ON VALUES OF REPEATED GAMES WITH SIGNALS

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We study the existence of different notions of value in two-person zero-sum repeated games where the state evolves and players receive signals. We provide some examples showing that the limsup value (and the uniform value) may not exist in general. Then we show the existence of the value for any Borel payoff function if the players observe a public signal including the actions played. We also prove two other positive results without assumptions on the signaling structure: the existence of the sup value in any game and the existence of the uniform value in recursive games with nonnegative payoffs.

1. Introduction. The aim of this article is to study two-player zero-sum general repeated games with signals (sometimes called “stochastic games with partial observation”). At each stage, each player chooses some action in a finite set. This generates a stage reward then a new state and new signals are randomly chosen through a transition probability depending on the current state and actions, and with finite support. Shapley [26] studied the special case of standard stochastic games where the players observe, at each stage, the current state and the past actions. There are several ways to analyze these games. We will distinguish two approaches: Borelian evaluation and uniform value.

In this article, we will mainly use a point of view coming from the literature on determinacy of multistage games (Gale and Stewart [3]). One

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defines a function, called **evaluation**, on the set of plays (infinite histories) and then studies the existence of a value in the normal form game where the payoff is given by the expectation of the evaluation, with respect to the probability induced by the strategies of the players. Several evaluations will be considered.

In the initial model of Gale and Stewart [3] of two-person zero-sum multi-stage game with perfect information, there is no state variable. The players choose, one after the other, an action from a finite set and both observe the previous choices. Given a subset $\mathcal{A}$ of the set of plays (in this framework: infinite sequences of actions), player 1 wins if and only if the actual play belongs to the set $\mathcal{A}$; the payoff function is the indicator function of $\mathcal{A}$. Gale and Stewart proved that the game is determined: either player 1 has a winning strategy or player 2 has a winning strategy, in the case where $\mathcal{A}$ is open or closed with respect to the product topology. This result was then extended to more and more general classes of sets until Martin [15] proved the determinacy for every Borel set. When $\mathcal{A}$ is an arbitrary subset of plays, Gale and Stewart [3] showed that the game may be not determined.

In 1969, Blackwell [1] studied the case (still without state variable) where the players play simultaneously and are told their choices. Due to the lag of information, the determinacy problem is not well defined. Instead, one investigates the probability that the play belongs to some subset $\mathcal{A}$. When $\mathcal{A}$ is a $G_\delta$-set, a countable intersection of open sets, Blackwell proved that there exists a real number $v$, the **value** of the game, such that for each $\epsilon > 0$, player 1 can ensure that the probability of the event: “the play is in $\mathcal{A}$” is greater than $v - \epsilon$, whereas player 2 can ensure that it is less than $v + \epsilon$.

The extension of this result to Shapley’s model (i.e., with a state variable) was done by Maitra and Sudderth. They focus on the specific evaluation where the payoff is the largest stage reward obtained infinitely often. They prove the existence of a value, called **limsup value**, in the countable framework [10], in the Borelian framework [11] and in a finitely additive setting [12]. In the first two cases, they assume some finiteness of the action set (for one of the players). Their result especially applies to finite stochastic games where the global payoff is the limsup of the mean expected payoff.

Blackwell’s existence result was generalized by Martin [16] to any Borel-measurable evaluation, whereas Maitra and Sudderth [13] extended it further to stochastic games in the finitely additive setting. In all these results, the players observe the past actions and the current state.

Another notion used in the study of stochastic games (where a play generates a sequence of rewards) is the uniform value where some uniformity condition is required. Basically, one looks at the largest amount that can be obtained by a given strategy for a family of evaluations (corresponding to longer and longer games). There are examples where the uniform value does not exist: Lehrer and Sorin [9] describe such a game with a countable
set of states and only one player, having a finite action set. On the other hand, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille \cite{23} proved the existence of the uniform value in partial observation Markov Decision Processes (one player) when the set of states and the set of actions are finite. This result was extended by Renault \cite{21} to general action space.

The case of stochastic games with standard signaling, that is, where the players observes the state and the actions played has been treated by Mertens and Neyman \cite{18}. They proved the existence of a uniform value for games with a finite set of states and finite sets of actions. In fact, their proof also shows the existence of a value for the limsup of the mean payoff, as studied in Maitra and Sudderth and that both values are equal.

The aim of this paper is to provide new existence results when the players are observing only signals on state and actions. In Section 2, we define the model and present several specific Borel evaluations. We then prove the existence of a value in games where the evaluation of a play is the largest stage reward obtained along it, called \textit{sup} evaluation and study several examples where the limsup value does not exist.

Section 3 is the core of this paper. We focus on the case of symmetric signaling structure: multistage games where both players have the same information at each stage, and prove that a value exists for any Borel evaluation. For the proof, we introduce an auxiliary game where the players observe the state and the actions played and we apply the generalization of Martin's result to standard stochastic games. Finally, in Section 4, we introduce formally the notion of uniform value and prove its existence in recursive games with nonnegative payoffs.

2. Repeated game with signals and Borel evaluation. Given a set $X$, we denote by $\Delta_f(X)$ the set of probabilities with finite support on $X$. For any element $x \in X$, $\delta_x$ stands for the Dirac measure concentrated on $x$.

2.1. Model. A \textit{repeated game form with signals} $\Gamma = (X, I, J, C, D, \pi, q)$ is defined by a set of states $X$, two finite sets of actions $I$ and $J$, two sets of signals $C$ and $D$, an initial distribution $\pi \in \Delta_f(X \times C \times D)$ and a transition function $q$ from $X \times I \times J$ to $\Delta_f(X \times C \times D)$. A \textit{repeated game with signals} $(\Gamma, g)$ is a pair of a repeated game form and a reward function $g$ from $X \times I \times J$ to $[0, 1]$.

This corresponds to the general model of repeated game introduced in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir \cite{19}.

The game is played as follows. First, a triple $(x_1, c_1, d_1)$ is drawn according to the probability $\pi$. The initial state is $x_1$, player 1 learns $c_1$ whereas player 2 learns $d_1$. Then, independently, player 1 chooses an action $i_1$ in $I$ and player 2 chooses an action $j_1$ in $J$. A new triple $(x_2, c_2, d_2)$ is drawn according to the probability distribution $q(x_1, i_1, j_1)$, the new state is $x_2$, player 1 learns $c_2$, and so on.
player 2 learns $d_2$ and so on. At each stage $n$ players choose actions $i_n$ and $j_n$ and a triple $(c_{n+1}, d_{n+1}, x_{n+1})$ is drawn according to $q(x_n, i_n, j_n)$, where $x_n$ is the current state, inducing the signals received by the players and the state at the next stage.

For each $n \geq 1$, we denote by $H_n = (X \times C \times D \times I \times J)^{n-1} \times X \times C \times D$ the set of finite histories of length $n$, by $H^1_n = (C \times I)^{n-1} \times C$ the set of histories of length $n$ for player 1 and by $H^2_n = (D \times J)^{n-1} \times D$ the set of histories of length $n$ for player 2. Let $H = \bigcup_{n \geq 1} H_n$.

Assuming perfect recall, a behavioral strategy for player 1 is a sequence $\sigma = (\sigma_n)_{n \geq 1}$, where $\sigma_n$, the strategy at stage $n$, is a mapping from $H^1_n$ to $\Delta(I)$, with the interpretation that $\sigma_n(h)$ is the lottery on actions used by player 1 after $h \in H^1_n$. In particular, the strategy $\sigma_1$ at stage 1 is simply a mapping from $C$ to $\Delta(I)$ giving the law of the first action played by player 1 as a function of his initial signal. Similarly, a behavioral strategy for player 2 is a sequence $\tau = (\tau_n)_{n \geq 1}$, where $\tau_n$ is a mapping from $H^2_n$ to $\Delta(J)$. We denote by $\Sigma$ and $\mathcal{T}$ the sets of behavioral strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively.

If for every $n \geq 1$ and $h \in H^1_n$, $\sigma_n(h)$ is a Dirac measure then the strategy is pure. A mixed strategy is a distribution over pure strategies.

Note that since the initial distribution $\pi$ and the transition $q$ have finite support and the sets of actions are finite, there exists a finite subset $H^0_n \subset H_n$ such that for all strategies $(\sigma, \tau)$ the set of histories that are reached at stage $n$ with a positive probability is included in $H^0_n$.

Hence, no additional measurability assumptions on the strategies are needed. It is standard that a pair of strategies $(\sigma, \tau)$ induces a probability $P_{\sigma, \tau}$ on the set of plays $H_\infty = (X \times C \times D \times I \times J)^\infty$ endowed with the $\sigma$-algebra $\mathcal{H}_\infty$ generated by the cylinders above the elements of $H$. We denote by $E_{\sigma, \tau}$ the corresponding expectation.

Historically, the first models of repeated games assumed that both $c_{n+1}$ and $d_{n+1}$ determine $(i_n, j_n)$ (standard signalling on the moves also called “full monitoring”).

A stochastic game corresponds to the case where in addition the state is known: both $c_{n+1}$ and $d_{n+1}$ contain $x_{n+1}$.

A game with incomplete information corresponds to the case where in addition the state is fixed: $x_1 = x_n, \forall n$, but not necessarily known by the players.

Several extensions have been proposed and studied; see, for example, Neyman and Sorin [20] in particular Chapters 3, 21, 25, 28.

It has been noticed since Kohlberg and Zamir [7] that games with incomplete information, when the information is symmetric: $c_{n+1} = d_{n+1}$ and contains $(i_n, j_n)$, could be analyzed by introducing an auxiliary stochastic game. However, the state variable in this auxiliary stochastic game is
no longer $x_n \in X$ but the (common) conditional probability on $X$ given the signals, that can be computed by the players: namely the law of $x_n$ in $\Delta(X)$. Since then, this approach has been extended; see, for example, Sorin [29], Ghosh et al. [5] and the analysis in the current article shows that general repeated games with symmetric information are the natural extension of standard stochastic games.

2.2. Borel evaluation and results. We now describe several ways to evaluate each play and the corresponding concepts. We follow the multistage game determinacy literature and define an evaluation function $f$ on infinite plays. Then we study the existence of the value of the normal form game $(\Sigma, T, f)$. We will consider especially four evaluations: the general Borel evaluation, the sup evaluation, the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation.

A Borel evaluation is a $\mathcal{H}_\infty$-measurable function from the set of plays $H_\infty$ to $[0, 1]$.

**Definition 1.** Given an evaluation $f$, the game $\Gamma$ has a value if

$$\sup_{\sigma} \inf_{\tau} E_{\sigma, \tau}(f) = \inf_{\tau} \sup_{\sigma} E_{\sigma, \tau}(f).$$

This real number is called the value and denoted by $v(f)$.

Given a repeated game $(\Gamma, g)$, we will study several specific evaluations defined through the stage payoff function $g$.

2.2.1. Borel evaluation: sup evaluation. The first evaluation is the supremum evaluation where a play is evaluated by the largest payoff obtained along it.

**Definition 2.** $\gamma^s$ is the sup evaluation defined by

$$\forall h \in H_\infty, \quad \gamma^s(h) = \sup_{n \geq 1} g(x_n, i_n, j_n).$$

In $(\Sigma, T, \gamma^s)$, the max min, the min max, and the value (called the sup value if it exists) are, respectively, denoted by $v^s, \overline{v}^s$ and $\nu^s$.

The specificity of this evaluation is that for every $n \geq 1$, the maximal stage payoff obtained before $n$ is a lower bound of the evaluation on the current play. We prove that the sup value always exists.

**Theorem 3.** A repeated game $(\Gamma, g)$ with the sup evaluation has a value $v^s$. 
For the proof, we use the following result. We call *strategic evaluation* a function $F$ from $\Sigma \times \tau$ to $[0,1]$. It is clear that an evaluation $f$ induces naturally a strategic evaluation by $F(\sigma, \tau) = E_{\sigma, \tau}(f)$.

**Proposition 4.** Let $(F_n)_{n \geq 1}$ be an increasing sequence of strategic evaluations from $\Sigma \times \tau$ to $[0,1]$ that converges to some function $F$. Assume that:

- $\Sigma$ and $\tau$ are compact convex sets,
- for every $n \geq 1$, $F_n(\sigma, \cdot)$ is lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex on $\tau$ for every $\sigma \in \Sigma$,
- for every $n \geq 1$, $F_n(\cdot, \tau)$ is upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave on $\Sigma$ for every $\tau \in \tau$.

Then the normal form game $(\Sigma, \tau, F)$ has a value $v$.

A more general version of this proposition can be found in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [19] (Part A, Exercise 2, Section 1.f, page 10).

**Proof of Theorem 3.** Let $n \geq 1$ and define the strategic evaluation $F_n$ by

$$F_n(\sigma, \tau) = E_{\sigma, \tau}\left(\sup_{t \leq n} g(x_t, i_t, j_t)\right).$$

Players remember their own previous actions so by Kuhn's theorem [8], there is equivalence between mixed strategies and behavioral strategies. The sets of mixed strategies are naturally convex. The set of histories of length $n$ having positive probability is finite and, therefore, the set of pure strategies is finite. For every $n \geq 1$, the function $F_n(\sigma, \tau)$ is thus the linear extension of a finite game. In particular $F_n(\sigma, \cdot)$ is lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex on $\tau$ for every $\sigma \in \Sigma$ and upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave on $\Sigma$ for every $\tau \in \tau$.

Finally, the sequence $(F_n)_{n \geq 1}$ is increasing to

$$F(\sigma, \tau) = E_{\pi, \sigma, \tau}\left(\sup_{t} g(x_t, i_t, j_t)\right).$$

It follows from Proposition 4 that the game $\Gamma$ with the sup evaluation has a value. $\square$

### 2.2.2. Borel evaluation: limsup evaluation.

Several authors have especially focused on the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation.

**Definition 5.** $\gamma^*$ is the limsup evaluation defined by

$$\forall h \in H_\infty, \quad \gamma^*(h) = \limsup_n g(x_n, i_n, j_n).$$

In $(\Sigma, \tau, \gamma^*)$, the maxmin, the minmax, and the value (called the limsup value, if it exists) are, respectively, denoted by $\underline{v}^*$, $\overline{v}^*$ and $v^*$. 
Definition 6. $\gamma^*_m$ is the limsup-mean evaluation defined by

$$\forall h \in H_\infty, \quad \gamma^*_m(h) = \limsup_n \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n g(x_t, i_t, j_t).$$

In $(\Sigma, T, \gamma^*_m)$, the max-min, the min-max, and the value (called the limsup-mean value, if it exists) are, respectively, denoted by $\underline{v}^*_m$, $\overline{v}^*_m$ and $v^*_m$.

The limsup-mean evaluation is closely related to the limsup evaluation. Indeed, the analysis of the limsup-mean evaluation of a stochastic game can be reduced to the study of the limsup evaluation of an auxiliary stochastic game having as set of states the set of finite histories of the original game.

These evaluations were especially studied by Maitra and Sudderth [10, 11]. In [10], they proved the existence of the limsup value in a stochastic game with a countable set of states and finite sets of actions when the players observe the state and the actions played. Next, they extended in [11] this result to Borel measurable evaluation.

We aim to study potential extensions of their results to repeated game with signals. In general, a repeated game with signals has no value with respect to the limsup evaluation as shown in the following three examples. In each case, we also show that the limsup-mean value does not exist.

Example 1. We consider a recursive game where the players observe neither the state nor the action played by the other player. We say that the players are in the dark.

This example, due to Shmaya, is also described in Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [25] and can be interpreted as “pick the largest integer.”

The set of states is finite $X = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, 0^*, 1^*, -1^*, 2^*, -2^*\}$, the action set of player 1 is $I = \{T, B\}$, the action set of player 2 is $J = \{L, R\}$, and the transition is given by

$$
\begin{array}{cccc}
L & R \\
T & (s_1 & -2^*) & s_2 \\
B & (1/2(1^*) + 1/2(s_1) & 1/2(-1^*) + 1/2(s_3) & 0^* \\
& s_1 & s_2 & s_3 \\
\end{array}
\begin{array}{cccc}
& L & R \\
& (s_3 & s_3 & 2^* \\
& 2^* & 2^* \\
\end{array}
$$

The payoff is 0 in states $s_1, s_2, s_3$. For example, if the state is $s_2$, player 1 plays $T$ and player 2 plays $R$ then with probability $1/2$ the payoff is $-1$ forever, and with probability $1/2$ the next state is $s_3$. States denoted with a star are absorbing states: if state $k^*$ is reached, then the state is $k^*$ for the remaining of the game and the payoff is $k$.

Claim. The game which starts in $s_2$ has no limsup value: $\underline{v}^* = -1/2 < 1/2 = \overline{v}^*$. 

Since the game is recursive, the limsup-mean evaluation and the limsup evaluation coincide, so there is no limsup-mean value either. It also follows that the uniform value, defined formally in Section 4, does not exist.

**Proof of Claim.** The situation is symmetric, so we consider what player 1 can guarantee.

After player 1 plays $B$, the game is essentially over from player 1’s viewpoint: either absorption occurs or the state moves to $s_1$ where player 1’s actions are irrelevant. Therefore, the only relevant past history in order to define a strategy of player 1 corresponds to all his past actions being $T$. A strategy of player 1 is thus specified by the probability $\varepsilon_n$ to play $B$ for the first time at stage $n$; let $\varepsilon^*$ be the probability that player 1 plays $T$ forever.

Player 2 can reply as follows: fix $\varepsilon > 0$, and consider $N$ such that $\sum_{n=N}^{\infty} \varepsilon_n \leq \varepsilon$. Define the strategy $\tau$ which plays $L$ until stage $N - 1$ and $R$ at stage $N$. For any $n > N$, we have

$$\mathbb{E}_{s_2,\sigma,\tau}(g(x_n, i_n, j_n)) \leq \varepsilon^*(-1/2) + \left(\sum_{n=1}^{N-1} \varepsilon_n\right)(-1/2) + \varepsilon(1/2) \leq -1/2 + \varepsilon.$$ 

It follows that player 1 cannot guarantee more than $-1/2$ in the limsup sense. □

**Example 2.** We consider a recursive game where one player is more informed than the other: player 2 observes the state variable and the past actions played whereas player 1 observes neither the state nor the actions played.

This structure of information has been studied, for example, by Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille [24], Renault [22] and Gensbittel, Oliu-Barton and Venel [4]. They proved the existence of the uniform value under the additional assumption that the more informed player controls the evolution of the beliefs of the other player on the state variable.

The set of states is finite $X = \{s_2, s_3, 0^*, 1/2^*, -1^*, 2^*\}$, the action set of player 1 is $I = \{T, B\}$, the action set of player 2 is $J = \{L, R\}$, and the transition is given by

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
L & R \\
T & (s_2) \\
B & (-1/2)^* & (1/2(-1^*) + 1/2(s_3)) \\
& 0^* & \end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
L & R \\
s_2 & (s_3) \\
(-1/2)^* & s_3 \\
& 2^* & \end{pmatrix}.
$$

We focus on the game which starts in $s_2$. Both players can guarantee 0 in the sup evaluation: player 2 by playing $L$ forever and player 1 by playing $T$ at the first stage and then $B$ forever. Since the game is recursive, the limsup-mean evaluation and the limsup evaluation are equals.
CLAIM. The game which starts in $s_2$ has no limsup value: $v^* = -1/2 < -1/6 = v$.

PROOF. The computation of the maxmin with respect to the limsup-mean evaluation is similar to the computation of Example 1. The reader can check that player 1 cannot guarantee more than $-1/2$.

We now prove that the min max is equal to $-1/6$. Contrary to Example 1, player 2 observes the state and actions, nevertheless the game is from his point of view strategically finished as soon as $B$ or $R$ is played: if $B$ is played then absorption occurs, if $R$ is played then either absorption occurs or the state moves to $s_3$ where player 2's action are irrelevant. Therefore, when defining the strategy of player 2 at stage $n$, the only relevant past history is $(s_2, T, L)^n$ and a strategy of player 2 is defined by the probability $\varepsilon_n$ that he plays $R$ for the first time at stage $n$ and the probability $\varepsilon^*$ that he plays $L$ forever.

Fix $\varepsilon > 0$, and consider $N$ such that $\sum_{n=N}^{\infty} \varepsilon_n \leq \varepsilon$. Player 1’s replies can be reduced to the two following strategies: $\sigma_1$ which plays $T$ forever and, $\sigma_2$ which plays $T$ until stage $N - 1$ and $B$ at stage $N$. All the other strategies are yielding a payoff smaller with an $\varepsilon$-error. The strategy $\sigma_1$ yields $0 \varepsilon^* + (1 - \varepsilon^*)(-1/2)$ and the strategy $\sigma_2$ yields $(-1/2) \varepsilon^* + (1 - \varepsilon^*)1/2 - \varepsilon$.

The previous payoff functions are almost the payoff of the two-by-two game where player 1 chooses $\sigma_1$ or $\sigma_2$ and player 2 chooses either never to play $R$ or to play $R$ at least once:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & -1/2 \\
-1/2 & 1/2
\end{pmatrix}.
$$

The value of this game is $-1/6$, giving the result. □

EXAMPLE 3. In the previous examples, the state is not known to at least one player.

The following game is a variant of the Big Match introduced by Blackwell and Ferguson [2]. It is an absorbing game: every state except one are absorbing. Since there is only one state where players can influence the transition and the payoff, the knowledge of the state is irrelevant. Players can always consider that the current state is the nonabsorbing state.

We assume that player 2 observes the past actions played whereas player 1 does not (in the original version, both player 1 and player 2 were observing the state and past actions):

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
L & R \\
T & \begin{pmatrix} 1^* & 0^* \\
0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}
\end{pmatrix}.
$$
Claim. The game with the sup evaluation has a value \( v_s = 1 \). The game with the limsup evaluation and the game with the limsup-mean evaluation do not have a value: \( v^* = v_n^* = 0 < 1/2 = v_m^* = v^* \).

Proof. We first prove the existence of the value with respect to the sup evaluation. Player 1 can guarantee the payoff 1. Let \( \epsilon > 0 \), and \( \sigma \) be the strategy which plays \( T \) with probability \( \epsilon \) and \( B \) with probability \( 1 - \epsilon \). This strategy yields a sup evaluation greater than \( 1 - \epsilon \). Since 1 is the maximum payoff, it is the value: \( v_s = 1 \).

We now focus on the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation.

After player 1 plays \( T \), absorption occurs. Therefore, the only relevant past history in order to define a strategy of player 1 corresponds to all his past actions being \( B \). Let \( \epsilon_n \) be the probability that player 1 plays \( T \) for the first time at stage \( n \) and \( \epsilon^* \) be the probability that player 1 plays \( B \) forever.

Player 2 can reply as follows: fix \( \epsilon > 0 \), and consider \( N \) such that \( \sum_{n=N}^\infty \epsilon_n \leq \epsilon \). Define the strategy \( \tau \) which plays \( R \) until stage \( N - 1 \) and \( L \) at stage \( N \). For any \( n > N \), we have

\[
\mathbb{E}_{n,\sigma,\tau}(g(x_n,i_n,j_n)) \leq \epsilon^* 0 + \left( \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} \epsilon_n \right) 0 + \epsilon (1) \leq \epsilon.
\]

Let us compute what player 2 can guarantee with respect to the limsup evaluation. The computation is similar for the limsup-mean evaluation. First, player 2 can guarantee \( 1/2 \) by playing the following mixed strategy: with probability \( 1/2 \), play \( L \) at every stage and with probability \( 1/2 \), play \( R \) at every stage.

We now prove that it is the best payoff that player 2 can achieve. Fix a strategy \( \tau \) for player 2 and consider the induced law \( \mathbb{P} \) on the set \( H_\infty = \{L,R\}^\infty \) of infinite sequences of \( L \) and \( R \) induced by \( \tau \) when player 1 plays \( B \) at every stage. Denote by \( \beta_n \) the probability that player 2 plays \( L \) at stage \( n \). If there exists a stage \( N \) such that \( \beta_N \geq 1/2 \), then playing \( B \) until \( N - 1 \) and \( T \) at stage \( N \) yields a payoff greater than \( 1/2 \) to player 1. If for every \( n \), \( \beta_n \leq 1/2 \), then the stage payoff is in expectation greater than \( 1/2 \) when player 1 plays \( B \). Therefore, the expected limsup payoff is greater than \( 1/2 \). \( \square \)

3. Symmetric repeated game with Borel evaluation. Contrary to the sup evaluation, in general the existence of the value for a given evaluation depends on the signaling structure. In Section 2, we analyzed three games without limsup-mean value. In this section, we prove that if the signaling structure is symmetric as defined next, the value always exists in every Borel evaluation.
3.1. Model and results.

**Definition 7.** A symmetric signaling repeated game form is a repeated game form with signals \( \Gamma = (X, I, J, C, D, \pi, q) \) such that there exists a set \( S \) with \( C = D = I \times J \times S \) satisfying
\[
\forall (x, i, j) \in X \times I \times J, \quad \sum_{s, x'} q(x, i, j)(x', (i, j, s), (i, j, s)) = 1
\]
and the initial distribution \( \pi \) is also symmetric: \( \pi(x, c, d) > 0 \) implies \( c = d \).

Intuitively, at each stage of a symmetric signaling repeated game form, the players observe both actions played and a public signal \( s \). It will be convenient to write such a game form as a tuple \( \Gamma = (X, I, J, S, \pi, q) \) and since for such a game: \( q(x, i, j)(x', (i', j', s'), (i'', j'', s'')) > 0 \) only if \( i = i' = i'' \) and \( j = j' = j'' \) and \( s' = s'' \), without loss of generality, we can and will write \( q(x, i, j)(x', s) \) as a shorthand for \( q(x, i, j)(x', (i, j, s), (i, j, s)) \). With this notation \( q(x, i, j) \) and the initial distribution \( \pi \) are elements of \( \Delta_f(X \times S) \).

The set of observed plays is then \( V_\infty = (S \times I \times J)^\infty \).

**Theorem 8.** Let \( \Gamma \) be a symmetric signaling repeated game form. For every Borel evaluation \( f \), the game \( \Gamma \) has a value.

**Corollary 9.** A symmetric signaling repeated game \( (\Gamma, g) \) has a limsup value and a limsup-mean value.

3.2. Proof of Theorem 8. Let us first give an outline of the proof. Given a symmetric signaling repeated game form \( \Gamma \) and a Borel evaluation \( f \), we construct an auxiliary standard stochastic game \( \hat{\Gamma} \) (where the players observe the state and the actions) and a Borel evaluation \( \hat{f} \) on the corresponding set of plays. We use the existence of the value in the game \( \hat{\Gamma} \) with respect to the evaluation \( \hat{f} \) to deduce the existence of the value in the original game.

The difficult point is the definition of the evaluation \( \hat{f} \). The key idea is to define a conditional probability with respect to the \( \sigma \)-algebra of observed plays. For a given probability on plays, the existence of such conditional probability is easy since the sets involved are Polish. In our case, the difficulty comes from the necessity to have the same conditional probability for any of the probability distributions that could be generated by the strategies of the players (Sections 3.3.2–3.3.4). (As remarked by a referee the observed plays generate in fact a sufficient statistic for the plays with respect to all these distributions.) The definition of the conditional probability is achieved in three steps: we first define the conditional probability of a finite history with respect to a finite observed history, then we use a martingale result.
to define the conditional probability of a finite history with respect to an observed play and finally we rely on Kolmogorov extension theorem to construct a conditional probability on plays. Finally, we introduce the function \( \hat{f} \) on the observed plays as the integral of \( f \) with respect to this conditional probability.

After introducing few notations we prove the existence of the value by defining the game \( \hat{\Gamma} \), assuming the existence of the function \( \hat{f} \) (Lemma 10). The next three sections will be dedicated to the construction of the conditional probability, then to the definition and properties of the function \( \hat{f} \) for any Borelian payoff function \( f \).

Let \( \Gamma \) be a symmetric signaling repeated game form, we do not assume the Borel evaluation to be given.

3.3. Notation. Let \( H_n = (X \times S \times I \times J)^{n-1} \times X \times S, H = \bigcup_{n \geq 1} H_n \), the set of histories and \( H_\infty = (X \times S \times I \times J)^\infty \), the set of plays.

For all \( h \in H_\infty \), define \( h|n \in H_n \) as the projection of \( h \) on the \( n \) first stages.

For all \( h_n \in H_n \), denote by \( h_n^+ \) the cylinder generated by \( h_n \) in \( H_\infty \): \( h_n^+ = \{ h \in H_\infty, h|n = h_n \} \) and by \( H_n \) the corresponding \( \sigma \)-algebra. \( H_\infty \) denotes the \( \sigma \)-algebra generated by \( \bigcup_n H_n \).

Let \( V_n = (S \times I \times J)^{n-1} \times S = H_n^1 = H_n^2, V = \bigcup_{n \geq 1} V_n \) and \( V_\infty = (S \times I \times J)^\infty \).

For all \( v \in V_\infty \), define \( v|n \in V_n \) as the projection of \( v \) on the \( n \) first stages.

For all \( v_n \in V_n \), denote by \( v_n^+ \) the cylinder generated by \( v_n \) in \( V_\infty \): \( v_n^+ = \{ v \in V_\infty, v|n = v_n \} \) and by \( V_n \) the corresponding \( \sigma \)-algebra. \( V_\infty \) is the \( \sigma \)-algebra generated by \( \bigcup_n V_n \).

We denote by \( \Theta \) the application from \( H_\infty \) to \( V_\infty \) which forgets all the states: more precisely, \( \Theta(x_1, s_1, i_1, j_1, \ldots, x_n, s_n, i_n, j_n, \ldots) = (s_1, i_1, j_1, \ldots, s_n, i_n, j_n, \ldots) \). We use the same notation for the corresponding application defined from \( H \) to \( V \).

We denote by \( V_n^* \) (resp., \( V_\infty^* \)) the image of \( V_n \) (resp., \( V_\infty \)) by \( \Theta^{-1} \) which are sub \( \sigma \)-algebras of \( H_n \) (resp., \( H_\infty \)). Explicitly, for \( v_n \in V_n \), \( v_n^* \) denotes the cylinder generated by \( v_n \) in \( H_\infty \): \( v_n^* = \{ h \in H_\infty, \Theta(h)|n = v_n \} \), \( V_n^* \) are the corresponding \( \sigma \)-algebras and \( V_\infty^* \) the \( \sigma \)-algebra generated by their union.

Any \( V_n \) (resp., \( V_\infty \))-measurable function \( \ell \) on \( V_\infty \) induces a \( V_n^* \) (resp., \( V_\infty^* \))-measurable function \( \ell \circ \Theta \) on \( H_\infty \).

Define \( \alpha \) from \( H \) to \([0, 1]\) where for \( h_n = (x_1, s_1, i_1, j_1, \ldots, x_n, s_n) \):

\[
\alpha(h_n) = \pi(x_1, s_1) \prod_{t=1}^{n-1} q(x_t, i_t, j_t)(x_{t+1}, s_{t+1})
\]

and \( \beta \) from \( V \) to \([0, 1]\) where for \( v_n = (s_1, i_1, j_1, \ldots, s_n) \):

\[
\beta(v_n) = \sum_{h_n \in H_n, \Theta(h_n) = v_n} \alpha(h_n).
\]
Let $\Pi_n = \{h_n \in H_n; \alpha(h_n) > 0\}$ and $\nu_n = \Theta(\Pi_n)$ and recall that these sets are finite. We introduce now the set of plays and observed plays that can occur during the game as $\Pi_\infty = \bigcap_n \Pi_n^+$ and $\nu_\infty = \Theta(\Pi_\infty) = \bigcap_n \nu_n$. Remark that both are measurable subsets of $H_\infty$ and $V_\infty$, respectively.

For every pair of strategies $(\sigma, \tau)$, we denote by $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}$ the probability distribution induced over the set of plays $(H_\infty, H_\infty)$ and by $\mathbb{Q}_{\sigma, \tau}$ the probability distribution over the set of observed plays $(V_\infty, V_\infty)$. Thus, $\mathbb{Q}_{\sigma, \tau}$ is the image of $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}$ under $\Theta$. Note that $\text{supp}(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}) \subseteq \Pi_\infty$. We denote, respectively, by $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}}$ and $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\sigma, \tau}}$ the corresponding expectations.

It turns out that for technical reasons it is much more convenient to work with the space $\nu_\infty$ rather than with $V_\infty$ (and with $\Pi_\infty$ rather than with $H_\infty$). And then, abusing slightly the notation, $\nu_\infty$ and $V_\infty$ will tacitly denote the restrictions to $\nu_\infty$ of the corresponding $\sigma$-algebras defined on $V_\infty$. On rare occasions this can lead to a confusion and then we will write, for example, $\nu_n$ to denote the $\sigma$-algebra $\{U \cap \nu_\infty \cap V_n \}$ the restriction of $\nu_n$ to $\nu_\infty$.

3.3.1. Definition of an equivalent game. Let us define an auxiliary stochastic game $\hat{\Gamma}$. The set of actions $I$ and $J$ are the same as in $\Gamma$. The set of states is $V = \bigcup_{n \geq 1} V_n$ and the transition $\hat{q}$ from $V \times I \times J$ to $\Delta(V)$ is given by

$$\forall v_n \in V_n, \forall i \in I, \forall j \in J, \quad \hat{q}(v_n, i, j) = \sum_{s \in S} \psi(v_n, i, j, s) \delta_{v_n, i, j, s},$$

where $\psi(v_n, i, j, s) = \frac{\hat{q}(v_n, i, j)}{\pi(v_n)}$.

Note that if $v_n \in V_\infty$ then the support of $\hat{q}(v_n, i, j)$ is included in $V_{n+1}$, in particular is finite. Moreover, if $\hat{q}(v_n, i, j)(v_n+1) > 0$ then $v_{n+1} = v_n$.

The initial distribution of $\hat{\Gamma}$ is the marginal distribution $\pi^S$ of $\pi$ on $S$, if $s \in S = V_1$, then $\pi^S(s) = \sum_{x \in X} \pi(x, s)$ and $\pi^S(v) = 0$ for $v \in V \setminus V_1$.

Let us note that the original game $\Gamma$ and the auxiliary game $\hat{\Gamma}$ have the same sets of strategies. Indeed a behavioral strategy in $\Gamma$ is a mapping from $V$ to probability distributions over actions. Thus, each behavioral strategy in $\Gamma$ is a stationary strategy in $\hat{\Gamma}$. On the other hand however, each state of $\hat{\Gamma}$ “contains” all previously visited states and all played actions; thus, for all useful purposes, in $\Gamma$ behavioral strategies and stationary strategies coincide.

Now suppose that $(v_1, i_1, j_1, v_2, i_2, j_2, \ldots)$ is a play in $\hat{\Gamma}$. Then $v_{n+1} = v_n$ for all $n$ and there exists $v \in V_\infty$ such that $v_n = v$ for all $n$. Thus, defining a payoff on infinite histories in $\hat{\Gamma}$ amounts to defining a payoff on $V_\infty$.

**Lemma 10.** Given a Borel function $f$ on $H_\infty$, there exists a Borel function $\hat{f}$ on $V_\infty$ such that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}}(f) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}_{\sigma, \tau}}(\hat{f}).$$
Therefore, playing in $\Gamma$ with strategies $(\sigma, \tau)$ and payoff $f$ is the same as playing in $\hat{\Gamma}$ with the same strategies and payoff $\hat{f}$.

By Martin [16] or Maitra and Sudderth [14], the stochastic game $\hat{\Gamma}$ with payoff $\hat{f}$ has a value implying that $\Gamma$ with payoff $f$ has the same value, which completes the proof of Theorem 8.

The three next sections are dedicated to the proof of Lemma 10.

3.3.2. Regular conditional probability of finite time events with respect to finite observed histories. For $m \geq n \geq 1$, we define $\Phi_{n,m}$ from $H_\infty \times V_\infty$ to $[0,1]$ by

$$
\Phi_{n,m}(h, v) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\sum h', h'|n = h|n, \Theta(h'|m) = v|m \alpha(h'|m)}{\beta(v|m)}, & \text{if } \Theta(h|n) = v|n, \\
0, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
$$

This corresponds to the joint probability of the players on the realization of the history $h$ up to stage $n$, given the observed history $v$ up to stage $m$.

Since $\Phi_{n,m}(h, v)$ depends only on $h|n$ and $v|m$, we can see $\Phi_{n,m}$ as a function defined on $H_n \times V_m$ and note that its support is included in $H_n \times V_m$. On the other hand, since each set $U \in H_n$ is a finite union of cylinders $h_n^+$ for $h_n \in H_n$ such that $h_n^+ \subset U$, $\Phi_{n,m}$ can be seen as a mapping from $H_n \times V_\infty$ into $[0,1]$, where $\Phi_{n,m}(U, v) = \sum_{h_n h_n^+ \subset U} \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v)$. Bearing this last observation in mind, we have the following.

**Lemma 11.** For every $m \geq n \geq 1$, $\Phi_{n,m}$ is a probability kernel from $(V_\infty, V_m)$ to $(H_\infty, H_n)$.

**Proof.** Since $\sum_{h_n \in H_n} \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v) = 1$ for $v \in V_\infty$, $\Phi_{n,m}(\cdot, v)$ defines a probability on $H_n$. Moreover, for any $U \in H_n$, $\Phi_{n,m}(U, v)$ is a function of the $m$ first components of $v$ hence is $V_m$-measurable. \(\square\)

**Lemma 12.** Let $m \geq n \geq 1$ and $(\sigma, \tau)$ be a pair of strategies. Then, for every $v_m \in V_m$ such that $Q_{\sigma, \tau}(v_m^n) = P_{\sigma, \tau}(v_m^n) > 0$, and every $h_n \in H_n$:

$$
P_{\sigma, \tau}(h_n^+|v_m^n) = \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v_m).
$$

**Proof.** Let $v_m = (s_1, i_1, j_1, \ldots, s_m)$ and $h_n \in H_n$,

$$
P_{\sigma, \tau}(h_n^+|v_m^n) = \frac{P_{\sigma, \tau}(h_n^+ \cap v_m^n)}{P_{\sigma, \tau}(v_m^n)}
\begin{align*}
= & \frac{\sum h', h'|n = h|n, \Theta(h'|m) = v_m \alpha(h'|m)W(i_1, i_1, \ldots, j_{m-1})}{\beta(v_m)W(i_1, j_1, \ldots, j_{m-1})}, & \text{if } \Theta(h_n) = v_m|n, \\
= & 0, & \text{otherwise,}
\end{align*}
$$
where \( W(i_1, j_1, \ldots, j_{m-1}) = \prod_{t \leq m-1} \sigma(v_m|t)(i_t)\tau(v_m|t)(j_t) \). After simplification, we recognize on the right the definition of \( \Phi_{n,m}(v_m, h_n) \). \( \square \)

We deduce the following lemma.

**Lemma 13.** For every pair of strategies \((\sigma, \tau)\), each \( W \in \mathcal{V}_m \) and \( U \in \mathcal{H}_n \) we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(U \cap \Theta^{-1}(W)) = \int_W \Phi_{n,m}(U, v)\mathbb{Q}_{\sigma,\tau}(dv).
\]

**Proof.** Clearly, it suffices to prove (2) for cylinders \( U = h_n^+ \) and \( W = v_m^+ \) with \( \beta(v_m) > 0 \).

We have

\[
\int_{v_m^+} \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v)\mathbb{Q}_{\sigma,\tau}(dv) = \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v_m)\mathbb{Q}_{\sigma,\tau}(v_m^+)
\]

\[
= \mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(h_n^+ | v_m^+)\mathbb{Q}_{\sigma,\tau}(v_m^+)
\]

\[
= \mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(h_n^+ | v_m^+)\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(v_m^+)
\]

\[
= \mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(h_n^+ \cap v_m^+).
\]

\( \square \)

Note that (2) can be equivalently written as: for every pair of strategies \((\sigma, \tau)\), each \( W^* \in \mathcal{V}_m^* \) and \( U \in \mathcal{H}_n \)

\[
\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(U \cap W^*) = \int_{W^*} \Phi_{n,m}(U, \Theta(h))\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(dh).
\]

3.3.3. Regular conditional probability of finite time events with respect to infinite observed histories. In this paragraph, we prove that instead of defining one application \( \Phi_{n,m} \) for every pair \((m,n)\) such that \( m \geq n \geq 1 \), one can define a unique probability kernel \( \Phi_n \) from \((\Omega_n, \mathcal{V}_\infty)\) to \((H_\infty, \mathcal{H}_n)\), with \( \mathbb{Q}_{\sigma,\tau}(\Omega_n) = 1 \), for all \((\sigma, \tau)\), such that the extension of Lemma 13 holds.

For \( h \in H_\infty \), let

\( \Omega_h = \{ v \in \mathcal{V}_\infty | \Phi_{n,m}(h, v) \text{ converges as } m \uparrow \infty \} \).

The domain \( \Omega_h \) is measurable (see Kallenberg [6], page 6, e.g.). Recall that \( \Omega_h \) depends only on \( h|n \) and write also \( \Omega_{h|n} \) for \( \Omega_h \). Let then

\[ \Omega_n = \bigcap_{h_n \in H_n} \Omega_{h_n}. \]

We define \( \Phi_n : H_\infty \times \mathcal{V}_\infty \rightarrow [0,1] \) by \( \Phi_n = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \Phi_{n,m} \) on \( H_\infty \times \Omega_n \) and 0 otherwise. As a limit of a sequence of measurable mappings \( \Phi_n \) is measurable (see Kallenberg [6], page 6, e.g.).
LEMMA 14. (i) For each pair of strategies \((\sigma, \tau)\), \(Q_{\sigma, \tau}(\Omega_n) = 1\).
(ii) For each \(v \in \Omega_n\), \(\sum_{h_n \in H_n} \Phi_n(h_n, v) = 1\).
(iii) For each \(U \in H_n\) the mapping \(v \mapsto \Phi_n(U, v)\) is a measurable mapping from \((V_\infty, V_\infty)\) to \(\mathbb{R}\).
(iv) For each pair of strategies \((\sigma, \tau)\), for each \(U \in H_n\) and each \(W \in V_\infty\)

\[
\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(U \cap \Theta^{-1}(W)) = \int_{W} \Phi_n(U, v)Q_{\sigma, \tau}(dv).
\]

PROOF. (i) For \(h_n \in H_n\) and each pair of strategies \(\sigma, \tau\) we define on \(H_\infty\) a sequence of random variables \(Z_{h_n,m}, m \geq n,\)

\[Z_{h_n,m} = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}[h_n^+ | V_m^*].\]

As a conditional expectation of a bounded random variable with respect to an increasing sequence of \(\sigma\)-algebras, \(Z_{h_n,m}\) is a martingale (with respect to \(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}\)), hence converges \(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}\)-almost surely and in \(L^1\) to the random variable \(Z_{h_n^+} = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}[h_n^+ | V_\infty^*].\)

For \(m \geq n\), we define the mappings \(\psi_{n,m}[h_n]: \mathcal{F}_\infty \rightarrow [0, 1],\)

\[\psi_{n,m}[h_n](h) = \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, \Theta(h)).\]

Let us show that for each \(h_n \in H_n\), \(\psi_{n,m}[h_n]\) is a version of the conditional expectation \(\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}}[1_{h_n} | V_m^*] = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}[h_n^+ | V_m^*].\) First note that \(\psi_{n,m}[h_n]\) is \((H_\infty, V_m^*)\) measurable. Lemma 12 implies that, for \(h \in \text{supp}(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}) \subset \mathcal{F}_\infty,\)

\[\psi_{n,m}[h_n](h) = \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, \Theta(h)) = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(h_n^+ | V_m^*)(h) = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(h_n^+ | V_\infty^*)(h),\]

where \(v = \Theta(h)\). Hence, the claim.

Since \(\psi_{n,m}[h_n]\) is a version of \(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(h_n^+ | V_m^*),\) its limit \(\psi_n[h_n]\) exists and is a version of \(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(h_n^+ | V_\infty^*),\) \(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}\)-almost surely. In particular,

(C1) the set \(\Theta^{-1}(\Omega_n) = \{h \in H_\infty | \lim_m \psi_{n,m}[h_n](h) \text{ exists}\}\) is \(V_\infty^*\) measurable and has \(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}\)-measure 1,

(C2) for each \(W^* \in V_\infty^*,\)

\[\int_{W^*} \psi_n[h_n](h) \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(dh) = \int_{W^*} \mathbb{E}[1_{h_n} | V_\infty^*] \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau} = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(W^* \cap h_n^+).\]

Note that (C1) implies that \(Q_{\sigma, \tau}(\Omega_n) = 1\).

(ii) If \(v \in \Omega_n\) then, for all \(h_n \in H_n\), \(\Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v)\) converges to \(\Phi_n(h_n, v)\). But, by Lemma 11, \(\sum_{h_n \in H_n} \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v) = 1.\) The sum being with finitely many nonzero terms one has \(\sum_{h_n \in H_n} \Phi_n(h_n, v) = 1.\)

(iii) Was proved before the lemma.

(iv) Since \(\int_{W} \Phi_n(h_n, v)Q_{\sigma, \tau}(dv) = \int_{\Theta^{-1}(W)} \psi_n[h_n](h) \mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(dh)\) for \(W \in V_\infty,\)

using (C2) we get

\[\mathbb{P}_{\sigma, \tau}(h_n^+ \cap \Theta^{-1}(W)) = \int_{W} \Phi_n(h_n, v)Q_{\sigma, \tau}(dv)\]

for \(U \in V_\infty.\) \(\Box\)
3.3.4. Regular conditional probability of infinite time events with respect to infinite observed histories. In this section, using Kolmogorov extension theorem we construct from the sequence $\Phi_n$ of probability kernels from $(\Omega_n, \mathcal{V}_\infty)$ to $(H_\infty, \mathcal{H}_n)$, one probability kernel $\Phi$ from $(\Omega_\infty, \mathcal{V}_\infty)$ to $(H_\infty, \mathcal{H}_\infty)$, with $Q_{\sigma,\tau}(\Omega_\infty) = 1$, for all $(\sigma, \tau)$.

**Lemma 15.** There exists a measurable subset $\Omega_\infty$ of $V_\infty$ such that, for all strategies $\sigma, \tau$:

- $Q_{\sigma,\tau}(\Omega_\infty) = 1$ and
- there exists a probability kernel $\Phi$ from $(\Omega_\infty, \mathcal{V}_\infty)$ to $(H_\infty, \mathcal{H}_\infty)$ such that for each $W \in \mathcal{V}_\infty$ and $U \in \mathcal{H}_\infty$

\[
\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(U \cap \Theta^{-1}(W)) = \int_W \Phi(U, v)Q_{\sigma,\tau}(dv).
\]

Before proceeding to the proof, some remarks are in order.

A probability kernel having the property given above is called a regular conditional probability.

For given strategies $\sigma$ and $\tau$, the existence of a transition kernel $\kappa_{\alpha,\beta}$ from $(V_\infty, \mathcal{V}_\infty)$ to $(H_\infty, \mathcal{H}_\infty)$ such that for each $U \in \mathcal{V}_\infty$ and $A \in \mathcal{H}_\infty$

\[
\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(A \cap \Theta^{-1}(U)) = \int_U \kappa_{\sigma,\tau}(A, v)Q_{\sigma,\tau}(dv)
\]

is well known provided that $V_\infty$ is a Polish space and $\mathcal{V}_\infty$ is the Borel $\sigma$-algebra. In the current framework it is easy to introduce an appropriate metric on $V_\infty$ such that this condition is satisfied thus the existence of $\kappa_{\sigma,\tau}$ is immediately assured.

The difficulty in our case comes from the fact that we look for a regular conditional probability which is common for all probabilities $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}$, where $(\sigma, \tau)$ range over all strategies of both players.

**Proof of Lemma 15.** We follow the notation of the proof of Lemma 14 and define $\Omega_\infty = \bigcap_{n \geq 1} \Omega_n$. Let $(\sigma, \tau)$ be a couple of strategies. For every $n \geq 1$, $Q_{\sigma,\tau}(\Omega_n) = 1$, hence $Q_{\sigma,\tau}(\Omega_\infty) = 1$. By Lemma 14(ii), given $v \in \Omega_\infty$, the sequence $\{\Phi_n(\cdot, v)\}_{n \geq 1}$ of probabilities on $\{ (H_\infty, \mathcal{H}_n) \}_{n \geq 1}$ is well defined. Let us show that this sequence satisfies the condition of Kolmogorov’s extension theorem.

In fact $\Phi_{n,m}(\cdot, v)$ is defined on the power set of $H_n$ by

\[
\forall A \subset H_n, \quad \Phi_{n,m}(A, v) = \sum_{h_n \in A} \Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v).
\]
Thus, for every \( h_n \in H_n \), we have
\[
\Phi_{n,m}(h_n, v) = \frac{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(v|_{m}^{+} \cap h_n^{+})}{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(v|_{m}^{+})}
= \frac{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(v|_{m}^{+} \cap (h_n \times I \times J \times X \times S)^{+})}{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(v|_{m}^{+})}
= \Phi_{n+1,m}(h_n \times (I \times J \times X \times S), v).
\]
Taking the limit, we obtain the same equality for \( \Phi_n \) and \( \Phi_{n+1} \) hence the compatibility condition. By the Kolmogorov extension theorem for each \( v \in \Omega \), there exists a measure \( \Phi(\cdot, v) \) on \((H_\infty, H_\infty)\) such that
\[
\Phi(h_n^+, v) = \Phi_n(h_n, v)
\]
for each \( n \) and each \( h_n \in H_n \).

Let us prove that, for each \( U \in H_\infty \), the mapping \( v \mapsto \Phi(U, v) \) is \( \mathcal{V}_\infty \)-measurable on \( \Omega_\infty \).

Let \( \mathcal{C} \) be the class of sets \( A \in H_\infty \) such that \( \Phi(A, \cdot) \) has this property. By Lemma 14, \( \mathcal{C} \) contains the \( \pi \)-system consisting of cylinders generating \( H_\infty \).

To show that \( H_\infty \subseteq \mathcal{C} \) it suffices to show that \( \mathcal{C} \) is a \( \lambda \)-system. Let \( A_i \) be an increasing sequence of sets belonging to \( \mathcal{C} \). Since, for each \( v \in \mathcal{V}_\infty \), \( \Phi(\cdot, v) \) is a measure, we have \( \Phi(\bigcup A_n, v) = \sup_n \Phi(A_n, v) \). However, \( v \mapsto \sup_n \Phi(A_n, v) \) is measurable as a supremum of measurable mappings \( v \mapsto \Phi(A_n, v) \).

Let \( A \supset B \) be two sets belonging to \( \mathcal{C} \). Then \( \Phi(A \setminus B, v) + \Phi(B, v) = \Phi(A, v) \) by additivity of measure and \( v \mapsto \Phi(A \setminus B, v) = \Phi(A, v) - \Phi(B, v) \) is measurable as a difference of measurable mappings.

To prove (5), take a measurable subset \( W \) of \( \mathcal{V}_\infty \) and consider the set function
\[
\mathcal{H}_\infty \ni U \mapsto \int_W \Phi(U, dv)Q_{\sigma,\tau}(dv).
\]
Since \( \Phi(\cdot, v) \) is nonnegative this set function is a measure on \((H_\infty, \mathcal{H}_\infty)\).

However, by Lemma (14), this mapping is equal to \( U \mapsto \mathbb{P}_{\sigma,\tau}(U \cap \Theta^{-1}(W)) \) for \( U \) belonging to the \( \pi \)-system of cylinders generating \( H_\infty \). But two measures equal on a generating \( \pi \)-system are equal, which terminates the proof of (5). \( \square \)

A standard property of probability kernels and the fact that \( \Omega_\infty \) has measure 1 imply:

**Corollary 16.** Let \( f : H_\infty \to [0, 1] \) be \( H_\infty \)-measurable mapping. Then the mapping \( \widehat{f} : \mathcal{V}_\infty \to [0, 1] \) defined by
\[
\widehat{f}(v) = \begin{cases} 
\int_{H_\infty} f(h)\Phi(dh, v), & \text{if } v \in \Omega_\infty, \\
0, & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}
\]
is $\mathcal{V}_\infty$-measurable and
\[ E_{P_{\sigma,\tau}}[f] = E_{Q_{\sigma,\tau}}[\hat{f}] \quad \forall \sigma, \tau. \]

**Remark 17.** In the previous proof, we proceeded through a reduction from a symmetric repeated game to a stochastic game in order to apply Martin’s existence result. The same procedure can be applied for $N$-player repeated games. Let us consider a $N$-player symmetric signaling repeated game. One defines a conditional probability and therefore associates to all Borel payoffs $f^i$ on plays, $i \in N$ an associated Borel evaluation $\hat{f}^i$ on the space of observed plays, therefore, reducing the problem to a $N$-player stochastic game with Borelian payoffs.

For example, Mertens [17] showed the existence of pure $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in $N$-person stochastic games with Borel payoff functions where at each stage at most one of the players is playing. Using the previous reduction, one can deduce the existence of pure $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in $N$-person symmetric repeated games with Borel payoff functions where at each stage at most one of the players is playing.

**4. Uniform value in recursive games with nonnegative payoffs.** In Section 2 and Section 3, we focused on Borel evaluations. In this last section, we focus on the family of mean average of the $n$ first stage rewards and the corresponding uniform value.

**Definition 18.** For each $n \geq 1$, the *mean expected payoff* induced by $(\sigma, \tau)$ during the first $n$ stages is
\[ \gamma_n(\sigma, \tau) = E_{\sigma,\tau}\left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^{n} g(x_t, i_t, j_t)\right). \]

**Definition 19.** Let $v$ be a real number.
A strategy $\sigma^*$ of player 1 *guarantees* $v$ *in the uniform sense* in $(\Gamma, g)$ if for all $\eta > 0$ there exists $n_0 \geq 1$ such that
\[ \forall n \geq n_0, \forall \tau \in \mathcal{T}, \quad \gamma_n(\sigma^*, \tau) \geq v - \eta. \]

Player 1 can *guarantee* $v$ *in the uniform sense* in $(\Gamma, g)$ if for all $\varepsilon > 0$ there exists a strategy $\sigma^* \in \Sigma$ which guarantees $v - \varepsilon$ in the uniform sense.

A symmetric notion holds for player 2.

**Definition 20.** The *uniform max min*, denoted by $\underline{v}_\infty$, is the supremum of all the payoff that player 1 can guarantee in the uniform sense. A *uniform min max* denoted by $\overline{v}_\infty$ is defined in a dual way.

If both players can guarantee $v$ in the uniform sense, then $v$ is the *uniform value* of the game $(\Gamma, g)$ and denoted by $v_\infty$. 

Many existence results have been proven in the literature concerning the uniform value and uniform max min and min max; see, for example, Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [19] or Sorin [28]. Mertens and Neyman [18] proved that in a stochastic game with a finite state space and finite actions spaces, where the players observe past payoffs and the state, the uniform value exists. Moreover, the uniform value is equal to the limsup-mean value and for every $\varepsilon > 0$ there exists a strategy which guarantees $v_\infty - \varepsilon$ both in the limsup-mean sense and in the uniform sense.

In general, the uniform value does not exist (either in games with incomplete information on both sides or in stochastic games with signals on the actions) and in particular its existence depends upon the signaling structure.

**Remark 21.** For $n \geq 1$, the $n$-stage game $(\Gamma_n, g)$ is the zero-sum game with normal form $(\Sigma, T, \gamma_n)$ and value $v_n$. It is interesting to note that in the special case of symmetric signaling repeated games with a finite set of states and finite set of signals, a uniform value may not exist, since even the sequence of values $v_n$ may not converge (Ziliotto [30]), but there exists a value for any Borel evaluation by Theorem 8.

We focus now on the specific case of recursive games with nonnegative payoff defined as follows.

**Definition 22.** Recall that a state is absorbing if the probability to stay in this state is 1 for all actions and the payoff is also independent of the actions played. A repeated game is recursive if the payoff is equal to 0 outside the absorbing states. If all absorbing payoffs are nonnegative, the game is recursive and nonnegative.

Solan and Vieille [27] have shown the existence of a uniform value in nonnegative recursive games where the players observe the state and past actions played. We show that the result is true without assumption on the signals to the players.

In a recursive game, the limsup-mean evaluation and the limsup evaluation coincide. If the recursive game has nonnegative payoffs, the sup evaluation, the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation both coincide. So, Theorem 3 implies the existence of the value with respect to these evaluations. Using a similar proof, we obtain the stronger theorem.

**Theorem 23.** A recursive game with nonnegative payoffs has a uniform value $v_\infty$, equal to the sup value and the limsup value. Moreover, there exists a strategy of player 2 that guarantees $v_\infty$. 
The proof of the existence of the uniform value is similar to the proof of Proposition 4 while using a specific sequence of strategic evaluations.

**Proof of Theorem 23.** The sequence of stage payoffs is nondecreasing on each history: 0 until absorption occurs and then constant, equal to some nonnegative real number. In particular, the payoff converges and the limsup can be replaced by a limit.

Let \( \sigma \) be a strategy of player 1 and \( \tau \) be a strategy of player 2, then \( \gamma_n(\sigma, \tau) \) is nondecreasing in \( n \). This implies that the corresponding sequence of values \( (v_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) is nondecreasing in \( n \). Denote \( v = \sup_n v_n \) and let us show that \( v \) is the uniform value.

Fix \( \varepsilon > 0 \), consider \( N \) such that \( v_N \geq v - \varepsilon \) and \( \sigma^* \) a strategy of player 1 which is optimal in \( \Gamma_N \). We have for each \( \tau \) and, for every \( n \geq N \),
\[
\gamma_n(\sigma^*, \tau) \geq v_N \geq v - \varepsilon.
\]
Hence, the strategy \( \sigma^* \) guarantees \( v - \varepsilon \) in the uniform sense. This is true for every positive \( \varepsilon \), thus player 1 guarantees \( v \) in the uniform sense.

Using the monotone convergence theorem, we also have
\[
\gamma^*(\sigma^*, \tau) = \mathbb{E}_{\sigma^*, \tau} \left( \lim_n \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^{n} g(x_t, i_t, j_t) \right) \\
= \lim_n \mathbb{E}_{\sigma^*, \tau} \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^{n} g(x_t, i_t, j_t) \right) \\
\geq v - \varepsilon.
\]
We now show that player 2 can also guarantee \( v \) in the uniform sense. Consider for every \( n \), the set
\[
K_n = \{ \tau, \forall \sigma, \gamma_n(\sigma, \tau) \leq v \}.
\]
\( K_n \) is nonempty because it contains an optimal strategy for player 2 in \( \Gamma_n \) (since \( v_n \leq v \)). The set of strategies of player 2 is compact, hence by continuity of the \( n \)-stage payoff \( \gamma_n \), \( K_n \) is itself compact. \( \gamma_n \leq \gamma_{n+1} \) implies \( K_{n+1} \subset K_n \) hence \( \bigcap_n K_n \neq \emptyset \): there exists \( \tau^* \) such that for every strategy of player 1, \( \sigma \) and for every positive integer \( n \), \( \gamma_n(\sigma, \tau) \leq v \). It follows that both players can guarantee \( v \), thus \( v \) is the uniform value.

By the monotone convergence theorem, we also have
\[
\gamma^*(\sigma, \tau^*) = \mathbb{E}_{\sigma, \tau^*} \left( \lim_n \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^{n} g(x_t, i_t, j_t) \right) = \lim_n \mathbb{E}_{\sigma, \tau^*} \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^{n} g(x_t, i_t, j_t) \right) \leq v.
\]
Hence, \( v \) is the sup and limsup value. \( \square \)
Remark 24. The fact that the sequence of $n$-stage values $(v_n)_{n \geq 1}$ is nondecreasing is not enough to ensure the existence of the uniform value. For example, consider the Big Match [2] with no signals: $v_n = 1/2$ for each $n$, but there is no uniform value.

Remark 25. The theorem states the existence of a 0-optimal strategy for player 2 but player 1 may only have $\varepsilon$-optimal strategies. For example, in the following MDP, there are two absorbing states, two nonabsorbing states with payoff 0 and two actions $\text{Top}$ and $\text{Bottom}$:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
1/2(s_1) + 1/2(s_2) \\
0^*
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
s_2 \\
1^*
\end{pmatrix}.
$$

The starting state is $s_1$ and player 1 observes nothing. A good strategy is to play $\text{Top}$ for a long time and then $\text{Bottom}$. While playing $\text{Bottom}$, the process absorbs and with a strictly positive probability the absorption occurs in state $s_1$ with absorbing payoff 0. So player 1 has no strategy which guarantees the uniform value of 1.

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