}, - \sum_{j=1}^{n-t} m_{1,j}, - \sum_{j=1}^{n-t} m_{2,j}, \ldots - \sum_{j=1}^{n-t} m_{t,j}) $$

Let $M'_i = (m'_{i,1}, \ldots, m'_{i,n-t}, 0, \ldots, 0, 1, 0, \ldots, 0)$ where $m'_{i,1}, \ldots, m'_{i,n-t}$ is any permutation of $m_{i,1}, \ldots, m_{i,n-t}$. Then $M'_i$ is orthogonal to $u$, but $M'_i$ is not a valid message. This example shows that unless $u$ is randomly chosen from the orthogonal space, for any given deterministic algorithm, it is easy for the adversary to construct a fake message to pass the verification process.

The reason for this attack to be successful is as follows. The linear space spanned by the original messages is $t$-dimensional and $u$ is orthogonal to a subspace of dimension $n-1$ which contains the message space. Thus, the adversary could succeed if she manages to get a vector in a $n-1-t$-dimensional subspace which is the difference of the $n-1$-dimensional orthogonal (to $u$) and the $t$-dimensional message space.

Recently, Kehdi and Li [26] designed a different scheme based on the orthogonal space. In their scheme, the vectors of the orthogonal spaces (that is, orthogonal to the linear space spanned by the message vectors) are distributed to all intermediate nodes (using a scheme that is similar to the network coding). There are several challenges for this scheme to be practical. First, the adversary may try to attack the orthogonal space distribution phase. The authors in [26] propose to use digital signature schemes to protect this phase. But then we have the egg and chicken problem.
4.3 Signature Scheme from INFOCOM 2008

Yu, Wei, Ramkumar, and Guan [40] designed a homomorphic digital signature scheme for network coding against pollution attacks. The homomorphic signature scheme was designed with the purpose that each intermediate node can verify whether a received packet has a valid signature and, without access to the private key, each intermediate node can generate a random linear combination of the incoming messages together with a digital signature on the combined message.

Specifically, their signature scheme is as follows. The source node has an RSA private key $d$, and public key $(N, e)$. Without loss of generality, we assume that these parameters are chosen securely and meets the security requirements (e.g., $N$ is 1024 bits or 2048 bits). Furthermore, let $p$ and $q$ be two primes such that $q|(p - 1)$ and $g_1, \ldots, g_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ be randomly chosen numbers with order $q$ (mod $p$). We assume that all nodes in the network have an authentic copy of the system parameters $(N, e), p, q, g_1, \ldots, g_n$.

In one session, the source node generates the digital signatures (message authentication codes) for messages $M_1, \ldots, M_t$ as follows. The signature on $M_i = (m_{i,1}, \ldots, m_{i,n})$ is computed as:

$$S(M_i) = \left( \prod_{j=1}^{n} g_j^{m_{i,j}} \right)^d \mod N$$

Now assume that an intermediate node receives message-signature pair $(v, S(v))$, where $v = (u_1, \ldots, u_n)$, it can verify the digital signature as follows:

$$S(v)^e = \prod_{j=1}^{n} g_j^{u_j} \mod p \mod N$$

Furthermore, assume that the intermediate node receives $(v_1, S(v_1)), \ldots, (v_k, S(v_k))$ from its $k$ incoming edges respectively, where $S(v_k)$ is the digital signature on $v_k$. For each outgoing edge, the node chooses random $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k \in F_p$ and computes the digital signature on the combined message $v = \alpha_1 v_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k v_k$ as follows:

$$S(v) = \prod_{j=1}^{n} S(v_j)^{\alpha_j}$$

Though the correctness of the signature scheme is proved in [40], it is pointed out in a recent paper [15] that this protocol is incorrect indeed (the protocol produced signatures could not be verified). The authors in [40] provide a security proof for the above signature scheme. In the following, we describe several observation attacks on this signature scheme (thus the scheme is not observation secure).

4.3.1 Attack 1

This attack is derived from the “batch verification” properties provided by the authors in their original paper [40]. Assume that the adversary observes a message-signature pair $(M', S(M'))$ from session one and a message-signature pair $(M'', S(M''))$ from session two. For any random numbers $\beta_1, \beta_2$, the adversary can generate the “digital signature” $S(M)$ on the coined message $M = \beta_1 M' + \beta_2 M''$ as $S(M')^{\beta_1}S(M'')^{\beta_2}$. It should be noted that this message $M$ belongs
neither to session one nor to session two. One may propose that a session ID could be embedded into the message space, but there is no easy way to do that. One may also propose that the system parameters $g_1, \cdots, g_n$ be changed for each session. That is, different sessions do not share the same parameters. But then the protocol will become very inefficient and one may wonder what is the advantage of network coding for these applications (compared to traditional copy-and-forward techniques) since the useful network capacity may be significantly reduced. Our next attack shows that even if one adds some kind of session identification to the signatures, it may still be easily broken.

4.3.2 Attack 2

Assume that the adversary observes a digital signature $S(M)$ on the message $M = (m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n)$. For any message $M' = (m_1', m_2', \ldots, m_n')$ chosen by the adversary, she may compute a number $x$ such that $m_1 = m_1 + e \cdot x$. Then the signature on the message $M'$ is $S(M') = S(M) \cdot g_1^{m_1}$. The reason is due to the following fact:

$$S(M')^e = S(M)^e g_1^{e \cdot x} = g_1^{e \cdot x} \prod_{j=1}^{n} g_j^{m_j} = g_1^{m_1 + e \cdot x} \cdots g_n^{m_n}$$

Similarly, the adversary can generate a digital signature $S(M'')$ for any message $M'' = (m_1', \ldots, m_n')$ at her choice. This attack shows that even if the source node distributes different system parameters for different sessions, it still does not work!

Recently, the same group of researchers have proposed an efficient scheme [41] for XOR based network coding. The scheme relies solely on symmetric key encryption schemes by avoiding using expensive public key cryptographic primitives, and may not be extended to general random linear network coding.

4.4 Agrawal and Boneh’s scheme and RIPPLE from INFOCOM 2010

Gkantsidis and Rodriguez [17] introduces the homomorphic hashing for network coding which requires expensive exponentiation computations for each intermediate nodes. In particular, the hashing output for a message $M_i = (m_{i,1}, \ldots, m_{i,n})$ is defined as $h(M_i) = \prod_{k=1}^{n} g_k^{m_{i,k}}$. Thus it is not practical for many applications [13].

Based on a classic MAC system due to Carter and Wagman [6], Agrawal and Boneh introduced a homomorphic MAC scheme [1] for network coding. In this scheme [1], the source node and the receiver node share the secret $(k_1, k_2)$. In order for the source node to generate an MAC tag on a message $M_i \in F_p^n$ in session id, it first uses pseudorandom functions to generate $u = (u_1, \ldots, u_n) \in F_p^n$ from $k_1$ and generate $b \in F_p$ from $(id, i, k_2)$. The MAC tag on $M_i$ is then defined as $u \cdot M_i + b$. Though the intermediate node may not generate the exact same MAC tags for a linear combination of incoming messages, they can attach the linear combination of the incoming tags to the linearly combined message. A node (e.g., the receiver node) could verify the combined MAC tags if it knows the value of the key $(k_1, k_2)$. The shortcoming of the scheme in [1] is that it will only help the receiver node (but not the intermediate nodes) to detect malicious packets. In another word, the scheme will not be able to defeat pollution attacks.

Authors in [1] proved that their homomorphic MAC is secure in their security model. Their model is similar to our chosen message security model except that they allow the adversary to make any queries of the format $(id, M)$ where $M$ is a message subspace while, in our model
(see, section 4.1), the adversary is not allowed to make queries with observed or already queried identifiers. In their model, their scheme [1] is obviously insecure. The attack is as follows: assume that the adversary has observed the MAC tags on \((\text{id}, M_1, \ldots, M_t)\). Without loss of generality, assume that \((M_1, \ldots, M_t, M'_1, \ldots, M'_{n-1})\) is a base for the entire space \(F_p^n\). The adversary can make a query for MAC tags on \((\text{id}, M'_1, \ldots, M'_{n-1})\). After this query, the adversary will be able to generate MAC tags on the message \(M = \alpha \cdot M_1 + \beta \cdot M'_1\) for the session id, though \(M\) is neither in the original message subspace or the queried message subspace. Thus the scheme in [1] could not be secure in their model [1].

The authors in [1] further extended their scheme to broadcast homomorphic MACs by pre-distributing some keys to the intermediate nodes (based on the cover free family concept) so that intermediate nodes could verify the MAC tags (thus avoiding pollution attacks). However, this scheme is only \(c\)-collusion resistant for some pre-determined \(c\). Furthermore, when \(c\) becomes larger, the scheme will become impractical (e.g., for the key pre-distribution).

Based on the multi-receiver/multi-sender authentication scheme [11], Oggier and Fathi [33] recently designed a message authentication scheme for network coding. However, due to the complicated pre-key distribution scheme, the scheme in [33] has limited applications.

Dong, Curtmola, and Nita-Rotaru [12] proposed a TESLA-like scheme DART to defend against pollution attacks in intra-flow network coding for wireless mesh networks. In their scheme, the source node periodically computes and disseminates a digitally signed random checksum packet \((\text{CHK}_s, s, l)\) where \(\text{CHK}_s\) is a \(t \times b\) matrix and \(b\) is the security parameter. This protocol works fine for wireless mesh networks with sufficient generations of packets. However, for general networks (such as peer-to-peer networks), there are several limitations for this protocol. In particular, the frequent broadcast of the large size checksum \(\text{CHK}_s\) will use up much of the network bandwidth and each intermediate node needs to verify the public key digital signature on each checksum which could be impractical for many applications.

Another TESLA-like scheme RIPPLE was recently proposed by Li, Yao, Chen, Jaggi, and Rosen in [31] at INFOCOM 2010. In the RIPPLE scheme, the source node chooses random seeds \((r^1, \ldots, r^T)\) and commits \((r^1_N, \ldots, r^T_N)\) where \(r^i_N = H^N(r^i) = H(\cdots (H(r^i)))\) at the beginning of message transmission. Here we assume there are at most \(N\) sessions, \(T\) is the maximum network hops for each packet to arrive at its destination, and \(H\) is a pseudorandom function. For a session with identifier \(i \leq N\), the key consists of \((K^1_i, K^2_i, \ldots, K^T_i)\) where \(K^j_i \in F_p^{\alpha + T - j}\) is derived from \(r^j\). The MAC tags for a message \(v\) is defined as \((j = 1, \ldots, T)\):

\[
\text{MAC}_j(v) = K^{T-j+1}_i \cdot (v, \text{MAC}_1(v), \ldots, \text{MAC}_{j-1}(v))
\]

At the beginning of RIPPLE message transmission, the source node digitally signs and broadcasts \((r^1_N, \ldots, r^T_N)\) to all nodes in the network. At time \(j \leq T\) of session \(i\), the source node broadcasts \(K^j_i\). When an intermediate node at hop \(j\) receives packets with MAC tags \(\text{MAC}_1, \ldots, \text{MAC}_{T-j+1}\), it will hold the packets until it receives \(K^j_i\). After it receives this value, it can verify the validity of \(K^j_i\) and \(\text{MAC}_{T-j+1}(v)\). It will then continue with the network coding protocol by generating and attaching the combined MAC tags \(\text{MAC}_1, \ldots, \text{MAC}_{T-j}\) for its outgoing messages.

The RIPPLE scheme is not secure (or secure but working) for the following reasons: The source node will broadcast \(K^j_i\) and \(K^{j+1}_i\) at time \(j\) and \(j + 1\) respectively. We may further assume that it takes time \(\delta\) for the disclosed key to move from one hop to the next hop. In the original RIPPLE paper, there is no discussion on the delivery time of the disclosed key or they assumed that \(\delta = 1\) which means the key delivery speed is the same as the other packets. Normally we may...
assume that $\delta < 1$.

$K_i^j$ arrives at a hop $j$ node $A$ at time $j + j\delta$. Assume that $j\delta > 1$ which is true for larger $j$ such as $j = 3$. At time $j + j\delta > j + 1$, a colluding node $B$ (which could be at hop 1 or later) has already learned the value of $K_i^{j+1}$. Thus $A$ and $B$ could collaborate together to generate valid MAC tags $\text{MAC}_{T-j}$ on bogus messages for hop $j+1$ at time $j + j\delta$ (here we assume that the nodes $A$ and $B$ may have another fast communication channel which is always possible for malicious attackers). Thus the node at hop $j + 1$ will either reject all messages (since the level-$j$ key $K_i^{j+1}$ has always been disclosed before it receives any message) or accept these bogus messages at future time when $K_i^{j+1}$ arrives at them. Thus the RIPPLE scheme will not be able to defeat pollution attacks.

4.5 Charles, Jain, and Lauter’s signature scheme and other schemes

Charles, Jain, and Lauter [9] have designed a signature scheme for network coding. The scheme is based on bilinear maps which we will discuss first.

4.5.1 Bilinear maps and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions

In the following, we briefly describe the bilinear maps and bilinear map groups.

1. $G_1$, $G_2$, and $G_T$ are three (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order $q$.
2. $g_1, g_2$ are generators of $G_1, G_2$ respectively.
3. \( \hat{e} : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T \) is a bilinear map.

A bilinear map is a map \( \hat{e} : G \times G \rightarrow G_1 \) with the following properties:

1. bilinear: for all $x, y \in Z$, we have \( \hat{e}(g_1^x, g_2^y) = \hat{e}(g_1, g_2)^{xy} \).
2. non-degenerate: \( \hat{e}(g_1, g_2) \neq 1 \).

We say that $G_1, G_2$ are bilinear groups if the group action in $G_1, G_2$ can be computed efficiently and there exists a group $G_T$ and an efficiently computable bilinear map \( \hat{e} : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T \) as above. For convenience, throughout the paper, we view $G_1, G_2, G_T$ as multiplicative groups though the concrete implementation of $G_1, G_2$ could be additive elliptic curve groups.

4.5.2 The signature scheme

We first briefly discuss the network coding signature scheme by Charles, Jain, and Lauter [9].

The system parameter consists of the bilinear group $G = (G, G, G_T, \hat{e})$ and $(n + 1)$ elements $g_1, \ldots, g_n, g \in G$ that are chosen by the source node. Note that here we assume that $G = G_1 = G_2$ for the bilinear groups.

For each session, the source node chooses a secret key $(s_1, \ldots, s_n)$. The signature on the message $M_i = (m_{i,1}, \ldots, m_{i,n})$ is $(g^{s_1}, \ldots, g^{s_n}, S(M_i))$ where

\[
S(M_i) = \prod_{j=1}^{n} g_j^{m_{i,j} s_j}
\]
Now assume that an intermediate node receives a message-signature pair \((v, (h_1, \cdots, h_n, S(v)))\), where \(v = (u_1, \ldots, u_n)\), it can verify the digital signature as follows:

\[
\prod_{j=1}^{n} \hat{e}(g_j^{u_j}, h_j) = \hat{e}(S(v), g)
\]

Furthermore, assume that the intermediate node receives \((v_1, (h_1, \cdots, h_n, S(v_1))), \cdots, (v_k, (h_1, \cdots, h_n, S(v_k)))\) from its \(k\) incoming edges respectively, where \(S(v_i)\) is the digital signature on \(v_i = (u_{i,1}, \cdots, u_{i,n})\). For each outgoing edge, the node chooses random \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k \in F_p\) and computes the digital signature on the combined message \(v = \alpha_1 v_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k v_k\) as \((h_1, \cdots, h_n, S(v))\) where

\[
S(v) = \prod_{j=1}^{n} g_j^{s_j} \prod_{i=1}^{t} \alpha_i u_{i,j} = \prod_{i=1}^{t} \prod_{j=1}^{n} g_j^{\alpha_i s_j} = \prod_{i=1}^{t} S(v_i)^{\alpha_i}
\]

The correctness of the signature scheme is straightforward and omitted here. The authors in [9] provide a security proof for the above signature scheme. In the following, we show a few attacks on this signature scheme.

### 4.5.3 Attacks

Our first analysis shows that the values \((g^{s_1}, \ldots, g^{s_n})\) have to be distributed to all nodes in a secure channel for each session. The reason is as follows (by assuming the values are not securely distributed, we present an attack).

- Assume that the adversary observes one signature \((g^{s_1}, \ldots, g^{s_n}, S(M_i))\) on the message \(M_i = (m_{i,1}, m_{i,2}, \cdots, m_{i,n})\). For any message \(M' = (m, m_{i,2}, \cdots, m_{i,n})\) chosen by the adversary, the adversary can compute a number \(\beta\) such that \(m = m_{i,1}\beta^{-1}\). Then \((g^{\beta s_1}, \ldots, g^{s_n}, S(M_i))\) is a signature for \(M'\). Thus it is straightforward for the adversary to generate signatures on any message \(M''\) by modifying the values of \((g^{s_1}, \ldots, g^{s_n})\).

Boneh, Freeman, Katz and Waters [4] observed that, for this signature scheme, if both sessions share \((g^{s_1}, \ldots, g^{s_n})\), then the adversary can easily combine the signatures on messages from two sessions to generate a new signature on a fake message:

- Assume that \(M'\) is from session one and \(M''\) is from session two. The signatures on the two messages are \(h_1, \ldots, h_n, S(M')\) and \(h_1, \ldots, h_n, S(M'')\).

- For any \(\beta_1\) and \(\beta_2\), one can compute the signature on the message \(\beta_1 M' + \beta_2 M''\) as \(S(M')^{\beta_1} S(M'')^{\beta_2}\).

Combining these attacks, it is clear that the network coding signature in [9] requires a secure channel for each session. This may be achieved by letting the source node digitally sign the value \((g^{s_1}, \ldots, g^{s_n})\) using a traditional digital signature scheme.

In a summary, the signature scheme from [9] is not suitable for network coding for the following reasons:

1. **High computational overhead**: bilinear operations are very inefficient
2. **Bandwidth non-efficiency**: for the distribution of each file (session), the source node needs to securely broadcast \((g^{s_1}, \ldots, g^{s_n})\) to all nodes.

Recently, Boneh, Freeman, Katz, and Waters [4] designed two provably secure digital signature schemes NCS1 and NCS2 for network coding. However, the first scheme NCS1 is based on bilinear maps, which may require more powerful computing capabilities for the intermediate nodes (could be routers). Thus it may be impractical for most applications (see, e.g., [12] for some discussions).

The second digital signature scheme NCS2 from [4] requires longer signatures to be delivered for each session, which will reduce the advantage of the network coding by using much of the bandwidth for signature delivery. Furthermore, the scheme NCS2 requires each intermediate node to compute \(n\) expensive public key exponentiation operations which could be impractical for many applications.

Gennaro, Katz, Krawczyk, and Rabin [15] proposed a RSA based homomorphic signature scheme and a homomorphic hashing scheme for linear network coding over integers. Though these two schemes are good in several aspects, they still need several exponentiation operations for intermediate node which is too expensive for many applications.

## 5 Secure message authentication code for network coding

In this section, we propose a chosen message secure homomorphic message authentication code for network coding based on delayed key release (TESLA-like) schemes. The most related schemes to our scheme is DART [12] and RIPPLE [31].

Typical authenticated broadcast channels require asymmetric cryptographic techniques, otherwise any compromised receiver could forge messages from the sender. Cheung [10] proposed a symmetric cryptography based source authentication technique in the context of authenticating communication among routers. Cheung’s technique is based on delayed disclosure of keys by the sender. Later, Perrig, Canetti, Tygar, and Song adapted delayed key disclosure techniques to TESLA protocols [34, 35].

The delayed checksum release idea has also been proposed for network coding in wireless mesh networks [12] and more recently in the RIPPLE scheme [31]. As we have mentioned in previous sections, the scheme in [12] is suitable to wireless mesh networks and requires frequent broadcast of large amount of checksum packets, and it has disadvantages in other environments such as peer-to-peer networks.

Assume that the maximum network hops for each packet to arrive at its destination is bounded by \(T\) and \(\delta\) is the maximal time needed for a node to deliver a packet to its next hop. For a session starting at time \(t_0\), in the following protocol description, we use time \(r\) to denote the time interval \([t_0 + r\delta, t_0 + (r + 1)\delta)\) for \(0 \leq r \leq T\). We assume that the clock for each node in the network has been loosely synchronized [34, 35]. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume that \(n \geq T\).

In the following, we describe our homomorphic message authentication scheme and the corresponding message transmission protocol.

**Session key setup.** For each session with identification id, the source node chooses a random seed \(s\) and computes \(b^r = H_1^r(s, id) \in F_p\) and \(a_j^r = H_2^r(j, b^r) \in F_p\) for \(j = 1, \ldots, n + T\) and \(r = 1, \ldots, T + 1\), where \(H_1\) and \(H_2\) are pseudo-random functions and \(H_1^r(\cdot) = H_1(H_1(\cdot)\cdots H_1(\cdot))\). Let \(a^r = (a_1^r, \ldots, a_n^r)\).
At the beginning time 0 of the session id, the source node digitally signs and broadcasts \(b^{T+1}\) to all nodes in the network, using a traditional cryptographic digital signature scheme (such as RSA or DSA). At time \(\frac{r(r+1)}{2}\) \((1 \leq r \leq T)\), the source node broadcasts \(b^{T-r+1}\) (no digital signature is needed here) to all nodes in the network.

**MAC generation.** For a message \(M \in F_p\), the source node generates \(T\) MAC tags for the message \(M\) as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{MAC}_1(M) &= a^1 \cdot M \\
\text{MAC}_r(M) &= a^r \cdot M + \sum_{j=1}^{r-1} a_{n+j}^r \text{MAC}_j(M)
\end{align*}
\]

**MAC Combine.** For a session id and \(r \leq T\), assume that an intermediate node (which is \(r\) hops away from the source node) receive \(k\) tuples \((\text{id}, v_1, \text{MAC}_1(v_1), \ldots, \text{MAC}_{T-r+1}(v_1)), \ldots, (\text{id}, v_k, \text{MAC}_1(v_k), \ldots, \text{MAC}_{T-r+1}(v_k))\). For each outgoing edge, the node chooses random \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k \in F_p\) and sends the tuple \((\text{id}, v, \text{MAC}_1(v), \ldots, \text{MAC}_{T-r}(v))\) on this outgoing edge, where \(v\) is the combined message \(v = \alpha_1 v_1 + \cdots + \alpha_k v_k\) and MAC tags on \(v\) are computed as follows \((1 \leq u \leq T - r)\):

\[
\text{MAC}_u(v) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \alpha_j \text{MAC}_u(v_j)
\]

**Message Transmission and MAC Verification.** Assume that the base of the message space consists of \(M_1, \ldots, M_t\). The source node initiates the message transmission at time 0 of session id by transferring the message base together with their MAC tags: \((\text{id}, M_i, \text{MAC}_1(M_i), \ldots, \text{MAC}_{T-r+1}(M_i))\) for all \(i \leq t\). For an intermediate node at hop \(r\) (i.e., \(r\) is the distance from this intermediate node to the source node), it receives a tuple \((\text{id}, v, \text{MAC}_1(v), \ldots, \text{MAC}_{T-r+1}(v))\), approximately at time \(\frac{r(r+1)}{2}\) of session id. It buffers the tuple and waits for the value \(b^{T-r+1}\) from the source node which is broadcasted by the source node at time \(\frac{r(r+1)}{2}\). Thus this node should get \(b^{T-r+1}\) approximately at time \(r + \frac{r(r+1)}{2}\).

After it receives the value of \(b^{T-r+1}\), it can verify its validity by checking whether \(H_1'(b^{T-r+1}) = b^{T-1}\). Note that the source node has broadcasted \(b^{T+1}\) and the digital signature on it at time 0, so this node should have received an authentic value of \(b^{T+1}\) already. Now assume that this intermediate node has received a valid \(b^{T-r+1}\). It continues by generating \((a_0^{T-r+1}, \ldots, a_n^{T-r+1})\) using \(a_j^{T-r+1} = H_2(j, b^{T-r+1})\) and for each buffered tuple \((\text{id}, v, \text{MAC}_1'(v), \ldots, \text{MAC}_{T-r+1}'(v))\) with \(v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)\), it checks whether the following equation holds:

\[
\text{MAC}_{T-r+1}'(v) = a^{T-r+1} \cdot v + \sum_{j=1}^{T-r} a_{n+j}^{T-r+1} \text{MAC}_j'(v).
\]

If the equation holds, then the MAC tag \(\text{MAC}_{T-r+1}'(v)\) is valid. Otherwise, the MAC tag is not valid and it will discard this buffered packet.

After all buffered tags for the key derived from \(b^{T-r+1}\) is checked, the intermediate node will continue with the network coding protocol by combining all valid messages and their corresponding MAC tags using the MAC Combine process at time \(r + \frac{r(r+1)}{2}\) and the node at hop \(r + 1\) will get the packet at time \(1 + r + \frac{r(r+1)}{2} = \frac{(r+1)(r+2)}{2}\). Here we assume that the time for the intermediate node to do the MAC verification and message mix computation are included in the value of \(\delta\) which is defined as the maximal time needed for a node to deliver a packet to the next hop. This completes the description of our homomorphic message authentication protocol.
Next we show the correctness of the protocol. First, it is straightforward that for any $\alpha \in F_p$ and $v \in F_p^n$, we have $\alpha \cdot \text{MAC}_1(v) = \text{MAC}_1(\alpha v)$. By a simple induction, it is also straightforward that $\alpha \cdot \text{MAC}_u(v) = \text{MAC}_u(\alpha v)$ for $u \leq T$.

Now assume that $v = \alpha_1 M_1 + \cdots + \alpha_t M_t$. For $u = 1$, it is straightforward that $\text{MAC}_1(v) = \sum_{i=1}^t \alpha_i \text{MAC}_1(M_i)$. For $u = 2, \cdots, T$, we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^t \alpha_i \text{MAC}_u(M_i)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^t \alpha_i \left( a^u \cdot M_i + \sum_{j=1}^{u-1} a^u_{n+j} \cdot \text{MAC}_j(M_i) \right)$$

$$= a^u \cdot \sum_{i=1}^t \alpha_i M_i + \sum_{j=1}^{u-1} a^u_{n+j} \cdot \text{MAC}_j \left( \sum_{i=1}^t \alpha_i M_i \right)$$

$$= a^u \cdot v + \sum_{j=1}^{u-1} a^u_{n+j} \cdot \text{MAC}_j(v)$$

$$= \text{MAC}_u(v)$$

We conclude this section by showing the above homomorphic message authentication scheme is chosen message secure within the model discussed in Section 4.1. First we show that the scheme is observation secure.

**Theorem 5.1** Assume that both $H_1$ and $H_2$ are pseudorandom functions and $n > \max\{t, T\}$. Before the $r$-hop key $b^{T-r+1}$ is broadcasted, an observation attacker has negligible advantage in generating a session id message $v$ and valid MAC tag $\text{MAC}_u(v)$ such that the message $v$ is not in the original message space.

**Proof.** The source node generates MAC tags on messages $M_1, \cdots, M_t$. Thus, for each $r = 1, \cdots, T$, we get $t$ equations with $n$ unknowns $(a^r_1, \cdots, a^r_n)$. The solution for the session keys $a^r = (a^r_1, \cdots, a^r_n)$ consists of a $(n - t)$-dimension in $F_p^n$. If an observation attacker could generate a message $v$ and its valid MAC tag $\text{MAC}_r(v)$ such that $v$ is not a linear combination of $M_1, \cdots, M_t$, then this could be used to add a new equation to the previous equation systems. Thus the dimension of the solution space for the unknowns $a^r = (a^r_1, \cdots, a^r_n)$ is reduced to $n - t + 1$. This is a contradiction. Q.E.D

Next we show that the scheme is chosen message secure.

**Theorem 5.2** Assume that both $H_1$ and $H_2$ are secure pseudorandom functions, the public key cryptographic scheme is secure, and $n > \max\{t, T\}$. Then the above homomorphic message authentication scheme homMAC is chosen message secure. In particular, let $A, A_1, A_2, A_3$ be the chosen message adversary for HomMAC, pseudorandom adversary for $H_1$, pseudorandom adversary for $H_2$, and public key signature scheme adversary respectively. Then the advantage

$$\text{Adv}[A, \text{HomMAC}]$$

for $A$ is bounded by

$$\text{Adv}[A_1, H_1] + \text{Adv}[A_2, H_2] + \text{Adv}[A_3, \text{PubK}] + \frac{T^2}{p}$$
Sketch of Proof. The adversary $A$ adaptively chooses queries $(id, M)$ where $M$ is a message subspace and $id$ is an identifier that has not been observed or queried by $A$. The challenger responds to these queries by oracle access to the pseudorandom adversaries $A_1$, $A_2$, and the public key adversary $A_3$. Eventually, the adversary outputs $(id, v, MAC_1(v), \cdots, MAC_T(v), b^{T+1}, Sig(b^{T+1}), s)$. The adversary $A$ succeeds if $Sig(b^{T+1})$ is a valid public key signature on $b^{T+1}$, $b^{T+1} = H^{T+1}_1(s, id)$, all MACs are valid, and either $id$ is different from any identifiers observed or queried by $A$ or $id$ was observed or queried by the $A$ but $v$ is not from the corresponding message space. A reduction can then be used to reduce the success of the adversary $A$ to one of the following cases: pseudorandom function adversary $A_1$ success, pseudorandom function adversary $A_2$ success, public key signature scheme adversary $A_3$ success, and random guess. Thus the bound is proved. Q.E.D

References


