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REVIEW I.

History of Civilization in England. By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE.
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It is with the more real satisfaction that we commence this notice by congratulating Mr. Buckle on the talent and learning displayed in the volume before us, because, with this general and merited approbation, there is yet, if not in the entire novelty of his views, at least in the new lights in which he disposes them, as well as in the difficulties and the wide suggestiveness naturally inherent in his subject, and the bold and uncompromising way in which he considers it, much which may be deemed well fitted to lead afterwards to the expression of minor dissents. Mr. Buckle has startled the literary world by laying before it the first, and still only fragmentary, instalment of an undertaking so gigantic in its design and proportions, that we shall with difficulty find its parallel in these our degenerate days, when men are prone to run after distinction too hastily to bear heavy burdens, or to contemplate severe labours, in its pursuit. A few brief months ago, and no name lay in deeper obscurity than that of our author: now, both the continents ring with it familiarly, and the leading periodicals, as well of Europe as of America, have joined in bestowing upon his volume that attention which is a tribute justly due to the genius displayed in it, though doubtless still without that unanimity of assent to its doctrines which he resolutely claims for them, but which it would be sanguine indeed to anticipate. To his mother he simply dedicates this the first volume of his first work; but it is a work for which he had made earnest preparation, and it has achieved fame for him at once.

It is essential to such a body of facts and doctrines as that evolved

in the volume of Mr. Buckle, that these should be, and possibly under no narrow sense, differently interpreted by different classes of readers and thinkers. In attempting an abstract of them, it shall be our endeavour in the first place to present them under that aspect in which we conceive that the writer himself actually regarded them; thus giving a view of them unwarped, if that be really possible, by our own subjectivity, or by the confusion which would infallibly be introduced through a premature balancing between the notions or definitions of conflicting metaphysical systems. This accomplished, we shall be entitled to permit ourselves a freer range; and, having allowed the author to enunciate his opinions, we shall be able to follow them by our brief comment, weighing the value of his doctrines, and testing them by such illustrations and objections as occur to us. Even at this early stage, it may be proper to premise that the portion of Mr. Buckle's work which he has now issued, although entitled a 'History of Civilization in England,' is, in fact, only introductory to that subject; and that so comprehensive is his scheme, and with such cautious consideration does he contemplate its treatment, that he announces his intention of occupying still two other volumes with merely preliminary facts and discussions, in order that, the necessary basis of principles and generalizations being first fully established, the reader may finally enter upon the main topic with a just understanding of the scope and spirit of his design. What may be anticipated as to the bulk and solidity of an edifice, the foundations of which are laid thus deeply and extensively, we are as yet scarcely in a position to determine. Its conception, however, looms before us magnificently in the future; and if, along with the idea of grandeur in its proportions, and beauty and strength in its materials, there appears meanwhile an air also of dreaminess and indistinctness in its outline, we must attribute this to the vastness of a project, for the successful execution of which the existing stores of human learning seem almost neither sufficiently ripe nor abundant, even could a single human intellect be hoped to prove fully adequate to the task of wielding them. Unquestionably, when we express our earnest desire that Mr. Buckle may be enabled to complete his important work, on the scale in which he has commenced it, this is tantamount to wishing him no ordinary amount of mental vigour, continued through no limited duration of effort. We trust, however, that he will achieve the utmost possible success in his labour; and assuredly, when he has happily arrived at its completion, and has at last committed it to posterity in that weighty and eloquent peroration with which we know that it will conclude, there is, notwithstanding all its perhaps necessarily inherent defects, no other modern author, on any kindred subject, who will be able to look back at a nobler consummation.

Mr. Buckle introduces his subject by remarking, that of all the great branches of human knowledge, history is that upon which most has been written, and which has always been most popular. Glancing at the description and quality of the facts which have been customarily used for its illustration, the author proceeds to stigmatize the defective

manner in which these have been ordinarily bent to their purpose. Thus, hardly any one has attempted to combine the parts of history into a whole, and to ascertain the way in which they are connected with each other. Since the early part of the eighteenth century, indeed, a few great thinkers have arisen, who have made something like a systematic effort to raise the subject to a higher value, by investigating it according to those exhaustive methods which in other branches of knowledge have proved successful, and through which alone empirical observations can be raised to scientific truths. Still, he proceeds, little more has been hitherto accomplished than to open up more cheering prospects; while scarcely anything has been actually effected towards discovering the principles which govern the character and destiny of nations. Our acquaintance with history being thus so imperfect, while our materials are so numerous, it seemed desirable that something should be done on a scale far larger than had hitherto been attempted; and that a strenuous effort should be made to bring up this great department of inquiry to a level with other departments, in order that we may maintain the balance and harmony of our knowledge. It is in this spirit that the work has been conceived. Whoever is at all acquainted with what has been effected during the last two centuries must be aware, the author further tells us, that every generation demonstrates some events to be regular and predictable, which the preceding generation had declared to be irregular and unpredictable; so that the marked tendency of advancing civilization is to strengthen our belief in the universality of order, method, and law. Hence, the expectation of discovering regularity in the midst of confusion is so familiar to scientific men, that amongst the most eminent of them it becomes an article of faith; and if the same expectation is not generally found among historians, it must be ascribed partly to their being of inferior ability to the investigators of nature, and partly to the greater complexity of those social phenomena with which their studies are concerned.

The author next proposes to inquire into the foundation of what he announces as the common opinion, that history must always remain in its present empirical state; and with reference to this he cites the existence of two doctrines, which appear to represent different stages of civilization. According to the first doctrine, every event is single and isolated, and is merely considered as the result of a blind chance: according to the second, men believe that every event is linked to its antecedent by an inevitable connexion, and that thus the whole world forms a necessary chain, in which, indeed, each man, playing his separate part, may hold his place, but can by no means determine what that place shall be. Tribes in the agricultural state, perceiving that what they sow, that likewise do they reap, are the first to take cognizance of this regular uniformity of sequence, through which gradually arises a dim idea of the stability of events; and thus begins to dawn upon the mind a faint conception of what at a later period are called the Laws of Nature, an increasing perception of which, in the ordinary march of society, destroys the doctrine of Chance, and replaces it by

that of Necessary Connexion. From these two doctrines of Chance and Necessity have arisen, in all probability, the subsequent dogmas of Free Will and Predestination; the doctrine of Chance, in the external world, corresponding, according to the view of the author, with that of Free Will in the internal world, while the other doctrine of Necessary Connexion appears alike analogous to that of Predestination; the only difference, he subjoins, being that the first is a development by the metaphysician, the second by the theologian. There is however, it is added, a growing opinion among the more advanced European thinkers, that both doctrines are wrong, or, at all events, that we have hitherto no sufficient evidence of their truth.

The idea of the supremacy of the free will, the author continues, involves two assumptions, of which the first is possibly true, the second unquestionably false. These assumptions are, that there is an independent faculty called consciousness, and that the dictates of that faculty are infallible. But it is by no means certain that consciousness is not rather a condition of the mind than a faculty; while, if it be a faculty, we have the evidence of all history to prove its extreme fallibility, at least as to the truth, if not as to the actuality, of its testimony. The doctrine of predestination he summarily sets aside as a barren hypothesis, because, being beyond the province of our knowledge, we have no means of ascertaining either its truth or its falsehood. Pursuing his argument, he adduces this uncertainty regarding the existence of consciousness, as an independent faculty, and the manner in which that faculty, if it exist, has contradicted its own suggestions, as two of the many reasons which have long convinced him that metaphysics will never be raised to a science by the ordinary method of observing individual minds: but that its study can only be successfully prosecuted by the deductive application of laws which must be discovered historically; that is to say, which must be evolved through an examination of the whole of those vast phenomena which the long course of human affairs presents to our view. He considers it fortunate, however, for the object of his work, that the believer in the possibility of a science of history is not called upon to adhere to either the doctrine of predestined events or that of freedom of the will; limiting the latter, somewhat singularly, to the idea of a cause of action residing in the mind, and exerting itself independently of motives. He expects, on the other hand, at this stage of the inquiry, the concession of the following positions: That, when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some motive or motives; that those motives are the results of some antecedents; and that, therefore, if we could become acquainted with the whole of the antecedents, and with all the laws of their movements, we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results. Inferring, then, that the actions of men, being thus determined solely by their antecedents, must have a character of uniformity—that is to say, must, under precisely the same circumstances, always issue in precisely the same results, he arrives further at the conclusion that, as all antecedents are either in the mind or out of it, all variations in the results, or, in other words,

all the changes of which history is full, must be the fruit of a double action; an action of external phenomena upon the mind, and another action of the mind upon the phenomena.

Such, according to Mr. Buckle, are the materials out of which a philosophic history can alone be constructed. We have, on the one hand, man modifying nature, and, on the other, nature modifying man, while out of this reciprocal modification all events must spring; the problem immediately before us being to ascertain the method of discovering the laws of the double modification. This leads to a collateral inquiry, as to which of the two modifications is the more important; that is to say, whether the thoughts and desires of men are more influenced by physical phenomena, or whether the physical phenomena are more influenced by them. Meanwhile, as confirmatory of the views already enunciated, the author offers a few of what he deems the most decided proofs, which we now possess, of the regularity with which mental phenomena succeed each other. These proofs are gathered from statistical facts, bearing upon the entire moral conduct of a given society, and acquired through the accumulation of masses of details, and the application of the doctrine of averages. Thus, the apparent regularity of the ratios of the recurrence of murder, of the numbers accused of other descriptions of crime, the fluctuations in which have been found to have been actually smaller than the synchronous fluctuations in mortality, and of the prevalence of suicide, are all held by the author as parallel chains of evidence, jointly forcing upon us the conclusion that the offences of men are the product, not so much of the individual offender, as of the state of society into which that individual is thrown. Nor is it merely the crimes of men which he adduces as marked by this uniformity of sequence. Marriages, as having a fixed and definite relation between their number and the price of corn, or even the aberrations of memory, as indicated by the number of letters forgotten to be directed when committed to the post-office, are given as other proofs of that regularity of events which is at once the key and the basis of history. But, beyond the proofs of our actions being regulated by law, and which are thus derivable from statistics, there are other powerful means of establishing truth, through which history may be cultivated; and especially, we ought not to infer that, because the physical sciences have not yet been applied to it, they are therefore inapplicable. On the contrary, since history deals with the actions of men, and since these actions are merely the product of a collision between internal and external phenomena, it becomes necessary to examine the comparative importance of these phenomena; to inquire into the extent to which their laws are known; and to ascertain the relative resources for future discovery possessed by these two great classes, the students of the mind and the students of nature.

The fundamental views of the author thus formalized, he proceeds to inquire into what those physical agents are by which the human race is most powerfully influenced, and he finds that they may be classed under four heads: viz., Climate, Food, Soil, and the General Aspects of Nature. The three former affect primarily the general organi-

zation of society: the last exerts a powerful influence, producing its principal results by exciting the imagination. Through the agency of these, spring up those important differences which are usually held to constitute original varieties of race, the existence of which, as sources of distinction, he holds to be altogether hypothetical. Grouping together the effects produced by one or other of the three first agencies, he points to the accumulation of wealth as the earliest and most important; because upon wealth follows leisure, and without leisure there can be no knowledge. The degree of rapidity with which this ensues, will be solely regulated by the physical peculiarities of the country; for these will modify, firstly, the energy and regularity with which labour is conducted, and, secondly, the returns made to that labour by the bounty of nature. While climate, moreover, exerts an influence, either by enervating the labourer or invigorating him, it produces a further effect on the regularity of his general habits. Thus, the long winter of the North breaks the chain of industry of the people, which suffers relatively an equivalent interruption in the parching heats of the Southern summer; so that, continued industry being impracticable in either, the national temperament acquires a fitful and capricious character, the appropriate examples of which he finds in the populations of Norway and Sweden on the one hand, and of Spain and Portugal on the other. Turning to Asia, he remarks that civilization has always been confined to that vast tract, stretching from China to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, where a rich alluvial soil has secured that wealth which is the first element of intellectual progress. In Africa, again, the portion irrigated by the waters of the Nile, and enriched by its deposits of fertile loam yielding the most abundant returns to labour, made a like accumulation a necessary sequence, and gave rise to the civilization of ancient Egypt, the only country which has been able to emerge from the barbarism imposed upon the rest of that continent by the penury of nature. It appears thus manifest, that, of the primary causes of civilization, the fertility of the soil is that which has exercised the most influence in the ancient world. But in European civilization it is not soil, but climate, the other great cause, that has been the most powerful: in the former case, the effect depending on the relation between the soil and its produce; in the latter, upon that between the climate and the labourer. Of these two classes of relations, the first, being the less complicated, is the less liable to disturbance, and therefore was brought the sooner into play. Hence it is, that, in the march of civilization, the priority is unquestionably due to the most fertile parts of Asia and Africa. But this form of civilization, although the earliest, is not the best or most permanent; for the only progress which is really effective can be shown to depend, not upon the bounty of nature, but upon the energy of man. It follows, in this way, that the civilization of Europe, which, in its earliest stage, was governed by climate, has shown a capacity of development unknown to those civilizations which were originated by soil.

As to the distribution of wealth, that our author is also inclined to attribute entirely, in a very early stage of society, to the influence of

physical laws. Wages being the price paid for labour, the rate of wages must, like the price of all other commodities, vary according to the changes in the market. Supposing, therefore, that in any country there is a given amount of wealth to be divided between employers and workmen, every increase in the number of the workmen will tend to lessen the average reward each can receive. But of all the physical agents by which the increase of the labouring classes is affected, that of abundant food is the most active and universal. As to the quality of food, men in a hot country require a smaller amount of non-azotized, or rather of highly carbonized, food to keep up their heat; and less also of azotized food, because there is less habit of bodily exertion to cause waste. In cold countries, on the other hand, men are compelled to eat more than in hot ones; while their food, from its necessary quality, is less easy to obtain, and requires a greater expenditure of labour. This implied degree of exertion, under a rigorous climate, in itself imposes the necessity of a diet of a more abundantly carbonized and nutritious quality, in order to sustain heat and compensate attrition; while the amount of toil thus enforced necessarily enhances the cost. There is thus a strong and constant tendency in hot countries for wages to be low, in cold countries for them to be high. Now, in all the more ancient civilizations, seated in hot climates, among which the author includes those in America, the rate of wages being very low, the condition of the labouring classes was very depressed. Selecting Hindostan as a first example, he adverts to the great heat of the climate there as bringing into play that law, by virtue of which the ordinary food is of an oxygenous rather than of a carbonaceous character; thus compelling the adoption of a diet rather from the vegetable than from the animal world, the chief constituent of which was in this instance rice, a grain ranking, according to the author, as the most nutritive, while one of the most productive, of all the cerealia. Hence a rapid growth of the population, a redundancy of labour, and that consequent inequality in the distribution of wealth which tends to render the upper classes enormously rich, and the lower classes miserably poor, fitting the latter to be only either slaves themselves, or to be led to battle to make slaves of others. This slavery in India, the author takes occasion to designate afterwards as an abject, eternal slavery, which, while it constituted the state of the great body of the people, was a state to which they were doomed by physical laws utterly impossible for them to resist. Thus, the annals of this people furnish no example of their having turned upon their rulers.

There is not an instance on record, Mr. Buckle continues, of any tropical country, in which, wealth having been extensively accumulated, the people have escaped this fate; no instance in which the heat of the climate has not caused an abundance of food, and the abundance of food an unequal distribution, first of wealth, and then of political and social power. Nor was it until civilization arose in Europe, where everything worthy of the name of civilization has originated, that other physical laws came into operation, and therefore other results were produced. Hence, the line of argument which he

has just applied to India, he considers as equally applicable to Egypt, Mexico, and Peru. The date, as well from the quality of its nutriment as from the profusion of its returns, is the analogue in Africa to the rice in Asia. But in the Said, the most fertile part of Egypt, there is an additional food, the dhourra, which is even more productive than either of the others. Thus liberally provided, there was no restraint to the growth of a population on the banks of the Nile, and therefore the laws already noticed came into uncontrolled operation. Independent of the testimony of Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, the only two ancient writers cited by Mr. Buckle as speaking of Egypt from personal knowledge, and who are both agreed respecting the rapid increase of the people, and the servile condition into which they had fallen, we have, he holds, in the mere appearance of those huge and costly buildings which are still standing, proof enough of what was the state of the nation that erected them. To raise structures so stupendous, and yet so useless, as the pyramids, there must have been tyranny on the part of the rulers, and slavery on the part of the people. Of the extent of this slavery, the debasement with which it was accompanied, and the reckless prodigality of life which it promoted, the author adduces proofs which he considers sufficiently ample. Turning now to the New World, he meets with fresh testimony to the accuracy of the preceding views. The only parts of America which, before the arrival of the Europeans, were in some degree civilized, were Mexico and Peru; to which may probably be added the long tract which stretches from the South of America to the Isthmus of Panama. The accounts we possess render it at least highly probable, that we have, in Central America, the ancient seat of a civilization in all essential points similar to that of India and Egypt. But of Peru and Mexico, our details are more positive and abundant; and here, too, we have a highly interesting degree of further proof of the extraordinary, and indeed irresistible, force with which the fortunes of man have been controlled by the powers of nature.

The first circumstance by which we must be struck, Mr. Buckle continues, is that in America, as in Asia and Africa, all the original civilizations were seated in hot countries, the whole of Peru proper being within the southern tropic, the whole of Central America and Mexico within the northern tropic. Now, besides the result effected by a hot climate of diminishing the requirements of a people, and thus producing a very unequal distribution of wealth and power, there is another way in which the average temperature of a country affects its civilization, and this may be more clearly illustrated in America than elsewhere. Indeed, in the New World, the scale on which Nature works, being much larger than in the Old, and her forces being more overpowering, it is evident that her operations on mankind may be studied with greater advantage than in countries where she is weaker, and where, therefore, the consequences of her movements are less conspicuous. In Brazil, these forces are too exuberant, and transgress their just balance; but in Peru they are confined within manageable limits, and the result becomes commensurate with what

has been observed in Asia and Africa. Looking, then, not merely at the exuberance, but also at what may be called the manageability of Nature, the author finds that it is in Mexico and Peru where this combination has most happily occurred, while at the same time the heat of the climate has brought into play those other laws by which, as he has attempted to show, all the early civilizations were influenced. Here the place of rice and of dates is taken by maize, a grain corresponding with these, he remarks, because eminently the product of a hot climate, and distinguished there by its extraordinary productiveness. A people who derived their sustenance from a plant of such singular fecundity, and aided besides by the produce of the banana, had little need to exercise their industrial energies, while at the same time they had every opportunity of increasing their numbers. Hence, the physical conditions being similar, the civilizations of Mexico and Peru became strictly analogous with those of India and Egypt; and there arose the same despotic power on the part of the upper classes, with the same contemptible subservience on the part of the lower, leading alike to the erection of immense yet useless buildings, such as no country could produce unless the labour of the people were ill-paid and ill-directed. Such, Mr. Buckle exclaims, with reference to this part of his subject, is the wonderful regularity which history, when comprehensively studied, presents to our view.

The influences of similar conditions of climate, food, and soil having been thus simultaneously passed under review, and proved, according to our author's belief, to be as identical in their nature and effects as they were irresistible in their powers, wherever predominating, the degree of importance to be attached to his fourth head, the General Aspects of Nature, is next considered. As it has been seen that the three former agencies mainly concern the accumulation and distribution of wealth, and therefore the material interests of man, so the latter will be found to concern the accumulation and distribution of thought, and therefore man's intellectual interests. The Aspects of Nature, the author considers, may be arranged into two classes: those fitted to excite the imagination, and those addressing themselves to the understanding. There is a prevailing disproportion between the action of these faculties, which advancing civilization tends to remedy; but which is still conspicuous in the greater sway of the imagination, as shown in every country, not more in the superstitions of the vulgar than in the poetic reverence for antiquity of the educated classes. Man is timid before the force and majesty of Nature, but confident where her works are feeble. It is in proof of this that the author instances with approbation the remark, that the grandeur of the mountain scenery in the Tyrol has been observed to have imbued the minds of the natives with fear, and to have caused the invention of many superstitious legends; while he appeals for testimony besides to the remarkable fact, that all the great early civilizations, keeping in view the quality of these civilizations, were situated within and immediately adjoining the tropics, where Nature's aspects are the most sublime, dangerous, and terrible. Earthquakes are among the most striking of the physical events which

give to man the lesson of insecurity; and, reverting to Europe, in the relative prevalence of these in the Spanish and Portuguese peninsula, as well as in Italy, he finds a ground, not only for the dominance of superstition among the inhabitants, but for their distinction in the arts and polite literature, rather than in the sciences, the imagination being stimulated under these circumstances beyond the intellect. Thus pre-eminently oppressed and harassed, the old tropical civilizations, suffering besides under a greater precariousness of sickness and mortality, had to struggle with innumerable difficulties; and there were naturally associations engendered in the mind which allowed the imagination to run into license, infused into the people a spirit of reverence instead of a spirit of inquiry, and encouraged a disposition to neglect the investigation of natural causes, and ascribe events to the operation of supernatural ones. In short, everything conspired here to increase the authority of the imagination, and weaken the authority of the reason.

But in Europe, on the other hand, we find a law diametrically opposed to this, by virtue of which the tendency of natural phenomena is, on the whole, to limit the imagination and embolden the understanding. The author illustrates this by an appeal to the literature, religion, and art of Greece, in contradistinction to those of India. The works of Nature, which in India are of startling magnitude, are in Greece far smaller, feebler, and in every way less threatening to man. The difficulties of life, which in the one only appeared soluble by referring to supernatural causes, were less intrusive, dangerous, and mysterious in the other. Thus in Greece everything tended to exalt the dignity of man, and in India to depress it. Hence, for the first time in the history of the world, we find in Greece the imagination in some degree tempered and confined by the understanding, though it may remain still doubtful whether or not the balance was accurately adjusted. A more graceful mythology, too, takes the place of the religion of the Hindu, which, like that of Central America, was based upon a system of complete and unmitigated terror. Even in the style of architecture the same principle was at work, the dangers of the tropical civilization being here more suggestive of the infinite, while the safety of the European civilization was more suggestive of the finite.

These principles established, Mr. Buckle proceeds to a closer view of the influences regulating the early growth of civilization in Europe. The powers of Nature having worked immense mischief in extra-European civilization, he finds that great relative advantages attended its advance within our continent; the tendency being here to subordinate, he repeats, nature to man, as out of it he alleges the reverse. This is to him the basis of the philosophy of history, since it suggests the important consideration, that if we would understand, for instance, the history of India, we must make the external world our first study, because it has influenced man more than man has influenced it. If, on the other hand, we would understand the history of a country like France or England, we must make man our principal study, because,

nature being comparatively weak, every step in the great progress has increased the dominion of the human mind over the agencies of the external world. The pressure of these is still immense, even where man's power has reached the highest point, but it diminishes in each succeeding generation, because our increasing knowledge enables us, not so much to control nature further as to foretell her movements. How successful our efforts have been is evident from the fact, that the number of inevitable dangers have become constantly fewer; plague, leprosy, and famine in its worst forms have ceased, and the average duration of life is extended. Hence follows a leading corollary, that, if the measure of civilization be the triumph of mind over external agents, then of two classes of laws, the mental class must be more important than the physical; and the discovery of the laws of European history becomes resolved into the discovery of the laws of the human mind. But the methods hitherto pursued for the latter purpose have been universally faulty, for metaphysicians have heretofore studied only the individual operations of their own minds, while their course should have been to have so enlarged their survey, extending it over many minds, as to have eliminated the intervening disturbances. Two methods of metaphysical investigation have been adopted, both of which are equally obvious, yet both of which lead to entirely different results. According to the first method, or sensationalism, the inquirer begins by examining his sensations. According to the second method, or idealism, he begins by examining his ideas. But these methods inevitably lead to conclusions diametrically opposed to each other, while they exhaust at the same time the customary resources of metaphysics; for both parties agreeing that there is nothing in the mind which is not the result either of reflection or sensation, the sole final choice they have to make is between subordinating the results of sensation to the laws of reflection, or else subordinating the results of reflection to the laws of sensation, no middle term being attainable, and the cause admitting of no umpire. Hence it is that metaphysics, in our author's opinion, have proved so barren of results, and that they have verified no principle of importance, unless a very few of the laws of association, with possibly the modern theories of vision and of touch.

It appears, then, that the metaphysical method of investigation, used in accordance with the present state of our knowledge, is inadequate to the task of discovering the laws which regulate the movements of the human mind, so as to fit us to understand, through them, the conditions which govern the movements of the human race. We are therefore driven to another, and the only remaining method, according to which mental phenomena are to be studied, not simply as they are evolved in the mind of the individual observer, but as they appear in the actions of mankind at large. As an illustration of the resources possessed by the latter plan for the investigation of truth, the author selects what he designates as a beautiful instance of the regularity with which, under the most conflicting circumstances, the great laws of Nature are able to hold their

course; the example to which he refers being that of the proportion kept up in the birth of the sexes. Towards the establishment and elucidation of this law, physiologists have done absolutely nothing, their success having been no greater than that of metaphysicians with reference to the laws of history; yet, at the present day, by the employment of what now seems a very natural method, that of the statistician, we are in clear possession of the truth respecting it. In suggesting an analogous method for ascertaining the laws of mental progress, the author points to the nature of this progress as twofold—Moral and Intellectual; the first having more immediate relation to our duties, the second to our knowledge. This double movement is essential to the very idea of civilization, and includes the entire theory of mental progress. But a question arises, now of great moment, namely, which of these two parts or elements of mental progress is the more important. It requires but a superficial acquaintance with history to be aware, that while men for the most part conform to the standard of morals and of knowledge common to the age and country in which they live, this standard is perpetually changing; and relevantly, therefore, the basis upon which it rests must also want the attribute of stability. But the primary dogmas of the moral system have in themselves undergone remarkably little change, for the thousands of years during which they have been as thoroughly understood as now; while intellectual truths, on the contrary, have been making surprising progress. If, then, all great moral systems which have exercised much influence have been necessarily, and at all times, fundamentally the same, and all great intellectual systems have been necessarily fundamentally different, the inference to be derived is immediately obvious. Since civilization is the product of moral and intellectual agencies, and since that product is constantly changing, it is evident that it cannot be regulated by the stationary agent. The only other agent is the intellectual one, and this accordingly is the real mover.

Such is the main argument by which the author's view of this part of his subject is supported, but he suggests also other and collateral circumstances as well worthy of consideration. Of these, one is, that the intellectual principle is not only far more progressive than the moral principle, but is also far more permanent in its results. Great truths are stored up; good deeds are of a more private and retiring character, and are therefore less capable of transmission. Even great public charities invariably fall into abuse and decay. Religious persecution, again, it must be admitted, is a great evil, yet, in a moral point of view, the motives of religious persecutors have been often unimpeachable, the great antagonist of intolerance being not humanity, but knowledge. Another great evil, second only, in our author's opinion, to religious persecution, is war; and with regard to the moral relations of this, we know nothing now which has not been known for many centuries. Yet it is evident, our author holds, that this barbarous pursuit is steadily declining with our advance in knowledge, as must be obvious to the hastiest reader of the history of Europe; in

which, until the late commencement of hostilities with Russia, peace had been maintained for nearly forty years, a circumstance unparalleled, he adds, either in our own or in other leading countries. It is, besides, highly characteristic of the actual condition of society, that this peace of unexampled length should have been first broken by two uncivilized nations. Finally, in thus alleging the paramount influence of the intellect, he does not deny that in successive generations the moral qualities may, in so far, constantly vary; but experience, he asserts, nevertheless teaches us, that as our different passions are always antagonistic to each other, they are thus so held in balance by the force of their own opposition that through them no permanent change is effected.

From all this Mr. Buckle maintains the, to him, inevitable inference, and that upon which he takes his stand, that if we wish to ascertain the conditions which regulate the progress of modern, as contradistinguished from ancient, civilization, we must seek them in the history of the amount and diffusion of intellectual knowledge; and we must further consider physical phenomena and moral principles as causing, no doubt, great aberrations in short periods, but in long periods correcting and balancing themselves, and thus leaving the intellectual laws to act uncontrolled by these inferior and subordinate agents. He even limits this scant admission with reference to the power of morals, by immediately subjoining, that although moral principles do affect nearly the whole of the actions of the individual, it is only as individual; but that we have incontrovertible proof that they produce not the least effect on mankind in the aggregate, or even on men in very large masses. Holding this to be established, Mr. Buckle now proceeds to ascertain what are the fundamental conditions of that intellectual progress to which he assigns so absorbing an influence. In pursuing this subject he introduces the three topics of religion, literature, and government, as all of vast importance, and, in the opinion of many, the prime movers of human affairs. This opinion, however, he maintains to be altogether erroneous, and he undertakes to demonstrate that each of these great forms of human development arises only as an effect of civilization, but is not a cause of it.

Into this branch of the subject we shall not attempt to follow him, by even a very cursory analysis; because the medical inquirer cannot assume its discussion as in any degree a part of his own peculiar field, however intense and vital may be its interest otherwise. For the same reason we shall be constrained to content ourselves with passing rapidly over the remainder of the volume, merely noticing that the author, after a brief inquiry into the origin of history, takes up, as more immediately bearing upon what is to be his ultimate subject, the state of historical literature in the middle ages. This topic then conducts him to an able survey of the history, more exclusively, of English literature, for a period from the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century. A similar outline of the history of the development of the French intellect follows, but for a period extending only to the accession to power of Louis XIV.; and this again is succeeded by a sketch of

the results of what he designates as the "protective spirit" towards literature, with a comparison of these as then observable in France and in England. A subsequent chapter traces the same subject to certain of its alleged issues, and leads to a contrast between the feuds of the Fronde and the coeval English rebellion. The investigation is further continued by an examination into the influence of the same protective spirit as wielded over literature by Louis himself, reviewing the consequences of the alliance thus fostered, or imposed, between the governing and intellectual classes, and laying important mischiefs to its charge. The reaction which followed upon this, after the death of Louis, next engages his attention; and, noting the nature of its effects, the author is led to the indications which foretold the approach of the French Revolution. After a preparatory consideration of the state of exclusively historical literature in France during the two centuries preceding that great event, the volume concludes with an inquiry into its more immediately proximate causes, as developed in the narrower period after the middle of the eighteenth century; including among these the intense intellectual and scientific movement for which France was then remarkable. The other introductory volumes, which we have mentioned as designed to follow, and which will be occupied by a survey of the civilizations of Germany, America, Scotland, and Spain, will complete the comprehensive plan of Mr. Buckle's proem; the object of which, as we have said, and as will be seen, pretends, expanded as it is, to nothing more than to discover the fundamental laws to be applied afterwards to the history of England.

We have been thus particular in our analysis of at least the initiatory part of this remarkable volume, not only because the topics on which it treats are in themselves among the weightiest that concern humanity, but because the physician, as of all men the best entitled to appropriate the celebrated *humani nihil à me alienum puto* of Chremes in Terence, must find in their discussion much that interweaves itself closely with his own special studies and pursuits. And if the physician, moreover, have any claim to those liberal attainments, or that love for scholarship, which Sir William Hamilton* somewhat splenetically denies to our profession in this country, or at least in Scotland where the learned professor chiefly observed it, the wide range traversed by Mr. Buckle will present abundant occasion for challenging his energies; and the earnest eloquence of the writer will either demand from him often an implicit acquiescence, or afford him the opportunity of showing the reason for the faith that is in himself. It would be unjust to style Mr. Buckle dogmatical; but he writes with an air of so apparently thorough conviction, is so unhesitating and forcible in his averments, and so sanguine and confident in his illustrations, that he must sometimes read warily who is unwilling to be subdued into an assent which a calm consideration afterwards would not always justify. Yet, assuredly, beyond this, his work contains many and great truths, often in all their purity, wisely and manfully enunciated, pregnant with instruction, and educed with remarkable facility and power of logical

* Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, p. 631.

distinction. If we meet occasionally with doctrines which are little better than assumptions, or allegations of fact which are alike manifestly misapprehensions, yet still find both urged with all the ardour which should have been the attribute of something better, there should be no reprobation in the demur or denial with which we encounter them; for we are bound to consider deferentially the vastness of his theme, and the complexity and abstruseness which are inseparable from its discussion. With such topics, especially as reviewed by mental idiosyncrasies such as that which is apparent in Mr. Buckle, in the midst of much that is safe, and just, and true, there is prone to intervene a vague and dreamy yearning after the unlimited and unattainable in knowledge, which entices onwards with all the brilliancy, but with all the unsubstantiality, of a meteor. Upon the whole, nevertheless, we have to thank him for a deeply interesting and deeply suggestive work; and it is in this spirit that we subject a few of its parts to a more close examination.

If we were to attempt to distinguish between what is new in reality in Mr. Buckle's treatise, and what is merely new in position and inference, we should enter upon but an ungracious and unprofitable task. The influence, we need hardly state, of climate, soil, and food, and even of the aspects of nature, upon mankind, have long been familiar to the medical inquirer. Not one of these topics is neglected among the concise details of the father of medicine, in his familiarly-known treatise, *Περὶ Ἀέρων, Ὑδάτων, Τόπων*: and, since the time of Hippocrates, down to the present day, all our leading physiologists and physicians, as well as our ethnographers, and especially all our writers on hygienics, have acknowledged the importance of the agency of this class of conditions upon man and his capabilities. If it has not been our province to apply, in any immediate way, to the mere history of civilization, the knowledge which a constant and extended observation has caused to accrue to us on this subject, the higher duty has been fulfilled of giving value to the materials of that history, through the profitable results of our experience in the investigation and supervision of man's physical relations; and through our efforts, unceasingly exercised, towards directly advancing his progress, by showing what conditions were requisite to the full development and exercise of his powers, whether with reference to the sound mind or to the sound body. Neither has the political philosopher nor the general historian always so entirely neglected this department of observation as Mr. Buckle, in certain of his preliminary remarks, would lead us to infer. When Cicero, in his 'Oration on the Agrarian Law,' tells us that the manners of men were implanted less by innate peculiarities of race, "*quàm ex iis rebus, quæ ab ipsa natura loci, et à vitæ consuetudine suppeditantur; quibus alimur, et vivimus;*"* and adds his illustrations of this from the character of the Carthaginians, and of the inhabitants of Campania and Liguria, he was but applying briefly, from the comprehensive stores of his knowledge of the philosophy of his age, those doctrines which Mr. Buckle has here extended over so large a space.

* *Oratio de Lege Agraria, contra Rullum, § 35.*

In far more recent times, Montesquieu has shown, in his celebrated 'Esprit des Lois,' how fully he too recognised these agencies as modifying the character and spirit of laws and forms of government; and Condorcet, whose 'Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain,' we are surprised not to find in Mr. Buckle's list of authors quoted, because it seems to us easy to detect its influence, direct or indirect, in his pages,* is equally decided in proclaiming their efficiency in developing and moulding the mind of man. Filangieri, too, in his remarkable treatise, while he has pointed out that Montesquieu had been himself in some measure anticipated in his views on this topic by Fontanelle, Chardin, Dubos, and Bodin, has discussed the influence of climate and soil, and local position, on the social condition of mankind with conspicuous soundness and moderation; admitting for them, as he justly might, a decided, yet only a concurrent, and never an absolute power of causation.† As to the historian, it is seldom that, when he is treating his subject generally and scientifically, he has wholly neglected this department of inquiry; in proof of which we may refer, passing by many others, to so familiar a book as that of Rotteck,‡ the thirteenth edition of which, published in 1838, is now lying before us. Yet, while we thus seem to encounter in Mr. Buckle's volume long, and everywhere, acknowledged facts and doctrines, we soon discover, under his guidance, an expansiveness and originality in his method of considering them, which stamps, nevertheless, the plan and its results as peculiarly his own. It is less his merit, therefore, that he deals with new materials, than that he arranges these frequently under new aspects, and makes them the subject of unexpected, if, now and then, of somewhat questionable, inferences.

Among the many excellences of Mr. Buckle's able volume, we do not hesitate at this stage to single out what appear to us three leading defects. The first is a disposition, certainly, however, neither peculiar to himself nor to any special age or school of philosophy, towards isolating causes, which can only exist as con-causes; and of imagining certain fundamental laws as separate and primary agencies, which, if they subsist at all, can yet only subsist in relation to other laws, as essential as themselves, and through a tissue of actions and re-actions so complicated and so varied, that it becomes impossible to define rigorously the influence of each. The second defect is, that Mr. Buckle's method being mainly deductive, the mental bias thence naturally ensuing renders him prone to neglect some facts, and to misinterpret others; so that thus the stability of his generalizations is not rarely shaken by the illustrations he himself adduces in their support,

* We may refer especially to pp. 7, 14, 17, and 44, of the second edition of Condorcet's treatise, where we seem to trace the indications, sometimes almost literal, of those dogmas regarding the accumulation of wealth, its tendency to the production of leisure, and the resulting division of labour, with the constancy of the general laws of nature as enabling us to foretoken the progress of coming generations, and the relations of these to the science of history, all of which Mr. Buckle has so amply developed.

† La Scienza della Legislazione, libro i. cap. 14-16.

‡ Allgemeine Geschichte, Band i. pp. 58, 61, 62, 289.

when these illustrations are subjected to a rigid scrutiny. The third defect is one rather of result than of method, from which, however, it springs consistently ; and it appears in Mr. Buckle's attempt to ignore the influence of moral agencies, and even of religion and government, in ruling the course of human events, while he assigns an almost sole supremacy to the progress of the intellect, as a power apart, in promoting the advance of civilization. Beyond this, we could have wished that Mr. Buckle had seen fit to have joined, to his conspicuous familiarity with physical and metaphysical studies, a greater knowledge and love of those of the archæologist, which was indeed required for an adequate treatment of his subject. But Mr. Buckle, though necessarily drawing many of his illustrations from antiquity, has confessedly little sympathy with the past, and sees no greatness but in the future. Yet reverence for the one is but the converse of anticipation for the other : and, remembering that each can stand only on the pedestal of his own age, we should be slow to deny to our progenitors that tribute of attention, and of respect where due, which we desire from posterity ; while we ought to be careful that, whether bestowed or withheld, it should only be on just grounds. We could have wished, moreover, that the influence of the ambitious phraseology of the school of Auguste Comte, or of the so-called Positive Philosophy, of which Mr. Buckle professes himself an ardent admirer, had been occasionally less apparent ; for we cannot but feel how prone are many of its formulæ, with all their affected rigour of expression, to assume the aspect of hollow generalities, which palter in the ear what they cannot convey to the understanding. The tenor of what must now be only our casual remarks, will show sufficiently our grounds for these observations.

Looking back to the early dawn of civilization, Mr. Buckle denies to the wandering tribes, living by hunting and fishing, the capacity of discerning, or even suspecting, anything like method in the arrangements of nature ; and it is only, he says, when such tribes advance into the agricultural state, that they perceive, in the uniformity of sequence in their crops, the first idea of a stability in events, and the first conception of what at a later period are called the Laws of Nature. Now Mr. Buckle cannot mean here a stability of events with reference to a determining power in man's agency, for such a power it is the whole course of his subsequent argument to deny ; and most of all, he denies it with reference to an inter-tropical civilization, which he reasonably admits to be the earliest arena of progress. But in whatever sense we regard the first idea of a stability in the order of events, it is very manifest that it cannot have originated in the order here imagined. The savage, still unversed in his relations to the world around him, but with the divine germ of intelligence implanted in his mind by the Creator, must necessarily detect first, in the succession of the spontaneous gifts of the soil, the regularity of that sequence which he afterwards renders available to supply his wants. It could not be till he had marked, time after time, the blossom following the bud, and the fruit following the blossom, with, perhaps, the seed sprouting into the plant, in the free

lap of nature, that he could approach the idea of utilizing the result of his experience for his own advantage. But long before this, and in a far less remote and intricate sequence, he had learned the great idea of order and succession in events, in the motions of the planets, the alternations of day and night, the ebb and flow of the tides, and the revolutions of the seasons; and these were not more patent to the tiller of the soil than to the wandering denizen of the forest. In truth, and it is an important truth, but it is one which the entire scope of Mr. Buckle's views compels him to disregard, there seems to have been, among all primitive peoples, and throughout all varieties of soil and climate, one original phase of civilization, through which, as a necessary grade, all mankind, from their constituent intrinsic nature, were constrained to pass; and this identity of primary civilization, irrespective of those peculiarities of physical condition to which our author ascribes so paramount an importance, is evinced over a field of observation so wide, and in features so palpable, that it would be mere wilfulness to misread the lessons they present.

As all living is merely a constant struggle against dying, to be undeviatingly decided at the last, so we find in the form, and in the enduring quality of the materials, of certain instruments used by man to secure his sustenance or his safety, as well as in the final memorials which mark his modes of disposal of the dead, the surest and most intelligible of all early traces of his existence, for the simple reason that they are those which are the least separable from the conditions of his being. There is scarcely a country in the globe, where the arrow-head and hatchet of flint and of stone, closely identical in shape as in substance, have not been discovered as the conspicuous tokens of an originally wide-spread conformity of primitive life, at whatever era of the world, and under whatever circumstances of variation in soil or geographical position. In America, from Cape Horn to the cold North; in Europe, beside the *fjords* of Norway, and on the plain of Marathon; in Africa, in Asia, and in Australasia; weapons and implements so similar have been picked up, that we might suppose that only a few hands, with as little diversity of purpose as of skill, had shaped them all. We have a still more conspicuous, and an equally widely diffused reminiscence, in the barrows everywhere heaped up in commemoration of the dead. The tumulus of the ancient Briton, in England, has no marked difference from that of the aboriginal Scythian, scattered abundantly throughout Russia, South Siberia, and Tartary; and both of these have their near analogues in lands as remote from each other as Etruria and Java; while we find them equally closely represented in the barrows of North America, or in those farther south, in Chili and Peru. The New Zealander still rears his sepulchral heaps just as they are still raised by the Hindoo in Rajasthan; and in Yucatan, the skeleton is still found with the vase of rude pottery at its side,* as the European archæologist encounters it in Scandinavia, France, or Britain. It may be worth noting also, that in North America the Indian wayfarer has been ob-

* Stephens's Yucatan, vol. i. pp. 276, 279; vol. ii. p. 341.

served to throw customarily his stone on the commemorative cairn, like the Highlander in our own country. The indications of this description of coincidence, or more than coincidence, might be widely extended, for the materials are abundant ; but it is at least interesting to note in conclusion, that when the old Norse chronicler described the burial of Thorolf,* a mercenary under our King Athelstan, who fell in battle in this country, and related how his brother, Egill, took the body and washed it, and, in the fashion of the time, hollowed out the grave, and placed there Thorolf, with his dress and weapons, adorning him with his gold armlets, and finally surrounding him with stones, and heaping up earth over all, he was but detailing a manner of interment which might, in almost all its main features, have been as appropriately detailed of a chieftain in any other country, at a given stage of its civilization. The mound described as raised over Beowulf, the hero of the well-known Anglo-Saxon poem, probably of the ninth century, suggests the like associations.

It is obviously not necessary, at least for our present purpose, to extend to this parity of early customs the force of a proof of an original affinity, among races so far apart from each other in time and in position. It seems more probable that the direct nature of the recourse had of itself, in each instance, secured its adoption : and that hence the inference becomes almost irresistible, that there has existed everywhere a common gradation in civilization, through which each people has been constrained to move, however remote its period or diversified its location ; with the further inference, that, therefore, the causes of this civilization must have depended, in the main, rather upon intrinsic than upon extrinsic forces, though doubtless often with modifications from a reciprocal action. At all events, any other view than this must be challengeable as a mere assumption, and rests upon no tangible evidence. That, from the earlier stages of civilization, there should be a progress onwards, is a natural result : for each generation, mingling with the survivors of that preceding it, commences with the advantage of the experience and the guidance of its fathers, and is earlier introduced to a higher training than if left to its own unaided efforts, gaining thus the opportunity of advancing ultimately to a higher perfection. This, repeated through an adequate series, introduces gradually the qualities of an improved culture as a necessary effect ; if, indeed, the progress be not wilfully arrested by the self-imposition of some arbitrary standard, beyond which it may be considered a dereliction or a supererogation to pass. Thus, the American savage inculcates the lesson of a contempt for the indulgences of civilized life ; and the Polynesian is slowly taught to feel the want of them. The Asiatic, on the other hand, too often limits the just growth of improvement by his habitual neglect of morality, honesty, and justice. Apart, however, from the consideration of this wilfully arrested development, we seem easily to trace the course of ordinary civilization, from the state of the hunter and fisher, through the pastoral and the agricultural condition ; and thence onwards, beneath the gradually

* Egill Skallagrim's Saga : "Egill jardadi Thorolf."

approaching lights of tradition and history, with a singular uniformity throughout in all essential particulars, at least in the early stages.

Yet even when we reach the age of tradition, in however plausible and consistent a form it may present itself, a temperate balancing of doubts continues, for all beyond this, to be the sole prudent course for the inquirer; and it is only when we gain the safer ground of cotemporary historical record that such precaution can be in some degree relaxed, though never slighted as wholly superfluous. The least uncertain of the marks of the advancing civilization of a people, after the lapse of its ruder stages, but before the age of its literature, exist in the more or less perfect remains of its artistic and architectural monuments, and the consideration of these significant and positive testimonies has not been neglected by Mr. Buckle. It is in Hindostan that he seeks the earliest proofs of the operation of physical laws upon a population, through the agencies of a hot climate and a liberal soil; but we shall ourselves prefer to turn first to Egypt, his second field of illustration, because there the relics of a remote civilization are infinitely the more striking and important, and their lessons, therefore, the more easily read. And here we have to complain of an instance of that determination to view facts only in a particular light, and to see nothing apparently but what is consistent with his own preconceptions, which we have signalized as the second of Mr. Buckle's defects; yet which we have by no means any inclination to attribute to a spirit of wilful misrepresentation, but believe to be honestly, however unfortunately, the result of his peculiar ardour and intrepidity of discussion. A population, urged into redundant growth, and profusely and easily supplied with food, suffered here rapidly, he alleges, through the necessary consequence of an unequal distribution of wealth, and the mass fell naturally into a nation of slaves, lorded over tyrannously by a few masters. The proof of this he finds in the existence of such structures, at once costly and useless, as the pyramids; and he refers besides, as we have noted in our analysis, to the authority of Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, as having had alone, among ancient writers, the opportunity of judging of the condition of the country from personal knowledge, and as thence affording confirmation of his views.

We shall scarcely pause to defend the motives which gave origin to the stupendous memorials of the pyramids, which, regarding them as unquestionably sepulchral monuments, are to us merely the culminating phase of that early usage of rearing tumuli, often exceedingly vast, over the dead, of which we have already spoken. Neither shall we attempt to estimate closely what may be the importance, in a moral sense, of such structures, though we are far indeed from admitting that a building may not have an immense æsthetical value, independent of any notion of mere utility. We shall not even inquire too nicely into what may be the worth of the testimony of the Greek authorities cited by our author, as to the special civil condition of the builders of monuments, regarding the precise era of certain of which chronologists, including Diodorus Siculus himself,* vary to the extent

* *Bibliotheca Historica*, lib. i. cap. v.

of more than two thousand years : but we cannot meanwhile admit that the picture which Herodotus presents of the Egyptians of his own day is one of the gross and slavish degradation which the hypothesis of Mr. Buckle renders it necessary for him to deduce from it ; and as to the past history, we are expressly told that, till the close of the reign of Rhampsinitus, there was a perfect distribution of justice through all Egypt, which prospered greatly,* only two subsequent reigns being especially stigmatized for their oppression ; while, with regard to the great works in architecture and engineering conducted under Sesostris, many of which deserved no depreciatory brand, but were of the highest utility, it is distinctly mentioned that the labourers were not an enslaved native population,† but were the prisoners brought in multitudes from the countries the monarch had subdued. Mr. Buckle's other authority, Diodorus Siculus, we find not less distinct in stating that the first kings of Egypt were not despotic, or without restriction in their government ; that they were, on the contrary, bound by the general laws ; that their personal attendants were neither slaves nor even ordinary servants, but the sons of the chiefs of the hierarchy ; that the Egyptian husbandmen were not rack-rented, which Mr. Buckle conceives for them as an absolute sequel, but held their lands at easy rates from the sovereign, the priests, and the military, and were the then most skilful agriculturists in the world ; and that the whole people, in short, flourished under a just rule, lived in the height of happiness, grew exceeding rich, and beautified their country, a truth we must at least still recognise, with countless magnificent works.‡ Reading the social state of a people in the extensively preserved remains of its artistic labours, we have difficulty in believing that there could be anything really grovelling in the position of those whose grandeur of conception and skill of execution produced, among a host of others, the splendours of the temple of Karnac ; and we can better reconcile these with our apprehension of the tenor of the testimony of Herodotus and Diodorus, than with that which our author has found means to discover in them. Doubtless, the Egyptians possessed slaves ; but so did almost all the world long after their era, and slavery has been no badge of any distinct order of civilization. We need not ourselves look back with any peculiar satisfaction to the once debased condition of the serfs and villeins within our own country ; or own anything else, even now, than a feeling of regret, that we should still have brothers, speaking our own tongue, who boast themselves of the freest nation of the earth, and who yet fret with resentment when invited to shrink from a similar contamination. The Spaniard, by the way, is no favourite with Mr. Buckle ; yet no serf, it is worth remembering, or mere *adscriptus glebæ*, ever existed in old Leon and Castile.

But to revert now, for an instant, to Hindostan, which Mr. Buckle has selected, doubtless justly, but not unchallengeably, as having a right to boast the most ancient civilization of Asia, we would ask why

* Euterpe, ii. § 124.

† Ibid., § 108.

‡ Bibliotheca Historica, lib. i. cap. vi.

the analogous physical conditions here have not led earlier to the development of a description of architecture, such as he has construed as their proper characteristic in Egypt. It is true that India possesses now its remains of a vast and singular, and sometimes stately and ornate, style of architecture: but it is not less true that we have there no remains to which it is safe to assign an earlier date than the third century before Christ; that even then these remains are few and insignificant; that it is not till seven or eight centuries later that the principal Hindu style, never so massive and durable as the Egyptian, sprung up to the south, in the countries mainly occupied by the Tamul races; and that in the valley of the Ganges, Mr. Buckle's selected spot for the elaboration of a primeval civilization, there are, with a few exceptions, and those not extending beyond the limits of one or two remoter provinces, no genuine Hindu buildings which can be referred to a date before the period of the Mahometan conquest. Where, then, are the proofs here of that early and tyrannical abuse of labour, which Mr. Buckle alleges as the essential concomitant of the luxuriance of inter-tropical culture? And now let us turn to Peru and Mexico, and examine into the consistent bearing of his illustrations there. In the singular forms of architecture in these countries, he finds, too, his fitting themes for exposition; and into these we willingly follow him, led by our own differently directed views of their quality and import. The Mexicans seem, like the early Egyptians, to have risen spontaneously from the idea of the tumulus of earth to that of the pyramid of a better defined outline; and to have had their corresponding conceptions of grandeur in construction, not in the element of form, but alike in that of duration, though with a very inferior success to the other, as well from defect in artistic skill as in strength and solidity of material. Yet they were able to rear structures sufficient, in their perfect condition, to strike with astonishment the early Spanish adventurers, familiar as they were with piles so stately as the minsters of Seville and Toledo, in their own country; and still great enough in their ruins to justify this admiration in the eyes of the modern traveller. In Peru, again, we encounter a style of architecture essentially different. The pyramid of the Toltec finds no exact analogue in the more southern country; but the remains of other descriptions of buildings, among which we may specify those of the fortifications of Cuzco, the ancient capital, containing stones which weigh each from fifteen to twenty tons, attest admirably the skill and energy of the former population. There was some approach to justice, then, in alleging here a similar condition of early civilization to that of the old Egyptians; and Mr. Buckle, in sweeping, doubtless, his eye across the planisphere, and marking a tropical, or nearly tropical, position for both, or possibly seduced by a like inadvertency in Montesquieu,* springs easily to a conclusion for which he was prepared by his preconceptions, that the causes of the similarity lay in the nearly identical physical conditions to which the people were subjected.

Now, perhaps it will be difficult to find elsewhere an instance in

* *Esprit des Lois*, lib. xvii. cap. 2.

which a really able, extensively accomplished, and profoundly reflecting author has been allured so easily into an error so palpable. But we suspect we have here, after all, only another example of the common mistake of plunging deeply in search of what lies floating on the surface. It has never occurred to Mr. Buckle to consider, in how great a degree the conditions of climate are merely relative; and that geographical position is here but one element, which the closer relations of topographical site are able to modify within almost every imaginable limit. If we have thus the minor variations of a maritime, an insular, a littoral, and an inland, or continental, climate within the same geographical range, we have, more marked than all, the gradations dependent upon different degrees of elevation above the ocean level. Thus the torrid, the temperate, and the frozen zones may be encountered in rapid transition into each other, in an exceedingly near contiguity of space. And this it is, unmarked by our author, which at once removes the condition of the ancient Toltec, or the Peruvian, from all identity with that of the Egyptian and Hindu; and therefore from all comparisons or inferences which are deduced upon so baseless a foundation. We know that the city of Mexico, situated on the table lands which constituted the centre and seat of the ancient empire, and having within it, or near it, the ruins of the great temple of Mixitli and those at Tezcuco, stands at an elevation of between seven and eight thousand feet above the level of the sea; while the imposing remains of the pyramid at Cholula are only a few hundred feet lower. These, and the similar table lands, are designated by the present inhabitants as the Cool Countries (*Tierras frias*), and have a temperature never exceeding 75° in the shade, even in summer. Clavigero, who lived thirty-nine years in the country, describes it, and especially what he styles the temperate region of the Mexican valley, as enjoying the advantages of the colder lands without their inconveniences, and of the hotter without their annoyances;* and he speaks elsewhere of all those countries of the interior, which were the main seats of the population, as blessed with a mild and benign climate, though with occasional, but exceedingly temporary, frost and snow in the months of December, January, and February.

If we turn to Peru, again, we find a still more marked divergence from the physical conditions of the seats of Eastern civilization. The ancient Tahuantinsuyu, the country of the Incas, occupied an elevated table land, now known as the Sierra, raised at a mean height of about twelve thousand feet above the sea-level. Quito, placed at an altitude of nine thousand five hundred feet, stands at one extremity of that immense causeway, assuredly not a useless construction, the work of the old Peruvians, which stretches thence to Cuzco, the original capital of Manco Capac, lying at its other extremity; the latter city being situated at the greater height of eleven thousand three hundred and eighty feet, and thus within four thousand feet of the line of perpetual snow. All the important relics of the people are on this mountain region, and the most extensive are at Cuzco. If Mr. Buckle had chosen to advert

* *Historia Antigua de Megico* (trad. por J. J. de Mora), tomo i, pp. 11, 17.

to the older historians of the Spanish conquerors, he would have found, among the rest, in Augustin de Zarate,* a view widely different from his own of the soil and vegetation, with the personal qualities, habits, &c. of the natives of the table land of Peru; while Francisco de Xeres would have told him how Pizarro and his troops, very naturally, suffered on one occasion from severe cold in that elevated region: "Que en Castillo, no hace maior frio, que en esta Sierra." Where, then, is the resemblance here to the valleys of the Nile and the Ganges, which could justify the allegation of a common causation dependent upon climatic influences? Nor are we more content with the rigid accuracy of many other points in Mr. Buckle's parallel. We have no right, for instance, to speak of the civilization here as possessing that antiquity which should have characterized it, had it been the constrained result of the operation of solely physical causes, such as he has imagined them. It may be impossible to affix an exact date to all those architectural remains in Mexico, from which alone we gather our least doubtful notions of the pristine condition of its people: but, using what authorities we have, we can scarcely assign to the works of the Toltecs at Cholula an age exceeding twelve hundred years; while the city of Mexico is said to have been founded only in 1325, and the great temple to have been completed there by the Aztecs, so late as 1486. In Peru, on the other hand, the records do not pretend to an earlier origin than about from three to four hundred years before the arrival of the Spaniards towards the commencement of the sixteenth century. Nor, further, with reference to those pitiless human sacrifices which Mr. Buckle, in so far justly, denounces as once prevalent, have we the slightest grounds for believing that they were ever practised by the Toltecs, or by their immediate successors the Chichimecos, or that they were perpetrated by even the Aztecs prior to the fourteenth century. The benevolent Las Casas, indeed, assures us that they occurred in a few parts only;† and in Peru, we have many authorities, besides the excellent one of Garcilaso de la Vega,‡ to prove that they were utterly unknown. Thus, of three centres of ancient civilization, selected by Mr. Buckle as identical in their types because dependent upon closely similar physical conditions, the two older were really somewhat analogous in their conditions, yet have differed materially in their development; and the later has been wholly different in its conditions, yet may be admitted to have made a singularly near approach in its development. We might be permitted to refer further, perhaps, to that part of Africa, now the seat of our Cape Colony, which bears nearly the same relation to the Southern, that Egypt bears to the Northern, Tropic; and where there is manifestly no such difference in the soil and climate otherwise, as can explain the immemorial existence of the grovelling debasement of the Hottentot and Bosjeman in the one, and the past magnificence of the realm of Rameses and

* *Historia del Descubrimiento y Conquista de la Provincia del Peru*, lib. i. cap. viii.

† *Controversia entre el Obispo don fray Bartolome de las Casas y el Doctor Gines de Sepulveda*, p. 107. Sevilla, 1552.

‡ *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, lib. i. cap. 8.

Sesostris in the other. In Eastern Asia, again, utilitarian China has its own peculiar, but well marked, discrepancies. With this in part negation, and in part contradiction, we may now judge, therefore, with what special extent of good fortune or caution it is that Mr. Buckle, pointing to these American countries, and referring back to the East, exults, as we have seen, in the wonderful regularity which history presents to our view when comprehensively studied. Desisting even from our impugnement otherwise of the entire accuracy of the materials of his illustrations, we have plainly demonstrated, and in his own fields of research, that what he considers as closely identical forms of civilization may subsist, and have subsisted, under the most widely diverging conditions of soil and climate; while, beyond this, similar conditions of soil and climate have been the seats of the most opposite states of civilization.

As to the author's fourth directing influence, or that of the General Aspects of Nature, we must own that the same necessity occurs to us of impeaching, as well the substantialness as the appropriate quality of certain of the selected illustrations. When the author tells us, for example, that the mountain-scenery of the Tyrol, and, we assume, of the rest of the Alpine districts, has been observed to imbue the minds of the natives with fear and superstition, we begin to wonder if a Hofer has really ever existed; or abandoning, however unwillingly, the story of Tell and his comrades as a myth, we feel constrained to doubt if the proud memories of Morgarten, Sempach, and Murten, where the mailed chivalry of Austria and Burgundy went down before the strokes of the mountaineers of Switzerland, be anything else than a dream. We are inclined to question, with the same kind of uneasiness, whether the country of Calvin, and the home of Beza, can be really of necessity the peculiar seat of superstition; or whether, to retreat to remoter times, the legends of the ancient dalesmen demanded among them a wilder credulity than that of the believers elsewhere in Dis or Teuth, or in Thor and Odin. Again, when, as another and a different illustration of the effects of the grand and terrible in nature, he points to the frequency of earthquakes in Spain and Portugal, and in Italy, as rendering superstition rife, imagination predominant, and intellectual vigour rare, we are compelled to demur on the double ground that destructive earthquakes are neither common nor broadly felt over these countries, and that in Italy, at least, the roll of scientific men has been ever as proud in fame as it has been wide in duration. As to Spain, we have noted that the author, in a prior passage, also further depreciates this country, and then along with Sweden, on the score of the parching summer heat of the one, and the long winter of the other, leading to irregularity of industry, and hence to a generally capricious instability and fickleness of the national character. But Spain, in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella, as well as of their immediate successor, took the lead of Europe in energy and enterprise; and there was little instability of mood in those hardy adventurers in the new Continent, who, to use the words of their historian De Solis, "led to their field of duty a few troops of soldiers, styling them armies, and not without justice, when

we consider at what they aimed and what they accomplished." As to Sweden, though Mr. Buckle's view of the Scandinavian character may be not altogether unjustified, it is at least greatly exaggerated. Europe will not soon forget the audacity and perseverance of the Norse Vikings, and the impression made by their prowess on so many kingdoms; and still less will the achievements of Gustavus Adolphus and his followers, or the scientific glories of a Linnæus and a Berzelius, become speedily an unheeded record. Such a population has been more competently judged by its native historian, Geijer (*Svea Rikes Häfder*), when he shows us, in an eloquent passage which we would willingly give at greater length, that only a hardy, laborious, and intelligent race could maintain its existence among the vales and mountains of Scandinavia, and points to their history as proving the moral strength and buoyancy which their habits of life engender and sustain. Not less strong, or less thoroughly grounded, and therefore not more partial, is the corresponding testimony of writers so judicious as Strinholm and Af Forsell. Dissatisfied with this description of comment, we would gladly have seen, sometimes, that a national memory, or a national character, could have availed itself better with Mr. Buckle against the force of a dogma.

We are not more inclined to agree with our author, that the force of the imagination, comparing, as he does, the manifestations of the intellect of Greece with those of the intellect of India, and accepting both as the criteria for Europe and the East, is stronger in the latter than in the former. On the contrary, the difference, which is a striking one, is to us chiefly one of quality and direction, and not of power or extent; or, if we are to establish the latter kind of gradation between them, it would be certainly to the imagination of Greece that we should assign the superiority. The graceful mythology of the Hellenes, drawing within its range all human passions, all aspirations, and all the more beautiful and striking among natural objects, and striving at an individual conception of the Godhead in each, was infinitely wider and higher in its scope than the mythology of India, and more prodigally and genially inventive in its forms. Nor, in poetry, need we fear to compare the creative genius of a Homer with that of a Kalidasa; while, if the warm East have loved to pour forth its scientific notions in verse, neither have we always wanted here our poet-physicians and our poet-philosophers. But we think our author errs in placing generally the imaginative or inventive faculty in so direct an antagonism with the intellectual or logical one, or at least he errs in applying to an era what may be only true of an individual; for, though the qualities rarely meet in perfection in a single mind, they may, which is more to our purpose, and not seldom do, advance collaterally in the same period of culture. There was no wide interval of time or local position between a Bacon and a Shakespeare, a Milton and a Hobbes, a Newton and a Dryden, a Descartes and a Corneille, a Kant and a Göthe, and many others: and we have imagination enough here to cast into the shade the brightest creations of the East, where much, too, ever verged upon that grotesquely

monstrous, which, if it belong to the fancy, belongs to it only in its lowest manifestation. Claiming, therefore, for Europe a twofold supremacy in this respect over the Asiatic civilization, or a superiority in imagination as well as in intellect, we proceed to consider what has been the effect of this upon the general progress; keeping in view our author's division into a moral and an intellectual progress, as something prospectively different, and his concluding allegation, that the influence of the latter becomes ultimately paramount, and that of the former, zero. In approaching this, and only briefly, as our last topic for remark, we necessarily pass over much besides to which we would willingly have directed more especial attention; just as we have left unsaid much of what crowded upon us with reference to those parts which have been already rapidly surveyed. But Mr. Buckle's themes are so diversified, so widely suggestive, and so uniformly interesting, that we must be constrained to a narrow principle of selection, if we would not extend our comment to the limits of his text.

Our attention is immediately and naturally arrested here by the too absolute separation instituted by the author between the operations of the moral and the intellectual faculties. He scarcely gives us room to suppose that these can be considered as integrant parts of one harmoniously acting mind; or that, if it be indeed possible to conceive the intelligence acting independently of the moral power, as unhappily we may, to conceive the moral power acting independently of the intelligence, is at least utterly impossible. Hence morals, so far from being merely now, as Mr. Buckle maintains, what they have been from all appreciable antiquity, differ not only materially in their diffusion, in as far as they may be confined to the few or extended over the many, but also in their practical range, in as far as they necessarily multiply and complicate themselves with the increasing and intermingling interests and duties of a growing civilization. Throughout this range it is manifest that the rules and principles of morality must be incessantly and necessarily referred to the intellect, which alone can give them an efficient existence; and moral science or art, term it as one will, ranks only as a branch of psychology. In the first stage of society, and therefore in the oldest of all forms of morals, these, so far from being in perfection, will exist in their lowest purity; for the primary individual duty of self-preservation, so immediate as to be peremptory, and so strong as to be instinctive, will then naturally predominate. Indeed, truth and justice being the basis of ethics, while dissimulation is often the necessary element of self-preservation, and force its instrument, it follows that, in the savage, or barbarous, or imperfect states of civilization, morals, in their true sense, can scarcely be said to exist. When duty, however, rises beyond that relating to self, first to include that to family, then to society, then to the state, and lastly to comprehend the relations between one state and another, or when, from merely private, we begin to recognise also social, political, and international duties, if we are still assuredly only within the field of morals, they have become far more pure and expansive; and it is finally nothing more than the art of applying

them which constitutes the basis of our systems of laws, for laws are but morals in action. Once admitting these stages, and their admission is unavoidable, we must admit also an infinitude of gradations between each, ere the paramount and absorbing influence of the first be relinquished, and the happiness of the individual be known and felt in the happiness of the race. It is not, therefore, the bare recognition of moral truths, but the extent of their diffusion at a given period, that tells upon civilization. That the leading axioms were anciently as thoroughly understood by a few as they are now, might be true of a certain era; but it would be ridiculous to assert that they have been always alike prevalently recognised among the people at large, among the doers and not the thinkers, as among the schools of the philosophers. And even now, with our riper civilization, to state that the rules of morality are the same everywhere and at all times, that they are diffused among all with the same unvarying purity, and modified among all by the same qualifications, would be equally opposed to the most obvious realities: and yet all this, and even more than this, would be required to substantiate the extraordinary dogma in the treatise. Thus the few rules of ethics referred to by Mr. Buckle are neither the whole of ethics, nor the first form of ethics. If, on the other hand, for their due practical application the intervention of the intelligence be indispensable, the question as to whether morals or intellect have the greater influence, where both have thus an essential influence, loses all its importance. We have here, as with all mental phenomena, a conjunct, as well as a consecutive, action; and we plainly ought not to separate that arbitrarily, and for the sake of discussion, which we can neither separate in reality, nor even conceive as separated.

Where there is this straining after isolation and precision, to anything but the advantage of precision, in the elaboration of Mr. Buckle's principles, we need not be surprised to find a similar defect in the accuracy of his illustrations. Nothing, to revert to another of his opinions, he tells us, is now known with reference to the relative justice or injustice of wars which has not been known for many centuries; yet, he remarks, till the late hostilities near the Euxine, we had remained at peace for the unparalleled period of nearly forty years; and he advances this as an irrefragable proof of the truth of his argument, that all great progress depends upon the growth of the intelligence. But where has he discovered his fact? If he had referred, indeed, to wars exclusively within the limits of Britain, he might have extended this period to a far wider duration; but if we are to pass beyond these limits, yet still speak only of ourselves, what are we to say of our many wars in India, Burmah, China, Afghanistan, Persia, South Africa, Canada, and elsewhere, all within the last forty years, and all prior to the important contest in the Crimea? Or, if we are to look abroad to the remainder of civilized Europe, what country within the same period has been wholly free from contention, and how many of the greatest capitals have escaped being deluged with blood? If Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna, Venice, Rome,

Dresden, and other cities, have not received any new lights with regard to the moral evils of war, neither, certainly, have they discovered, in the growth of their intelligence, any remarkable amount of those checks to it which Mr. Buckle has so singularly imagined. But on this point we have our own ready comment: that knowledge, as knowledge, is nothing; and that it is knowledge in reciprocal relation to the pure moral principle, and in its broadest practical application, that in such matters alone avails. Even Mr. Buckle admits, as we have seen, that moral principles affect nearly the whole of the actions of the individual, though not in the least, as he subjoins, those of mankind in the aggregate. But the aggregate is nothing more than an association of individuals, at whom, synthetically or analytically, we must begin at first or arrive at last. In history, if the abstract have its curiosity and interest, it is the concrete which has its value and importance. What strange philosophy, then, is this, which attempts the impossible feat of stripping man of his identity, and losing him in the mass? We know the very great value of averages to science, as science; but, even in this respect, we cannot admit that Mr. Buckle has always selected his averages of the best quality, applied to them the necessary corrections, or limited their use to its proper scope. There are myriads of examples, beyond medicine as within medicine, where the general rule must remain subordinate to the individual instance. The very idea of establishing an average infers that of an inequality; and it becomes often of far more importance to ascertain a maximum and a minimum range, than to determine the intermediate expression of either, by constraining the facts into this kind of bed of Procrustes. Thus, if Mr. Buckle had examined more closely one of his selected sources of illustration, the statistics of suicide, he would have found, confessedly imperfect as these are in Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and elsewhere, not a fixed proportion, denoting what he terms a law, but a rapidly ascending ratio, during a little more than the last half-century; and even in London, the discrepancies between the various successive years are greater than suits his leading hypothesis of a compulsory sequence of events, a dogma in other respects, we need hardly add, as old as the Stoical philosophy. But Mr. Buckle manifestly not rarely confounds a law with the fact which would be the product of that law, if it were really established. A law of nature is the constant and regular order through which a cause operates in producing a given category of effects, but the effects are not the law. That certain qualities in marshy districts produce ague is to the physician a law: but the individual marsh is only a condition, which may, or may not, be persistent; and the individual ague is the attendant fact, which resolves itself accordingly. And so with the moral marsh, which may be drained, the moral miasmata, which may be dispelled, and the moral pestilence dissipated: yet here, or in the conversely possible event of the individual man being shielded from its operation, the general law would remain unimpeached; for the fact, we repeat, is not the law. There is a disregard of this vital distinction in most of

our author's illustrations from statistics, on which he founds so zealously. The proportion of crimes, as of suicides, is no fixed or general law, but a resulting fact from certain states of morals, under which, on a narrow view, the semblance of a law is constituted. It changes, however, with changing conditions, and the facts accordingly are modified or disappear.

We shall have had little success, while thus examining and counter-vailing the views of Mr. Buckle, if we have given no indications of what are our own. We have attributed to him, and we think justly, a proneness to a too decided isolation of causes, which can have no independent action; we have shown that he is not exempt from the charge of an omission of certain facts, and a misapprehension or misapplication of others, which suffice to break up certain of his leading categories, and which prove their incompetency to embrace all that he demands from them; and we have, besides, demonstrated the unreasonableness of any attempt to separate the idea of the practical application of morals from the exercise of the intelligence, thus refusing, by implication, to concede to the latter an autocracy of influence with reference to the progress of civilization. We do not deny, because it would be ridiculous to deny, the partial, and usually even very important, agency of climate and soil on the condition of mankind; but we do not admit these to be absolute at any time, just as we cannot admit them, or any other special influences, to be alike persistent through all times, a conclusion which would force us to claim the glories of Nineveh for the hovels of Nebbi Yunus, or to discover, in the Athens of Otho, the intellectual and æsthetic splendours of that of Pericles. So far from ignoring the action of moral causes upon the growth of culture, we see in them rather its main and indispensable condition; because morality infers the laws which regulate the just conduct of human life in the individual and in his relations, and the conduct of human life, so understood, is to us the very essence of civilization. Thus judging, we cannot, moreover, with Mr. Buckle, disjoin the idea of civilization from religion, because nowhere can morals be wholly separated from religion, and in Christianity we encounter them in their widest and purest expression. Nor can we view it apart from Government; because law is, or should be, only morals systematized and enforced: or from literature, because the lowest aspect of this renders it the record, and the highest the minister, of the progress of mankind. We claim for man a free agency, and do not admit that he is the slave of events, further than that he is not endowed with omnipotency: but he can choose at least the means of adapting himself to events, and of selecting his course with reference to them; and that he is possessed of this power is proved not only by his own consciousness, but by the fact that scarcely any two individuals, though placed in the same circumstances, will be found to pursue an identical line of conduct. Thus, as truth is never single, but exists only in its relations, it is to a mixed career of influences that man becomes subjected; and cause and concause, secondary cause and reactive cause, in manifold but not wholly inextricable com-

plexity, make up, with the spirit of intelligence more or less directing through all, the sum of existence in the individual and in society. And as the past, with its instructions, becomes our mirror, throwing its light forward into the darkness of the future, we stretch beyond time to realize more and more closely the conception of our greater and ultimate relations to eternity; a culminating idea, at once so magnificent and so exalting, that his could only be a degraded spirit, and hardened in degradation, who, for the sake of its responsibilities, would forego its grandeur.

In thus concisely summing up our own views, while recording the expression of our partial dissent from those of Mr. Buckle, we remain not the less willing to renew that homage of respect for the general talent and learning of his treatise which we have already justly and cordially offered. We should fail, indeed, in duty to ourselves, if we did not again express the deep gratification we have received from its perusal. An author who discusses, ardently and eloquently, questions of supreme interest to humanity, who frequently carries us with him thoughtfully into far remote tracts of disquisition, or guides us aptly through richly diversified fields of research, and who thus wakens up our resources, giving a stimulus to the mind which is at once animating and healthful, has laid us unquestionably under no common obligation. With all his occasional faults, no one has ever been more successful in adapting the graces of a fervid declamation to the formal phraseology of the abstract sciences, or has given to dialectics a truer inspiration and charm.

We are glad, meanwhile, on every consideration, that Mr. Buckle has seen fit to issue even the introductory part of his work in fragmentary portions. The comments each of these will receive in succession, cannot fail wholly in their influence on what is to follow; and the author will gain from them, at least, a nearer view of the difficulties and objections he must strive to overcome, before he can expect a tolerably wide acquiescence in his doctrines. Should he be enabled to complete his vast design, and to commit it finally to posterity, even though the finished labour should still lie under the exceptional blemishes we have pointed out, thinking men, on the approach of that future which Mr. Buckle honours, and when he himself has become a part of that past which it is his too prevailing spirit to condemn, will doubtless own of him admiringly, that in those days there were giants in the land.