

international relations, arguing that economic growth has reduced the incentives for individuals and countries to choose the risky option of war.

The next four chapters examine how economics have transformed specific countries or regions: the United States, the European Union, East Asia, and areas of poverty. The countries/regions are not compared systematically. This is not necessarily a problem, since the circumstances of each are different (e.g., the factors underlying European integration are fundamentally different from the economic development of Japan and China). However, one can quibble with some of the topics selected (such as the increasing number of international students who attend university in the United States), and left out (including China's political and social challenges). The final chapters include a range of policy recommendations.

Lincoln does not break new theoretical ground. His argument is framed within Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's work on complex interdependence. Lincoln uses Kenneth Waltz's levels of analysis from *Man, the State, and War* (1959) to illustrate how the economic transformation of the world affects international relations, and he briefly mentions the work of John Mearsheimer, Hans Morgenthau, and other realists in criticizing their focus on military power and narrow national self-interest. But advancing international relations theory is not Lincoln's purpose here. This is clearly a book for "the prince," his or her advisors, and opinion formers. That should not be surprising, given Lincoln's Beltway experience with the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations. Yet the book is appropriate for undergraduate courses on international political economy, current issues in international relations, and international business. Although the author is an economist, his prose is extremely readable, avoiding economics jargon, equations, and graphs. Even his section on macroeconomic imbalances in the United States explains the importance of a technical issue like current-account balances in a manner that virtually any reader can understand.

Not everyone will like this book. Lincoln's arguments and policy recommendations are mostly centrist. He clearly believes in markets and is a strong proponent of openness in trade and investment. But he recognizes that something must be done to win over those segments, especially in the United States but also abroad, that are globalization's losers. He acknowledges that income disparity in the United States is widening and that some companies are trimming pension and health benefits. As a result, "[p]eople who are dissatisfied and anxious about their personal lives are more likely to support bad policy ideas such as protectionism" (p. 102). Among his policy recommendations are greater levels of U.S. government support for displaced workers, a national health policy, and measures to reduce economic inequality. Critics on the Right will counter that such plans are too expensive, interfere with markets, and expand

the role of government. They would disagree with other recommendations, too, including placing economic policy on a par with security policy and embracing China and other transition economies as partners rather than adversaries. Critics on the Left will agree that Lincoln has identified important problems, but suggest that his proposals do not go far enough in reducing economic inequality and curbing the power of big business and the paychecks of CEOs. Nor will they like his recommendation that the United States make completion of the WTO's Doha trade round a top foreign policy priority. On the other hand, few readers would disagree with his call for greater transparency in the IMF and World Bank.

The only serious weakness of the book is that Lincoln appears to underestimate the obstacles to his "economic ties lead to perpetual peace" thesis. For example, he notes that systemic shocks like financial and health crises "are conceivable, but they are not very probable" (p. 65). But the global ramifications of the recent subprime mortgage crisis or the impact of the rapid rise in food prices on the world's poorest people suggest that such crises are likely and can wreak havoc simultaneously. Another possible problem he cites is governments that choose "bad policies" (i.e., those that obstruct trade, investment, and economic liberalism), but that seems to be the precise direction that policymaking in the United States and a number of other countries is taking. Also, while Lincoln rightfully connects aspects of terrorism and ethnic conflict to poverty, no amount of wealth will eliminate some conflicts based on nationalism, ethnicity, or religion, and the road to economic growth in some of these countries will be painfully long and winding.

Nonetheless, it would be nice if *Winners Without Losers* were read widely by candidates and the electorate alike. It is a good primer on the impact of economics on current U.S. and global events, and provides a sound basis for discussion about important public policy issues.

Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes. By Dan Lindley. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2007. 280p. \$35.00.

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— Paul F. Diehl, *University of Illinois*

The flow of information is central to most rational choice models of war. It is supposed to facilitate the ability of parties to reach a settlement, given the clarity of the eventual outcome and the desire to avoid paying the costs of fighting. Yet, in these approaches, information flow functions more as a central assumption of what happens in conflict than as a process that is actually examined or tested. Thus, it is refreshing to read a study that examines not only the potentially multiple effects of information flow but also individual instances in several different contexts. Specifically, Dan Lindley looks at the impact of

transparency—“the availability of information about potential adversaries’ actions, capabilities, and intentions” (p. 17)—that comes from security regimes. The result is a very fine book that speaks to several research milieus: rational choice, security studies, regimes, and peacekeeping, to name the most prominent ones.

The expectations that regimes promote transparency and that transparency promotes cooperation and peace are straightforward and broad. Yet several elements set this study apart. First, the theoretical logics underlying the hypotheses and the derivative propositions are well developed and grounded in broad sets of literature. Second, alternative expectations are explicated; these are not merely straw-man hypotheses opposite those of the author and presented for testing purposes. Rather, Lindley explicates the logics of these competing expectations; for example, the proposition that transparency may promote conflict is buttressed by arguments in the academic literature that too much information may be exploited by one party or that negotiations are more prone to deadlock under such conditions.

The book is especially impressive in the execution of the research. Conclusions are derived from in-depth case studies of four peacekeeping operations (Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Namibia, and Cambodia), as well as the Concert of Europe. The latter may seem out of place with the other selections, but it contributes significantly to a broadening of the applicability of the arguments and findings to security arrangements in general. Especially welcome in this same direction are two appendices that apply the findings on transparency to informational components (e.g., radio broadcasts) of more recent United Nations peacekeeping operations and arms control, “open skies” proposals, and nuclear nonproliferation, respectively. The primary method of analysis is process tracing, in which the analyst considers the sequence of events in a given case and draws inferences about their causal connections. In the hands of others, process tracing is often a thin veneer for superficial historical research. Here, the author does an excellent and systematic job in linking key actions that promote transparency to observable outcomes. Each hypothesis includes a specification of observable implications, which prevents the analyst from finding only evidence that supports the expectations; for example, indicators that security regimes promote transparency include diplomatic conferences, incident reports, and buffer zones, among others. A good portion of the analysis is based on the author’s fieldwork. The Cyprus case is especially well documented, relying on fieldwork and on-site interviews, whereas the other peacekeeping cases contain less in-depth and somewhat less insightful analyses.

Lindley concludes that security regimes (formal or informal arrangements by the international community to manage conflict) provide transparency, but largely only in

uncertain environments; there is less value added when adversaries already have access to information. For example, peacekeeping forces can detect cease-fire violations, but these are generally obvious to all observers. Yet who is responsible for such violations is less evident, and peacekeepers can fill an information void by investigating incidents and rendering an impartial judgment about which side (if either) is the guilty party. Most information provided by regimes is accurate, and there was little indication that it had deleterious effects by reinforcing existing fears among the disputants. The remaining findings demonstrate the variable effects of transparency across the five cases, suggesting significant contextual effects. There were few uniformly strong and positive effects from transparency, and accordingly, the author lays out an informed research agenda to investigate various points further.

The finding that transparency has multiple and sometimes differing effects by context is a valuable one for scholars used to treating uncertainty reduction as a desirable outcome. Perhaps because four of the five cases involve peacekeeping operations, the findings here will be read most closely by scholars and policymakers in that sub-field. The book does an exceptional job of detailing the processes that underlie the way in which peacekeepers deal with minor disputes between parties and discourage the breaking of cease-fires; this may involve mediating disagreements at an early stage or constructing buffer zones. Similarly, the book makes an extra effort to point out direct policy implications that follow from the findings, such as discrediting rumors, as was done when peacekeepers refuted rumors of atrocities in Cyprus during a 1967 crisis. Investigating allegations and reporting the results can provide credible information that replaces rumors or non-credible claims by the conflicting parties. Transparency is clearly most relevant to traditional monitoring missions that involve cease-fire and election supervision; the appendix also makes a strong case for the role of transparency in communication aspects of recent operations, such as broadcasting information to the local citizenry and educating them on election procedures or human rights through the distribution of leaflets. It is less clear what role transparency plays in a host of other and newer peacebuilding functions, such as quelling civil disturbances, reconstructing infrastructure, or providing local government services.

This is a book that could too easily be overlooked by various scholarly constituencies who might incorrectly perceive it to be about only one subject (peacekeeping) or concern (information) and who therefore might not even pick it up. Others may be put off by the decidedly mixed findings and therefore lack of consistent lessons across cases. That would be a mistake. There is something for many (not quite everyone), and readers will profit by learning about topics that they thought they already knew, as

well as other topics that they could stand to learn more about. Transparency is most effective in promoting peace when there are few competitors to the regime providing information and just enough—but not too much—bias, uncertainty, and incomplete information among the disputants (this is what Lindley labels the “Goldilocks zone”). This bottom-line finding may not be as strong as less equivocal claims elsewhere, but the conclusions here are well-enough grounded so as to question models and studies that purport to offer clear and consistent relationships between transparency and peace.

Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980–2004.

By Evan S. Medeiros. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007. 367p. \$65.00 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592708081796

— Edward Friedman, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

In this book, Evan Medeiros seeks to explain the Chinese Communist regime’s policies on nuclear proliferation and missile proliferation, comparing the Mao era with the post-Mao era. The rich data that he vividly presents is a synthesis of interviews with specialists in both the PRC and the U.S., as well as key writings from both countries. The result is a magisterial study of encyclopedic breadth that will serve as a solid reference for all concerned with changes and continuities in Chinese nonproliferation policies.

Medeiros concludes that “U.S. policy played a decisive role” in “positive change in the direction of greater support for WMD nonproliferation” (p. 260). The U.S. is said to have fostered an epistemic community of Chinese specialists through engagement in the post-Mao era. Constructivism helps one comprehend how ruling groups in Beijing came to see WMD nonproliferation to be in China’s interest. Realism is said to be incapable of explaining these changes.

Actually, the wonderful data unearthed by the thorough research of the subtle and knowledgeable Medeiros is more complex than the conclusions he draws from it. Medeiros finds that while China moved from enabling nuclear proliferation in the Mao era to joining those who would stop nuclear proliferation in the post-Mao era, China continues to be a major proliferator of missiles and missile technology. While Medeiros suggests that significant progress has been made on missile nonproliferation, the data shows otherwise. The enigma is why the creation of an epistemic community would work for nuclear weapons but not for missiles. I would maintain that looking at China’s real international interests and Beijing’s domestic politics offers more powerful and persuasive hypotheses than does constructivism.

Is it credible that Mao-era leaders could not understand Chinese interests and therefore irrationally promoted nuclear weapons proliferation until enlightened

American specialists helped the Chinese to see their true interests? To be sure, interests can change. The point is to explain how. Even before the PRC was officially established, Mao sent specialists to “ban the bomb” peace conferences in Europe with instructions to begin purchasing what was needed for a Chinese nuclear project. Alliance with Stalin’s regime allowed Chinese scientists to learn about nuclear technology. When Khrushchev refused to deliver the bomb, Mao pushed a project to speed WMD production, even though it increased Chinese famine deaths. Mao understood his anti-Soviet interest and Chinese national interest to mean that for China to be a world power, equal to Russia and America, China would have to acquire WMD. The episteme that is decisive is China’s national identity as a world power at least the equal of the most powerful.

Before China had a secure second strike deterrent, the PRC was temporarily more vulnerable. Both Kennedy and Brezhnev looked into destroying China’s nuclear facilities. Mao, as the leader of a vulnerable nation, responded by promoting nuclear proliferation to cause problems for the two superpowers and by seeking détente with Nixon to deter Brezhnev. Obtaining nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them was a top Chinese interest. To become a world power equal to other great powers, China had to risk an era of vulnerability. Ambitious post-Mao leaders share Mao’s view of China’s hegemonic status.

Once China had a decisive, deterrent second strike in the post-Mao era, however, the interests of the PRC were redefined. China’s rulers then did not want to see other nations in their region going nuclear. China opposed India becoming a nuclear power. It works to end the North Korean nuclear program because North Korean WMD could prod Japan, the economic colossus of the region, to go nuclear, something Chinese leaders very much do not want to happen, as Medeiros notes. Hard-headed real interests of an ambitious ruling group whose situation fundamentally changes explain why China could first be a nuclear proliferator and then an opponent of proliferation. China still wants to be the dominant power in its region.

In addition, post-Mao growth creates a Chinese need for oil and nuclear power, as Medeiros writes. Once China needs energy from the Middle East to keep its economy going, a nuclear Iran destabilizing the Middle East is no longer in China’s interests. Focusing on the creation of an epistemic community calls attention away from the actual changing interest dynamics that shape Chinese policy-making.

In addition, although Medeiros claims that sanctions do not work, his data shows that U.S. sanctions against Chinese proliferation have in the past had an impact on Chinese policy. Whether sanctions on China will work in an era when the American economy is weaker and China’s is stronger is another question.