Replications and Refinements

Under this heading appear summaries of studies which, in 500 words or less, provide useful data substantiating, not substantiating, or refining what we think we know. Additional details concerning the results can be obtained by communicating directly with the investigator or, when indicated, by requesting supplementary material from Microfiche Publications.

Models of Responsiveness: The Lausanne Peace Negotiations (1922-1923)

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A RECENT STUDY by Druckman and Harris (1990) compared alternative models of responsiveness for goodness of fit to moves made in each of six international negotiations: five were arms control talks, and one was a military base rights negotiation between Spain and the United States. One particular model was found to provide the best fit to the moves made in each of the negotiations. Referred to as the comparative responsiveness model, it assumes that bargaining moves (concessions) are responses made to a comparison of the difference between moves made by self and other in the previous round, with adjustment in the direction of the other's previous move. This model provided a better fit to the data than the alternative directional (match or mismatch concessions, tit-for-tat) or trend models (respond to the other's increase or decrease in concession from one previous

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round to the next), as well as several other models considered as variants on these themes (see also Stoll & McAndrew, 1986).

The comparative model represents a more complex form of reciprocity than matching the other's moves (directional model) or monitoring a trend in the other's moves over time (trend model). It assumes that bargainers react to ongoing comparisons of the difference in size of concessions or of tough and soft postures in order to synchronize their moves to satisfy a norm of reciprocity or fairness (Druckman, 1990; Gouldner, 1960). The present study attempted to test this model in another setting. A content analysis of the negotiations leading to the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty between Turkey and the allied powers provided an opportunity to extend the types of negotiations examined for goodness of fit of the alternative models.

The Turkish language transcripts from the 11 rounds of bloc-to-bloc negotiations at Lausanne were coded according to the categories of the bargaining process analysis system (Walcott & Hopmann, 1978; Walcott, Hopmann, & King, 1977). The blocs consisted of the post-World War I coalitions of England, Italy, and France (Bloc 1) on the one hand and Turkey and the Soviet Union (Bloc 2) on the other. All statements made by each of the parties within blocs were coded according to four indices: one version of a soft (accommodations and promises) versus hard (commitments and threats) index; a second version of a soft (initiations, accommodations, and promises) versus hard (commitments and threats) index; statements indicating agreement or disagreement with the other's comments, and statements expressing either positive or negative affect. The codes were aggregated to form percentages by round. Spearman rank-order correlations were computed between the round-by-round moves made by each bloc for each of the indices, first from the standpoint of responses made by Bloc 2 to moves by Bloc 1 and then from the standpoint of responses made by Bloc 1 to moves by Bloc 2. (Details of analysis methods are described in Druckman and Harris, 1990.) A total of eight correlations (four indices by two blocs) were computed for each of the three models, directional, trend, and comparative responsiveness.

More significant correlations were obtained for the comparative responsiveness model than for the directional or trend models. Six of eight correlations were significant (below the .05 level), all in a positive direction. Four of the six significant correlations were obtained on the agreement and affect indices for both blocs, .76 (Bloc 1 on agreement), .62 (Bloc 2 on agreement), .67 (Bloc 1 on affect), and .64 (Bloc 2 on affect). Negotiators

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from both blocs responded to the difference between self's and other's moves, adjusting their moves or rhetoric in the direction of the other's moves or rhetoric. The two significant correlations on the softness indices were both obtained for Bloc 1's responses to Bloc 2's moves and were .62 (index version 1) and .70 (index version 2). Only two of eight correlations were significant for each of the other models and all of these were in a negative (inverse) direction.

These results extend support for the comparative responsiveness model as the best description of the way international negotiators respond to each other's moves through the course of a negotiation. Not only do contemporary arms control negotiators respond in this manner, as shown in Druckman and Harris (1990), but the same pattern also depicts the behavior of national representatives negotiating during an earlier period of international diplomacy, as shown by these analyses.

The findings bolster interpretations of negotiating behavior in terms of a desire for fairness during the process. In all the negotiations analyzed to date, negotiators attempted to close the gap in tough rhetoric (or in concessions) when the difference was noticed, a tendency referred to as threshold adjustment (Druckman, 1986). This tendency was particularly strong in this study, occurring for at least one of the blocs (and usually both blocs) for each of the indices analyzed. However, a desire for fairness in the process or synchronous behavior during the process may not lead to fair outcomes.

Comparative responsiveness can lead to either impasses or agreements depending on the direction of the adjustment: In a military base rights negotiation, for example, both parties adjusted their moves toward the other's tough posture, producing mutual toughness and impasses (Druckman, 1986). In the test-ban talks analyzed by Druckman and Harris (1990), on the other hand, the United States adjusted its moves in the direction of the Soviets' soft postures, leading eventually to an agreement. More broadly, the results of this study, together with those obtained in the earlier study, contribute to the increasing body of evidence attesting to the importance of comparison processes in negotiations, as in other forms of social interaction.

REFERENCES


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