English Nationalism and Brexit: Past, Present, and Future.

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of

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The vastness of England swallows you up, and you lose for a while your feeling that the whole nation has a single identifiable character. Are there really such things as nations? Are we not forty-six million individuals, all different? And the diversity of it, the chaos! The clatter of clogs in the Lancashire mill towns, the to-and-fro of the lorries on the Great North Road, the queues outside the Labour Exchanges, the rattle of pin-tables in the Soho pubs, the old maids hiking to Holy Communion through the mists of the autumn morning – all these are not only fragments, but characteristic fragments, of the English scene. How can one make a pattern out of this muddle?

<div align="right">–   England Your England (1941), George Orwell</div>

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the 'Brexit' referendum and why a majority of the British electorate chose to vote to leave the European Union. Using the British Election Study Panel Survey database, this study examines the statistical relationship between English nationalism and the results of the Brexit referendum. First, this study finds that English nationalism is robustly related to the Brexit referendum result. Second, this study finds that immigration's impact on the UK economy is also robustly linked to the Brexit referendum result. In the process, this paper assesses the political stance of UK parties on the European Union. Thirdly, this study finds that UKIP's position on Europe is robustly linked to a voter's decision to leave the EU, while the Conservative Party's position was not. Utilizing the current government's policy position after the Brexit referendum this study finds limited qualitative evidence that the government has adopted policy decisions in line with English nationalist sentiment on strengthening English constitutionalism, and limiting immigration. This study concludes that English nationalism did affect the referendum result, although further research is required to examine economic and immigration factors which also shaped the referendum outcome.

BACKGROUND & INTRODUCTION

The day of the EU referendum, was a surprisingly chilly summer's day for the British Isles. Low clouds had crept in overnight. Temperatures failed to rise throughout the early morning. Rain-showers were dotted across the United Kingdom. It was on this day that the nation was waiting with baited breath. In the space of twenty-four hours, the electorate would prove to make one of the most influential and long-lasting decisions in living British history. The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, colloquially known as the 'Brexit' Referendum was taking place[1]. Not since 1975, had the British electorate been asked to vote on the United Kingdom's membership in the European Union. This was the first time since 1975 that the British electorate had been asked to vote on any aspect of the UK's membership with the EU. The decision of whether the UK should decide to leave or remain a member of the European Union, would have geopolitical, social, cultural, and economic consequences both for the UK, the European Union, and states globally.

Turnout for this history-making referendum decision, was high at 72.2%. After poll booths had closed, votes were feverishly tallied throughout the night. News organizations were unable to call from exit-polls which camp, 'Vote Leave' or 'Vote Remain' had won (The Guardian, 23 June 2016). By early morning, however, the votes had been tallied to the surprise of pollsters and pundits alike. Narrowly, the British electorate had voted to leave the European Union (The Economist, 24 June 2016). The result was 51.9% of the voting electorate had chosen to leave the European Union, compared to 48.1% of the electorate who chose to remain in the European Union. Nationally, across England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, differences were clear. In England, 53.2% of voters chose to leave, compared to 46.8% who voted to remain. In Scotland, 38.0% voted to leave, against 62.0% who voted to remain. In Wales, 52.5%

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[1] Several terms are used, such as, 'Brexit vote,' 'The 2016 Referendum,' 'Brexit Referendum' to refer to the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum on June 23, 2016 in shorthand. This study will generally refer to the referendum colloquially as the 'Brexit' Referendum as to avoid confusion with the 1975 EEC Referendum and for reasons of succinctness.

(854,572 votes) voted to leave, compared to 47.5% to remain. Lastly, in Northern Ireland, 44.2% of the electorate voted to remain in the European Union, compared to 55.8% who voted to remain in the European Union (UK Electoral Commission, 2016).

Three questions soon became central to successive news cycles globally covering the Brexit vote. Firstly, why had pollsters predicted the results so poorly? Second, what factors underlay the consequential decision to vote to leave the European Union? Thirdly, how should Britain renegotiate its relationship with the European Union in the forthcoming months and years ahead? Given the domestic and geopolitical consequences of the Brexit referendum result, understanding the forces which affected the decision by a majority of the electorate to leave the European Union and others to vote to remain has become of central importance, socially, politically and academically. This study aims to review a factor which has been argued in the news media affected the result of the referendum, the rise of English nationalism (The Guardian, 18 June 2016). It is the purpose of this thesis to critically examine the extent to which 'English nationalism' (Newman 1987; Kumar 2003; Wellings 2012; Vines 2014; Kenny 2015) affected the outcome of the Brexit referendum. The key research question of this study is as follows:
To what extent did English nationalism affect voter preferences in the Brexit referendum?

Going forward, a literature review comprised of four broad overlapping sections which govern the scholarly work on this complex topic area. Organizing the literature review thematically is beneficial given the interconnectedness of several relevant bodies of work including: English nationalism, Euroscepticism, fringes parties, and referendum politics. In this vein, an effort will be made to understand the historical foundations of English nationalism and parse out the differences this has to other regional nationalist identities in the United Kingdom, such as Scottish nationalism. Secondly, the literature review will focus on the nexus of nationalism and Euroscepticism. The literature review will discuss why nationalism and Euroscepticism should be seen as ideologies. Understanding the complex relationship and distinctions in scholarly literature between these two overlapping ideologies will complement this

study's broader understanding of English nationalism's role in the Brexit referendum. Thirdly, the scholarly literature on the role of referendums in the British debate on membership to the European Union will be examined. Grappling with the long political history of referendums as a mechanism of direct democracy to decide the fate of Britain's role in the European Union is important to understand the complexity and history which underlies the Brexit referendum. This will also include the budding collection of scholarship devoted to studying the Brexit referendum result.

Thereafter, a thorough grounding in the methodological approach this study takes will be discussed. This paper will formulate several hypotheses drawn from the central research question. This study tests the extent to which English nationalism was a factor in English electorate's decision to leave the European Union. Thereafter, this study goes on to examine the relationship between political party support and English nationalism in the referendum. This paper examines the extent to which party support influences the relationship between English nationalism and vote choice in the EU referendum.

By using survey data from the British Election Study (Evans et al. 2016), and employing a series of robustness checks, this study examines empirically the magnitude of English nationalism's effect on the EU referendum. By quantitatively analysing panel survey data, and controlling for demographic factors and issues related to English nationalism, such as, immigration and Euroscepticism, this study arrives at several findings. Firstly, that English nationalism is robustly linked to voting in the referendum. Second, that the impact of immigration upon the UK economy is robustly linked to voting in referendum. Thirdly, this study found that gender is a statistically significant demographic factor linked to one's vote preference in the Brexit referendum. Lastly, by conducting content analysis on the UK government's most comprehensive policy document released since the referendum on Brexit, this study finds limited support that the government has addressed *symptoms* of English nationalism, concerned broadly with the effect of the immigration and UK constitutionalism into

their policy framework for the UK post-Brexit. Although, this study was not able to draw a causal connection between English nationalism as a factor in the referendum result and subsequent policy decisions determinations made by the UK government.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Definitions and Historical Background

In a study concerned with the impact of English nationalism upon the Brexit referendum, it is, first and foremost, critical to comprehend the emergence of English nationalism as a theoretical term in academic literature and understand where it derives its historical origins. English nationalism as a term is both complex and Gordian given its long history and limited discussion in academic literature until recently. To make sense of English nationalism in the literature, several angles of enquiry will be developed to unpack the term and place it in its historical origins, its contemporary formation, its expression in political parties, and its interconnection with Euroscepticism. Organizing the literature review conceptually is beneficial and warranted given the interconnected nature of several concepts relevant to the study of contemporary English nationalism and its influence upon Brexit.

Gerald Newman's informative book, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History 1720-1820* (1987) is a good place to begin. The author provides a necessary historical overview and cultural context to the term. Newman provides a carefully traced understanding of the conceptual differences between nationalism and patriotism, which supplements his argument that English nationalism arose in the middle of the eighteenth century (Newman 1987, 127). These definitional distinctions are crucial if one is to understand the full complexity of English nationalism in the United Kingdom today. Newman pinpoints the difficulty of a study of English nationalism early on his text. To fully understand English nationalism, Newman argues, "we will need to keep the basic concepts of nationalism in hand as a compass" (Newman 1987, 51).

Newman argues that the difficulty lay in the definition of nationalism, "the chief stumbling block may simply be the difficulty of analysing this complex phenomenon, of attempting to understand and describe anything so seemingly nebulous in its essence yet vast in its effects" (Newman, 1987, 52). For Newman, defining nationalism becomes an academic enquiry of understanding why nationalism is distinct from patriotism (Newman 1987, 52). Though both terms are ostensibly synonymous, this is in fact where confusion abounds, as Newman states, "it is true that both terms do refer to very strong emotional identifications between individual and group, *and this is why they are often confused*" (Italics added) (Newman 1987, 52). Newman argues that patriotism is:

> A group-oriented feeling or psychological predisposition which exists *universally,* wherever human beings are joined in societies, and nationalism as a much more complex, programmatic and historically conditioned elaboration of this simple feeling into *patterns of demands and actions* deeply affecting a group policy, a distinction which necessarily rests therefore on the historic growth of a sense of active participation or citizenship in the individual as he relates himself to his group (Newman 1987, 52).

Newman's defines nationalism as a far more complex phenomenon which has arisen in the context of the modern era (Newman 1987, 54). Newman notes that nationalism is inextricably linked with a rise in modernity. Newman utilizes the language from the noted academic Ernst Gellner who argues that nationalism is the "ideological counterpart of modernization" (Gellner 1983). For Newman, nationalism is both more complex and expansive than purely patriotism. Patriotism for Newman is "focused outward" compared to nationalism which "takes *all the nation's affairs*, internal as well as external, into its compass" (Newman 1987, 54).

As a typology, Newman makes the useful point that nationalism is, as a matter-of-fact, an ideology, with a clear psychological disposition (Newman 1987, 55). He argues that a key component of this nationalist psychology is, "the indispensable importance of an *out-group* (or groups) in the formation of in-group consciousness and discipline." (Italics added) (Newman 1987, 55). This is a pivotal component of nationalist identity identified by Newman, important when unpacking nationalist undertones utilized in the Brexit referendum regarding debates

surrounding immigration (Dennison and Goodwin 2015). As the author explains, "the significant new point here is the importance of *aliens and outsiders* to the formation of group consciousness" (Newman 1987, 55). Newman references the noted-Cambridge philologist Munro H. Chadwick who argued that, the rise of nationalist sentiment "would seem to need the stimulus of a powerful antagonistic force, either within the same country or beyond, but not too far beyond, its borders" (Newman 1987, 55; Chadwick 1945). Newman takes *a priori* that any nationalist movement comes with a "historically conditioned suspicion of a particular foreign rival" (Newman 1987, 57).

Newman shifts gears to argue that rise of English national identity, "began around 1750 and was substantially complete by 1830" (Newman 1987, 127). Newman's specificity is worrisome given that other authors, namely Susan Reynolds (1985), trace the emergence of English nationalism to the sixteenth century. Newman takes the view that English nationalism derives in origin from a cultural and literary movement at the beginning of the 18th century. Regardless of historiographical issues presented, Newman argues assertively that a concern for *sincerity* can be found at the source of English national identity (Newman 1987, 128). Newman points to the fact that by the eighteenth century, arose a demand for great literary and cultural authors of the past were evoked to project a common sense of sincerity and a higher morality. (Newman 1987, 128). Newman takes the position that sincerity meant a mixture of five virtues which made up the national English character: innocence, honesty, originality, frankness, and moral independence (Newman 1987, 129-131).

But we are left with several questions from Newman's work. Firstly, what distinguishes 'English nationalism' or 'English national identity' from British identity? Secondly, is the English nationalism identified by Newman of the Victorian era similar in style to contemporary English nationalism? The informative book by Krishnan Kumar entitled, *The Making of English National Identity* (2003), provides the necessary connection between the broader ideology of nationalism and British nationalism and the discrete sub-ideology of English nationalism as defined by

Newman (1987). Kumar takes stock of the description of national character in 1941 by George Orwell in his essay *The English People*, in which he carefully articulates the complexity of ascribing what defines English nationalism. Orwell noted amusingly that, "we call our island by no less than six different names, England, Britain, Great Britain, the British Isles, the United Kingdom, and in very exalted moments, Albion" (Kumar 2003, 12; Orwell 1941). Kumar's focus upon Orwell's comment, though whimsical, sheds light on the important fact that English nationalism must be viewed as a typology of nationalism against British, Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish nationalism. Kumar takes the view that English nationalism must be part "of a larger whole whose boundaries extend to the very limits of the globe" (Kumar 2003, 15). Kumar disagrees strongly with Newman's understanding of English national character (Kumar 2003, 177). In Kumar's view, Newman's understanding of English national character fails to draw any distinction between British and English national character. As Kumar argues, "He fundamentally confuses English and British, Englishness and Britishness...It clearly does not occur to Newman that this matters, that distinguishing England from Britain, in the century in which the British state was formed and British identity actively promoted" (Kumar 2003, 177). Kumar argues that nationalism emerged in England far later than Newman asserts because there was no need for a nationalist movement in England at the turn of the eighteenth century. Instead, Kumar argues that English nationalism arose in the late-Victorian period out of a need to distinguish it from other forms of nationalism stirring in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Kumar 2003, 200). Irish nationalism, according to Kumar, "had begun earlier, following the classic European patterns of resentment and the demand for national independence" (Kumar 2003, 200) Echoing the language of group consciousness necessary for the creation of nationalism (Newman 1987, 55), Kumar notes that, "With Irish nationalism, was the rediscovery, or reinvention, of a native culture and a national history, of a more or less 'Celtic' kind...It also asserted an essential difference from the dominant people of the United Kingdom, the English"

(Kumar 2003, 200). For Kumar, English nationalism arose as a *response* to the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century in Ireland (Kumar 2003, 201).

Kumar's work, however, poses more questions than it solves. Firstly, what effect have recent periods of devolution in in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland respectively had upon the English nationalist identity? Secondly, what effect does Europe have upon English national identity and English nationalism? Turning to the first question, since the release in 2003 of Kumar's informative book, several developments in terms of the constitutional and political structure of statutory power to regional bodies across the United Kingdom have taken place. Notably, by the middle of 2007, the Welsh National Assembly was given further law-making powers under the Government of Wales Act (2006), and the restoration of devolved governance had been implemented in Northern Ireland respectively (Lester 2007). This has had profound effects upon the British *body politic* (Kumar 2003, 203). Ross Bond, Charlie Jeffery, and Michael Rosie in their article published in *Nations and Nationalism* entitled, "The Importance of being English: National Identity and Nationalism in Post-Devolution England" (2010) sought to unravel the effect that devolution has had upon English national identity and English nationalism. Bond et al. echo Kumar (2003) in their approach to studying the question of Englishness and devolution. The authors state that, "The contemporary status of England and Englishness must be understood not only through comparison with other parts of the UK but, equally importantly, through relation to the broader – and to some degree overlapping – question of Britishness" (Bond, Jeffery, and Rosie 2010, 463). Bond et al. trace the prevailing academic literature on the impact devolution has had upon English nationalism. The authors grapple with two predictions of the consequences of further devolution raised in an article by Susan Condor (2010), "that the devolution legislation denied the English the political expression of their national identity; and that it would encourage the politicization of this identity" (Bond, Jeffery, and Rosie 2010, 465). Instead, our authors find that there is a contrast in elite and popular perspectives to an English backlash against devolution (Bond, Jeffery, and Rosie 2010, 466). The

authors found that movements such as the Campaign for an English Parliament (CEP) failed to materialize at a popular level, with a failure of any major political party to support the creation of an English Parliament (Bond, Jeffery, and Rosie 2010, 466).

Arthur Aughey in his excellent article, "Anxiety and Injustice: The Anatomy of Contemporary English Nationalism" (2010), attempts to provide a grounding in why the rise of English nationalism should be better characterized as a *mood* rather than a distinctive nationalist *movement* (Aughey 2010, 506). Moreover, Aughey fruitfully adds to our understanding of English nationalism, bridging the gap between a historical overview of the rise of English nationalism and its present contemporary form. Aughey's article offers a nuanced argument by analysing English nationalism from differing perspectives. In doing so, Aughey heightens our understanding of English nationalism's foundational structures and offers several perspectives in which to view contemporary English nationalism. Aughey makes the initial but fundamental point that English nationalism is concerned with *what is being denied* (Aughey 2010, 507).

Aughey argues that "four mutually reinforcing English anxieties foster a mood of national uncertainty" (Aughey 2010, 508). The first anxiety is an *anxiety of absence*, according to Aughey (2010). In this peculiar turn-of-phrase, he is referring to the disquiet and lack of serious open dialogue on what it means to be English (Aughey 2010, 509). The second he pinpoints is an *anxiety of silence* (Aughey 2010, 509). This is an interesting point by Aughey, where he connects mainstream political parties' refusal to engage in the 'West Lothian Question'[2] or 'English Question' to perceived national identity (Aughey 2010, 509). In turn, Aughey argues this reinforces an anxiety of silence, given the lack of seriousness the question of English national identity is taken by mainstream political parties (Aughey 2010, 509). Thirdly, Aughey argues contemporary English nationalism suffers from an *anxiety of anticipation* (Aughey 2010, 510). Aughey describes this as an 'anticipation' for, "the end of the United Kingdom, the anxiety that,

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[2] This is a term to denote a widespread debate surrounding whether English MPs should only vote on laws concerned with England. For a thorough overview of the West Lothian or English Question, *See e.g.* Hayton, Richard. 2015. "The Coalition and the Politics of the English Question." *Political Quarterly* 86, no. 1: 125-132.

while the other nations are coming out from under the safety blanket of Britishness, the English will be smothered by it" (Aughey 2010, 510). Aughey's use of terminology is admittedly somewhat confusing. Aughey's description of an 'anxiety of anticipation' could be better characterized as an 'anxiety of loss' given that his argument centres on around a "sense of living" that England is decaying and becoming lost to the "multinational Union" (Aughey 2010, 510). An 'anxiety of anticipation' suggests that this anxiety that England is being commodified into an amorphous and indistinct territory has yet to begin. Lastly, Aughey presents an intriguing and informative argument that an '*anxiety of imitation*' plagues English nationalism rising from a mood to a movement. Aughey states that, "This anxiety assumes that other national identities are likeable and fun" (Aughey 2010, 511). Aughey's point, though plain to see, is a crucial aspect to English national identity. Aughey provides a useful lens in which to understand Kumar's argument that England should be part "of a larger whole" (Kumar 2003, 15). England's difficulty in asserting its own national identity as a wholehearted movement is a difficulty in constituting what it means to be English as opposed to the 'larger whole' of Britain, and naturally distinctive from Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland respectively.

Rounding off the literature on 'Englishness' or 'English nationalism,'[3] is the recent book by Michael Kenny, *The Politics of English Nationhood* (2014). Kenny's work adds informatively to the literature on contemporary English nationalism, complementing the growing corpus of work on the subject area. Kenny's work provides both a useful historical perspective on the rise of English nationalism and what factors constitute contemporary English nationalism. In this vein, Kenny provides several novel arguments for English nationalism's rise and how it is constituted. Kenny traces a turning-point in contemporary English national identity to the period of devolution in the 1990s (Kenny 2014, 27). Kenny argues that devolution in the UK during the

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[3] The conceptual difference between these two terms is a matter of debate in scholarship. For the purposes of this study, the two terms are used interchangeably. Kenny notes of the term 'Englishness' that, "Its standard usage tends to convey a settled, interior core, which has often been imagined as a bundle of national characteristics and a related set of cultural proclivities" (Kenny 2014, 21).

1990s should be seen through a larger framework of identity politics rising to the fore across Europe (Kenny 2014, 27). Kenny suggests that devolution came at a confluence with other factors which promoted the rise of English nationalism in this period. Kenny proposes a multi-causal account of why English national identity rose during the late 1990s. Kenny first makes the case that economic globalization and the envisioned post-industrial British economy precipitated in renewed demand for national identity in a time of economic flux and transition (Kenny 2014, 28). Kenny's argument provides a convincing overview of why English nationalism rose during this period, given the author's determination to provide a multi-causal argument of the factors which allowed English nationalism to arise. In addition, Kenny adopts Wellings' position that the rise of English nationalism during this period was a reactionary movement against further European integration efforts taking place in the 1990s (Wellings 2012).

Kenny's key contention throughout the book is that English nationalism and English national identity more broadly, stand divided with competing political expressions of what constitutes 'Englishness.' This is thought-provoking given both the closeness of the Brexit referendum result and the opposing visions for a post-Brexit Britain. Kenny, to sum up, delineates three types of competing zeitgeist which currently reflect English nationhood. Firstly, he argues that a 'populist-nationalism' channels a growing animosity towards the political class throughout England. Kenny states that this resentment towards the political class "lies at the heart of populist appeals to the beleaguered English nation" (Kenny 2014, 117). Kenny suggests that 'populist-nationalism' spans a wide variety of political actors from street-based movements such as the English Defence League (EDL), to more organized political organizations, such as, the Eurosceptic political party UK Independence Party (UKIP) (Kenny 2014, 118). Secondly, the author's second strand of nationalism is what he defines as 'everyday English conservatism' (Kenny 2014, 120). Kenny distinguishes between 'populist nationalism' and 'everyday English conservatism' by noting that the latter is "rich and sinuous seam of pragmatic, adaptive, and conservative English sentiment" (Kenny 2014, 120). Kenny suggests that this vision of English

national identity is largely based on an idealized bucolic notion of England (Kenny 2014, 121).
Kenny points out that England's countryside is evoked historically to augment political visions
and serves to promote 'Arcadian' images of English countryside life (Kenny 2014, 121). Thirdly,
and most intriguingly, Kenny argues that a liberal strain of English nationalism can be seen in
contemporary England (Kenny 2014, 124). Kenny argues that, "this is the third broad pattern of
national sentiment which has become embedded within contemporary English culture" (Kenny
2014, 125). The implication of these three distinct visions of nationalist ideologies is that
England's national identity is both seen to be *contested* and *multi-dimensional* in modern-day
England.

This study will therefore adopt a working definition of English nationalism which can be
broadly defined as a national consciousness based on three overlapping interests: representation,
community, and culture. Firstly, English nationalism can be defined as a nationalist ideology
which reflects a resentment towards the political class and a belief that the English people are
underrepresented and even *absent*, to use Aughey's (2010) phrase, in the constitutional and
political structures of the UK. Second, it is nationalist ideology which is based on an idealized
homogenous community of English people which is both fearful and distrustful of outsiders to
its group identity and consciousness (Newman 1987). Lastly, it is an ideology which idealizes
England as both bucolic and culturally Arcadian (Kenny 2014, 125).

English Nationalism and Euroscepticism

So far, this review of the literature on English nationalism has sought to provide an
historical overview of the sheer complexity and dangers of over simplifying what English
nationalism represents. In this section of the literature review, this study will seek to unpack the
relevant literature surrounding the complexity English nationalism in its interconnected
relationship with Euroscepticism. Ben Wellings defines Euroscepticism generally as "resistance
to European integration" (Wellings 2012). But the term in academia has been disputed and
thought of, at times, derisively as a journalistic media label rather than a precise academic term

(Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013). C. R. Aguilera de Prat's book, *Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism: The Radical Parties of the Right and Left vis-à-vis the European Union* (2013), provides a broader supranational argument linking the radical parties of both the left and right in a common narrative of political opposition towards the European Union. In this light, the author provides a key insight into the term 'Euroscepticism' adding thoughtfully to the literature on what defines 'Euroscepticism.' Rodriguez-Aguilera notes that 'Euroscepticism' arose as a media label in the UK during the 1975 referendum on the European Economic Community (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013, 21). The author argues that "Euroscepticism is not just a phenomenon of certain elites, some mass media or voters who protest: it is a more complex phenomenon that interacts with all these elements in certain contexts" (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013, 21). The author argues that Euroscepticism is better understood when viewed as one opinion on a continuum of positions towards European integration (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013, 25). The author argues that this may range from rejectionist sovereign nationalist positions (e.g. UKIP) to supranational federalist policy positions (e.g. The Liberal Democrats) (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013, 25). Rodriguez-Aguilera makes the informative conceptual definition of Euroscepticism that "in all its forms – is a transversal ideological phenomenon that crosses the left/right axis and is clearly present even within the parties themselves" (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013, 25). In other words, that 'Euroscepticism' should not be narrowly seen as a term which purely occupies the political right, but rather, a process found in parties across the ideological spectrum. Rodriguez-Aguilera goes on to provide a useful conceptual framework to distinguish the varied political views on European integration. The author suggests that grouping all 'Eurosceptic' parties under the same banner of 'Euroscepticism' is not entirely helpful for academic enquiry (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013, 42). The first group are *Europhobic* groups, such as UKIP, who are interested purely in withdrawing membership to the European Union and are against any form of integration (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013, 42). The second are *anti-integrationist* groups, who do not explicitly reject integration but reject it in its current modality. Thirdly, Rodriguez-Aguilera defines a third

group as *eurocritical* are political groups who believe that the EU has not gone far enough in terms of integration and reject the current integrationist policy as insufficient (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013, 42).

It is also important to delineate in the literature what distinguishes English nationalism from Euroscepticism and how these two ideologies are related with one another. Ben Wellings book, *English Nationalism and Euroscepticism: Losing the Peace* (2012), unpacks these two interrelated terms and places them in their historical, cultural, and political context. Wellings' central thesis argues that "resistance to European integration has conditioned contemporary English nationalism" (Wellings 2012, 5). Before delving into the reasons why this conditioning has taken place, Wellings presents a balanced view of English nationalism and its relationship to British sovereignty. Wellings' argues that the difficulty in explaining English nationalism for Kumar and those concerned with the historical foundations of English nationalism is due to a matter of theoretical perspective (Wellings 2012, 19). Wellings' argues convincingly that to fully appreciate English nationalism one must look at both the historical structures of English nationalism as Kumar and others adroitly do, and via the conception of English sovereignty (Wellings 2012, 27).

Turning to the role of historical structures first, Wellings in line with the arguments made by Kumar (2003), argues that English nationalism arose in the eighteenth century. For Wellings, the historical event of importance was the period of state consolidation after the Act of Union in 1707 which led to the creation of the United Kingdom as one knows it today (Wellings 2012, 38). Wellings adopts the phrase "Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty," or to put more simply parliamentary sovereignty, to argue that this represents a core ideological component of English nationalism (Wellings 2012, 38). According to Wellings, symbolism matters a great deal, notably that Parliament through the consolidation of power after 1707 became a visible symbol of sovereignty and became "a totem of Englishness in its own right" (Wellings 2012, 39).

The second major argument put forward by the author makes the argument that an essential component of nationalism and particularly relevant to English nationalism is "the

legitimization of a particular location of sovereignty, be that sovereignty vested in the people or the state or both" (Wellings 2012, 37). This conception of nationalism is pertinent given the debate surrounding Brexit, which questioned the role of European integration and whether Parliament was sovereign or bound to the rule of law of a larger supranational body.

Wellings' goes on to discuss an area of weakness in Kumar's scholarship on English nationalism. He argues an essential structure which "helps condition contemporary English nationalism is 'Europe,'" (Wellings 2012, 43). Wellings makes this the focus of his research, understanding the interaction between European integration and contemporary English nationalism (Wellings 2012, 43). Proponents of European integration, argues Wellings, present an integration narrative whereby Europe integration has the unique ability to accommodate "all differing historical experiences" of member states (Wellings 2012, 44). Wellings' argues that this perspective is the central myth of European unity. (Wellings 2012, 44). Wellings' argues that this contemporary relationship began in July 1961 when Britain's chose to apply for membership to the European Economic Community (EEC) (Wellings 2012, 91). This marked an end of what had then been a European Free Trade Area (EFTA) which the United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal were signatories to, and instead represented a pivot towards Europe (Wellings 2012, 92). This reached an apex in 1975 when the first nationwide UK referendum was held on whether UK should remain a member of the European Community (Common Market). As Wellings and Vines have noted in their article on the subject, the lasting significance of the vote was that it signalled that Britain's place in Europe was a matter of such supreme national importance that conventional measures for resolving the issue were inadequate" (Wellings and Vines 2016, 316). For Wellings, the decision to move "towards Europe" had a "profound effect on the shape of English nationalism in years to come" (Wellings 2012, 92).

For one British politician helped to catalyse the essential conditions for what contemporary English nationalism means today and its fervent resistance to any European

integration efforts: the controversial politician, Enoch Powell (Wellings 2012, 102). According to Wellings, Powell, "had a lasting impact on the emerge of contemporary English nationalism through his deployment of race and xenophobia...Powell sought to articulate a new vision of England based on race and eventually resistance to European integration" (Wellings 2012, 103). Wellings' makes the crucial point that Powell's prominence in conservative circles arose in the 1960's and 1970's, a period in which England was transitioning into a post-imperial era (Wellings 2012, 107). This is an interesting point made by Wellings, linking the role of decline of the British Empire to contemporary English nationalism. This echoes the comments made by Kumar who argues that nationalism and imperialism are conceptually incompatible with one another (Kumar 2003, 32). Wellings' references a speech by Powell made at the Royal Society at St. George on 22nd April 1961, in which Powell expressed his vision for England and for 'Crown-in-Parliament' sovereignty:

> To embrace and express the qualities that are peculiarly England's: the unity of England, effortless and unconstrained, which accepts the unlimited supremacy of Crown in Parliament so naturally as not to be aware of it; the homogeneity of England, to discover the difference and assert the peculiarities; the continuity of England, which has brought this unity and this homogeneity about by the slow alchemy of centuries. (Wellings 2012, 107).

In just this short paragraph, Powell has expressed what Wellings refers to as the "key elements" of nationalist opposition to the signing of the Treaty of Rome (Wellings 2012, 107). Wherein he traces, "the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament; the homogeneity of the English nation; and most importantly, its long historical continuity" (Wellings 2012, 108). In other words, that European integration meant a direct threat to English sovereignty in Powell's view. Several questions of historical scholarship arise during Wellings discussion of Enoch Powell. Firstly, if contemporary English nationalism arose during the post-war era, how did decolonization and the end of Britain's imperialist project alter English nationalism? Secondly, how did the decline of the empire affect Euroscepticism?

Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon's recently published book, *Continental Drift: Britain and Europe from the End of Empire to the Rise of Euroscepticism* (2016), adds cogently to the dialogue on the

questions left with us from Wellings work regarding the impact of the post-imperial order on English nationalism and Euroscepticism. He argues that Euroscepticism has become intertwined with English nationalism due to a "nostalgic rendering of Britain's past, from a desire to return to the 'golden age' of British history – an age that was defined by British imperialism, even if present-day Eurosceptics do not call the Empire by name" (Fitzgibbon 2016, 468). Fitzgibbon provides a useful lens of analysis by this statement in viewing any key political debate regarding Europe and the United Kingdom as a question of whether it promotes or hinders returning to that 'golden age' of British history defined by empire (Fitzgibbon 2016, 468). Consequently, unpacking other moments in the chronology of Britain's relationship with European integration can be analysed through the lens of *nostalgia* of political independence and sovereignty as Fitzgibbon underlines as an essential aspect to Euroscepticism and English national identity. (Fitzgibbon 2016, 468).

For example, Wellings traces the role that the 1975 Referendum on the United Kingdom's membership to the European Economic Community (EEC) affected the contemporary foundations of English nationalism (Wellings 2012, 117). Again, the author frames the 1975 referendum on the EEC in terms of a political question of popular sovereignty. Most importantly, the debates of the first half of the 1970s – culminating in the referendum of June 1975 – shaped English nationalism by invoking popular sovereignty, thus laying down – if not yet truly awakening – the populism of later decades" (Wellings 2012, 117). Wellings makes the careful argument that by elevating the debate of membership in the EEC to a national level, rather than a parliamentary one, it turned the question of membership of the EEC into a concern of 'popular sovereignty' (Wellings 2012, 147). This is a key point of Wellings scholarship, that by elevating the EEC to a referendum, it became part of a broader populist agenda (Wellings 2012, 147).

Wellings' and Fitzgibbon both converge on political and historical events to explain the association between Euroscepticism and English nationalism. Chris Gifford's informative article

entitled, "Nationalism, Populism and Anglo-British Euroscepticism" (2012) seeks to complement our understanding of Euroscepticism and English nationalism by linking it to elite betrayal. Gifford argues, "populism does not necessarily signify a nationalist moment, although it may often seem that way" (Gifford 2015, 2). Gifford complements Wellings argument that political Euroscepticism is a product of cultural English nationalism (Gifford 2015, 2). Gifford's presents the argument that English nationalists perceive that political elites have allowed Europeans and immigrants to encroach upon their sovereignty (Gifford 2015, 3).

Emma Vines in her article "Reframing *English Nationalism and Euroscepticism*: From populism to the British Political Tradition" (2014), seeks to place Ben Wellings scholarship into the broader context of the British Political Tradition (BPT). Vines' agrees with Wellings position that Euroscepticism is the most coherent expression of contemporary English nationalism today (Vines 2014, 256). However, the author takes issue with the argument made by Wellings that English nationalism has become populist in nature (Vines 2014, 256). Instead, Vines seeks to reframe "the case for Eurosceptic English nationalism in terms of a continued adherence to the British Political Tradition" (Vines 2014, 256). BPT is a term to describe an 'elitist view of responsibility and tradition', according to Vines (Vines 2014, 256).

Vines' is sceptical of arguments made by Wellings (2012) that the rise of the fringe populist parties, British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), indicates a populist trend in British nationalism (Vines 2014, 257). Vines', however, views the rise of Euroscepticism as an expression of English nationalism as an example of political tradition, *not* populism. Vines' defines 'political tradition' broadly as a tradition which "encompass particular beliefs, discourses and practices...as capable of constraining, without determining, actors' behaviour and political decisions." (Vines 2014, 263). Vines argues that British political tradition is marked by a political class which operates largely outside of interference from the electorate, providing a centralized form of governance through the Westminster model (Vines 2014, 264). Vines' critiques Wellings argument that the use of

referendums signals a sea change in British politics, moving away from parliamentary to popular sovereignty (Wellings 2012, 147). For Vines this belief in the power of referendums to shape popular sovereignty in the UK represents a "narrow understanding of responsibility and representation at the heart of the BPT" (Vines 2014, 267). Vines' argues Wellings fails to grasp that referendums are only called for when it serves the interest of political parties (Vines 2012, 268). Vines' article raises a vital question in terms of the literature: how have political parties affected English nationalism? Secondly, what does the advent of fringe political parties, notably the BNP and UKIP, mean for English nationalism?

English Nationalism, Mainstream Political Parties, and Fringe Parties

Understanding the role that political parties have in the discourse, shape, and direction of English nationalism is a critical aspect to comprehending the complexity of this strain of nationalism. In this respect, this section of the thesis will critically examine the literature on the nexus of mainstream political parties and English nationalism. Thereafter, the growing literature surrounding the role of extreme right-wing parties, notably the British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and what environment allowed them to rise in publicity and support throughout the United Kingdom will be examined. Given both parties adoption of both English nationalism and Euroscepticism, (e.g. Vines 2012; Wellings 2014, Fitzgibbon 2016), as part of their political ethos and manifesto platforms this is a critical avenue of enquiry to review.

In their article "The Party Politics of Englishness," (2014) Andrew Mycock and Richard Hayton seek to grapple with this very phenomenon. The authors review the extent to which political parties in Westminster are becoming explicitly attuned towards England and the extent to which they have framed their political discourse through the language and culture of Englishness (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 252). The authors argue that devolution of statutory powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have presented a challenge to Westminster parties who must speak for both England, and the UK, (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 256). The

authors present an interesting view of the Conservative Party's attempt to address this imbalance of representation caused by devolution in part with providing an answer to the West Lothian Question. The West Lothian Question, also known colloquially as the 'English Question', is a debate whether English Members of Parliament (MP) should only vote on laws affecting England. Mycock and Hayton argue that the Conservative Party adoption of the West Lothian Question into their manifesto pledge in July 1999 was a shrewd manoeuvre by the Conservatives "to maintain their traditional Unionist standpoint and sidestep the broader question of growing cultural and political identification with Englishness" (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 258). The authors present the view that the Conservative Party were cognizant of the fact that by engaging with an English nationalist position, it would be seen to be capitulating to a populist position. If they had chosen to take an overtly English nationalist opinion, the authors argue that this would be directly opposed to the party's determination to modernize their political image and move towards the centre-ground on mainstream political issues (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 258). This also reinforces the argument made earlier on by Aughey (2010) that an *anxiety of silence* permeates English nationalism due in part by the silence on the 'English question' issue by mainstream political parties (Aughey 2010, 509). The authors go on to argue that the Conservative Party, officially and indicatively, the Conservative and Unionist Party, has consistently faced a conundrum when faced with the question of whether to embrace English nationalism, "whereby they are exposed to demands for recognition of cultural as well as constitutional Englishness which could damage the Union but where defence of the current asymmetrical arrangements could see them placed in opposition to rising English populism" (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 259).

Turning their attention towards the Labour Party, the authors appear to treat the demand for an additional layer of government, with calls for an 'English' Parliament, as synonymous with English nationalism (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 260). As this study has already made abundantly clear, English nationalism is a highly complex and interconnected ideology, which does not have

a singular goal. Despite this oversight, the authors make the intriguing note that Labour, Conservatives (when they were in government under the leadership of both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown respectively) chose to underplay policies which purely affected England (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 260). The authors provide an interesting perspective on a mainstream Westminster party's attitude towards English nationalism. Our authors argue that Labour has stayed clear of embracing English nationalism as an electoral or manifesto platform given the ill-defined nature of what policy outcomes this would entail and the lack of a broad cross-party support for a regional political agenda, pitched squarely to English residents (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 260).

Mycock and Hayton argue that the Liberal Democrats, who argue for a federal-style government across the United Kingdom have been more open to engaging in the policy issues raised by English nationalism following devolution of statutory power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland respectively (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 263). The authors present an image of a party reluctant to fully engage or become associated with English-nationalism, despite their foundational political aims of a federal-style of government which would be in line with an English nationalist approach to governing (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 263). The authors suggest that this reluctance stems from the belief within the Lib Dems that, "to engage in the 'party politics of Englishness' is, in part, reflective of a suspicion of English nationalists who, together with white supremacists and Islamic fundamentalists, are a 'threat to harmonious social relations in Britain'" (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 264).

For the United Kingdom Independence Party (more commonly referred to by its acronym UKIP), given its foundational political aim of withdrawing the United Kingdom from membership of the European Union, the authors argue that the party politics of Englishness has offered a mixture of both opportunities and threats to the party (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 265). The authors present the argument that though UKIP purports to be of the position of "restoring Britishness," in fact, the party has conflated Englishness with Britishness (Mycock and Hayton

2014, 265). UKIP's support of the creation of an English Parliament, according to our authors, has severely undermined their policy platform in recent years given the inherent difficulties of creating an English Parliament, whilst not acknowledging the asymmetry of devolved powers to the regional bodies (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 265). The authors argue that UKIP has sought to differentiate themselves and forcefully condemn ethnic-nationalist political parties such as the British National Party and the English Democrats. UKIP, to attain credibility have strongly condemned these parties for which they view as a danger to the cohesion of the United Kingdom (Mycock and Hayton 2014, 265).

Michael Kenny in his article, "Englishness Politicised? Unpicking the Normative Implications of the McKay Commission" (2015) adds his perspective to the debate on political-elite representation of English national identity after analysing the implications of the McKay Commission – a government commissioned report in order to establish any necessary reforms in light of the West Lothian Question, or English Question. Kenny argues that it is against a backdrop of a growing interest in English national identity due to the consequences of devolution that the McKay Commission should be evaluated against. Kenny's central argument is that the McKay Commission "illuminates significant tensions among some of the main contending normative ideas associated with the popular re-emergence of an avowedly English, rather than British, sense of affiliation" (Kenny 2015, 154). Kenny's analysis of the McKay Commission provides further evidence for why the Conservative Party declined to alter its policy stance to favour England (Mycock and Hayton 2014). Kenny complements Mycock and Hayton's argument (2014) by suggesting that the independent McKay Commission, allowed the Conservative Party to displace the English question from its purview and await the results of the commission (Kenny 2015, 155). Kenny notes the McKay Commission findings which evince that English national identity has risen *post*-devolution and that a "significant level of grievance" is found among English people who believe ardently that due to devolution, Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish persons have significant advantages compared to an English person (Kenny 2015,

161). Kenny does not address how mainstream political parties in the United Kingdom have responded to the findings *ex-post* the McKay Commission's publication. However, Kenny does provide a critical insight into what the McKay Commission's findings may mean for British politics and nationalist trends. He posits that, "a new sense of ethnic-majority nationalism may well be one of the forces behind the deepening sense of disenchantment with politics, politicians and the political system, as well as also being a consequence of the latter" (Kenny 2015, 164). Given the Brexit vote, Kenny's premonition seems to have been proven true *if* 'ethnic-majority' nationalism, as Kenny coins it, is proven to have been a driver of the Brexit referendum result.

As Mycock and Hayton (2014) carefully referred to, the rise of UKIP represented the first significant political party manifestation of Euroscepticism – the clearest expression of English national identity (Wellings 2012). Appreciating the rise of UKIP and its implication for policy in the UK is therefore a central concern given their key issue ownership on the role of the European Union in British politics and the outcome of the Brexit referendum (Mycock and Hayton 2014). James Dennison and Matthew Goodwin in their article "Immigration, Issue Ownership, and the Rise of UKIP" (2015) provide the necessary background to UKIP's rise to a mainstream political party and complement our understanding of the factors which allowed their rise to prominence (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 168). The article offers a compelling argument for why UKIP surged in popularity in the 2015 General election, capturing 12.9% of the vote in Great Britain (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 168). The authors argue that, "whilst UKIP won only one seat, by the time of the General Election deeper changes had enabled the insurgent party to secure ownership of one of the most salient issues in British politics" (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 169).

The authors raise essential points relevant to the interconnected nature of English nationalism, Euroscepticism, immigration, and party politics more generally. In addition, the authors provide a noteworthy example of Newman's argument that to channel a nationalist psychology an *out-group* must be identified to rally against and foment in-group consciousness

(Newman 1987, 55). The authors argue that the Conservative Party's failure to stem the rise in net migration to the UK after the electoral victory and the formation of the coalition government in 2010, provided UKIP room to manoeuvre on this policy issue (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 170). The government's failure according to the authors was at a time when Nigel Farage, the then-leader of UKIP was aiming to pivot his party from a fringe-role in UK politics towards a mainstream position (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 172). The authors note that, "Farage had developed a fusion strategy, merging Britain's EU membership, traditionally an issue that has been of low salience, with immigration, which since the late 1990s had emerged as an issue of significant public concern" (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 172).

The authors disagree with an essential point that UKIP, under the leadership of Farage, could successfully connect Euroscepticism with the level of immigration in the UK, a key ingredient according to Newman's theoretical definition of nationalism (Newman 1987). Indeed, UKIP under the close leadership of Nigel Farage sought to cement immigrants as an *out-group* threatening *in-group* national consciousness and identity, using the terminology of Newman (Newman 1987, 55). As the authors note, "UKIP similarly put immigration at the centre of its campaign at the European Parliament elections in May 2014, during which Farage suggested that he did not want to live next door to Romanians and that he felt anxious when he did not hear the English language on public transport" (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 172). The authors note, that attitudinal data from the British Social Attitudes Survey suggests that the majority of Britons are opposed to low-skilled migrants from Central and Eastern Europe (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 172). Though this naturally poses a unit of analysis issue given the authors study at the 'British' rather than 'English' level. However, the authors do pose an intriguing corollary from this observation, useful for our comprehension of UKIP's rise to power. They argue that UKIP's ability to link curtailing immigration as a key tenet of their policy platform made it "even more likely immigration sceptics will become receptive to parties like UKIP, which infuse their campaigns with anti-establishment populism" (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 176).

In Geoffrey Evans and Jon Mellon's highly informative paper, "Working Class Votes and Conservative Losses: Solving the UKIP Puzzle" (2016) they go one step further by questioning why the major political parties could not stem the losses caused by UKIP. The authors also ask the crucial question: Why did Labour not attract the voters lost by the conservatives because of policy differences? Using long-term panel data, the authors provide a novel argument suggest that failures in Labour's policy platform exacerbated losses to UKIP (Evans and Mellon 2016, 464). The authors suggest that the commonly held notion that the rise of UKIP's support among working class voters hurts the Labour Party who traditionally garnered most of its base of supporters from the working class (Evans and Mellon 2016, 464). Instead, the authors argue that contrary to popular opinion, that this assertion is entirely false. As the authors argue, "What we show not to be true is the assumption that most working- class defection to UKIP is working-class defection from Labour" (Evans and Mellon 2016, 464). The authors contend that a confluence of factors allowed UKIP's rise in British politics long before it reached national standing (Evans and Mellon 2016, 467). Firstly, the authors argue that Labour's policy shift towards what they define as a mainstream 'liberal consensus' position on the EU and immigration undermined their support among the working class (Evans and Mellon 2016, 467). This provides a fuller picture to Dennison and Goodwin's (2015) observation of UKIP's policy shift towards an extreme position on immigration (Dennison and Goodwin 2015, 172). Secondly, they go on to state that this policy shift by Labour provides the answer to the ostensible contradiction in constituency-level analyses. As the authors state, "Hence the mismatch between constituency-level findings, which have shown substantial UKIP support in Labour-held seats, and individual voters' reported patterns of defection which have mainly been from the Conservatives" (Evans and Mellon 2016, 467).

Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin's 2014 paper, "Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind" takes a different approach to reveal the complexity of UKIP's rise on the British political landscape. The authors take two innovative approaches to

examining UKIP's ubiquitous rise in British politics focussing on the nexus of social, economic, cultural and generational changes which have precipitated UKIP's rise. In doing so, the authors produce a host of additional factors other than English nationalism and Euroscepticism to explain the rise in popularity of UKIP. Firstly, the authors present the argument that UKIP's increase in national standing in British politics reflects, "the political articulation of deep divides in British society–divides that have been building for decades" (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 278). The authors suggest that UKIP's policy platform fitted with Britain's changing economic and social structures which reflected an economic and societal shift away from a manufacturing-led economy and towards a service-led economy (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 279). The authors general argument is that a generation of 'left-behind' blue-collar voters provide the basis of UKIP's support (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 279). A discussion of class structures in the UK and class-based politics would have provided a complementary discussion and a critical line of enquiry to compare whether these 'left-behind' fit into the same class. The authors go on to advance an intriguing line of argument to help elucidate why these 'left-behind' voters as the name portends, were 'left-behind' by the mainstream political parties. The authors make the point that blue-collar voters by the early 2000s shifted away from Labour (the traditional party of the working class) and rather than remain and identify with the other major political party, the Conservatives, they stopped identifying with either party altogether (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 280). The authors suggest that this was exacerbated by recent policy decisions taken by the Conservatives and Labour who refrained from engaging this 'left-behind' group and instead positioned their parties "in favour of a more economically centrist and socially liberal policy targeted at the professional and middle class voters" (Ford and Goodwin 2014, 281). Ford and Goodwin's pertinent discussion of 'left-behind' voters provide a critical mode of analysis of supporters of English nationalism and why this group of 'left-behind' voters shifted toward extreme right wing groups rather that to remain attached to traditional mainstream political parties. However, several further questions arise from this paper. Firstly, what other issues do

these 'left-behind' voters coalesce around? Secondly, what does the discovery of a 'left-behind'

group of voters mean for both Brexit and English nationalism?

In an article published in the *European Journal of Political Research* (2010), Cutts et al. use the

2009 European elections as a critical study into the attitudinal drivers of extreme right support in

the UK. In doing so, the authors reveal several contemporary instruments of nationalism in the

UK, while broadening one's understanding of the attitudinal drivers which underpin the

supporters of these fringe political parties. This article from the off-set has a units of analysis

issue given its discussion of attitudinal drivers at the British-state level, rather than unpacking the

United Kingdom in its distinct nationalities and regional groups. Though this article provides a

limited perspective on English nationalism, it does provide an excellent account of the

supporters and their motivations of what the authors define as extreme right parties (ERPs),

specifically the rise of the British National Party (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011, 418).

Utilizing data obtained the 2009 European elections, the authors unpack the basis of

support for the BNP. Throughout their article Cutts et al. appear to place the BNP within the

nationalist psychological framework of Newman and Chadwick (Newman 1987; Chadwick 1945).

Mirroring the arguments made that an essential component of the creation of a nationalist

psychology is the creation of a clear 'out-group' (Newman 1987, 55), Cutts et al. argue that

"racial prejudice is the strongest driver of BNP support...anti-immigrant sentiment and populist

hostility to the political mainstream are also significantly correlated with BNP voting" (Cutts,

Ford, and Goodwin 2011, 419). Disentangling who constitutes the supporters of the BNP, the

authors reveal an interesting mixture of supporters. Their analysis suggests intriguingly for this

study that the BNP finds its support situated primarily in the former industrial areas of the North

of England, and made up of primarily men, older age cohorts, and members of the working class

(Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011, 427). The authors analysis suggests that success of the BNP

stems from its recent political ability to move away from the purely racist fringe supporters

towards a broader general anti-immigration sentiment bloc of voters (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin

2011, 434). The authors reveal the complexity and interconnectedness *of* attitudinal characteristics. For example, the authors describe that voters may understand the benefits of immigrants while holding the belief that Britain is unable to support the current level of immigration (Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011, 428). This presents a complicating factor when determining whether English nationalism is on the rise in the UK currently by analysing the strength of party support to fringe parties given possibility that voters who align themselves with these groups may not agree entirely with the manifesto platforms of the party.

George Kassimeris and Leonie Jackson in their article, "The Ideology and Discourse of the English Defence League: 'Not Racist, Not Violent, Just No Longer Silent'" (2015) provide an insight into the ideology of the English Defence League (EDL), a protest group or street movement which emerged in the UK in 2009 (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015, 171). The article complements the literature on the emergence of far right political parties in the UK and provides a useful distinction to fully understand why the EDL is specific in structure, form, and motivation from the BNP (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015, 171). The authors provide a useful line of enquiry distinguishing that "EDL Islamophobia is an example of (culturally) racist discourse construction" which makes it ideologically distinct from the BNP which utilizes more-encompassing anti-immigrant rhetoric (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015, 172). Through an analysis of EDL literature the authors argue that the EDL have overtly demarcated non-Muslims as an 'in-group' and Muslims as an 'outgroup' (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015, 172) providing further evidence of Newman's theory of nationalist psychology. The authors omission of nationalism while conceptualizing the ideology behind the EDL is problematic given many of the ideological constructions the authors identify, such as anti-immigrant sentiment, and Islamophobia, would appear to fit within a nationalist framework.

English Nationalism, Referendums, and Brexit

In a study of the impact of English nationalism upon the Brexit referendum it is useful to appreciate how a referendum is used and what effects this novel form of political participation has upon an electorate. Matt Qvortrup's book, *Referendums and Ethnic Conflict* (2014), is the first to comprehensively study this political phenomenon and its relationship with ethnic conflicts. Qvortrup's work provides a brief yet critical insight into the use of referendums towards European integration and allows one to think critically about the use of a referendum in British politics to inform the outcome of whether to continue membership with the EU. Qvortrup poses the deceivingly simple question: "Why are referendums on European integration held?" (Qvortrup 2014, 114). Qvortrup through a statistical analysis of referendums held, asserts that referendums are held on European integration for tactical not idealistic purposes (Qvortrup 2014, 121). Qvortrup agrees wholeheartedly with Dennis Kavanagh's remark that "the referendum had more to do with political expediency than constitutional principle or democracy" (Qvortrup 2014, 121; Kavanagh 1996, 60). Qvortrup makes the point that, "the decision to submit integration issues to referendums is not an irrational act, but a calculated decision to increase electoral support" (Qvortrup 2014, 122). This is an important tactical point to referendums, and crucially Brexit, given the decision by Prime Minister David Cameron to hold a referendum on an issue which internally divided his own party (Smith 2016). Julie Smith in a recent article entitled "David Cameron's EU renegotiation and referendum pledge: A case of déjà vu?" (2016) published in *British Politics*, examines this tactical decision by David Cameron to hold the EU referendum. Smith makes a novel comparison between the decision by David Cameron to hold a referendum, with Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1975 who similarly chose to hold a referendum on European membership (Smith 2016). Smith takes a different stance to Qvortrup, arguing that the decision by Cameron and Wilson to hold a referendum was not due to a decision to increase electoral support but instead, "reflected the two leaders' inability to hold their respective parties together on an issue of relatively low public salience but one that caused

visceral intra-party disagreements" (Smith 2016, 325). Qvortrup and Smith both converge on Kavanagh's (1996) remark that *political expediency* is the name of the game when a government or political leader chooses to stage a referendum (Kavanagh 1996, 60). The implications of this assessment are not entirely clear in terms of English nationalism. To summarize, if the government approached the referendum and more broadly Brexit through the lens of political expediency, are the factors (which may include a growth of English nationalist sentiment) which forced the government to hold a referendum post-Brexit factored into the consequences and tactical-decision making in the forthcoming negotiation period with the European Union? Cameron's decision to hold the referendum was based on an intra-party decision over the 'European' question. Instead, what has resulted is a far more expansive referendum campaign with Britain's political economy and very identity called into question. Smith's (2016) article also relays a crucial point regarding the referendum, the Conservative Party and the government were not aligned in the decision to hold a referendum. It was, as Smith (2016) notes, a ploy by Cameron to acquiesce to his backbenchers. Now under the premiership of Theresa May, has the government's position *ex-post* shifted considering the Brexit referendum?

Henderson et al. in their article, "England, Englishness, and Brexit" (2016) add to the incipient literature on the impact of the Brexit referendum specifically and its relationship to England and English nationalism. Published just before the Brexit referendum was held, Henderson et al. make several interesting points regarding the state of English nationalism and the developments of Eurosceptic attitudes since the 1975 EEC referendum. The authors question when and if attitudes in England shifted towards a Eurosceptic position (Henderson et al. 2016, 190). The authors, through an analysis of 2011 Future of England Survey found that those with the strongest English identity are the most likely to hold a Eurosceptic attitude (Henderson et al. 2016, 195). The authors are somewhat limited by overlaps in survey data which interchangeably use the labels 'British' rather than 'English' to denote identity which limits the level of analysis offered (Henderson et al. 2016, 197).

To summarize, this review has highlighted that English nationalism is complex with various intersections between Euroscepticism and party identification. This study has pinpointed several foundational elements which define contemporary definitions of English nationalism, including resentment of the political class, cultural homogeneity and a distrust of outsiders, and idealized pastoral visions of England (Newman 1987, Aughey 2010). This review has underlined the importance of studying English nationalism from a variety of angles, both as an ideology and as a product of party affiliation. This study's approach to English nationalism therefore analyses English nationalism effect upon Brexit both from the perspective of related issues of identity politics, Euroscepticism, cultural and economic effects of immigration, and party politics. Furthermore, this literature review has noted that the decision to hold the referendum by David Cameron appears to be based on 'tactical' rather than ideological grounds (Qvortrup, 2014). This study seeks to go one step further to examine whether *ex-post* the referendum, the current government policy framework towards Brexit and whether it addresses key issues of English nationalists.

METHODOLOGY

This study utilizes a 'mixed-methods' approach to problematizing the analytical study of English nationalism's impact upon the Brexit referendum. Mixed-methods denotes a mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis to inform the research and analysis conducted (Creswell 2014). Michael Kenny in his book *The Politics of English Nationhood* (2014) made the following comment: "And there is a particular merit in adopting what social scientists term a 'mixed method' approach when studying a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, which acknowledges that both quantitative and qualitative sources are likely to enhance our understanding" (Kenny 2014, 79). Brexit is a complex phenomenon and the attitudinal drivers which determined why the government would choose to hold a referendum and why the

majority of the electorate voted in favour to leave the European Union warrants such an approach to be adopted.

This study will utilize a sequential explanatory approach to the mixed methods design whereby the quantitative analysis section will inform the analysis conducted in the qualitative analysis component (Creswell 2014, 135). The first section of the methodology is devoted to conceptualizing the central research question of this study. As stated previously this paper seeks to determine if English nationalism affected the voting preferences in the Brexit referendum. First, we wish to operationalize the central research question and test to the extent to which English nationalism affected voting choice in the EU referendum. Second, this paper determines if demographic factors and issues related to immigration and party politics influences the relationship between English nationalism and voting choice in the Brexit referendum.

The second section of this research design is devoted to explaining the quantitative data chosen, its purpose, utility, and methodological design. In this section, the utility of the dependent and independent variables will be discussed and how they fit into operationalizing the research question. The third section of this research design is devoted to explaining the qualitative section of this study. In doing so, this study will not the limitations in adopting such an approach and the difficulties in drawing inferences from policy documentation.

Hypotheses

As the research question seeks to determine whether English nationalism affected the voters' decision making when choosing whether to vote 'Leave' or 'Remain', conceptualizing this into a series of testable hypotheses is of the utmost importance. We can assume that if a voter has a strong sense of English national identity this will inform their voting decision. We can therefore describe the first hypothesis as follows:

H_1: Voters with a strong English national identity will vote to leave the European Union.

As the literature review on this subject has made clear, English nationalism is implicitly linked to voter perceptions on the strength of English democracy and English constitutionalism. Therefore, we can assume that if a voter is both rational and votes according to issue voting (Hobolt 2007), then if they perceive English democracy to be weak, voters will correspondingly vote in favour of Brexit. We can hypothesize this as follows:

H_{1a}: Voters who perceive English democracy to be weak or under threat will vote to leave the European Union.

Lastly, we can hypothesize regarding English voters who do not associate with an English identity. In this regard, under an issue voting model of voters in referendums (Hobolt 2007) we can expect voters with a weak sense of English identity to vote in a referendum, according to the salience of issues and a variety of heuristics to inform their voting decision (Hobolt 2007, 152). We can therefore hypothesize this simply as follows:

H_2: Voters with a weak sense of English identity will vote according to the political preferences of the nearest party ideologically aligned to their voting preferences.

Quantitative Section

To test our three hypotheses, secondary data analysis will be conducted from survey data taken in the British Election Study (BES) (Evans et al. 2016). This paper relies specifically on one set of survey data to test the hypotheses against. Specifically, the study will utilize Wave 8 of the 2014-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel (2016 EU Referendum Study, Daily Campaign Survey) taken in May 2016 -June 2016 just before the Brexit referendum was held, surveying 31,409 respondents. In the first regression table (Table 1), three regression analyses are analysed to determine the statistical significance between Englishness and voting intention, controlling for demographic and political-party factors. In the second regression table (Table 2), a regression analysis of the certainty of voting for a political party and the party's position on Europe is analysed are used as predictor variables to determine whether a party's political position on the

European Union affects a citizen's vote choice in the EU referendum. Summary statistics of all variables used in this section are provided in Table 1 and 2 below.

Why this data set? For its strengths, this panel survey data is particularly helpful given that it uniquely asks respondents several questions related to their perceived attitude towards English democracy and the strength of their English identity. Further, given that this data set has a weighted sample of the UK electorate this allows us to draw broader population-level observations about English voters. The data provides regional level data according to a voter's country of origin (i.e. England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) which allows this study to isolate voters who live and vote in England. This allows regression analyses to take place which specifically draw on English voters and determine their level of English identity. Moreover, the data sample asks specific questions related to the perceived strength of English democracy and the level of 'Englishness' respondents associate towards. In addition, the panel survey data asked critical question related to perceptions of immigration on the UK economy and British culture. Finally, it asked respondents to note their intended vote in the forthcoming Brexit referendum.

However, there are several problems raised by adopting this quantitative design. The data poses complications in drawing inferences of whether respondents were conditioned to consider their English identity by way of the survey question rather than it being an active determinant of their voting behaviour. Furthermore, there is a weakness in the utility of the study given the fact that this was conducted before the referendum occurred, a more robust design would include data from after the referendum had occurred.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
euRefVote2	18,082	666.3099	2492.709	0	9999
englishness	20,768	180.9227	1311.385	1	9999
satDemEng	20,692	838.1412	2767.118	1	9999
ptvUKIP	1,755	572.5726	2317.781	0	9999
controlImmig	5,164	472.6261	2117.123	1	9999
immigEcon	20,768	590.4316	2349.491	1	9999
immigCultu~l	20,768	502.1462	2176.129	1	9999
ageGroup	20,768	4.884245	1.660844	1	7
gender	20,768	1.518394	.4996736	1	2
education	20,768	12.01136	5.288996	1	20
profile_et~y	20,738	1.649098	2.58293	1	16

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
euRefVote2	18,082	666.3099	2492.709	0	9999
likeCon	20,768	478.4676	2125.571	0	9999
certainty~on	20,768	1790.414	3831.403	1	9999
likeLab	20,768	484.5644	2137.745	0	9999
certaintyE~b	20,768	1940.578	3952.397	1	9999
likeLD	20,768	701.9097	2548.13	0	9999
certaintyE~D	20,768	2577.397	4371.908	1	9999
likeUKIP	20,768	500.6662	2173.151	0	9999
certainty~IP	20,768	1661.801	3719.331	1	9999
likeGrn	20,768	878.9499	2824.881	0	9999
certainty~en	20,768	3249.299	4681.803	1	9999

Theoretical Description of Variables

Dependent Variable

A key dependent variable is used in the five models in the quantitative analysis section. The dependent variable is the intended voting intention in the EU referendum, coded as 'EUrefVote2' in the BES data. This variable is useful as it operationalizes our research question into a workable value, an individual's intended voting preference in the referendum. It also excluded postal votes which would skew the data improperly and produce biased observations.[4]

Indicator Variables Table 1

For the independent variables, six factors which may influence the relationship and correlation between English nationalism and the EU referendum have been chosen to regress against the dependent variable. Firstly, the key indicator variable of interest is *'Englishness'* as coded in the BES data. The categorical variable asks respondents to measure the perceived level of English identity on a scale from 'Not at all English' to 'Very Strongly English'. This allows us to test empirically the relationship between English nationalism and referendum voting choice and therefore allows us to accept or reject the hypotheses made in H_1. As the literature review has made clear, and H_{1a} seeks to test, English nationalism is interconnected with perceptions on the strength or, indeed, weakness of English democracy. Therefore, several associated indicator variables are included to ascertain the relationship between referendum voting intention and English national identity. This includes several variables related to immigration and Euroscepticism. As the literature review made clear (Rodriguez-Aguilera 2013; Vines 2014; Mycock and Hayton 2014; Dennison and Goodwin 2015) Euroscepticism and English nationalism are deeply intertwined. The first additional indicator variable included in the data is a categorical variable coded as 'satDemEng' which asks respondents to rate their satisfaction with

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[4] The data is coded via Region to only include respondents who stated that they reside in England. This is essential to ensure that the data is not skewed by Welsh, Scottish, or Northern Irish respondents who also took part in the BES study.

English democracy. This will test the validity of H_{1A}. As noted in the literature review section, constitutionalism and English national identity are interconnected (Aughey 2010; Mycock and Hayton 2014). Secondly, an indicator variable is included in Table 1, coded as 'ptvUKIP' which indicates the likelihood that a voter is likely to vote for UKIP. As the literature review made note of, an aspect to English national identity is the creation of an 'out-group' (Chadwick 1945; Newman 1987). Therefore, we include indicator variables which asks respondents about their views towards immigrants to test the statistical significance of immigration to the UK and a citizen's vote choice in the referendum. Thirdly, an indicator categorical variable 'controlImmig' is included which asks respondents the question: 'How much control do you think Britain has over immigration to the UK?' Respondents are then asked to state their belief through a series of choice answers ranging from 'No control at all' to 'Complete Control.' Fourthly, an indicator variable asks respondents whether they believe immigration is good or bad for the economy. This is coded as 'immigEcon' in Table 1. Respondents are given an 8-point scale in which to respond. In the third model in Table 1, control variables are included for demographic factors. This includes age group, gender, educational attainment, and ethnicity.

Indicator Variables Table 2

The variables for Table 2 seek to determine the statistical relationship between party policy preferences and an individual's vote in the EU referendum to test *H2*. In Model 1, Table 2, indicator variables are included which asks respondents to state whether they like or dislike, the major parties of the UK on a ten-point scale from 'Strongly dislike' to 'Strongly like.' The parties included in the models are, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party, and UKIP. Regional parties such as the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru are excluded given the fact that this study is only concerned with English respondents. In addition, the BES data did not ask respondents questions related to the BNP. In Model 2, an additional indicator variable is included for each party which asks respondents to record how certain they are about the party in question's position on the EU. Respondents can reply, 'Not at

all certain,' 'Somewhat certain,' 'Very certain,' or that they do not know. This provides a great deal of explanatory power to ascertain they veracity of H_3 given the assumption that voters with limited knowledge of the European Union will vote according to the party they are ideologically aligned towards.

Qualitative Section

Through analysing quantitative data of members of the electorate before the referendum, we can formulate in policy document analysis whether the current government is adopting any of the attitudinal concerns raised by the electorate in the referendum. In doing so, this study utilizes the United Kingdom's "Exit from and New Partnership with the European Union White Paper" published on 2 February 2017 by the UK government's Department for Exiting the European Union. This document was chosen as it is the most comprehensive policy document officially released by the UK government since Brexit on the UK's future relationship with the EU and provides hints towards the government's future negotiating strategy with the EU. By reviewing the government's plans to negotiate with the European Union, inferences can be drawn determining whether the government is prioritizing aspects of membership with the European Union and whether this correlates with the preferences of the English electorate as identified in the quantitative section.

This, naturally, presents several methodological concerns. Firstly, this study is taking the results from a statistical analysis performed on survey data taken *ex-ante* the referendum and months and applying it towards a white paper commissioned and published by the government *ex-post* the referendum. This complicates the discussions since the leader of the government has subsequently changed from then-prime minister David Cameron, to prime minister Theresa May. Kenny, again provides sage advice as to the nature of survey and polling date, making the note that: "The evidence supplied by polls in general needs to be treated with considerable care, and regarded as suggestive and indicative, rather than objective and determinate" (Kenny 2014,

80). This study adopts Kenny's approach by treating the evidence presented as both 'suggestive and indicative' of trends within the electorate.

Furthermore, it must be highlighted that this white paper does have a relatively low utility for research purposes. For a document with the intended purpose of stating the UK's new relationship with the EU it is remarkably brief at 77 pages. Moreover, this paper was commissioned by the government at a time before negotiations have begun with the EU and member states respectively. It is therefore only indicative of the government's positions on policy areas rather than taken as cemented positions by the UK government.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Before estimating the models, pairwise correlations among the independent variables were studied. As Table 5 (Appendix A) demonstrates, many of the indicator variables are statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level. The listwise correlation between our dependent variable and Englishness is $r = 0.09$ and the listwise correlation is significant at $p<0.01$. Going on to testing for multicollinearity through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) command does not present any evidence of multicollinearity within the set of variables in both models (Table 6 and Table 7, Appendix A). The command determines both VIF and its reciprocal (1/VIF). No variable has a VIF over 10 which is a general rule of thumb to indicate the presence of multicollinearity. In addition, no indicator variable value for 1/VIF is < 0.10, the general rule of thumb that there may be multicollinearity present within the set of indicator variables. Therefore, to a high degree of probability, we can be sure that multicollinearity is not present within the models. To check our models for heteroscedasticity present within the data set, this study utilizes the Breusch-Pagan Test to determine whether we can reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are homoscedastic. In Figures 1 and 2, (Appendix A) tests for heteroscedasticity utilizing all indicator variables which regress the squared residuals against. The test statistic for Figure 3 is $Chi^2 = 45.80$. The test computes the p-value at 0.0000. As the p-value is smaller than 0.05 at

0.0000, the null-hypothesis should be rejected and the test suggests the significant presence of heteroscedasticity. Correcting for heteroscedasticity requires the use of robust standard errors. The same is true for the VIF test of the variables used in our second regression model, which has a Chi^2 = 6365.29. Therefore, in the regression analyses, all models are robustly regressed to correct for heteroscedasticity.

Survey Analysis

In the first analysis, the regression results are presented in Table 3 (see below). The key indicator (independent) variable of interest for this study is *Englishness,* which is an identity scale of one's individual level of English national identity. In Model 1, a bivariate linear regression indicates the statistical relationship between our (dependent) variable, euRefVote2, and the indicator variable Englishness. The coefficient for Englishness is positive and significant at 0.177. For each one-point increase in Englishness, referendum voting intention increases by 0.177 (euRefVote2 = 631.9 + 0.177*Englishness). The p-value tests the null hypothesis of whether coefficient for Englishness is statistically significant from 0. In Model 1, Englishness is statistically significant in explaining 'euRefVote2' and we can reject the null hypothesis, given that $p < 0.01$. R^2 examines the degree of variance of Y (euRefVote2) explained by X (Englishness). In the case of Englishness, explains 0.9% of the variance in voting choice in the EU referendum, holding all variables constant. The low R^2 is to be expected given that our model is trying to determine whether a single factor contributed towards an individual's voting decision. We can therefore describe the relationship as a relatively weak to moderate relationship between our indicator variable and our dependent variable. However, the model does indicate that English national identity is statistically significant, and is a component in determining an individual's vote choice for the EU referendum. This presents a moderate to strong probability that the hypothesis given H_1 is correct in its assertion that voters with a strong English national identity will vote in favour of Brexit.

In Model 2 (Table 3) further indicator variables are included in the model, to determine whether other factors associated with English identity, including satisfaction with English democracy, probability of voting for UKIP, the control of immigration, immigration's effect on the economy, immigration's effect on culture, may be correlated with the English electorate's voting decision. In the multivariate regression, our key indicator variable remains statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In the model the relationship between the indicator variable, Englishness and our dependent variable is negative with a coefficient of -0.322. For every one-point increase in Englishness, there is a decrease by 0.322 (euRefVote2 = 567.7 - 0.322*Englishness). Three indicator variables included in Model 2 are not statistically significant at $p < 0.1$. This includes the level of satisfaction in English democracy, the likelihood of voting for UKIP, and the variable asking respondents to rate the level of control the UK has over immigration. Given the fact that English democracy is not significant at $p < 0.01$ level, we can assume that H_{1A} is false and there is a strong likelihood that there is no relationship between referendum voting and the perceived strength of English democracy. The indicator variable 'immigEcon' which asked respondents to rate the extent to which immigration is 'good' or 'bad' for the British economy is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ level. The variable's coefficient is positive at 0.302. For each one point increase in the indicator variable 'immigEcon', our dependent variable is expected to increase by 0.302, holding all other variables constant (euRefVote2= 567.7 + 0.302*immigEcon). Similarly, to Model 1, this model has a low R^2 value, though it has increased marginally compared to Model 1 with the inclusion of additional predictor variables to $R^2 = 0.056$. This suggests that Model 2 can explain 5.6% of the variance in the intended voting pattern in the EU referendum. This is in line with theoretical expectations given the assumption that determining a voter's set of preferences is laden with difficulties due to the multitude of issue preferences which makeup a voter's decision.

In Model 3, controls are included for demographic factors. As Model 3 indicates, English national identity after controlling for demographic factor remains statistically significant at

p<0.05 level. The coefficient for Englishness has decreased slightly from Model 2 to -0.365. For each one point increase in Englishness, our dependent variable decreases by 0.365, holding all other variables constant. In Model3, the indicator variable immigEcon, is similarly to Model 2, statistically significant and positive. Though, the coefficient has decreased marginally from Model 2 from 0.302 to 0.245. The variables (satDemEng, ptvUKIP, controlImmig) continue to be statistically insignificant. 'ImmigCultural,' the indicator variable which asks respondents to respond to immigration's effect on British culture, has become statistically significant at the p<0.1 level. Including control variables for demographic factors demonstrates a statistically significant correlation between gender and our dependent variable at p<0.01 level. R^2 increased significantly from Model 2. $R^2 = 0.093$, which means that the indicator variables in Model 3 explains 9.3% of the variance in our dependent variable.

Table 3: English Identity Scale and EU Referendum Voting Intention[5]

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Englishness	0.177***	-0.322**	-0.365**
	(0.0136)	(0.152)	(0.159)
satDemEng		0.0461	0.0180
		(0.0657)	(0.0664)
ptvUKIP		0.00404	-0.0200
		(0.0730)	(0.0753)
controlImmig		-0.0737	-0.0770
		(0.0791)	(0.0799)
immigEcon		0.302***	0.245***
		(0.0693)	(0.0748)
immigCultural		0.161	0.168*
		(0.0138)	(0.0980)
ageGroup			107.8
			(87.84)
gender			692.8***
			(266.7)
education			-30.94
			(25.47)
profile_ethnicity			-20.35
			(41.89)
Constant	631.9***	567.7***	-622.0
	(18.64)	(135.3)	(800.7)
Observations	18,082	368	368
R-squared	0.009	0.056	0.093

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 4 tests H_2. In Table 2, Model 1 a multivariate regression is conducted of an

individual's view on UK political parties: The Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP,

and the Green Party. In addition, our key indicator variable of interest for this study *Englishness* is

included in the models to determine the statistical relationship between English national identity

and an individual's Brexit vote, controlling for support of political parties and political parties'

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[5] All three models are robustly regressed to control for the presence of heteroscedasticity. In addition, all data is weighted appropriately.

policy preferences on the European Union.

Table 4: Political Parties and European Union Policy Stance[6]

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2
Englishness	0.0774***	0.0609***
	(0.0190)	(0.0190)
likeCon	0.0549*	0.0462
	(0.0286)	(0.0285)
certaintyEUCon		0.00846
		(0.0113)
likeLab	0.0522*	0.0421
	(0.0293)	(0.0291)
certaintyEULab		0.0249**
		(0.0110)
likeLD	0.00202	-0.00943
	(0.0113)	(0.0113)
certaintyEULD		0.0116*
		(0.00597)
likeUKIP	0.0751***	0.0544***
	(0.0167)	(0.0168)
certaintyEUUKIP		0.0407***
		(0.00832)
likeGrn	0.0285***	0.0137
	(0.00938)	(0.00958)
certaintyEUGreen		-0.00146
		(0.00429)
Constant	526.9***	414.4***
	(13.91)	(14.49)
Observations	29,175	29,175
R-squared	0.034	0.046

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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[6] All data, similarly to Table 1, is set according to region. In this case, it is set according to respondents who state that they currently rise in England. Since, this study's interest is in the role of English nationalism and any inclusion of other regional voters outside of England, who inappropriately skew the observations made in the data.

In Model 1, a multivariate regression portrays the statistical relationship of respondents' preferences towards these party and their intended vote in the EU referendum. Again, in Table 4 similarly to Table 3, English national identity is statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ level. For each one-point increase in Englishness, referendum voting intention increases by 0.0774 (euRefVote2 = 526.9 + 0.0774*Englishness). This further corroborates the likelihood that the hypothesis made in H_1 is correct. For the Conservatives, an individual's like or dislike of the party is not a statistically significant factor at $p<0.1$ in explaining their intended vote in the EU referendum. For Labour, the like or dislike of the party is statistically significant and the coefficient is positive. The indicator variable 'likeLab' is statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ level. The coefficient for 'likeLab' is 0.0522. For each one-point increase in our indicator variable, referendum voting intention increases by 0.0522, *ceteris paribus*. For the Liberal Democrats, there is no statistically significant relationship. Like Labour, the like/dislike of UKIP is statistically significant. At an alpha value of 0.01, the coefficient of 'likeUKIP' is statistically significant from 0, given that it's p-value is <0.01. The indicator variable 'likeUKIP' is also statistically significant and positive at $p<0.01$ level. The coefficient for 'likeUKIP' is positive at 0.0751. For every one-unit increase in the independent variable, referendum voting intention increases by 0.0751, *ceteris paribus*. For the Green Party, the indicator variable which measures an individual's like or dislike of the Green Party is statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ level. The coefficient is 0.0285 for the indicator variables. Holding all other variables constant, a 1-unit increase in the indicator variables, referendum voting intention increases by 0.0285. $R^2 = 0.034$ which indicates that the model explains 3.4% of the variance of our dependent variables. R^2 is relatively weak and not entirely unsurprising given the number of factors which affect an individual's decision to vote for a position in a referendum.

Model 2 includes additional indicator variables controlling for an individual's perception of a party's certainty on their support or opposition for the EU broadly speaking. Similarly, to

Model 1, the indicator variable Englishness is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. This in line with expectations again increases the likelihood that the hypothesis stated in H$_1$ is indeed correct. The most intriguing aspect of Model 2 is the continued statistical significance of the indicator variables concerned with UKIP. The indicator variable 'likeUKIP' continues to be statistically significant and positive at p<0.01 level. In addition, the new indicator variable measuring the certainty voters have on UKIP's position on the EU, is statistically significant at p<0.01 level. This is in line with theoretical expectations made in the literature review, which demonstrated that UKIP *raison d'etre* is to ensure that the UK leaves the European Union. Including additional indicator variables has removed any statistical significance between EU referendum vote choice and support or opposition towards the Conservative Party. In addition, an individual's perception of the policy certainty the Conservative Party has towards the EU is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the perceived policy certainty of Labour on the EU is statistically significant at p<0.05 level.

Qualitative Analysis

As has just been determined in the quantitative section, the data suggests a statistically significant relationship between English nationalism and voting in the referendum. Moreover, this study has also pinpointed a statistically significant relationship between the perceived effect of immigration on the UK economy and voting in the referendum. In addition, the study has found that one's gender is also statistically significant factor in determining one's vote in the referendum. Utilizing a mixed-methods sequential explanatory approach, this section is devoted to analysing the current government's official white paper on its future policies towards Brexit and the European Union entitled, 'The United Kingdom's exit from and new partnership with the European Union White Paper' published by the Secretary of State for the Department for Exiting the European Union, Rt. Hon David Davis (2017). As the quantitative section confirmed there is a statistically significant relationship between English national identity and voting intention in the Brexit

referendum. The government's white paper is telling and provides a critical insight into whether the government has responded to an aspect which appears to have contributed towards the Brexit result (Davis 2017). This study argues that the government is addressing the *symptoms* of English nationalism in this white paper. The government has set forth a twelve-point plan (Davis 2017, 3), which includes the following:

1. Providing certainty and clarity;
2. Taking control of our own laws;
3. Strengthening the Union;
4. Protecting our strong historic ties with Ireland and maintaining the Common Travel Area;
5. Controlling immigration;
6. Securing rights for EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals in the EU;
7. Protecting workers' rights;
8. Ensuring free trade with European markets;
9. Securing new trade agreements with other countries;
10. Ensuring the United Kingdom remains the best place for science and innovation;
11. Cooperating in the fight against crime and terrorism; and
12. Delivering a smooth, orderly exit from the EU.

The government appears to strike a chord with the position of English nationalist's through points two, three, and five respectively. The white paper refers to England only five times in its 77-pages, providing anecdotal evidence that regional concerns of England are diminished in this policy paper. The recent separatist resurgence in Scotland and calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence from the rest of the United Kingdom provides further evidence for why the UK government would wish to diminish any appearance of regional bias (New York Times, 14 March 2017). In section 2 of the white paper the government details its plan for 'Taking Control of our own laws.' The government adopts the position in section 2.1 that:

2.1 The sovereignty of Parliament is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution. Whilst Parliament has remained sovereign throughout our membership of the EU, it has not always felt like that. The extent of EU activity relevant to the UK can be demonstrated by the fact that 1,056 EU-related documents were deposited for parliamentary scrutiny in 2016. These include proposals for EU Directives, Regulations, Decisions and Recommendations, as well as Commission delegated acts, and other

documents such as Commission Communications, Reports and Opinions submitted to the Council, Court of Auditors Reports and more.

The government does not adopt any rhetoric concerned with England. However, it does address the fears of encroachment upon UK sovereignty and the need to protect the UK's constitutional structures – which are core tenets of English nationalist ideology as noted in the literature review (Kumar 2003; Mycock and Hayton 2014). In section 2.3 the government appears to take a more direct policy towards UK law-making:

> 2.2 Leaving the EU will mean that our laws will be made in London, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, and will be based on the specific interests and values of the UK. In chapter 1 we set out how the Great Repeal Bill will ensure that our legislatures and courts will be the final decision makers in our country.

Notably the government refers to specific locale within the regions of the United Kingdom. By asserting that "laws will be made in London, Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Belfast" and that laws will be "based on specific interests and values" appears to suggest that regional and national concerns will be addressed in the Brexit negotiations and a post-Brexit United Kingdom. As the government has not yet entered negotiations with the European Union for withdrawal, there is a difficulty in ascertaining whether the policy positions related to constitutionalism and parliamentary sovereignty will be modified. In addition, it is unclear from what mandate the government has decided to propose these changes. There is not evidential proof in the government's white paper that English Nationalism affected this policy paper despite the strong correlation between English nationalism and voting intention as uncovered in the quantitative analysis section.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study has advanced the argument that English nationalism was a factor in the Brexit referendum. Through the statistical analysis of panel survey data from the British Election Study, research has determined the strong likelihood that English nationalism was a factor, among others, when voters cast their vote in the Brexit referendum. In addition, this study has demonstrated through the statistical analysis of policy competition among UK political parties, that UKIP's policy coherence on leaving the European Union may have contributed towards the Conservative government's decision to stage the referendum.

It is important for policy-makers within the current government to fully grasp the drivers of why the slim majority of the electorate voted 'Leave.' If policy-makers within the government enter the forthcoming Brexit negotiations with faulty assumptions as to the nature of the mandate provided via the referendum, the stance the government adopts in negotiations may not be aligned with the preferences of the electorate.

This study also has significant shortcomings which need to be highlighted. This study has demonstrated a causal association between English national identity and voting intention in the referendum. This study has not proven that English nationalism has risen in the United Kingdom. To do so, a study would need to adopt time-series data to analyse the strength of English national identity over time. Furthermore, this study utilizes data drawn from survey data taken before the referendum had taken place. A more rigorous methodology would also review panel survey taken before and after the referendum to ascertain whether the there was a change in the level of English nationalist sentiment after the referendum result.

In addition, this study has made a series of qualitative observations drawn from the government's white paper on leaving the European Union. This is laden with subjectivism and not an entirely methodologically rigorous approach to determining whether the government has adopted any policies considering English nationalism. Further scholarly research is required to

fully ascertain whether the strand of English nationalism identified in this study is a demonstration of a resurgence of nationalism in England. In addition, a more expansive study would include a comparative analysis of Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish nationalism to determine whether nationalism in England was in line with nationalist identities across the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a more comprehensive study would review local differences such as the North versus South divide in England, and local differences in London. Additionally, a more wide-ranging study would also address why English support for the EU has waned since the 1975 referendum and delve further into this history.

Despite these shortcomings, there is still significant utility in the methodological approach of this study and the findings which, in short, have established that English nationalism was a factor in the decision by the electorate to vote to leave the European Union. In the models conducted by this study, strong positive associations were also found from immigration's impact on the UK economy and gender as statistically significant factors. This study also found that UKIP's policy on Europe, is robustly linked to a voter's decision to vote to leave the European Union in the referendum. The same cannot be said of the two major political parties, the Conservatives and Labour respectively. This study suggests that in the Brexit referendum English nationalism did surface, the strength of its effect among other factors however, requires further research to be determined.

APPENDIX A

Figure 1: Breusch–Pagan Test of Table 1 Variables

```
Breusch–Pagan / Cook–Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
        Ho: Constant variance
        Variables: fitted values of euRefVote2


        chi2(1)      =     45.80
        Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
```

Figure 2: Breusch-Pagan Test of Table 2 Variables

```
Breusch–Pagan / Cook–Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
        Ho: Constant variance
        Variables: fitted values of euRefVote2


        chi2(1)      =   6365.29
        Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
```

Table 5: Pairwise Correlation of Table 3 Variables

	euRefV~2	englis~s	satDem~g	ptvUKIP	contro~g	immigE~n	immigC~l
euRefVote2	1.0000						
englishness	0.0967*	1.0000					
	0.0000						
satDemEng	0.1722*	0.2673*	1.0000				
	0.0000	0.0000					
ptvUKIP	0.1174*	0.2547*	0.5247*	1.0000			
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000				
controlImmig	0.1764*	0.3137*	0.4582*	0.4513*	1.0000		
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000			
immigEcon	0.1793*	0.3163*	0.3728*	0.2995*	0.4058*	1.0000	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		
immigCultu~l	0.1792*	0.3520*	0.4377*	0.3852*	0.4528*	0.7144*	1.0000
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
ageGroup	-0.0439*	-0.1243*	-0.2004*	-0.1418*	-0.1546*	-0.1187*	-0.1380*
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
gender	0.0828*	0.0252*	0.1317*	0.0902*	0.0706*	0.0685*	0.0690*
	0.0000	0.0003	0.0000	0.0002	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
education	-0.0170*	0.0184*	-0.0358*	-0.0637*	0.0107	-0.0013	-0.0246*
	0.0220	0.0080	0.0000	0.0076	0.4403	0.8527	0.0004
profile_et~y	0.0380*	0.1153*	0.0691*	0.1180*	0.0648*	0.0584*	0.0609*
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

	ageGroup	gender	educat~n	profil~y
ageGroup	1.0000			
gender	-0.0621*	1.0000		
	0.0000			
education	-0.1665*	-0.0134	1.0000	
	0.0000	0.0535		
profile_et~y	-0.1248*	-0.0214*	0.0829*	1.0000
	0.0000	0.0021	0.0000	

Table 6: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
immigCultu~l	2.03	0.491511
englishness	1.68	0.594194
satDemEng	1.67	0.599386
controlImmig	1.65	0.606082
ptvUKIP	1.64	0.610521
immigEcon	1.62	0.618601
ageGroup	1.20	0.831763
profile_et~y	1.10	0.909898
gender	1.10	0.912192
education	1.10	0.912249
Mean VIF	1.48	

Table 7: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test for Multicollinearity

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
likeLab	7.76	0.128863
likeCon	7.39	0.135278
certaintyE~b	6.45	0.155001
certainty~on	5.81	0.172242
certaintyE~D	3.69	0.271291
certainty~IP	3.52	0.283691
likeLD	2.99	0.334594
likeUKIP	2.74	0.364679
certainty~en	2.52	0.397290
likeGrn	2.13	0.468390
englishness	1.10	0.912820
Mean VIF	4.19	

Table 8: Pairwise Correlation of Table 4 Variables

	euRefV~2	englis~s	likeCon	certa~on	likeLab	certai~b	likeLD
euRefVote2	1.0000						
englishness	0.0883*	1.0000					
	0.0000						
likeCon	0.1653*	0.2521*	1.0000				
	0.0000	0.0000					
certainty~on	0.1667*	0.1806*	0.3855*	1.0000			
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000				
likeLab	0.1656*	0.2533*	0.9220*	0.3797*	1.0000		
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000			
certaintyE~b	0.1681*	0.1699*	0.3663*	0.8950*	0.3703*	1.0000	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		
likeLD	0.1437*	0.2301*	0.7753*	0.3562*	0.7836*	0.3474*	1.0000
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
certaintyE~D	0.1484*	0.1475*	0.3066*	0.7420*	0.3082*	0.7885*	0.3354*
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
likeUKIP	0.1637*	0.2509*	0.7084*	0.3705*	0.7044*	0.3588*	0.6316*
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
certainty~IP	0.1735*	0.1808*	0.3813*	0.8107*	0.3834*	0.8038*	0.3538*
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
likeGrn	0.1414*	0.2030*	0.5893*	0.3409*	0.5919*	0.3428*	0.5760*
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
certainty~en	0.1261*	0.1250*	0.2638*	0.6283*	0.2664*	0.6690*	0.2772*
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

	certai~D	likeUKIP	certa~IP	likeGrn	certa~en
certaintyE~D	1.0000				
likeUKIP	0.3092*	1.0000			
	0.0000				
certainty~IP	0.7121*	0.4041*	1.0000		
	0.0000	0.0000			
likeGrn	0.3295*	0.6754*	0.3616*	1.0000	
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		
certainty~en	0.7563*	0.2692*	0.6242*	0.3382*	1.0000
	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	

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