Corruption in bank lending to firms : cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing

@article{Barth2009CorruptionIB,
  title={Corruption in bank lending to firms : cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing},
  author={James R. Barth and Chen Lin and Ping Lin and Frank M. Song},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  year={2009},
  volume={91},
  pages={361-388},
  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:8069690}
}

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