7 Flaws of Identity Management: Usability and Security Challenges

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
Outline

Why Phishing Works study

Bank of America SiteKey study


Usability Challenges for Identity Management

www.bankofthevvest.com




Why Phishing Works (Dhamija, Tygar CHI 2006)

- Why do users fall for phishing attacks?
- 22 users viewed 20 websites
 - Phishing & legitimate websites
 - Asked to think aloud
 - Is this a real or phishing website?
 Why or why not? How confident are you?




- → Some good phishing sites fooled more than 90%
- → 23% use only content of the page to make a determination 36% use content and URL
- → Users ignore SSL, rely on the wrong indicators

Emperors New Security Indicators (IEEE Security & Privacy 2007)









Will users check indicators before entering passwords?

We asked Bank of America users to conduct common online banking tasks....






Results: HTTPS indicators removed


Group	Sent password	Withheld
Role playing	18 (100%)	
Security primed	18 (100%)	
Personal Account	27 (100%)	

All 63 participants entered their password!



Results: Sitekey removed

Group	Sent password	Withheld
Role playing	18 (100%)	
Security primed	17 (100%)	
Personal Account	23 (92%)	2 (8%)



Results: Warning page inserted

Group	Sent password	Withheld
Role playing	10 (56%)	8 (44%)
Security primed	12 (71%)	5 (29%)
Personal Account	8 (36%)	I4 (64%)

7 Laws of Identity

7 Flaws of Identity

Challenge 1

Users don't want to "manage" their identity

Users don't think...

"I want to be secure"

"I want to go to my bank securely"

"I want to login to my bank"

Users are task focused



"I want to pay my bills"

Attackers add urgency





"I have to update my account NOW, or my account will be closed"

Challenge 2

Identity management can increase cognitive burden



What is OpenID?

In short, OpenID is a way for individuals to create ide supported.

Means the elimination of multiple usernames and passwords

For geeks, OpenID is an open, decentralized, free frame takes advantage of already existing internet technology (URI, HTTP, SSL, Diffie-Hellman) and realizes that people are already creating identities for themselves whether it be at their blog, photo stream, profile page, etc. With OpenID you can easily transform one of these existing URIs into an account which can be used at sites which support OpenID logins.

For individuals, OpenID means the elimination of multiple user names and passwords and a smoother, more secure, online experience. For businesses, this means a lower cost of password or account management, the opportunity for easier and higher numbers of new user registrations and the elimination of missed transactions because of user frustration with lost and forgotten passwords. OpenID allows for innovation in the authentication space beyond just using a password to "unlock" your OpenID identity, but the ability to strongly protect your OpenID and have that benefit move with you everywhere you go online.

To login to an OpenID-enabled website (even one you've never been to before), just type your OpenID URI. The website will then redirect you to your OpenID Provider to login using whatever credentials it requires. Once authenticated, your OpenID provider will send you back to the website with the necessary credentials to log you in. By using Strong Authentication where needed, the OpenID Framework can be used for all types of transactions, both extending the use of pure single-sign-on as well as the sensitivity of data shared.

Discuss

- Mailing Lists
- Wiki
- Planet OpenID

Developers

- Specifications
- Libraries

Other Sites

- I Want My OpenID
- OpenIDEnabled

Beyond Authentication, the OpenID frames components of their digital identity. By utilizing (see specs), users are able to clearly control when the specs is the specs of the specific of th

To login ... just type your OpenID URI

Provider, such as their name, address, or phone number.

Today, OpenID has emerged as the de-facto user-centric identity framework allowing millions of people to interact online. With programs such as the LWant My OpenID Bounty, developers of Open Source projects are rapidly adding support for OpenID in order to enable their communities. People around the World speak about OpenID and its adoption, many of these presentations can be found under the section on the right.

Like any other new technology, it is hard to explain OpenID in the same words to all who may wish to take advantage of the benefits offered by this open, decentralized approach to online identity. We definitely encourage you to become a part of the OpenID community and join the conversation on general@openid.net.



Users don't understand URIs


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http://jane.livejournal.com/
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http://openid.aol.com/jane/

http://jane.myopenid.com/

http://jane.pip.verisignlabs.com/





→ OpenID doubles user trust decisions

Challenge 3


Identity management can maximize information disclosure

User-centric identity:

- "Technical identity systems must only reveal information identifying a user with the user's consent." - Kim Cameron
- "... the technical protocol lets the user control the flow absolutely, by making them an intermediary at run time." - Eve Maler
- "The user is in the middle of a data transaction.
 This does not mean the user has to approve every transaction..." Dick Hardt

Achieving Informed Consent is Hard

Video: an experiment in simplifying EULAs








To see or edit card data before you send it, select a card, and then click Preview. To create a new card, click Add a card and then click Add.



Blogging



DIGITAL CARDKEY

Microsoft

Employee ID



Fabrikam Discounts



Surfing

Tasks

Duplicate card

- - X

Delete card

Add a card

Back up cards

Restore cards

Preferences

Delete all cards

Disable Windows CardSpace

Which card should I send?

Help


Learn more about this site



You have not sent this card to the site. You can review the card before you send it. To review the card, click Send or Preview


Send

Preview



More dialog boxes ≠ Consent

More trust decisions ≠ Control



Challenge 4

Attacks are too easy with existing software



Privacy & Security

Overview

Our Products Are Secure

Preventing Fraud

How Bank of America Protects You

How You Can Protect Yourself

Bank of America Toolbar

Norton Internet Security Special Offer

Types of Online Fraud

Using Cards Safely

ShopSafe

Detecting Fraud

Reporting & Resolving Fraud

Privacy Policies & Preferences

Additional References

Bank of America Toolbar powered by EarthLink®



Protect yourself against online scams

- Identifies fraudulent websites.
- Works on all websites
- Free for everyone

Download now (2)

For Internet Explorer

Features

Preview ScamBlocker

An extra laver of protection

Know if a website is safe or potentially dangerous with the free Bank of America Toolbar powered by EarthLink^{®1}.

Bank of America works closely with you to keep your information safe while you bank online. Now we've joined with EarthLink® to offer you this free product to help you avoid fraud wherever you go on the Internet.


The security of ScamBlocker™

The Toolbar's ScamBlocker™ feature alerts you to "phisher" websites – fraudulent sites that mimic legitimate bank, auction, or Internet payment sites in an attempt to steal your credit card number, Social Security number, passcodes or identity.

If you visit one of these fraudulent sites, ScamBlocker™ displays a red "thumbs down" in the toolbar. That means the website is potentially dangerous and you shouldn't provide the site with any of your personal information.

A yellow "thumbs down" means the website is questionable. A green "thumbs up" means a website is safe. A "shadow" icon means the website doesn't appear fraudulent. Preview ScamBlocker™

When you use the Toolbar in conjunction with a personal firewall and antispyware and anti-virus protection, you get an added level of online protection.





Do toolbars prevent phishing attacks? (Wu, Miller & Garfinkel, 2006)

Neutral-information Toolbar (Netcraft, Spoofstick)

45% spoof rate

You're on earthlink.net Site Info: Since: Dec 1995 [US]

System-decision Toolbar (Spoofguard, eBay)



38% spoof rate

SSL-verification Toolbar (Trustbar)



Identified by



33% spoof rate

WARNING: THIS PAGE IS NOT PROTECTED


Security indicators are a symptom of flawed design



Challenge 5

We need better software

But users aren't motivated to get it




Integration with OS or browsers



Problem:

- Change is hard
- Interfaces conflict

Benefits attackers!





Can standards help?



Web Security Context Working Group

From our charter: The **mission** of the Web Security Context Working Group is to specify a baseline set of security context information that should be accessible to Web users, and practices for the secure and usable presentation of this information, to enable users to come to a better understanding of the context that they are operating in when making trust decisions on the Web.

The Group is part of the Security Activity, and follows up on the W3C Workshop on Transparency and Usability of Web Authentication.

Nearby: Administrativa (member-confidential); participants; issue and action tracker; wiki; patent policy status

News

Working Draft: Web Security Experience, Indicators and Trust: Scope and Use Cases

The Working Group has published an updated Working Draft of its scope-shaping deliverable. Another iteration is expected soon, as is a Last Call. Comments are, of course, highly welcome!

2007-05-29

Third face-to-face meeting: Dublin, Ireland; 30/31 May

Trinity College Dublin will host our next face-to-face meeting, on 30/31 May in Ireland. The meeting page has links to logistics, agenda, and registration information.

2007-05-29

First Public Working Draft: Web Security Experience, Indicators and Trust: Scope and Use Cases

The Working Group has published a first public working draft of its scope-shaping deliverable. Comments can be sent to public-usable-authentication@w3.org (archive).

2007-03-02


Challenge 6

Relying parties want to control user relationship & experience

Compare digest authentication...



... to password forms.



Site Map Contact Us Careers Security Priva


The descriptions on this Web site do not generally apply to the financial products, services, pricing and related terms & conditions that pertain to International Personal Banking (IPB) customers. IPB customers should visit the IPB Web site to obtain such information.

My Citi gives you access to accounts and services provided by Citibank and its affiliates. Citibank, N.A. Member FDIC.





RPs don't want to send the user "away"




Challenge 7

Trust.

Some users are too trusting

- "People make fake websites to get passwords??"
- "Why would a phishing site display a phishing warning? It must be real."
- "Sometimes I type in my password to see if I have an account there."

Other users don't trust anyone



Implications for Design

- Give users something they want
 - Security and identity management are secondary goals
- Reduce cognitive burden
 - Don't replace one burden with others
 - Don't overwhelm users with more warnings, dialogs, and indicators - leads to habituation
 - Reduce trust decisions
- Help users to detect spoofing attacks
 - Users misplace trust in logos and indicators
 - Assume that uniform graphic designs will be copied!

Implications for Design (cont.)

- If you want trust, be trustworthy
 - Need early reviews from security community
 - Spoof your own designs in user testing
 - Publish security and usability results

Questions?

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References

- Why Phishing Works, Dhamija, Hearst and Tygar, CHI 2006 http://www.deas.harvard.edu/~rachna/
- Emperor's New Security Indicators, Schechter, Dhamija, Ozment and Fischer, IEEE Security and Privacy 2007

http://www.deas.harvard.edu/~rachna/

- 7 Laws of Identity, Kim Cameron
 http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2004/12/09/thelaws.html
- User Centric Identity Quotes
 - Kim Cameron: http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2004/12/09/thelaws.html
 - Eve Maler: http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/archives/2006/06/19/r-e-sp-e-c-t/
 - Dick Hardt: http://identity20.com/?p=61
- Photo credits
 - Horse blinders: http://flickr.com/photos/ritechus/24107637/
 - Traffic tree: http://www.flickr.com/photos/oobrien/7597395/