

## Reducing alarm fatigue: exploring decision structures, risks, and design

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### Abstract

Automated patient monitoring systems suffer from several design problems. Among them, alarm fatigue is one of the most critical issues, as evidenced by the *Sentinel Event Alert* that The Joint Commission – the U.S. hospital-accrediting body – recently issued. In this study, we explore fast-and-frugal heuristics that may be used to prioritize patient alarms, while continuing to monitor patient physiological state. By using a combination of human factors methodologies and the theory of Distributed Cognition (DCog), we studied alarm fatigue and its relationship to the underlying hospital systems. We identified three specific factors that we envision to be helpful for clinical personnel: ventilator presence, number of intravenous drips, and number of medications. We discuss their application in daily hospital operation. We also address cost-benefit considerations and possible monitor designs.

Received on 20 November 2016; accepted on 06 April 2017; published on 13 July 2017

**Keywords:** Alarm fatigue, cognitive heuristics, cost-benefit analysis, design considerations, fast-and-frugal trees, patient monitoring systems

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doi: 10.4108/eai.13-7-2017.152886

### 1. Introduction

In July 2010, a patient who suffered a severe blow to the face underwent surgery, and was then admitted to the hospital's Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Agitated, the patient kept removing the pulse oximeter from their finger, triggering an alarm to sound each time. These were obviously false alarms, and the staff stopped paying attention to them. However, a real problem soon arose: the patient's heart rate and breathing started to increase, while the blood oxygen decreased. Alarms sounded, to no response, for an hour. Then, the patient stopped breathing. A critical alarm sounded. Hospital personnel finally responded, but it was too late: the patient had suffered severe brain damage [19].

This is not an isolated incident. Alarm fatigue is a common problem in ICUs. Approximately 80% of ICU monitor alarms are irrelevant [36]. This volume of irrelevant alarms desensitizes nurses [43], leading to inappropriate behavior during real emergencies [41]. The Joint Commission identified alarm fatigue as a threat to patient safety [15].

In this study, we identify cognitive heuristics that nurses may already be using to quickly assess patient acuity, and we propose that automated patient monitors use such heuristics to automatically prioritize physiological alarms. Current monitors feature simple alarm prioritization. However, it appears that cognition is inappropriately distributed. Too much of the cognitive burden of determining whether a physiological state requires action falls on nurses or clinicians. This burden exceeds their available cognitive resources, resulting in alarm fatigue. We conjecture that, by redistributing cognition such that automated actors bear more of this burden, they will more effectively prioritize the information that they convey to clinical personnel, without increasing the risk of an alarm being missed.

We make various research contributions in this paper. We propose using a heuristic model to measure patient acuity, which we define in Section 3.2. While it is known that nurses use heuristics to assess patient acuity [38], to our knowledge, building these heuristics into patient monitors is a novel concept. By exploiting our model, we propose that future physiological monitors prioritize alerts using such a heuristic, and we present heuristics that have a high potential to

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succeed. Furthermore, we frame alarm fatigue through the lens of Distributed Cognition (DCog). We believe that this novel approach is a necessary step, motivated by the critical observation that situation awareness is distributed among automated monitors and team members in the ICU.

Previous literature [42] suggests that we might be able to limit alarm fatigue by making monitors less sensitive – but this carries its own risks! We take a rational approach to these trade-offs in Section 7, by setting up a cost-benefit analysis to frame what it means for alarm sensitivity to be optimal.

Finally, in Section 8, we explore how patient monitors of the future might interact with nurses, revealing their decision structures, rationales, and actions, and negotiating alarm limits with nurses, so that they are cooperative and understandable, instead of “black boxes.”

In the next section, we start by explaining the background research that informed our approach.

## 2. Background

Multiple disciplines have addressed medical alarm fatigue. In this section, we discuss how nurses and engineers have addressed the problem. Then, we apply concepts from the broader cognitive sciences literature to the medical domain.

In 2010, Graham and Cvach [11] demonstrated that best-practices nurse training could improve patient monitor alarm validity. They showed that this training reduced the number of critical monitor alarms in an ICU by 43%. However, frequent and comprehensive training is costly and time-consuming, and hospital personnel rarely undergo the necessary training to effectively solve this problem.

As an alternative, designers and engineers believe that good product design solves user interface issues more effectively than training [4]. To address alarm fatigue, they have recently made important advancements to increase the relevance of alarms, by integrating measures from multiple monitoring systems, and by leveraging statistical methods and artificial intelligence techniques. While promising, these solutions have largely been implemented in simulation only [36],<sup>1</sup> so there is little to no data on their impact in the field. Furthermore, as we discuss in the next section, drastically decreasing the percentage of false alarms will likely result in a new range of issues. This is because it may lead staff to assume perfect accuracy, and then to

modify their behaviors to follow this assumption, without understanding the shortcomings of the technical design.

### 2.1. Human Factors and Ergonomics

Human factors research in different work domains, such as aviation and nuclear power plant operation, has addressed alarm fatigue. Notably, Wickens *et al.* [42] (p. 25) introduced an important framework and practical guidelines:

1. *Use multiple alarm levels.* Prioritize alarms based on each event’s level of urgency and certainty.
2. *Raise automated beta slightly.* This refers to Signal Detection Theory, where false positives may be directly traded off for false negatives by raising the decision criterion.
3. *Keep the human “in the loop.”* Humans should monitor the raw data in parallel with the automated systems.
4. *Improve operator understanding of alarm false alarms.* The statistical necessity of a high sensitivity and low specificity should be explained to nurses and clinical personnel. This involves encouraging nurses to shift how they think of alarms, from a stimulus intended to indicate an error to a stimulus intended to guide attention.

In this paper, we conduct a study to address Wickens’ guidelines 1 and 3. Guideline 2 raises an important question: how far can we adjust *beta* without exposing patients to undue risk? We weigh benefits and risks Section 7. Later, in Section 8, we return to Guideline 3, exploring how we might keep the nurse “in the loop” through the monitor’s user interface. Although one might hope that a well-designed interaction will engender operator understanding of alarm false alarms (indeed, we address this briefly in Section 8), Guideline 4 seems to raise questions of training as well, which are outside the scope of this paper. Guideline 1 recommends that alarms indicate their level of certainty, as well as urgency. Although this is clearly important, we leave this to future work, focusing solely on urgency, as measured by acuity. Future work will need to consider how the level of certainty may determine whether or not an alarm should sound.

To contextualize our analysis, we frame alarm fatigue as *under-trust* in the alarm system. As we hinted above, when an alarm is highly accurate, but not perfect, this may result in *over-trust* [21]. Similarly, Mosier *et al.* [29] speak of *automation bias*, a “heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing.” It manifests as several issues.

One issue is *Complacency*, which is observed when the operator no longer monitors the raw sensor data, instead relying on the system to issue an alarm in

<sup>1</sup>In addition to effectively prioritizing alarms, new medical technologies should sound alarms that nurses can easily identify. The ISO/IEC 60601-1-8 alarm set does not meet this requirement, although an alternative set does [1].

the event of a problem [28]. *Reliance* occurs when the operator does not take precautions because the system does not issue any warning. *Compliance* occurs when the operator responds to an alarm as if the indicated problem is truly happening, without first checking for a false alarm. Finally, after extended periods of over-trusting automation, operators tend to *deskill* [7], meaning that they lose the ability to perform tasks manually. This may be remedied with regular drills [31].

## 2.2. Distributed Cognition

In healthcare, knowledge, work, and situation awareness are represented and transformed collaboratively, among many actors and artifacts. Plans change dynamically, because future states of the work system are unpredictable. DCog views cognition as distributed among human, technological actors, and cognitive artifacts (such as “to-do” lists), as well as through time, within specific work systems [13]. We believe that the environment and characteristics of critical alarms in the ICU is a typical example of a DCog system. Thus, DCog is well-suited to help address the problem of ICU alarm fatigue.

In DCog, responsibilities overlap vertically in the actor hierarchy, creating a shared responsibility to catch errors. Additionally, communication channels are separated, to ensure independent error-checks. In the case of ICU alarms, nurses occupy a higher role in the actor hierarchy, above automated physiological monitors. They share the responsibility of monitoring the raw data to catch abnormalities.

## 2.3. Cognitive Heuristics

How do nurses monitor patients? There are accurate models of patient acuity [12], such as APACHE II and NEWS [44]. However, they are computationally intensive and complex, necessitating the use of a scoring worksheet. Simmons *et al.* [38] found that nurses use heuristics to assess patient acuity, rather than perform mental computations that resemble these models. Heuristics are not necessarily inferior to computational models [9]. In fact, Kruse *et al.* [20] found nurse estimation of mortality risk to be as reliable as APACHE II.

Building upon this reasoning, we recommend that patient monitors prioritize alarms by patient acuity, using a heuristic that mimics the reasoning process of clinical staff. This would *keep the human in the loop*; the algorithm of choice must be usable in rapid decision-making contexts.

Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier [9] advocate the use of heuristics in medical domains, because they are intuitive, easily learned and recalled, and rapidly applied. These features are key to their adoption

in clinical practice [26]. Indeed, they have been successfully implemented to determine which patients should be sent to a coronary care unit. By contrast, complex statistical models are unintuitive, difficult to learn and recall, and tedious to apply. These considerations provide the basis for our own guidelines ‘1’ and ‘2,’ introduced below.

Next, we explore the design of such a heuristic. In order to evaluate alternative heuristic models, we consider our previous discussion to generate the following criteria:

1. Nurses and other clinical personnel should find its decision structure intuitive.
2. Nurses should be able to rapidly recall and use it.
3. Its parameters should be visually available, reducing noise, which can impede communication during medical emergencies [34]
4. Perhaps counterintuitively, as discussed in Section 2.1, the system should be *inaccurate* enough to avoid over-trust, so that nurses continue to monitor the raw data.

In order to understand how we may build on human-factors engineering, apply cognitive heuristics, and consider the theory of Distributed Cognition to address the problem of alarm fatigue, we conducted an exploratory study. In the remainder of this paper, we describe our study, and discuss the results and conclusions that we drew from it.

## 3. Methods

We collected data in a large, non-teaching hospital, located in a mid-sized metropolitan area in the Southeastern United States. After IRB approval, we approached nurses on the ICU floor and in the break-room, informed them of the benefits and risks of participation, and asked them to consider participating in our study.

Seventeen nurses enrolled in our study, and we were able to observe approximately 77% of patient rooms. Despite the relatively high number of participants and the large amount of data we collected, several potential participants were not able to join our study, mainly due to heavy workload or specific dangerous situations. For example, when a patient required urgent care, interviewing the nurse would have endangered the patient. Nevertheless, in our study, out of the 7 situations in which more than 1 nurse identified a patient as highly acute or having “coded” (i.e., having entered a rapidly declining state) in the previous 24 hours, we were unable to observe and sample only 2 of them. In addition, occasionally nurses were simply not in the unit, because they had taken the patient to radiology. In 2 cases, nurses declined to

participate. We discuss implications of the unobserved cases in Section 6 (Discussion), and recommend ways to overcome these obstacles for future studies in Section 9 (Outlook).

### 3.1. Exploratory Interview Phase

In order to gather enough information, we scheduled 6 2-hour observation visits to the ICU. Additionally, we conducted semi-structured interviews to identify potential indicators and informational sources of *acuteness*, *busyness*, and *patient progression*. Below, we list typical questions that we used to guide our semi-structured interviews:

1. How would you rate the *acuity* of your patient, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 represents the greatest *risk*?
2. Please rate the *busyness* of your patient, on a 1 to 5 scale, where 5 represents the greatest *workload*.
3. What indicates to you that their acuity is that high?
4. Where did you get that information?
5. What are you watching that will indicate to you that your patient's condition is improving or worsening?
6. Who are the most acute patients in this unit right now?
7. How do you know they are the most acute?
8. Where did you get that information?

We coded the transcriptions from semi-structured interviews in order to identify the variables that nurses use to assess patient acuity. We reveal these in the next section. In order to build initial heuristic models, we systematically gathered additional empirical data.

### 3.2. Questionnaire Design

The exploratory interview phase revealed a number of variables to consider. The answers to our semi-structured interview questions guided therefore the design of a questionnaire that we based on several specific areas:

**Nurse Experience** We asked nurses to self-report where they stood on Benner's [3] novice-to-expert scale. A *Novice* is one with no experience, an *Advanced Beginner* has begun to see patterns, a *Competent* nurse has 2-3 years' experience in similar situations, a *Proficient* nurse makes holistic decisions, anticipates outcomes, and adapts plans, and an *Expert* no longer relies on principles, rules, or guidelines.

**Patient Acuity** Kruse *et al.* [20] found that nurse estimation is as accurate a measure of mortality risk as APACHE II. We asked nurses, "On a scale of 1 to 5, where '1' means that the patient is ready to transfer, and '5' means they probably won't make it, how acute is the patient?"

**Certainty about Acuity** During the semi-structured interviews, nurses indicated that sometimes they could not assess acuity, because their patient had not arrived. Others mentioned that regularly scheduled measurements, such as lab results and scans, indicated the effectiveness of treatments. We hypothesize that certainty of patient acuity (1) starts low, when a patient initially arrives, (2) increases when fresh results arrive, and (3) reduces when a new treatment is administered. While acuity is the main focus of this study, we gathered nurse certainty perception on a 1-to-5 scale, '5' representing complete certainty.

**Patient Busyness** During our interviews, nurses frequently pointed out that, contrary to intuition, some patients at low risk of mortality require more time and attention than patients who face higher risk, and vice-versa. In order to ensure that nurses did not report busyness instead of acuity, we asked them to assess patients on both dimensions. We asked, "On a scale of 1 to 5, where '1' means the patient can take care of themselves, and '5' means you must constantly watch them, how busy is the patient?"

**Identified By Others** If nurses who are not assigned to the patient are able to reliably indicate which patients in the unit are most acute, then indicators of patient acuity that are visually observable are better candidates for use in heuristics. We observed that nurses communicate patient details in informal conversations. However, nurses cited visual observations, rather than conversations, when asked how they knew that another nurse's patient was highly acute. We asked nurses, "Which patients in this unit are most acute?" and tallied their responses.

**Has Coded** In hospital vernacular, "to code" means "to enter a rapidly declining physiological state, requiring emergency measures." During a code, there is a high likelihood of patient mortality. We asked nurses whether their patient had coded in the last 24 hours. They answered "yes" in only 4 of 54 cases. We considered this an insufficient quantity from which to draw conclusions, and discarded this variable prior to analysis.

**Medication Questions** Nurses frequently cited their patients' medications as evidence of acuity. Interviews suggested that medication class and dosage indicate

acuity. For example, many patients have one vasopressor line, and nurses do not consider this an indicator of high acuity. If, on the other hand, a patient has six vasopressor lines, a nurse may infer that the patient is highly acute.

However, there are many medications, and many dosage scales, which are adjusted to account for additional factors, such as weight and age. Such multidimensionality demands more data than one may gather in this study. Instead, we gathered the following 3 measures, in order to broadly characterize medication consumption:

1. *Relative Medication Quantity.* For purposes of keeping the human “in the loop,” it is necessary to consider whether nurses have an accurate mental model of the quantity of medications they are administering to their patients. We asked, “On a scale of 1 to 5, ‘1’ being very few medications and ‘5’ being the most you have ever seen, how would you rate the quantity of the medications this patient is on?”
2. *Actual number of medications.* After estimating relative medication quantity, we asked nurses to retrieve the exact number of unique medications administered in the last 24 hours from the Electronic Health Record.
3. *Number of intravenous medication drips.* We asked nurses, “How many drips does this patient have, including saline, but not including food? If they have more than one line for the same medication, this counts as more than one drip.”

**Number of Watch Variables** We asked nurses, “What variables are you watching that indicate the progression of this patient?” Nurses indicated a range of variables as evidence of acuity. We identified the following categories: *Arterial, Fluids, Labs, Medication Dosages, Neuromotor Status, Oral Intake, Pain, Respiratory Status, Scans, Temperature, Urinary Output, Visuosensory Cues, Vitals, and Wounds.*

**Invasive Equipment** We took note of whether the following were present in the patient’s room: *Ventilator, Chest Tube, Balloon Pump, and CRRT (Continuous Renal Replacement Therapy).* Nurses indicated these as evidence of acuity. However, we did not observe any *Balloon Pumps* or *CRRTs* during our study, and only observed a chest tube twice, so we discarded these two categories prior to analysis.

### 3.3. Questionnaire Administration Phase

In order to administer the questionnaire, we visited the ICU for 5 additional 2-hour visits. At that point, we had gathered 54 observations, and we felt that

this was enough for an exploratory analysis. We interviewed all nurses who were present and willing to participate during each visit. Visits took place on both weekday and weekend afternoons, to sample a variety of contexts. Each nurse was administered the questionnaire described above.


## 4. Analysis and Results

In this section, we report on the analysis of nurse responses in terms of certainty in acuity assessments, how well nurses assess the quantity of their patients’ medications, whether nurses who are not assigned to a patient know which nearby patients are highly acute, and how well each of the viable candidate factors predict acuity.

The ordered logistic regression relies on the parallel regression assumption, so we accompany these with Brant [5] tests of this assumption. Low Brant  $p$ -values indicate that the assumption is likely violated. In practice, models may still be useful even if this assumption is violated. For an explanation of this assumption, consult [23], page 150.

Nurses expressed complete certainty, ‘5’, in their acuity assessments in 72% of cases, and never reported a certainty below ‘3.’ An ordered logistic regression found no correlation between *certainty* and *busyness* ( $\beta = 0.07, p = 0.87, S.E. = 0.40$ ), and passed the Brant test ( $p = 0.63$ ).

**Estimated Relative Medication Quantity** We ran an ordered logistic regression between *number of medications* and *nurse-estimated medication quantity* to determine whether nurses have a well-developed mental model of medication quantities. We eliminated categories 4 and 5, because they contained only 3 datapoints in total. Figure 1 plots the data. We found a significant positive correlation in support of this hypothesis ( $\beta = 0.16, p = 0.001, S.E. = 0.05$ ), Brant test notwithstanding ( $p = 0.29$ ).



**Figure 1.** An ordered logistic regression indicated that nurse estimates of relative medication quantity predict actual number of medications. Larger dots indicate overlapping datapoints. We excluded categories 4 and 5 from the analysis due to data paucity.


**Predicting Acuity** In order to define the terms *acute* and *most acute*, we split *acuity* into approximate percentiles, as shown in Table 1. We aimed to define the top 50% as *acute*, and the top 25% as *most acute*. Categories 3-5 represented the top 57%, and categories 4-5 represented the top 22%.

We split *number of medications* into approximate percentiles, as shown in Table 2. Patients had up to 29 medications, so this independent variable has a precise granularity. Reducing its granularity in this way makes the results easier to interpret, since its odds ratios are more directly comparable with those of other predictor variables.

Nurses reliably identified the most acute patients in the unit, as evidenced by a logistic regression between *most acute* and *identified by others* (Odds ratio = 1.80,  $p = 0.05$ , S.E. = 0.55). A Brant test is not applicable here, since the dependent variable is binary.

Figure 2 shows the marginal probabilities. In order to obtain these marginal probabilities, we calculated the marginal probabilities of *not being most acute*, then subtracted them from 1. This was necessary because the *most acute* patients are defined as uncommon, resulting in a small sample of *most acute* patients.

We ran an ordered logistic regression to determine the extent to which each candidate predictor variable indicated acuity (Table 3). *Ventilator presence*, *number of drips*, and *number of medications quartile* are promising predictors.



**Figure 2.** Nearby nurses tend to know who is most acute. This chart shows the probability of a patient's acuity being a '4' or a '5,' as assessed by their assigned nurse, given that a number of nurses have identified them as the most acute in the unit.

**Table 1.** Definitions of *acute* and *most acute*. We chose the category ranges that came closest to the top 25% and 50% to define these terms.

Acuity	Cumulative	Acute	Most Acute
5	11.11%		
4	22.22%	Top 57%	Top 22%
3	57.41%		
2	68.52%		
1	100.00%		

**Table 2.** Percentile definitions of *number of medications*. Ranges are boundary-inclusive.

Number of Medications	Cumulative
2-5	20.37%
6-10	50.00%
11-15	75.93%
16-29	100.00%

**Table 3.** Ordered logistic regression results show the ability to predict if a patient is acute (OR = Odds Ratio, S.E. = Standard Error, C.I. = Confidence Interval, Qtl. = Quartile, Vrs. = Variables)

Predictor	OR	p-value	S.E.	95% C.I.
Ventilator	13.84	0.03	16.61	1.32 - 145.43
# Drips	2.27	0.10	1.13	0.85 - 6.05
# Meds Qtl.	1.12	0.16	0.09	0.95 - 1.31
# Watch Vrs.	1.02	0.96	0.40	0.47 - 2.20
Constant	0.11	0.03	0.10	0.02 - 0.73

## 5. Exploring Potential Heuristics

In this section, we compare the accuracy of ordinal logistic regression models with fast-and-frugal tree models, a common cognitive heuristic [9]. We provided the rationale and explanation for designing heuristics in Section 2.1. We trained our heuristic models to distinguish between patients who were and were not *acute*, as defined in Table 1.

In order to conduct the comparison, we split the data 9 ways by selecting every 9<sup>th</sup> datapoint in all 9 possible ways. This resulted in 9 combinations of training and testing sets, each with 48 training datapoints and 6 testing datapoints. In order to generate fast-and-frugal trees, we used Kass's [16] decision tree algorithm, implemented in Stata by Luchman [24]. Figure 3 shows the resulting trees.

We trained and tested the two models on each of the 9 segment pairs using each of 4 sets of independent variables:

1. *Ventilator presence* only.
2. *Ventilator presence* and *number of drips*.
3. *Ventilator presence* and *medication quantity quartile*.
4. All 3 variables.

We compared accuracy between the ordinal logistic regression and the fast-and-frugal tree models using the Wilcoxon test of pairwise comparisons. Jaimes *et. al* [14] also used this method to compare logistic models with neural networks. As Table 4 shows, there is little reason to believe that the models differ in accuracy. We defined 57% of patients as *acute* (see Table 1), so a naïve classifier would classify all patients as *acute*,

achieving 57% accuracy. As Table 4 shows, both models performed significantly better than chance.

## 6. Discussion

In previous sections, we explored and analyzed nurse's mental models of patient acuity, proposing heuristic models to mimic the structure of their acuity assessment process. Here, we discuss the results in detail.

### 6.1. Certainty

Nurses expressed high certainty in their acuity assessments. Nurse assessments of acuity are a reliable predictor of mortality risk [20], so this confidence may have been well-placed. Overconfidence bias [8] may have played a role as well. In our interviews, two nurses reported that they face pressure from family members and physicians to express confidence, even when they feel uncertain, since expressing uncertainty is met with consequence from both parties. Indeed, Taylor [39] found that nurse confidence is key to patient-perceived competence. While we, the observers, were not physicians or family members, nurses may present confidence habitually.

Additionally, we hypothesized in Section 3.2 that patients tend to arrive in an uncertain state, and that certainty is repeatedly recovered and reduced as new observations are taken and treatments are attempted. While this is not the focus of this study, it is still worth noting, especially because, in our study, nurses with new patients who had just arrived quickly became too busy to participate. This could explain the clustering of certainty in the higher categories. While there does not appear to be a correlation between *certainty* and *busyness*, this may be due to the paucity of low-certainty samples.

### 6.2. Estimates of Medication Quantity

Overall, nurse perception of relative patient medication quantity coincided well with actual quantity. However, most did not readily report a medication quantity. They tended to find the measure unintuitive, and most appeared to conduct a mental inventory before reporting an answer. Several nurses carried around a sheet of handwritten paper that listed "to-do" notes and medications to administer<sup>2</sup>; these nurses seemed to report relative medication quantity more quickly, sometimes even without looking at their paper.

In contrast to the number of medications, nurses seemed to report the number of drips and the presence of a ventilator quickly. We hypothesize that the mental

availability of these variables is affected by observation frequency, perhaps due to the effect of spaced repetition on retention [2].

### 6.3. Predicting Acuity


Nurses were able to identify the most acute patients in the unit, even though they were not specifically assigned to those patients. Nurses frequently stated that they were only aware of nearby patients. This may be because physiological monitors are configured to display the nearest patients, as shown in Figure 4. Some nurses stated that they were only aware of their own patients; we suspect that nurses with particularly busy patients tended to respond this way.

Vitals are a strong predictor of acuity, as evidenced by the APACHE II model [18]. Because of the physical configuration of the unit, vitals, like ventilator presence and the number of drips, are visually available. This explains the assertion that nurses are most aware of the status of nearby patients: they are aware of the information available within their *horizon of observation*, as identified by Hutchins [13] (p. 268). Further work would determine whether nurses are typically only aware of nearby patients.

Surprisingly, the number of variables that nurses were watching was not a significant predictor of patient acuity. While it is possible that the number of variables being watched has no relationship with patient acuity, it is also possible that this is due to the measure. Two expert nurses pointed out that several variables are watched for all patients. Both reported that vitals are watched for all patients; one also reported watching urinary output for all patients. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 5, vitals were the most-reported watched variable. Nurses with more expertise may have only reported the distinctive watch variables. Additionally, if two variables were listed in the same category, this was counted as one variable. However, we saw this as necessary, because sometimes, participants would list the category, such as "vitals," but other times, they would list items within that category, such as "heart rhythm." While this reduced the granularity of the measure, we do not believe that it reduced the quality of the data. Presumably, if there were a relationship between the number of variables watched and acuity, the watched variables would be spread out among several categories (e.g. "I am watching vitals and two lab values"), rather than clustered into one (e.g. "I am watching four lab values and ignoring vitals entirely").

Reporting low acuity in circumstances of certain mortality, however, is consistent with the definition of "acuity" given by an expert nurse participant: *the time and attention that a patient requires*. Coincidentally, this is how we defined "busyness." In future work, we recommend avoiding the term "acuity" altogether,


<sup>2</sup>These may be the "brain" artifacts observed by others (e.g., [30], [27])



**Figure 3.** These fast-and-frugal trees heuristically determine whether a patient is acute. As shown in Table 4, they are correct approximately three-fourths of the time, about as often as ordered logistic regression models.

opting instead to refer to “likelihood of mortality” and “busyness,” in order to more closely match nurse vernacular, improving researcher-participant communication.

It is still possible that medication class and dosage, which we did not measure due to feasibility limitations,



**Figure 4.** Mapping of monitors to rooms. There is one patient and monitor per room (not shown). The monitors on the outer desk typically show vitals from the six nearest patients. When an alarm occurs, all monitors sound the alarm, and display the corresponding raw data. Not drawn to scale.

**Table 5.** The number of observations in which each watch variable was listed. Categories not listed in this table had a frequency of zero.

Frequency	Watch Variable
30	Vitals
15	Respiratory
14	Labs
12	Neuromotor
7	Urinary
5	Temperature
2	Pain
1	Scans
1	Wounds

predict acuity. Further research would determine whether this is the case. However, much like medication quantity, these parameters are largely invisible to emergency-responding staff. In the interest of keeping all actors “in-the-loop,” we recommend only using visually available parameters. We discuss this further in Section 8.

**Table 4.** Comparison of ordered logistic regression and tree models to identify acute patients. The low baseline  $p$ -values indicate that the models are more accurate than chance. The high Wilcoxon model comparison  $p$ -values indicate that the models are unlikely to differ in accuracy. “Meds” is short for Medication Quantity Quartile.


Independent Variables	Accuracy $\mu$		Accuracy $\sigma$		<i>t</i> -test Comparison with 57% Baseline ( $p$ -values)		Model Comparison $p$ -values
	Logit	Tree	Logit	Tree	Logit	Tree	
Vent	79.26%	77.78%	13.82%	14.43%	0.0007	0.0014	0.92
Vent and Drips	79.63%	77.16%	16.20%	8.98%	0.0017	0.0001	0.55
Vent and Meds	71.48%	77.16%	17.09%	9.58%	0.0193	0.0001	0.34
Vent, Drips, and Meds	81.48%	77.78%	15.47%	7.97%	0.0008	0.0000	0.39

## 7. Cost-Benefit Analysis

In Section 2.1, we briefly mentioned Wickens' [42] second guideline for reducing alarm fatigue: "Raise automated beta slightly." In other words, make the alarm system slightly less sensitive. Here, we address a key question: How far is it appropriate to adjust beta? In this section, we frame the choice of the automated monitor's sensitivity as a cost-benefit optimization problem.

### 7.1. Overview of Signal Detection Theory

We start with a brief overview of Signal Detection Theory (SDT), which is often used to address problems where there is a stimulus one is trying to detect, and there is noise to distinguish it from [42]. As shown in Figure 5, the signal and noise are approximated as Gaussian distributions. The distance between the peaks is called  $d'$ . One sets a threshold  $X_C$ , classifying a stimulus level above  $X_C$  as "signal," and a stimulus below as "noise." The choice of  $X_C$  determines the distribution of hits (H), misses (M), false alarms (FA), and correct rejections (CR). The ratio of the probabilities of the amount of evidence  $X_C$  given signal or noise is called  $\beta$ .



**Figure 5.** Visual overview of signal detection theory.

To maximize accuracy, one may set the threshold  $X_C$  such that  $\beta = \beta' = 1$ , where the distributions meet. However, in many cases, such as this one, the probabilities and costs of hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections are different, so they must be considered if one wishes to minimize cost. Macmillan and Creelman [25] provide the following formula to determine optimal likelihood ratio  $\beta$ , accounting for costs and benefits:

$$\beta_{optimal} = \frac{R(CR) - R(FA)}{R(H) - R(M)} * \frac{p(\text{noise})}{p(\text{signal})} \quad (1)$$

Where:

- $p$  is the *a priori* probability of a noise or signal event, and
- $R$  is the reward for each event-response combination. Penalty "rewards" are negative.

In the next section, we will discuss the complexity introduced by the human operator's response to automated  $\beta$ . This will prepare us to expand on Equation 1.

### 7.2. Operator Response to Automated Beta

As discussed in Section 2.1, the operator adjusts their own responses, reacting to automated  $\beta$ . For example, when the number of false alarms is too high (automated  $\beta$  is too low), we observe alarm fatigue; the operator adjusts their own  $\beta$  upward, resulting in an uptick in misses!

This complicates the overall behavior of the work system. Unfortunately, despite a thorough search of the literature, we have not found a rigorous mathematical model that predicts operator  $\beta$  as a function of automated  $\beta$ , in order to account for operator responses, such as alarm fatigue.

*Automation complacency* is another operator response, which we discussed in Section 2.1. It may arise when an alarm is highly accurate, reducing the beneficial effects of redundant error-checking. However, this effect means that an operator's response conforms to the automated response, rather than deviating from it.

### 7.3. Derivation

In reality, both  $d'$  (peak-to-peak distance) and  $\beta$  (related to the alarm threshold) determine the proportions of hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections. For this analysis, we are holding  $d'$  constant, and choosing automated  $\beta$ .

We will use terminology appropriate to this context. Where classical SDT refers to the operator, we will instead refer to the care "team." For the team:

- A "hit" is an attempt to rescue
- A "miss" is a failure to rescue (FTR)
- A "false alarm" is an unnecessary intervention (U)
- A "correct rejection" is normal operation

For parsimony, we will assume that the costs and benefits associated with normal operation, as well as needful attempts to rescue, are assumed by the work system, so they are zero. Failures-to-rescue may result in a loss of life or function to the patient [40]; these are passed on to the hospital as legal costs. Unnecessary interventions immobilize resources that could be better allocated to patients in need, and present risks of complications that may also injure the patient [40]. Both mistakes may create emotional distress and relationship strain among team members [17]. We will refer to these costs as  $C_{FTR}$  and  $C_U$ .

We define team beta as a function of automated beta:  $\beta_T(\beta_A)$ . Then, optimal team beta is given by:

$$\beta_{T, opt} = \beta_T(\beta_A) = \frac{C_U}{C_{FTR}} * \frac{p(patient\ OK)}{p(patient\ not\ OK)} \quad (2)$$

Where:

- “Patient OK” means that the patient does not require intervention, and
- “Patient not OK” means that they do.

To optimize team response, automated  $\beta$  should be:

$$\beta_{A, opt} = \beta_T^{-1} \left( \frac{C_U}{C_{FTR}} * \frac{p(patient\ OK)}{p(patient\ not\ OK)} \right) \quad (3)$$

In other words, the optimal threshold is the one that minimizes the costs incurred by the operator’s response. Additionally, in order to use this equation, one must quantify the costs of an unnecessary intervention and a failure-to-rescue. We discuss such practical matters in the following section, as well as in Sections 9 and 10.

## 7.4. Optimization and Best Practices

In this section, we pursued an analytical approach to choosing an optimal alarm sensitivity. There are, however, certain barriers that will affect how further research will progress. It is unlikely that it will be possible to gather team response for a wide range of beta – testing inappropriate monitor settings in-the-wild presents serious ethical considerations – but it may be possible to measure (and then model) team response over a smaller, more local range. In fact, Graham and Cvach [11] raised automated beta within an acceptable range in a hospital unit to alleviate alarm fatigue, without apparent consequence.

In their paper, Graham and Cvach [11] make no mention of using an analytical approach to determine how far to raise automated beta. We surmise that they relied on expert judgment instead. Additionally, the best-practices that they describe involve customizing monitor alarm thresholds to each patient, and further adjusting thresholds as the patient’s status changes. This is an artful task, relying on nurse expertise and judgment, and we do not believe it can be fully automated away without consequence – we elaborate on this in Section 8.

## 8. Design

Previously, we developed constraints for improved patient monitor design. In this section, we propose design alternatives that may meet these constraints. Further research will be able to answer some of the questions that arise from inspecting these proposals.

### 8.1. Alarm Limit Customization

As noted in Section 7.4, nursing best-practices for addressing alarm fatigue currently involve manually customizing alarm thresholds on a per-patient basis, and modifying the thresholds as the patient’s condition changes [11]. Interestingly, Li *et al.* [22] found that manually adjusting alarm limits is a complicated and user-unfriendly task. They proposed that a direct link to the threshold-setting page could be presented to the nurse after they explicitly ignore 5 consecutive alarms. We believe that consecutive ignores may be a good indicator that the patient’s condition has changed, so this would make it easier to follow Graham and Cvach’s [11] recommendations. We additionally propose that threshold adjustment be easy to access at any time; a nurse need not be bothered by several irrelevant alarms if they judge that the patient’s status has changed.

One might be tempted to entirely automate the process of periodically setting alarm thresholds. As mentioned in Section 7.4, however, we would be reluctant to do this. This is because, first and foremost, periodically changing alarm thresholds to match patient status without informing the nurse could incur serious consequences – we speculate that, with such a design, a patient could slowly decline without the nurse’s awareness. Second, nurses who apply Graham and Cvach’s best-practice methods might use these alarm limits to represent, reinforce, or communicate the patient’s status. In our observations, for example, when there is nothing more that the team can do for a patient, their alarms are disabled. It is important to understand artifact usage before changing its behavior through automation [45].

Thus, while some automation might save the nurse the trouble of determining baseline values, nurses should have some degree of control in the process. How much control is appropriate? We discuss this further in Section 8.3, using Sheridan and Verplank’s [37] supervised-automation scale (Table 6) as a guide.

At least some patient monitoring systems already feature automatic alarm limit customization [32], although whether these features are being used – and how well they suit the needs of the healthcare environment – remains to be seen.

### 8.2. Changing Behavior Based on Acuity

How should the monitor’s interactive behavior differ between patients who are *acute* or *non-acute*? We address this question in this section.

We briefly mentioned that some monitors can take some of the manual work out of customizing alarm thresholds to each patient. For example, the Philips IntelliVue monitor’s manual [32] states that it can set alarm limits based on the patient’s current readings.

**Table 6.** Levels of automation scale (after Sheridan and Verplanck [37])

- |    |   |
|----|---|
| 10 | The computer decides on everything, acts autonomously, ignoring the human   |
| 9  | informs the human only if the computer decides to                           |
| 8  | informs the human only if asked, or   |
| 7  | executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and             |
| 6  | allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or   |
| 5  | executes the suggestion if the human approves, or                           |
| 4  | suggests one alternative  |
| 3  | narrowes the selection down to a few, or                                    |
| 2  | the computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or      |
| 1  | the computer offers no assistance: human must take all decisions and action |

This seems to make sense – a monitor should inform the nurse if the patient's condition changes. The monitor also features “narrow” and “wide” threshold settings. The manufacturer recommends that nurses use the “narrow” limits for more acute patients, since they need to be watched more closely.

Since we are already considering enabling the monitor to identify acute patients, we might consider automatically setting narrower limits on more acute patients, and wider limits on less acute patients. However, it may make sense for the more frequent alerts that will result from narrower limits to be presented as notifications, rather than as alarms. This may ensure that nurses understand the intention of these more frequent alerts – to help them “keep an eye” on the patient, rather than to indicate the presence of a dangerous situation. This is consistent with Wickens’s [42] (p. 25) fourth guideline, “Improve operator understanding of false alarms,” explained in Section 2.1.

### 8.3. Handling Reclassification Transitions

Sometimes, a patient’s condition will change while they are in the ICU – it may become more or less serious. When the monitor reclassifies the patient as more or less acute, it makes sense to change how their alarms are managed and presented. But how should this transition happen?

Sheridan and Verplanck [37] have constructed an automation scale (Table 6). It would be worthwhile to explore designs that allocate more or less control to automation, to determine what is most appropriate. We have illustrated two example designs along this automation scale in Figure 6.


### 8.4. Notifying the Nurse about Reclassification

When a condition change is detected, the monitor should inform the nurse. It is worth discussing how this might be done. Should the monitor interrupt the nurse with both visual and audio notifications? Should it inform the nurse via mobile phone notification? Should


it avoid interrupting the nurse, by simply displaying a silent notification banner (such as the one shown in Figure 6) until the nurse dismisses the notice?

We do not believe that patient reclassification is a particularly urgent task, and it is known that too many low-priority interruptions in healthcare can create patient safety risks [33]. This is particularly the case for smartphone interruptions [10]. Thus, at this time, we believe that the notification should be a persistent notification banner that the monitor displays until the nurse handles the transition. Further research will be able to corroborate or contradict this tentative design recommendation.

#### Less Automation



#### More Automation



**Figure 6.** Two alternate designs that could be implemented to handle changes in patient acuity. In the top story, the monitor prompts the nurse to change the alarm limits, and then suggests new limits, which the nurse may modify. In the bottom story, the monitor changes the limits automatically, then allows the nurse to undo this, adjust the limits manually, or accept the new limits. We discuss options for the rationale that will appear in the “Rationale” panels in Section 8.5.

## 8.5. Revealing the Rationale

Our goal is to keep nurses “in-the-loop” by revealing why the automated system is doing what it is doing. This involves revealing the decision heuristic, how the monitor applied the heuristic to the patient, and the action the monitor took based on that assessment.

It is not immediately obvious what form of rationale will be adopted most readily by nurses. This is why we chose to leave the “Rationale” panels empty in Figure 6. However, we discuss some possible forms below:

- The monitor could reveal the entire heuristic as a tree diagram (much like those shown in Figure 3), and the path to the end. However, if the decision tree becomes too complex, this diagram could become unwieldy.
- Reveal part of the heuristic as a diagram – for example, the monitor could show the terminating step, or the last three steps. Nurses might develop a tacit understanding of the overall decision structure over time.
- Reveal the entire or a part of the heuristic as a worded narrative. For example, “Although the patient is not on a ventilator, they have 6 medications, so I believe they are acute.”

Further work will be needed to determine which presentation will most effectively convey the monitor’s decision rationale to nurses.

## 9. Outlook

The evidence suggests that designers of the next generation of monitors may be able to reduce alarm fatigue while avoiding over-trust by prioritizing alarms in a way that nurses understand. In this paper, we suggest constructing a cognitive heuristic for alarm prioritization, and we identified variables of interest that may be incorporated into such a heuristic. This addresses some of the Joint Commission’s concerns.

In future work, we plan to build a more accurate model, by integrating physiological measurements into our heuristics. We also plan to gather a larger number of observations, to accurately identify the extent to which each variable predicts acuity, as well as to gather sufficient data in rare categories, such as balloon pumps, CRRTs, and chest tubes.

After collecting the data, we plan to construct a heuristic that balances accuracy with complexity. Further work will be needed in order to determine how complex this heuristic may be made before nurses no longer find it to be usable.

We observed that, during critical events, many actors respond. The room quickly becomes noisy, with many people speaking at once. This has been independently

observed [34]. Thus, we believe it is important that actors are able to visually gather the information they need to assess the validity of each new alarm. We recommend using variables that are directly observable in the current technological environment in this heuristic.

In Section 8, we explored how different interactive designs might realize different levels of nurse control, as well as present the monitor’s heuristic rationale to nurses. These interactive designs should be tested in realistic settings, to determine the appropriate level of automation, as well as the most effective presentation style.

It is widely understood that stress negatively affects human performance [6]. This presents two special considerations. First, data should be gathered from stressful situations; because these contexts place extensive demand on nurse attention and cognition, we recommend using video recording to gather the data. Other researchers have been able to do this in the past (e.g. Sarcevic [35]). In our experience, because of the perceived risks posed by patient privacy laws, this requires strong trust between hospital leadership and researchers. Second, the performance of constructed heuristics in high-stress situations, in addition to real-world environments, will need to be studied. Due to the difficulty in sampling cases where a patient requires continuous attention, understanding performance in high-stress contexts will likely require testing in simulated care environments.

Finally, in Section 7, we laid the foundation for a cost-benefit analysis to determine the alarm threshold that will minimize risk. An economic analysis is needed, to quantify the expected costs of an unnecessary intervention, as well as failure-to-rescue, since the analysis depends on these costs. Also, testing is needed to model nurse response to the automated alarm limits, since this is still unknown. There is reason to believe that different interfaces might influence the nurse’s understanding of the alarm system – in the words of Wickens *et al.* [42] (p. 25), they might “improve operator understanding of alarm false alarms.” We addressed this briefly in Section 8.2, through our intention to present more frequent alerts as notifications, intended to help nurses “keep an eye” on more acute patients. Thus, it may be difficult to the effects of automated beta and the interface on the nurse’s response, so they may need to be tested together.

## 10. Conclusion

In this paper, we identified several visually available factors that predict patient acuity. We propose that these, and others, be used to construct a cognitive heuristic to prioritize patients, and improve alarm management. We also recommend that these heuristics

be considered in the design of future alarm systems in the ICU. By using an understandable mechanism to prioritize alarms, nurses will be able to better identify misprioritized alarms, giving rise to an appropriate level of trust in the automated monitoring system, and avoiding over-trust. We recommend testing multiple levels of automation, multiple styles of decision rationale presentation, and heuristics of multiple complexity, to determine what interface is most appropriate. We also recommend testing nurse response to different automated alarm thresholds and interface designs. An economic analysis is needed to determine what automated alarm threshold would minimize costs incurred by adverse alarm-related events.

## 11. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank all participants for their time, as well as the reviewers for their helpful feedback.

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