

# Finding Error Handling Bugs in OpenSSL using Coccinelle

(Practical Experience Report)

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## Context: Error handling in C code

The C language doesn't provide any error handling abstractions

- ▶ Convention 1: **1** indicates success, **0** indicates failure.
- ▶ Convention 2: **0** indicates success, **-n** indicates failure.

### OpenSSL

- ▶ Toolkit for implementing secure network communication.
- ▶ Some OpenSSL functions return both **0** and **-n** on failure.

# Problem 1

## CVE-2008-5077 (January 2009)

- ▶ OpenSSL 0.9.8i and earlier **does not properly check the return value** from the `EVP_VerifyFinal` function, which allows remote attackers to bypass validation of the certificate chain via a malformed SSL/TLS signature for DSA and ECDSA keys.

## Example:

```
if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey)) {  
    /* bad signature */  
    al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;  
    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);  
    goto f_err;  
}
```

**But:** `EVP_VerifyFinal()` returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for failure and -1 if some other error occurred.

## Problem 2

### CVE-2009-0591 (March 2009)

- ▶ The CMS\_verify function in OpenSSL 0.9.8h through 0.9.8j, when CMS is enabled, **does not properly handle errors** associated with malformed signed attributes, which allows remote attackers to repudiate a signature that originally appeared to be valid but was actually invalid.

### Example:

```
if (!CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio)) {
    CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);
    goto err;
}
```

CMS\_SignerInfo\_verify\_content() also returns 1, 0, or -1

# Do similar bugs occur elsewhere?

Bugs in the CVE functions were fixed. Are there others?

## Potential bug-finding methodology

- ▶ Find functions that return both 0 and negative values in error cases.
- ▶ Find uses of these functions that only test for 0.

## Issues

- ▶ OpenSSL-1.0.0-stable-SNAP-20090911 contains almost 250 000 lines of C code and almost 6000 functions.
- ▶ Potentially many such functions and call sites, so **automation** is needed.

# Our technology: Coccinelle

## Features:

- ▶ Code-like notation for expressing searches.
- ▶ Patch features for expressing transformations (Semantic Patches).
- ▶ *Isomorphisms* for handling syntactic variations.

```
@@ expression list args; @@  
- !EVP_VerifyFinal(args)  
+ EVP_VerifyFinal(args) <= 0
```

```
@@ expression list args; @@  
- !CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(args)  
+ CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(args) <= 0
```

**Problem:** All function names must be known.

# An iterative process, developed for Linux [DSN 2009]

Define a semantic patch to find functions having some property

Define a semantic patch template to find bugs in the use of an arbitrary function

Then, apply these semantic patches to the code base

# An iterative process, developed for Linux [DSN 2009]

Define a semantic patch to find functions having some property

- ▶ A function that returns a negative constant directly.
- ▶ A function that stores a negative constant in a variable and returns that variable.
- ▶ A function that checks that a variable is negative and returns that variable.

Define a semantic patch template to find bugs in the use of an arbitrary function

Then, apply these semantic patches to the code base



# An iterative process, developed for Linux [DSN 2009]

Define a semantic patch to find functions having some property

Define a semantic patch template to find bugs in the use of an arbitrary function

- ▶ Code that only checks whether the result is 0, not whether it is negative.

Then, apply these semantic patches to the code base

# An iterative process, developed for Linux [DSN 2009]


Define a semantic patch to find functions having some property

Define a semantic patch template to find bugs in the use of an arbitrary function

Then, apply these semantic patches to the code base

- ▶ Run the first semantic patch on the code base to collect a list of function names.
- ▶ Instantiate the semantic patch template for each collected function.
- ▶ Run the instantiated semantic patches on the code base to find and fix the bugs.

# An iterative process, developed for Linux [DSN 2009]



# Results

## 387 functions of the three types identified

```
@@
expression list args;
identifier virtual.FN;
@@
- (FN(args)) == 0
+ FN(args) <= 0
```

```
@@
expression list args;
identifier virtual.FN;
@@
- (FN(args)) != 0
+ FN(args) > 0
```

Bugs: 26

False positives: 20

Unknown: 3

Files: 30

```
@match@
expression x, E; constant C;
identifier virtual.FN;
position p;
@@
x@p = FN(...)
<+... when != x <= ( 0 | -C )
           when != x < ( 0 | -C )
           when != ( x > 0 | x == -C )
( x != 0 | x == 0 )
...+>
( return ...; | x = E )
```


Bugs: 6

False positives: 14

Unknown: 2

Files: 19

# Bug history



# Issues

## OpenSSL-specific macros

- ▶ `STACK_OF (SSL_COMP) *sk;` is not valid C.
- ▶ **Solution:** Configure Coccinelle to ignore `STACK_OF` (4 problematic macros in all)

## Functions using 0 for success

- ▶ Some functions return 0 for success and negative values for failure.
- ▶ **Solution:** Filter out functions that never return positive values.

# Issues

## Comparison functions

- ▶ Some functions return -1 for <, 0 for =, and 1 for >
- ▶ **Solution:** Filter out function names ending in `cmp`.

## Value dependencies

- ▶ Function arguments may control whether a negative result is possible.

```
if ((a != NULL) && (sk_num(a) != 0)) M_ASN1_I2D_put_SET(a, f);
```

- ▶ **Solution:** Manual inspection.
- ▶ **Potential solution:** Data flow analysis (integration with Clang).

# Conclusions

Our technique that was developed for Linux code has been shown useful for (user-level) OpenSSL code too.

Different projects have different conventions, bug histories and bug profiles.

- ▶ Our previous efforts with OpenSSL found few bugs, and those found did not interest the OpenSSL community.
- ▶ Bug-finding requires project-specific expertise.
- ▶ Automated bug-finding tools must be easily adaptable by the user.

Coccinelle can meet this challenge.

<http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/>